Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-10 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 04:13:00PM -0800, Nelson wrote:

 I do believe there is a benefit to Torrents as many of us can attest to,
 ex: fast downloads of different Linux distros; but if your use of
 Torrents is in fact legit then why use Tor for downloading your legal
 content in the first place? This doesn't pass the smell test. As I

Sniff harder. You forgot about targeted attacks. The exits can be
as malicious as the wider Internet, but unlike the wider Internet
they don't know you from Adam. 

 understand it downloading from a P2P site on Tor is not a smart thing to
 do in the first place, if you're downloading illegal content, so why do
 it? Doesn't make sense. People can't claim ignorance that they didn't
 know that Tor does not protect their identity online when using P2P sites.
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-05 Thread gq
Access to tails does not depend on any specific transfer protocol such 
as torrents correct?


Could it not be made available on a hidden service, a website. an email 
or ftp server within tor?






On 11/4/2013 11:45 PM, Nelson wrote:

 From all that I have read in these lists not all exit nodes are
configured exactly the same, so some level of traffic control is being
rightly exercised by the operator(s). For any given reason be it moral,
ethical or legal many well known ports are being blocked, as was
previously discussed, as an example by setting up a white-listing
config rather than blacklisting, and these white-listed ports exclude
known ports used by Torrent sites. The choice to configure the exit node
should be left to the operator based on their own legitimate preference
and criteria.

The argument to what if is indeed relative to the level of control and
access to legitimate torrents such as Tails, and therefore any
argument against freedom of access to legitimate content defeats the
purpose of Tor. This is not really an issue. I'll ask a stupid question:
what comes first, the chicken or the egg? If you have access to Tor
client in the first place and want to download Tails, where's the problem?

..and if you don't have Tor client installed in the first place, where
do you get it, so they (mel gibson quote) don't know

On 11/4/2013 5:23 PM, Kevin C. Krinke wrote:

On Nov 4, 2013, at 7:13 PM, Nelson nel...@net2wireless.net
mailto:nel...@net2wireless.net wrote:

I do believe there is a benefit to Torrents as many of us can attest to,
ex: fast downloads of different Linux distros; but if your use of
Torrents is in fact legit then why use Tor for downloading your legal
content in the first place? This doesn't pass the smell test.

What about someone in a highly censored locale that wants to download a
copy of Tails or TBB without them knowing?


+1 for restricting bandwidth

For the record, my exit node does limit the ports as per the reduced
exit policy [1] and I'd happily open it up wide if I could throttle just
the torrenting to a minimally-usable level. However, I honestly don't
think it's realistic to spend so much effort to solve the throttling of
torrents when those efforts could be better spent elsewhere [2].

Just my 0.002BTC

Cheers!

--
Kevin C. Krinke ke...@krinke.ca mailto:ke...@krinke.ca
GnuPG - 851662D2 - 0x18C67F61851662D2
http://kevin.c.krinke.ca/851662D2.asc


[1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy

[2] No idea what would be better deserving but I'm sure there's plenty
of work in Tor-project-land that doesn't involve throttling hard-target
services.


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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-05 Thread Gordon Morehouse
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

gq:
 Access to tails does not depend on any specific transfer protocol
 such as torrents correct?
 
 Could it not be made available on a hidden service, a website. an
 email or ftp server within tor?

An http hidden service with the .onion link in Tor docs might be an
obvious choice.

 
 On 11/4/2013 11:45 PM, Nelson wrote:
 From all that I have read in these lists not all exit nodes are 
 configured exactly the same, so some level of traffic control is
 being rightly exercised by the operator(s). For any given reason
 be it moral, ethical or legal many well known ports are being
 blocked, as was previously discussed, as an example by setting up
 a white-listing config rather than blacklisting, and these
 white-listed ports exclude known ports used by Torrent sites. The
 choice to configure the exit node should be left to the operator
 based on their own legitimate preference and criteria.
 
 The argument to what if is indeed relative to the level of
 control and access to legitimate torrents such as Tails, and
 therefore any argument against freedom of access to legitimate
 content defeats the purpose of Tor. This is not really an issue.
 I'll ask a stupid question: what comes first, the chicken or the
 egg? If you have access to Tor client in the first place and
 want to download Tails, where's the problem?
 
 ..and if you don't have Tor client installed in the first place,
 where do you get it, so they (mel gibson quote) don't know
 
 On 11/4/2013 5:23 PM, Kevin C. Krinke wrote:
 On Nov 4, 2013, at 7:13 PM, Nelson nel...@net2wireless.net 
 mailto:nel...@net2wireless.net wrote:
 
 I do believe there is a benefit to Torrents as many of us can
 attest to, ex: fast downloads of different Linux distros; but
 if your use of Torrents is in fact legit then why use Tor for
 downloading your legal content in the first place? This
 doesn't pass the smell test.
 What about someone in a highly censored locale that wants to
 download a copy of Tails or TBB without them knowing?
 
 +1 for restricting bandwidth
 For the record, my exit node does limit the ports as per the
 reduced exit policy [1] and I'd happily open it up wide if I
 could throttle just the torrenting to a minimally-usable level.
 However, I honestly don't think it's realistic to spend so much
 effort to solve the throttling of torrents when those efforts
 could be better spent elsewhere [2].
 
 Just my 0.002BTC
 
 Cheers!
 
 -- Kevin C. Krinke ke...@krinke.ca mailto:ke...@krinke.ca 
 GnuPG - 851662D2 - 0x18C67F61851662D2 
 http://kevin.c.krinke.ca/851662D2.asc
 
 
 [1]
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy


 
[2] No idea what would be better deserving but I'm sure there's plenty
 of work in Tor-project-land that doesn't involve throttling
 hard-target services.
 
