Re: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] Fwd: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes
r rather than Onion Service V3) as at the project discussed. Open Source code needs always to be revised. So the best is doing nothing and not deciding?, then we have all our own soup. The Reflec.Tor in Exit.Nodes makes immediately a strong code basis a Tor-Messenger - and everyone can overtake it or implement it in the own client. As a groupchat server is not coded yet in these three clients, there is no offence and in the opposite it is a gift to have a common sense how to implement groupchat and offline chat and also to have with a Reflec.Tor a Server already provided by Tor-Developers. As said, ieven f five or more exit-operators alreay provide/install an Echo Server on their Exit-IP, then we just have a different port, but in the same minute Tor-Messaging is working reliable with the Spot-On Tor-Messenger and the new standard for a better graph architecture is set. Why then not implementing it for all the exit-nodes and provide also the basis for groupchat for the three hidden-server based Messengers? So the model is less coding (and probably using less funding) by joined forces. Kind regards, Sam Am Mi., 14. Aug. 2024 um 16:04 Uhr schrieb George Hartley via tor-relays < tor-relays@lists.torproject.org>: > Hello, > > Similar to Briar, even developers of such clients above tell the loss of > messages and low reliability of the hidden to hidden path. Some of you > might know, that there were use cases with missing messages in a range of > 35-45 %. > > > Sorry, but this is just not the case from my experience - it may take a > while to fetch the descriptor of the hidden service, but once a TCP > connection is established, aka. the ACK packet has been received, there > should be no problems with packet-loss, this is one of the core features of > TCP: > > Retransmission on various conditions. > > I also hosted a hidden IRC server, as well as a Tor hidden service on my > grandmothers laptop, to be able to SSH in through Tor and troubleshoot > problems. > > Experienced no packet loss, unless a relay in the circuit suddenly went > offline. > > If you want, I can measure packet loss from various locations (Northern > Europe, East Europe, and New York, USA). > > Also, to improve latency and throughput, you could make the server a one > hop hidden server by enabling: > > HiddenServiceSingleHopMode > > > This way the looking up the server is faster, but clients remain anonymous > using a normal 3-hop circuit. > > I don't think we need extra code for this, you could just build your app > using the programming language of your desire and use the existing network. > > That's what I was doing with my ~200 user IRC server, and it worked fine, > even while being hosted at home at a limited uplink of 15 Mbps, which now > got upgraded to 30 Mbps. > > Unfortunately fiber is not an option, so we have to rely on 60+ years old > copper wires maintained by Telecom, I have a quite fancy industrial router > with modem software and capabilities, and we still use VDSL2 17a G.Vector > (ITU G.993.5). > > I do however own a virtual machine machine on my friends colocated server > at DataWagon, they are very exit friendly, zero abuse so far, I believe > they just redirect abuse mails to /dev/null or something.. lol. > > Anyway, point is that I never encountered packet loss, and even if, the > protocol would compensate for it. > > This became kind of a rant while I'm at work, so if it's not that useful, > Im sorry. > > Regards, > George > > On Wednesday, August 14th, 2024 at 9:12 AM, Sam > wrote: > > System wrote via Tor Project :Feedback: > Please submit the proposal also to tor-dev: tor-dev Info PageIntroducing > & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & > Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes > > https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/1e4te8m/introducing_discussing_reflectors_as_concept/ > > ==Introducing > & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & > Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes > > > *Tor-Messaging: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | > Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay |* > > Hello, > > I think this belongs to this core, general, relay topic-forum, as it is > also a development & community issue, request and efford, I post it here > into the reddit forum for your core discussion: > > The idea is to add next to Bridges, Relays and Exit-Nodes also > "Entry-Nodes" as "Reflec-Tor"(s) to the point of Exit-Nodes. Hence: > Exit-Nodes are developed futher to be also an Entry-Node. > > Some may remem
Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes
in combination of Tor-Messaging cover many aspects of these processes and are healing Tor, providing perspectives and need to be welcomed in the bubble, which is mostly done by understanding, cappable and innovative developers with a view more on the architecture and environment rather than the own place to build. An idea could be to really test in practice - as all is there to install and to test out - the speed of incomming messages with ReflecTors in comparison of the Hidden-to-Hidden versions. Kind regards Sam Am Sa., 3. Aug. 2024 um 17:18 Uhr schrieb Landon : > Hello, > > I am a bridge relay operator. > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Fwd: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes
Hello, as tb discussed further with developers of Tor, the concept of "Reflec-Tor"s (and Exit-Nodes to be seen also as an Entry-Node) might have an impact like Snowflakes for Chat and Messaging over Tor and addresses opinions of Relay admins and university research too. Regards -- Forwarded message - Date: Di., 16. Juli 2024 um 20:36 Uhr Subject: Fwd: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes To: System wrote via Tor Project :Feedback: Please submit the proposal also to tor-dev: tor-dev Info PageIntroducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/1e4te8m/introducing_discussing_reflectors_as_concept/ ==Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes *Tor-Messaging: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay |* Hello, I think this belongs to this core, general, relay topic-forum, as it is also a development & community issue, request and efford, I post it here into the reddit forum for your core discussion: The idea is to add next to Bridges, Relays and Exit-Nodes also "Entry-Nodes" as "Reflec-Tor"(s) to the point of Exit-Nodes. Hence: Exit-Nodes are developed futher to be also an Entry-Node. Some may remember when gnutella got hybrid with edonkey and then also with torrent, Mike Stokes from Shareaza did that. The idea today, 20 years later, is to add some Echo-capabilities to Tor in regard of the servers for Exit and Entry. *Vision: Every (updated) Exit-Node is an Echo-Server - For a better Tor-Messaging.* What does that mean? An Echo-Server is a server for chat-messaging to send an incomming message packet again out to all connected clients at the moment. Ping-in and Ping-Out to all. That simple, that's why it is called the Echo. Like a shout in front of a forrest, all connected users can hear and get the (encrypted) shout or message or packet back from the tree wall. There are 3 software applications for Echo-Servers: - https://github.com/textbrowser/spot-on (Desktop, sercer in the Listener Tab) - https://github.com/textbrowser/smokestack (java for Android) - https://github.com/textbrowser/spot-on-lite (headless deamon for Linux) Now, the Listener function with ping in and ping out should be implemented within a Tor-Exit-Node. When it comes to Tor-Messaging, there are some pathes possible: A) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Tor - Internet - Echo-Server - Internet - Tor - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob (Tor-proxied Chat-Server, which only accepts encrypted packets) B) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Echo - Tor - Tor - Echo - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob (Echo Tor-tunneled) C) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Echo-Server - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob (direct connection to Echo-Server with only encypted packets) The request here is to build and develop option A. That is just right now also possible, by an Exit-Node of Tor running the Echo-Server-Software on the same machine in parallel. Just the port is different. This is an idea for some might be new, but thinking Tor Messaging a bit, it comes quickly to this ideas and better soluttion. The way to connect D) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Hidden Onion Server v3 - Tor - Tor - Hidden Onion Server v3 - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob is the current given way for clientes like RicoChet Refresh, Quiet or Cwtch. Similar to Briar, even developers of such clients above tell the loss of messages and low reliability of the hidden to hidden path. Some of you might know, that there were use cases with missing messages in a range of 35-45 %. Don't quote me on that, but as core developers and community members you might be in contact with those who experience this. Furthermore the Messaging clients