 
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-04 Thread Gordon Morehouse
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Hash: SHA512

Lukas Erlacher:
 your refusal to pay for content people create.
 
 That's a silly smear.

If an endless tsunami of torrent traffic makes it so Tor users can't
buy music off bandcamp - a site where the artist gets the lion's
share, and where some small indie artists are getting enough to wait
tables 32 hours a week instead of 40, and thus spend 8 more hours a
week on music - is that a problem?

 not related to tor
 
 That's just plain silly.

Not as silly as you think, but the outright blocking vs finding ways
to throttle is more a discussion worth having.  I suspect most of the
Silent Majority(tm), if polled, would rather throttle than block.

I *swear* there was a paper on this other than the 2009 one I posted
the other day.

Best,
- -Gordon M.

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-04 Thread Gordon Morehouse
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Hash: SHA512

Lukas Erlacher:
 Let me chime in here in regards to torrents to be perhaps not the 
 devil's, but the radical's advocate.

A lot of the people wishing to handle bittorrent are aware of these
arguments and may not wish to block it so much as throttle the hell
out of it.

And thus we find ourselves sort of considering to act like Comcast,
except in a good-faith defense of our network.  m(

 I'm sure everyone here will agree that a good case can be made
 that copyright laws as they stand today are a perversion of, and 
 counter-productive to, their original stated intention of
 advancement of the arts and sciences, and just as leaking secret
 information and evidence of wrongdoing is a protest and defense
 against governments that try to hinder freedom and transparency, so
 is distributing copyrighted cultural goods a protest and defense
 against content industries (that are often justifiably compared to
 criminal organisations (MAFIAA) due to their frequently corrupt
 and abusive conduct) that attempt to censor culture in order to
 excise maximum profit from it. Cultural goods that should be
 preserved and made available to everyone rot away every day because
 they were not allowed to be preserved and distributed.

Yes, and I'd actually love to see a sort of 'Torrent Library of
Congress' bots that downloads stuff from various trackers in order of
lowest # of seeds, so it doesn't vanish.  One of my many ideas I'll
never have time to do until I'm 80.

 Do not indict torrents because it's all movies and porn of
 horrible quality - that is defamation. The hollywood movies and
 the porn may not have much cultural value, but who is the arbiter
 of what cultural value is? And even if it was found unanimously
 that porn does not concern culture (hah!), then for every TB of
 porn and hollywood shite you block, there are Megabytes of bona
 fide culture liberated from the shackles of copyright that you
 throw to the wolves, saying it's just torrents. And doesn't
 wikileaks use mostly torrents for distributing their releases?

Yes, yes and yes, but I would vastly prefer if Little Bobby Torrents
from Schenectady downloading the testament to American culture that is
Bang Bus 32 didn't impact the bandwidth of people trying to use Tor
to get important information around.  Yeah, I just made a judgement
about relative quality of information there, and that's ... okay.  See
http://radioornot.com/site/?p=5181

 When you block torrenting, you're making a decision to censor 
 information and speech based on it being done using a method that
 is predominantly used for illegitimate, illegal activity; in
 that case, why not shutter Tor entirely? We all know it's mainly
 used by fraudsters and other criminals, and right now at this time
 we know that 80% of Tor clients are zombies from a botnet.

Who said anything about blocking?  Maybe others.  I'd prefer
throttling.  There are many legitimate uses for torrents.  Throttling,
maybe based on amount of data transferred (if that could ever be known
at the edge(s) of the Tor network) is a better, though not perfect
solution.

 Censor torrents because your provider will shut you down if you 
 generate DMCA complaints and CD's; censor them because you truly 
 believe that the torrents are a necessary sacrifice to allow the
 Tor network to continue to function; don't censor them because they
 don't contain worthwhile speech that deserves to be protected.

Not trying to censor anything, personally, not that I run an exit node
(yet).

Best,
- -Gordon M.

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-04 Thread Paul Syverson
On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 08:18:29AM -0800, Gordon Morehouse wrote:
[snip]
  
  That's just plain silly.
 
 Not as silly as you think, but the outright blocking vs finding ways
 to throttle is more a discussion worth having.  I suspect most of the
 Silent Majority(tm), if polled, would rather throttle than block.
 
 I *swear* there was a paper on this other than the 2009 one I posted
 the other day.
 

Are you perhaps thinking of Throttling Tor Bandwidth Parasites?
Available at http://www.syverson.org/ or
http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~jansen/publications.shtml

Throttling is tricky and not a panacea. This is noted in the
above paper and analyzed in some detail in
How Low Can You Go: Balancing Performance with Anonymity in Tor,
also available at 
http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~jansen/publications.shtml

aloha,
Paul
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-04 Thread Gordon Morehouse
On Mon, 4 Nov 2013 14:38:40 -0500, Paul Syverson paul.syver...@nrl.navy.mil 
wrote:

 On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 08:18:29AM -0800, Gordon Morehouse wrote:
 [snip]
   
   That's just plain silly.
  
  Not as silly as you think, but the outright blocking vs finding ways
  to throttle is more a discussion worth having.  I suspect most of the
  Silent Majority(tm), if polled, would rather throttle than block.
  
  I *swear* there was a paper on this other than the 2009 one I posted
  the other day.
  
 
 Are you perhaps thinking of Throttling Tor Bandwidth Parasites?
 Available at http://www.syverson.org/ or
 http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~jansen/publications.shtml

That's one of them, here are a couple sources of information on throttling 
bandwidth hogs:

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problem-adaptive-throttling-tor-clients-entry-guards

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9368

 Throttling is tricky and not a panacea. This is noted in the
 above paper and analyzed in some detail in
 How Low Can You Go: Balancing Performance with Anonymity in Tor,
 also available at 
 http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~jansen/publications.shtml

Indeed. I suspect it's also better than doing nothing, and better than any 
attempt to block certain types of traffic altogether.