are not advanced in functionality, nor advanced in strong encryption. It would be third a long development way to got that route. It is cost effective and needs cappable developers. Some project have stamped on and made a workable client, but does that unite all our power in the sense of Tor-Messaging? Messaging needs a Vision and Statement from the Tor-Core-Developer team with a discussion in the community in that regard with honor to the individual projects and also with support for their chosen path (Model D). At the same time we have to state that it is as it is, a HTTP-Server in the middle like in Model A is faster than Model D. In the graph-path the Echo-Server in the middle handles only encrypted traffic, so it is just like another Relay. We can call it "Reflec-Tor". The only sense it to multiply incomming encrypted packets from one node to all connected nodes. With that Idea, the Messenger Spot-On could be used as a Tor-Messenger. This Messenger has stong enc
Re: [tor-relays] Policy Question: Tor Exits at Universities, Corporate Networks, etc
On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 1:05 AM, Mirimir wrote: > Damn, I hadn't considered that :( I guess that I had assumed such > blocking was limited to consumer-level ISPs. Not uplinks in data > centers. This is the case for the UK, yes (it's not actually even all consumer-level ISP's, mine for example does not conform to it). Can't speak for other countries. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Netflix overblocking non-exit Tor relays
Is this now broken / reverted again? I'm getting a "you seem to be using an unblocker or proxy" warning when trying to access Netflix through my US middle relay... On 1 Mar 2016 7:38 pm, "Gero Kuehn" wrote: > > I had an update from Neil Hunt @ Netflix > >> I'm told that we pushed a fix this weekend that should have solved the > problem - lmk > > Things are working again at my end - can anyone else confirm? > > Yes. The feedback to them seems to have worked and the error message is > gone now. > Thanks to everyone who helped to talk them out of this! > > Gero / dc6jgk > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] torworld relays in entry and exit position
Ansible is GPL'd and free of cost - are you possibly looking at Ansible Tower, or something similar? You can find Ansible here: https://github.com/ansible/ansible ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Fw: new message
It's definitely spam, not me. Don't click it. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Exit node situation in Finland
Hi Juha, I'd just like to say great work! I'm sure I speak for everyone when I say I really appreciate the local advocacy and positive vibes you're spreading! Exciting stuff and a good situation to be in! I'm sure Alison and Nima in particular will be very excited about the library stuff! Cheers, Sam On 1 Apr 2016 12:37 p.m., "Nurmi, Juha" wrote: > Greetings Tor Relay mailing list, > > I decided to write little bit about Finnish exit node situation. > > I am maintaining this exit node campaign in Finland: > > http://campaigns.ahmia.fi/finnish-tor-campaign/index_en.html > > In Finland: > > - Running an exit node is absolutely legal > - ISP may cut your connection because it is listed as malware host > - The National Cyber Security Center Finland (NCSC-FI) is able to > "whitelist" your IP address so the ISP does not get those automated malware > detections > - Sebastian Mäki got police visit because his exit node > - The National Bureau of Investigation is using exonerator.torproject.org > so basically they are considering this information before they rush to your > home > - There has been warming up phase that maybe Finnish libraries start some > Tor activity > > I am doing a lot of local advocacy work here :) > > Best, > Juha > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Opt-In Trial: Fallback Directory Mirrors
I'm happy to have ratchet on there: FA3415659444AE006E7E9E5375E82F29700CFDFD Cheers, Sam. On 17 Dec 2015 7:51 p.m., "Kurt Besig" wrote: > On 12/17/2015 6:07 AM, Nick Mathewson wrote: > > TL;DR: Stable non-exit relays can help tor clients use the Tor > > network. Please opt-in! > > > > We want to run a trial of fallback directory mirrors (fallbacks) > > in Tor. Tor clients contact fallbacks to download the consensus > > during initial bootstrap, before they contact the directory > > authorities. > > > > Fallbacks allow Tor to bootstrap in networks that block the Tor > > directory authorities. This allows people to use Tor without > > manually configuring bridges or pluggable transports. > > > > For more information about