Thanks!
-Gordon M.
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-04 Thread Gordon Morehouse
On Sat, 02 Nov 2013 21:58:57 +, Paritesh Boyeyoko parity@gmail.com 
wrote:

 On Friday 01 Nov 2013 14:39:28 Gordon Morehouse wrote:
 
  Completely aside from the ethical and censorship-related buzzsaw you're
  about to run into for posting this (perennial) question, I believe some
  actual developers on Tor have written a paper about the problems with
  Bittorrent et al (and I think there's a more specific one than the Why Tor
  Is Slow[1] paper) but I can't currently find it.  Anybody know?
  
  1. 
  https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/roadmaps/2009-03-11-performance.pdf
  
  NB: the above paper is from 2009.
 
 I've just had a quick scan of that paper and it makes for an interesting 
 read. 
 :)  I'm going to go away and read it properly but a couple observations.

Here are some more links:

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9368

http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~jansen/papers/throttling-sec2012.pdf

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problem-adaptive-throttling-tor-clients-entry-guards

Finally found em just as another user brought some of them back to my 
attention.  :)

Best,
-Gordon M.
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-04 Thread Nelson
My main concern, and the reason I asked about blocking specific traffic
(ip's from blacklisted p2p sites), is mainly due to the problem the
original poster faces with DMCA; abuse complaints and the possibility of
being shutdown. No one wants to volunteer a service and then face legal
issues. Who in the hell wants or needs the headache?

That being said I can see that the original poster's issue has raised
much needed debate, and a few ideas that I was not personally aware of
that I believe can help everyone contribute to the Tor network in a more
effective and safe manner.

In my opinion if a well intentioned Tor contributor has no other
choice but to shutdown his exit node due to legal threats and
restrictions primarily based on P2P abuse, then this will be just
another reason why Tor is frowned upon and people just don't want to
deal with legal issues. A lot more can be done to emphasize to do the
right thing and then somehow shape public opinion on the issues of
the necessity of Privacy/Anonymity in light of the NSA's (and friends')
abusive and unconstitutional activities and how the Tor network as
another tool can effectively help keep people secure while online.

I do believe there is a benefit to Torrents as many of us can attest to,
ex: fast downloads of different Linux distros; but if your use of
Torrents is in fact legit then why use Tor for downloading your legal
content in the first place? This doesn't pass the smell test. As I
understand it downloading from a P2P site on Tor is not a smart thing to
do in the first place, if you're downloading illegal content, so why do
it? Doesn't make sense. People can't claim ignorance that they didn't
know that Tor does not protect their identity online when using P2P sites.

But the ones who get clobbered day-in and day-out because of the
ignorant few are the Tor operators who contribute ($$$) substantially
for everyone's right to freedom and privacy online. I think this act
alone should be respected.

+1 for restricting bandwidth

On 11/4/2013 1:41 PM, Gordon Morehouse wrote:
 On Sat, 02 Nov 2013 21:58:57 +, Paritesh Boyeyoko parity@gmail.com 
 wrote:
 
 On Friday 01 Nov 2013 14:39:28 Gordon Morehouse wrote:

 Completely aside from the ethical and censorship-related buzzsaw you're
 about to run into for posting this (perennial) question, I believe some
 actual developers on Tor have written a paper about the problems with
 Bittorrent et al (and I think there's a more specific one than the Why Tor
 Is Slow[1] paper) but I can't currently find it.  Anybody know?

 1. 
 https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/roadmaps/2009-03-11-performance.pdf

 NB: the above paper is from 2009.

 I've just had a quick scan of that paper and it makes for an interesting 
 read. 
 :)  I'm going to go away and read it properly but a couple observations.
 
 Here are some more links:
 
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9368
 
 http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~jansen/papers/throttling-sec2012.pdf
 
 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problem-adaptive-throttling-tor-clients-entry-guards
 
 Finally found em just as another user brought some of them back to my 
 attention.  :)
 
 Best,
 -Gordon M.
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-04 Thread Kevin C. Krinke

 On Nov 4, 2013, at 7:13 PM, Nelson nel...@net2wireless.net wrote:
 
 I do believe there is a benefit to Torrents as many of us can attest to,
 ex: fast downloads of different Linux distros; but if your use of
 Torrents is in fact legit then why use Tor for downloading your legal
 content in the first place? This doesn't pass the smell test.

What about someone in a highly censored locale that wants to download a copy of 
Tails or TBB without them knowing?

 +1 for restricting bandwidth

For the record, my exit node does limit the ports as per the reduced exit 
policy [1] and I'd happily open it up wide if I could throttle just the 
torrenting to a minimally-usable level. However, I honestly don't think it's 
realistic to spend so much effort to solve the throttling of torrents when 
those efforts could be better spent elsewhere [2].

Just my 0.002BTC

Cheers!

-- 
Kevin C. Krinke ke...@krinke.ca
GnuPG - 851662D2 - 0x18C67F61851662D2
http://kevin.c.krinke.ca/851662D2.asc


[1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy

[2] No idea what would be better deserving but I'm sure there's plenty of work 
in Tor-project-land that doesn't involve throttling hard-target services.___
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-04 Thread Nelson
From all that I have read in these lists not all exit nodes are
configured exactly the same, so some level of traffic control is being
rightly exercised by the operator(s). For any given reason be it moral,
ethical or legal many well known ports are being blocked, as was
previously discussed, as an example by setting up a white-listing
config rather than blacklisting, and these white-listed ports exclude
known ports used by Torrent sites. The choice to configure the exit node
should be left to the operator based on their own legitimate preference
and criteria.

The argument to what if is indeed relative to the level of control and
access to legitimate torrents such as Tails, and therefore any
argument against freedom of access to legitimate content defeats the
purpose of Tor. This is not really an issue. I'll ask a stupid question:
what comes first, the chicken or the egg? If you have access to Tor
client in the first place and want to download Tails, where's the problem?

..and if you don't have Tor client installed in the first place, where
do you get it, so they (mel gibson quote) don't know.

On 11/4/2013 5:23 PM, Kevin C. Krinke wrote:
 
 On Nov 4, 2013, at 7:13 PM, Nelson nel...@net2wireless.net
 mailto:nel...@net2wireless.net wrote:

 I do believe there is a benefit to Torrents as many of us can attest to,
 ex: fast downloads of different Linux distros; but if your use of
 Torrents is in fact legit then why use Tor for downloading your legal
 content in the first place? This doesn't pass the smell test.
 
 What about someone in a highly censored locale that wants to download a
 copy of Tails or TBB without them knowing?
 
 +1 for restricting bandwidth
 
 For the record, my exit node does limit the ports as per the reduced
 exit policy [1] and I'd happily open it up wide if I could throttle just
 the torrenting to a minimally-usable level. However, I honestly don't
 think it's realistic to spend so much effort to solve the throttling of
 torrents when those efforts could be better spent elsewhere [2].
 
 Just my 0.002BTC
 
 Cheers!
 
 -- 
 Kevin C. Krinke ke...@krinke.ca mailto:ke...@krinke.ca
 GnuPG - 851662D2 - 0x18C67F61851662D2
 http://kevin.c.krinke.ca/851662D2.asc
 
 
 [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy
 
 [2] No idea what would be better deserving but I'm sure there's plenty
 of work in Tor-project-land that doesn't involve throttling hard-target
 services.
 
 
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-03 Thread Moritz Bartl
On 11/03/2013 03:30 AM, t...@tafb.xxx wrote:
 I'm new to running a relay. There are lots of exit policies when I 
 look at my atlas details:

https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/DDB401F4CA108C6F6AF4E0DCE2DFC3407F577B21
 Is this a pretty good exit policy list to prevent harassment from my ISP?

Where did you copy that policy from? Your relay allows traffic to exit
from your relay on most ports, and uses a blacklist approach. It's not a
bad policy to test your ISP, but you might need to further reduce the
number of allowed ports in case of complaints in the future. A more
conservative approach would be whitelisting, ie. only allow specific
ports while blocking all others. The reduced exit policy is such a
whitelist.

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy

Considering that you run your relay from what looks like a residential
(home) connection, you might want to further reduce the number of
allowed ports.

Thank you for running an exit relay!

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-03 Thread Gordon Morehouse
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Paritesh Boyeyoko:
 On Friday 01 Nov 2013 14:39:28 Gordon Morehouse wrote:
 
 Completely aside from the ethical and censorship-related buzzsaw
 you're about to run into for posting this (perennial) question, I
 believe some actual developers on Tor have written a paper about
 the problems with Bittorrent et al (and I think there's a more
 specific one than the Why Tor Is Slow[1] paper) but I can't
 currently find it.  Anybody know?
 
 1. 
 https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/roadmaps/2009-03-11-performance.pdf


 
NB: the above paper is from 2009.
 
 I've just had a quick scan of that paper and it makes for an
 interesting read. :)  I'm going to go away and read it properly but
 a couple observations.

And I swear there's a more bittorrent-specific paper but I can't find it.

 2.3 Throttle certain protocols at the client side I agree this is
 not a good idea BUT it sparked off another idea in my head.  In 
 order to get better utilisation of slower relays, would it be worth
  introducing a behaviour whereby slow circuits are deliberately
 built for low volume traffic?
 
 For example, sending email and IM messages doesn't (usually)
 require a huge amount of bandwidth, so when the Tor client detects
 that a user wants to send/receive data on certain slow ports such
 as POP3, IMAP4, MSA and Jabber it deliberately builds a slow
 circuit to handle that traffic.  Obviously it would have to be port
 based, but since people tend to send data on well-known ports, it
 shouldn't be an issue.

That might have at least been thought about, but it's a good idea.
It'd also help with better allocating bandwidth offered by slow or
fast but at the bottom end nodes, which I've seen devs in here say
they are well aware is not optimally allocated.

 
 I think this would play well with the circuit-bonding work here
 
 http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#pets13-splitting
 
 
 3.1.2 Better Support for relay operators This caught my eye: We
 lose relays when the operator reboots and forgets to set up the
 relay to start on boot.  Does installing the .deb package (for 
 example) not configure Tor to start on boot, in the same way that
 Apache would be?  I ask because I haven't rebooted my VPS yet. :p

I've not seen this with .debs, but Windows?  If so, maybe the restart
on reboot? dialog - if there is one, and not a hidden checkbox -
should be front and center when opting to relay traffic.

 3.1.3  Facebook app to show off your relay I liked this bit:
 Opportunities for expansion include allowing relay operators to
 form “teams”, and for these teams to be ranked on the contribution
 to the network. (Real world examples here include the SETI 
 screensaver and the MD5 hash crack challenges.)

I'd go for an embeddable badge, first.  Then maybe a Facebook app.
It's only a hunch, but I think we'd get a lot more mileage out of an
embeddable badge (for web sites, tumblr, and anything else tumblr-like
that allows embedding) than out of a Facebook app, though if there
were time, money and spoons[1] to do both, I'd certainly do both with
the Facebook thing coming second.  Well, maybe.  Nobody should be on
Facebook, least of all anybody who is running Tor for the right
reasons, but we have reality to contend with here.

My hunch is based on demographics, BTW. :P

 What would be really interesting would be to find sponsors (read:
 hosters) willing to put their name to it and gain/risk some
 publicity.