fallbacks, see: > > > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/FallbackDirectoryMirrors > > > > For this trial, we want to find around 100 stable non-exit relays, > > as exits currently experience high load. > > > > We want relays that expect to be stable for the next 2 years, > > with: > > > > good uptime, the same IP address(es) and port, the same relay > > identity key, good bandwidth and network connectivity. > > > > In December 2015, we created a list of ~400 candidate fallbacks. > > > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/15775/fallback_dirs.inc > > > > If your relay is on this list, and you expect it to be on the same > > IP address(es) and port for at least 2 years, please consider > > opting-in for this trial. (Relays that aren't on the list are > > welcome to opt-in. They will be considered in future releases, or > > if the selection criteria change.) > > > > For the initial fallback release, we will only add your relay if > > you opt in. Please reply on the tor-relays mailing list, if you are > > able. (Opt-ins, opt-outs, and fallbacks chosen for inclusion in > > tor, will be managed using lists in the publicly available tor git > > repository.) > > > > all best wishes, & thanks for running Tor! > > ___ tor-relays mailing > > list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > Relay was down during transition to new VPS, meets all criteria at > this point. Available if needed. > New Fingerprint: 'horizons E65D300F11E1DB12C534B0146BDAB6972F1A8A48' > > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Tor Relay Operators Meetup at 32c3: 28.12. 16:45
This will be my first C3 and tor meetup! Looking forward to meeting everyone there! =) Sam. On 12 Dec 2015 2:58 p.m., "Moritz Bartl" wrote: > As usual: Let's all gather at 32c3 to discuss Tor relay operation! > > Monday, 28.12.2015 > 16:45-18:45 > Hall 13 > > https://events.ccc.de/congress/2015/wiki/Session:Tor_Relay_Operators_Meetup > > See you there! > -- > Moritz Bartl > https://www.torservers.net/ > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather not working?
On Fri, Nov 20, 2015 at 11:30 PM, Moritz Bartl wrote: > We are :-) Yes, the backlog is long, it's all being done manually for > now until someone works on a nicer Weather. Everyone will get a shirt > who matches the requirements. > > Also, our shirts are fair trade organic cotton and we know the producers > and order quite large amounts. One downside is that over time we run out > of some sizes and colors, and also that we have to physically store all > the shirts "somewhere at home". Now imagine your own flat with an extra > 19 boxes of 140kg of shirts. > > Obviously this is not a final solution, we're slowly working on > improving the process, along with all the other things. Is there any way in which those who are willing to help out print / pay for printing / stock / mail out t-shirts / do admin stuff can help? Cheers, Sam. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Ansible repo for setting up relays
Alexander's email about the Puppet module he's putting together has reminded me to send a mail about an ansible repository I use to manage my relays. https://github.com/skottler/tor-ansible is where it lives. Unlike the puppet module, I'm working on getting a whole environment deployment put together. Ultimately (when I get some time) I'll have it stand up all the necessary pieces to securely run (i.e. ssh configuration, user setup, etc) a relay. For now it just installs Tor. Let me know if you've got any questions. Pull requests are all welcome, of course! -s ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] TTTT
Is it necessary to run it by scripts or is it possible to create a exe or dmg file -Original Message- From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of Sebastian Urbach Sent: Sunday, March 2, 2014 2:10 PM To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: [tor-relays] Dear list members, The next big data review regarding the "Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes" project was initiated this week. It will probably take a while (weeks) before we have solid conclusions. We are very close to 100 complete runs from different IP's, in fact 99 right now. I hope that we will reach this goal very soon :-) We are not sure yet if we gathered enough data, but time will tell. We want to thank you for your support and if you want to make sure that we have more data in case the amount we collected turns out to be insufficient, then join us or keep running multiple rounds. Project: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html Results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html I make sure that this list is getting the results from the data review before anyone else. -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach -- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. -- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] "Relay info kit" for Tor exits at universities