Start by asking XMission, GANDI and maybe even (though they don't do
VPS) NearlyFreeSpeech.net if this ever happens.  Also, dig back into
news articles about industry response to the NSA wiping its butt with
the Fourth Amendment, and see which VPS providers were yelling the
loudest, especially the mom-n-pop to mid-tier providers.  $.02.

Best,
- -Gordon M.

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-03 Thread tor
On 11/03/2013 at 6:51 AM, Moritz Bartl wrote:
 Where did you copy that policy from?

It is the default policy that was installed with Vidalia.

 A more conservative approach would be whitelisting, ie. Only
 allow specific ports while blocking all others. The reduced
 exit policy is such a whitelist.

Thanks for the link, I have implemented that reduced exit policy.

 Considering that you run your relay from what looks like a
 residential (home) connection, you might want to further
 reduce the number of allowed ports.

It is indeed a residential connection :) Pretty decent speeds,
unlimited bandwidth:
http://www.speedtest.net/result/3001260636.png

 Thank you for running an exit relay!

I wasn't using my connection for much of anything else and after reading
about Tor in the Snowden files I figured I'd better contribute!

-Jamie M.

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-03 Thread Lukas Erlacher
Let me chime in here in regards to torrents to be perhaps not the
devil's, but the radical's advocate.

I'm sure everyone here will agree that a good case can be made that
copyright laws as they stand today are a perversion of, and
counter-productive to, their original stated intention of advancement
of the arts and sciences, and just as leaking secret information and
evidence of wrongdoing is a protest and defense against governments
that try to hinder freedom and transparency, so is distributing
copyrighted cultural goods a protest and defense against content
industries (that are often justifiably compared to criminal
organisations (MAFIAA) due to their frequently corrupt and abusive
conduct) that attempt to censor culture in order to excise maximum
profit from it. Cultural goods that should be preserved and made
available to everyone rot away every day because they were not allowed
to be preserved and distributed.

Do not indict torrents because it's all movies and porn of horrible
quality - that is defamation. The hollywood movies and the porn may
not have much cultural value, but who is the arbiter of what
cultural value is? And even if it was found unanimously that porn
does not concern culture (hah!), then for every TB of porn and
hollywood shite you block, there are Megabytes of bona fide culture
liberated from the shackles of copyright that you throw to the wolves,
saying it's just torrents.
And doesn't wikileaks use mostly torrents for distributing their releases?

When you block torrenting, you're making a decision to censor
information and speech based on it being done using a method that is
predominantly used for illegitimate, illegal activity; in that
case, why not shutter Tor entirely? We all know it's mainly used by
fraudsters and other criminals, and right now at this time we know
that 80% of Tor clients are zombies from a botnet.

Censor torrents because your provider will shut you down if you
generate DMCA complaints and CD's; censor them because you truly
believe that the torrents are a necessary sacrifice to allow the Tor
network to continue to function; don't censor them because they don't
contain worthwhile speech that deserves to be protected.
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-03 Thread ramo
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

I don't think this is the right place for you to try and justify your refusal 
to pay for content people create. I think most people on this list would prefer 
you keep political opinions not related to tor off list.

Cheers

Ramo

On Sun, Nov 03, 2013 at 11:50:58PM +0100, Lukas Erlacher wrote:
 Let me chime in here in regards to torrents to be perhaps not the
 devil's, but the radical's advocate.
 
 I'm sure everyone here will agree that a good case can be made that
 copyright laws as they stand today are a perversion of, and
 counter-productive to, their original stated intention of advancement
 of the arts and sciences, and just as leaking secret information and
 evidence of wrongdoing is a protest and defense against governments
 that try to hinder freedom and transparency, so is distributing
 copyrighted cultural goods a protest and defense against content
 industries (that are often justifiably compared to criminal
 organisations (MAFIAA) due to their frequently corrupt and abusive
 conduct) that attempt to censor culture in order to excise maximum
 profit from it. Cultural goods that should be preserved and made
 available to everyone rot away every day because they were not allowed
 to be preserved and distributed.
 
 Do not indict torrents because it's all movies and porn of horrible
 quality - that is defamation. The hollywood movies and the porn may
 not have much cultural value, but who is the arbiter of what
 cultural value is? And even if it was found unanimously that porn
 does not concern culture (hah!), then for every TB of porn and
 hollywood shite you block, there are Megabytes of bona fide culture
 liberated from the shackles of copyright that you throw to the wolves,
 saying it's just torrents.
 And doesn't wikileaks use mostly torrents for distributing their releases?
 
 When you block torrenting, you're making a decision to censor
 information and speech based on it being done using a method that is
 predominantly used for illegitimate, illegal activity; in that
 case, why not shutter Tor entirely? We all know it's mainly used by
 fraudsters and other criminals, and right now at this time we know
 that 80% of Tor clients are zombies from a botnet.
 
 Censor torrents because your provider will shut you down if you
 generate DMCA complaints and CD's; censor them because you truly
 believe that the torrents are a necessary sacrifice to allow the Tor
 network to continue to function; don't censor them because they don't
 contain worthwhile speech that deserves to be protected.
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-03 Thread Lukas Erlacher
 your refusal to pay for content people create.

That's a silly smear.

 not related to tor

That's just plain silly.

Did you really enter this thread just to flame? That's also silly.
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-02 Thread Moritz Bartl
On 11/02/2013 01:15 PM, Paritesh Boyeyoko wrote:
 Publication of sample exit policies?  Would that encourage exit node 
 operators 
 to run restricted exit policies, and save themselves loads of bandwidth and 
 DMCA headache?
 Is there a forum where one can put up a sticky post with sample exit policies 
 so that operators can simply cut and paste them into their setups?

There's
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy ,
but you probably know that one?

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-02 Thread Paritesh Boyeyoko
On Friday 01 Nov 2013 20:02:29 Gordon Morehouse wrote:

 
 What if someone inside a totalitarian state is attempting to upload
 evidence of a massacre to a service which runs on port 80?

Yeah, I did think of this but I thought I'd put it out there anyway. 
Unfortunately, too many sites/services don't use SSL.  Well, it's a no-no.

 I'd love to get the bandwidth back from the 16 year olds downloading
 movies and terrible porn over Tor, too, but this won't fly, and y'all
 are gonna get flamed into cinders in about 5... 4... 3... for the
 types of reasons I just mentioned above.

So would I, hence my looking at this to try and knock such 16 year olds off of 
the network. :)  However, yourself and Lunar make good points especially 
concerning the legal position over traffic redirection and/or manipulation.  

Unfortunately, too many BitTorrent trackers are written in PHP, which makes 
them easy to integrate into a typical web hosting setup, as opposed to 
requiring a VPS or dedi to run the tracker software on a separate port.

So what's the answer?  Education?  Educating torrent users to not use Tor 
isn't going to work - if they know enough to use Tor (thanks Azureus, NOT) - 
then they're gonna use it, so that's pretty much out.

Publication of sample exit policies?  Would that encourage exit node operators 
to run restricted exit policies, and save themselves loads of bandwidth and 
DMCA headache?

Is there a forum where one can put up a sticky post with sample exit policies 
so that operators can simply cut and paste them into their setups?

Best,
-- 
Parity
parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-02 Thread Paritesh Boyeyoko
On Saturday 02 Nov 2013 13:21:39 Moritz Bartl wrote:
 On 11/02/2013 01:15 PM, Paritesh Boyeyoko wrote:
  Publication of sample exit policies?  Would that encourage exit node
  operators to run restricted exit policies, and save themselves loads of
  bandwidth and DMCA headache?
  Is there a forum where one can put up a sticky post with sample exit
  policies so that operators can simply cut and paste them into their
  setups?
 There's
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy ,
 but you probably know that one?

Thanks, yes I've seen that one. :)

I'm just finding it difficult to accept that there's little to be done.  As far 
as I can see, the only way BitTorrent content distibution can work across Tor 
is because exits are allowing accept *:* as their exit policy - torrent 
clients are typically on non-standard ports.

The effect of this is that Tor gets a bad rep for copyright abuse right 
alongside BitTorrent, and people shy away from running exits due to 
the hassle involved.

Observation:  the URI you linked above is accessed from this page

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki//doc/TorExitGuidelines

but you must go halfway down the page, under Handling abuse complaints to 
get to it.  Perhaps on this page

https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian.html.en

running an exit should be given its own section on this page, since running an 
exit is rather more involved than running a middle relay?  Perhaps make the 
reduced exit policy more prominent so that people are more aware of it?

Question:  why not ship the reduced ExitPolicy as part of the default torrc, 
but commented out, and with reject *:* as the default ExitPolicy?  That way, 
an exit node operator simply has to uncomment the lines they need, or at least 
use it as a guide if they want a less cluttered torrc.

Best,
-- 
Parity
parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-02 Thread Moritz Bartl
On 11/02/2013 02:46 PM, Paritesh Boyeyoko wrote:
 I'm just finding it difficult to accept that there's little to be done.  As 
 far 
 as I can see, the only way BitTorrent content distibution can work across Tor 
 is because exits are allowing accept *:* as their exit policy - torrent 
 clients are typically on non-standard ports.
 The effect of this is that Tor gets a bad rep for copyright abuse right 
 alongside BitTorrent, and people shy away from running exits due to 
 the hassle involved.

As one of the large operators that indeed allows exiting on all ports
except 25: This is on purpose. I don't consider applications that choose
random ports as bad, I don't consider file sharing per se as bad. I
don't want to interfere with user traffic. I wish I could leave 25 open
as well, but our ISPs don't like that.

 Observation:  the URI you linked above is accessed from this page
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki//doc/TorExitGuidelines
 but you must go halfway down the page, under Handling abuse complaints to 
 get to it.  Perhaps on this page
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian.html.en
 running an exit should be given its own section on this page.

I can understand the intention. The exit guidelines should be linked
from there, I agree. On the other hand, I am not a fan of making it
easier to run exit relays. Reading a (somewhat lengthy) document as the
exit guidelines should really be the least you can require. There's some
things you just can't optimize away.

 Question:  why not ship the reduced ExitPolicy as part of the default torrc, 
 but commented out, and with reject *:* as the default ExitPolicy?

The current torrc ships with

#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed

So, reject *:* is already an example rule in there. Listing all
examples from the reduced exit policy will make reading the file more
complicated, especially for the majority that will not want to run an
exit relay in the first place.

Also, it has:

## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.

And that URL mentions the DMCA problem and links to both the reduced
exit policy and the exit guidelines.

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-02 Thread Gordon Morehouse
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Paritesh Boyeyoko:
 On Friday 01 Nov 2013 20:02:29 Gordon Morehouse wrote:
 
 
 What if someone inside a totalitarian state is attempting to
 upload evidence of a massacre to a service which runs on port
 80?
 
 Yeah, I did think of this but I thought I'd put it out there
 anyway. Unfortunately, too many sites/services don't use SSL.
 Well, it's a no-no.

That's changing, not fast enough, but the NSA did a great job of
raising awareness (even if they *can* crack it)...

 I'd love to get the bandwidth back from the 16 year olds
 downloading movies and terrible porn over Tor, too, but this
 won't fly, and y'all are gonna get flamed into cinders in about
 5... 4... 3... for the types of reasons I just mentioned above.
 