On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 4:08 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote: > - Georgia Tech (Dave Dagon) > This is fantastic news, I used to run an exit relay out of my dorm room at Georgia Tech. It was a bit of a pain to get set up initially — ResNET and OIT didn't really understand the concept, but ended up letting me run it. I've been wanting to set something up with the College of Computing or GTRI for a while now, so it's good to see that this is being done. Let me know if you need any help (I'll get in touch with Dave and mention it to him as well). > - We should set up a mailing list for university relay operators to share > experiences and feel solidarity. I'll also encourage them to sign up here. > We might also post a list of university Tor exits somewhere obvious, > so new ones can gain more confidence in the idea. > Both great ideas. Unfortunately I don't have a lot of feedback on these issues except to say that I love the idea, and I'm glad to see that Georgia Tech (which has substantial network resources) will be on board. —Sam -- Sam Whited pub 4096R/EC2C9934 SamWhited.com s...@samwhited.com 404.492.6008 ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Electronic surveillance on major tor exits
On Thu, Jul 26, 2012 at 2:47 PM, mick wrote: > He specifically used the word "traffic". That does not imply shoulder > surfing. I think the original messages point was simply: ``we all know that some people don't use Tor properly." I doubt he is actually sniffing traffic on his relay (or looking over a friend's shoulder). Perhaps not though — I just wouldn't jump to any conclusions. Best, Sam -- Sam Whited pub 4096R/EC2C9934 SamWhited.com s...@samwhited.com 404.492.6008 ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 07/25/2012 12:34 PM, Julian Wissmann wrote: > Please don't forget non profits, like 501(c)3, under which > probably many hackerspaces in the US fall or the german e.V., like > Zwiebelfreunde e.V., who run torservers.net > <http://torservers.net/>. Absolutely! I meant to use LLC's as an example as they are much easier to form than a 501(c)3 exempt organization, but my wording was poor. I intended that to be read, "any company that's not a sole proprietorship." > I disagree again. We're on the verge of cheap,affordable 10GBit > (as in torservers has just gotten an offer for unlimited traffic > 10GBit for $750 with SWIP from a hoster who seems Tor friendly). > This means, that 100mbit is getting cheaper and cheaper, as does > GBit. 100mbit already comes at a price diadvantage compared to > gbit, we don't nead to start on cost-effectiveness of 10mbit, not > to mention that many people in the west could run 10mbit nodes from > home by now. Perhaps you're right; has anyone done any network simulations or run any tests to see what would be better for network latency and/or anonymity (more low-throughput relays, or a few larger relays)? Regardless, I don't think the speed/bandwidth cap (if there is one) should be set too high. In many countries it may be difficult—if not impossible—to run a 10, or even a 1GBit node. As great as lots of 1(0+)GBit nodes would be, we don't want to end up with plenty of nodes in the USA, GB, Germany, etc. and very few elsewhere. Geographic diversity is also extremely important for the project. That being said, if we can get good geographic diversity while only paying for larger nodes it might be more cost-effective. Again, this might need (further?) research. —Sam - -- Sam Whited pub 4096R/EC2C9934 SamWhited.com s...@samwhited.com 404.492.6008 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJQEG4zAAoJEPs5vPfsLJk0PKQP/1SCo+pEcJDFWx/cy8riGYiA mFGHiwRUrDRVVzjW/GsjnVT6oWyo0U0RL2/bzN+lh2I7xohgeKT15SFul4E5cjmG qIuRl7zpBHhKckJLwIcksuHgiaFVXmjZxWP1nET4uCYF+yw+4rT8EyXeW+3VnQJ9 nCfsa79cjqFcPo06wy6UOKVvhTja+/rBKBBM13tJmZAbgTUtm6yBCpn919x6YXzM g6rnltUvVdJWLjxj0hzkfL1WS2wXog58M7OA+WEXtW6/0aD+g5Q4hqcQtp/e1Vz+ oheb9KZvyvG9WU96vXwTc6Sc7jCN77MT5+rgJdzS5iPQfIZTFTHGgk6LNV68KkQq m344O+YUhE79/8C8c3oziU5t3JDl64CCOakI6dqKv0PfrSi6qlvnjsg1E60MsDzB 6FzYqAC3h4l3Yjw4lGkbJRRPOwYqPjjz+Z/ux+e9gxo1Bs+d5hx+Ik9iFAU9GZz8 uWfqIAps5UDYNENNrVNkkQUL6847R0EpVOoqNRuoNMdw6h35s+JjJdkK6Bt9eZiF ZgpgOC1PZMmPIb4/P23BVC8hI3lTGKvivX/bLX9AHfEUnxs5tDD7vu6bEU8rPkg4 3Oo2+6aJQXrVANM1xFfQn0PPdACKX39kstDCoEbO4dnQm/VmahbvWj4WGmgm7Uor TdSzx8ckEtdiaq0qr/v6 =CFjY -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays
On Mon, Jul 23, 2012 at 2:58 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote: > Open questions we need to decide about: > > 1) What exactly would we pay for? > As you said, reimbursing users for hosting is probably the best idea here, however, we also don't want to get in the situation where users feel that they _must_ be reimbursed to run an exit relay. What happens if the sponsors funding dries up in a year and no one wants to donate bandwidth anymore? Perhaps only registered companies should be sponsored — as much as I hate to limit the scope of the project, I think this (might) prevent abuse to a certain extent. Individuals who wanted to run an exit relay of their own could still do so, they would just have to use some of the money to form an LLC (or whatever their countries equivalent is if the scope of this project extends outside of the US). This gives them a bit more of an incentive to separate their Tor node form their personal server/computing resources (in the form of limited liability), which they should probably be doing anyways. > I think we should aim to constrain ourselves to talking about >=100mbit > exits > I disagree; as others have said, lots of 10mbit relays will do as much for the network as a few 100mbit relays. Most peoples use case is simply checking email, browsing the web, reading news, etc. which don't necessarily need a huge 100mbit relay. > 2) Should we fund existing relays or new ones? > It's probably not wise to distinguish between the two. If you only fund new relays, you may see a lot of old relays shut down (and then restarted as "new relays" to get funding). So you might as well just sponsor both. More thoughts on this in a bit. > - Should we prefer big collectives like torservers, noisetor, CCC, > dfri.se, and riseup (which can get great bulk rates on bandwidth and are > big enough to have relationships with local lawyers and ISPs), or should > we prefer individuals since they maximize our operator diversity? I think > "explore both approaches" is a fine first plan. > "Explore both approaches" sounds good; I think we'll find that operator diversity leads to a healthier (more anonymous) network. Again, I lean towards small guys that will run a few nodes at different data centers, but not Sole proprietorship's. > - For existing relays who pay for hosting… Picking a certain monthly transfer target might solve this; so existing relays that are fast could apply for aid, and it would give slower relays incentive to speed up. The challenge then becomes, where do we set this cutoff? I'm inclined to think it could be kept relatively low and still be very beneficial for the network. > the Tor network must not end up > addicted to external funding. So long as everybody is running an exit > relay because they want to save the world, I think we should be fine. > This is the core of the entire discussion. We might also consider only funding relays in areas where we need the diversity by taking into account… > There's network diversity (AS / upstream network topology), organization > and operator diversity, jurisdictional (country) diversity, funding > diversity, data-center diversity, and more. > …this stuff. > > 7) How do we audit / track the sponsored relays? > > How should we check that your 100mbit relay is really working? What do > we measure to confirm its capacity? To a first approximation I'm fine > assuming that nobody is going to try to cheat (say, by colluding with > an ISP to write legit-looking invoices but then just split the money). > Probably better to monitor this carefully from the get-go. Sponsors like to know where their money is going, and continued funding could hinge on it. > Then I'll send individual emails to exit relay operators pointing them > to it and asking for their feedback > Consider asking some of the faster / more stable non-exit relay operators as well. Many of these folks (myself included) have run an exit relay at one point or another and stopped—or want to run an exit but won't—because of the financial burden, or because of legal ramifications, etc. Some of them might want to run an exit relay, or change their existing nodes to exit relays if they could only get a bit of funding to help cover bandwidth and separate their personal resources / business from their exit node(s) (via a new server, or a separate business entity, etc.) Best, Sam -- Sam Whited pub 4096R/EC2C9934 SamWhited.com s...@samwhited.com 404.492.6008 ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