 So would I, hence my looking at this to try and knock such 16 year
 olds off of the network. :)  However, yourself and Lunar make good
 points especially concerning the legal position over traffic
 redirection and/or manipulation.

Well, plus, there are ethical questions about managing the traffic
itself, and the fact that if tampering is detected, you'll get a
BadExit flag.  It's mostly ethical questions, IMO.

 So what's the answer?  Education?  Educating torrent users to not
 use Tor isn't going to work - if they know enough to use Tor
 (thanks Azureus, NOT) - then they're gonna use it, so that's pretty
 much out.

Education does help - I've crashed many a thread suggesting Tor for
BitTorrent and explained why it's harmful.  I mean, I guess I don't
have any metrics to back me up, but a lot of the people seem to say
oh, jeez, well in that case maybe I won't.

 Publication of sample exit policies?  Would that encourage exit
 node operators to run restricted exit policies, and save themselves
 loads of bandwidth and DMCA headache?

That's been done, but a link in the default torrc above those config
areas would be *great*.

Best,
- -Gordon M.

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-02 Thread Paritesh Boyeyoko
On Saturday 02 Nov 2013 17:10:50 Moritz Bartl wrote:

 As one of the large operators that indeed allows exiting on all ports
 except 25: This is on purpose. I don't consider applications that choose
 random ports as bad, I don't consider file sharing per se as bad. I
 don't want to interfere with user traffic. I wish I could leave 25 open
 as well, but our ISPs don't like that.

I suppose you and I have different philosophies regarding this. :)

If the paper I linked earlier can be considered reflective of the entire Tor 
network, knowing that 54% of the traffic on Tor is BitTorrent traffic is 
frustrating.

Like you and others, I'd like to see people take advantage of Tor, rather than 
simply abuse it.  I have a VPS running a middle relay and I've had to restrict 
the line rate on it to 3Mb/s to avoid going over the 1TB monthly quota and 
avoid the relay from hibernating.

Knowing that more than half that traffic is BitTorrent traffic is disheartening 
when 

a) I will happily support Tor for its intended purpose (I hate anyone who 
tries to control/negate free speech) and

b) I know full well, as we all do, that 90%+ of BitTorrent traffic is 
copyrighted works.

As I said earlier, if Tor was 100,000+ nodes strong with 100Mb/s per node and 
unlimited bandwidth nobody would care.  Unfortunately, that isn't the case and 
the BitTorrent users very obviously don't know or care about the very real 
effect they are having.

Don't get me wrong, it's not like I hate BitTorrent and have a crusade against 
it - I don't.  In fact I use it regularly. :p I'd just like a way of actively 
discouraging its use on Tor, and as far as I can see the line is drawn (quite 
literally) at the exits.

Best,
-- 
Parity
parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-02 Thread Paritesh Boyeyoko
On Friday 01 Nov 2013 14:39:28 Gordon Morehouse wrote:

 Completely aside from the ethical and censorship-related buzzsaw you're
 about to run into for posting this (perennial) question, I believe some
 actual developers on Tor have written a paper about the problems with
 Bittorrent et al (and I think there's a more specific one than the Why Tor
 Is Slow[1] paper) but I can't currently find it.  Anybody know?
 
 1. 
 https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/roadmaps/2009-03-11-performance.pdf
 
 NB: the above paper is from 2009.

I've just had a quick scan of that paper and it makes for an interesting read. 
:)  I'm going to go away and read it properly but a couple observations.

2.3 Throttle certain protocols at the client side
I agree this is not a good idea BUT it sparked off another idea in my head.  In 
order to get better utilisation of slower relays, would it be worth 
introducing a behaviour whereby slow circuits are deliberately built for low 
volume traffic?

For example, sending email and IM messages doesn't (usually) require a huge 
amount of bandwidth, so when the Tor client detects that a user wants to 
send/receive data on certain slow ports such as POP3, IMAP4, MSA and Jabber it 
deliberately builds a slow circuit to handle that traffic.  Obviously it 
would 
have to be port based, but since people tend to send data on well-known ports, 
it shouldn't be an issue.

I think this would play well with the circuit-bonding work here

http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#pets13-splitting


3.1.2 Better Support for relay operators
This caught my eye: We lose relays when the operator reboots and forgets to 
set up the relay to start on boot.  Does installing the .deb package (for 
example) not configure Tor to start on boot, in the same way that Apache would 
be?  I ask because I haven't rebooted my VPS yet. :p


3.1.3  Facebook app to show off your relay
I liked this bit: Opportunities for expansion include allowing relay 
operators to form “teams”, and for these teams to be ranked on the 
contribution to the network. (Real world examples here include the SETI 
screensaver and the MD5 hash crack challenges.)

What would be really interesting would be to find sponsors (read: hosters) 
willing to put their name to it and gain/risk some publicity.


3.2 Funding Relays Directly
100 10Mb/s relays at $10/month is $12K a year, not $120k/year. :)  


Best,
-- 
Parity
parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-02 Thread I
Putting the extensive exit restriction policy in the responses to take-down 
demands seems like a good idea. 

Robert


 Publication of sample exit policies?  Would that encourage exit node
 operators
 to run restricted exit policies, and save themselves loads of bandwidth
 and
 DMCA headache?
 
 Is there a forum where one can put up a sticky post with sample exit
 policies
 so that operators can simply cut and paste them into their setups?

 parity@gmail.com


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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-02 Thread tor
I'm new to running a relay. There are lots of exit policies when I look at my 
atlas details: 
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/DDB401F4CA108C6F6AF4E0DCE2DFC3407F577B21

Is this a pretty good exit policy list to prevent harassment from my ISP?

Thanks!

-Jamie M.

 Putting the extensive exit restriction policy in the responses to take-down 
 demands seems like a good idea. 

 Robert

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Lunar
Gordon Morehouse:
 Yeah... you guys would know better than me about that, but speaking
 from the perspective of a small fish, the exit-as-default torrc is a
 serious WTF? and always has been, given potential legal trouble in
 privacy-hostile countries.

I have phrased this differently but I basically agree and opened #10067:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10067

-- 
Lunar lu...@torproject.org


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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Paritesh Boyeyoko
On Thursday 31 Oct 2013 21:52:41 Roger Dingledine wrote:

 The main reason for this choice is the number of people who've told us
 that they are only able to run exit relays because it's what Tor does
 when you run a relay, and their institution wouldn't let them do it if
 it required a manual config change to become an exit.
 
 Then again, that was a long time ago, and maybe it's gotten harder to
 sustain exits these days?
 
 --Roger


I think the Tor exit climate may well have gotten tougher.  Invariably people 
abuse Tor, and from what I've been reading on the likes of LowEndTalk like 
this thread

http://lowendtalk.com/discussion/1347/tor-node-on-low-end-boxes

more than a few hosters (VPS and dedi) just don't want to have to deal with 
issues such as abuse and DMCA, so they either 

a) Ban Tor completely or

b) Do not allow exits.

Some hosters actually have software that will check the /etc/tor/torrc file on 
their VPS images to check that the software isn't configured for exit.

Best,
-- 
Parity
parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread I
On the other hand the reports, of actual problems, don't seem to be many.
The mutterings and rumours do seem to echo.

Of the eighteen exit relays I've run (for just a few months) only a couple have 
brought letters over copyright and they were in the USA. I am having to deal 
with the providers's overreaction but I pay by the month so at worst I will 
lose them. The advice on how to manage exit problems seems to be very sound and 
Tor is defensible because it is being abused by torrenting also.

Ten exits are going happily on a major provider in Europe who is said to have a 
policy against them.

Just have a go.

Robert

 -Original Message-
 From: parity@gmail.com
 Sent: Fri, 01 Nov 2013 11:18:53 +
 To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
 Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report
 
 On Thursday 31 Oct 2013 21:52:41 Roger Dingledine wrote:
 
 The main reason for this choice is the number of people who've told us
 that they are only able to run exit relays because it's what Tor does
 when you run a relay, and their institution wouldn't let them do it if
 it required a manual config change to become an exit.
 
 Then again, that was a long time ago, and maybe it's gotten harder to
 sustain exits these days?
 
 --Roger
 
 
 I think the Tor exit climate may well have gotten tougher.  Invariably
 people
 abuse Tor, and from what I've been reading on the likes of LowEndTalk
 like
 this thread
 
 http://lowendtalk.com/discussion/1347/tor-node-on-low-end-boxes
 
 more than a few hosters (VPS and dedi) just don't want to have to deal
 with
 issues such as abuse and DMCA, so they either
 
 a) Ban Tor completely or
 
 b) Do not allow exits.
 
 Some hosters actually have software that will check the /etc/tor/torrc
 file on
 their VPS images to check that the software isn't configured for exit.
 
 Best,
 --
 Parity
 parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Paritesh Boyeyoko
On Friday 01 Nov 2013 05:37:14 I wrote:
The advice on how to manage exit problems seems to
 be very sound and Tor is defensible because it is being abused by
 torrenting also.
 

...and this is something else I don't quite understand.  People who know about 
Tor (which obviously includes exit operators) are well aware of the stress 
that BitTorrent puts on the Tor network.

The paper http://planete.inrialpes.fr/papers/TorTraffic-NSS10.pdf shows 54.48% 
of the traffic passing through the sample exit nodes was BiTorrent traffic.

Myself and others (I'm sure) look forward to the day when the Tor network 
comprises 100,000+ 100Mb/s nodes.  However, until that time comes I would 
think that exit node operators would (wrong choice of words incoming) make 
more effort to use a whitelisted exit policy, thereby starving BitTorrent of 
bandwidth, and forcing those users away from this free VPN.  The likes of 
Vuze (Azureus) don't help the situation by offering Tor as an option.

Would it be worth putting together selection of template Exit Policies which 
exit node operators can cut  paste into their torrc?  Or (and this is more a 
dev question) have an include directive where separate policy files can be 
specified (and therefore substituted), something like this:

ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/mail.exit
ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/rdp.exit
ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/web.exit
ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/chat.exit

Combine this with a default reject *:* policy and it *may* lead to a change of 
culture and squeeze BitTorrent out.  It may even help reduce the number of 
DMCA notices that exit operators get.

Thoughts?
-- 
Parity
parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Nelson
Please excuse my ignorance operating Tor relays, but if I run an exit
node on Windows 7 and use something like Peerblock and correspoding
block lists of P2P sites, wouldn't this be somewhat effective in
stopping this sort of undesired traffic on Tor?


On 11/1/2013 10:48 AM, Paritesh Boyeyoko wrote:
 On Friday 01 Nov 2013 05:37:14 I wrote:
 The advice on how to manage exit problems seems to
 be very sound and Tor is defensible because it is being abused by
 torrenting also.

 
 ...and this is something else I don't quite understand.  People who know 
 about 
 Tor (which obviously includes exit operators) are well aware of the stress 
 that BitTorrent puts on the Tor network.
 
 The paper http://planete.inrialpes.fr/papers/TorTraffic-NSS10.pdf shows 
 54.48% 
 of the traffic passing through the sample exit nodes was BiTorrent traffic.
 
 Myself and others (I'm sure) look forward to the day when the Tor network 
 comprises 100,000+ 100Mb/s nodes.  However, until that time comes I would 
 think that exit node operators would (wrong choice of words incoming) make 
 more effort to use a whitelisted exit policy, thereby starving BitTorrent of 
 bandwidth, and forcing those users away from this free VPN.  The likes of 
 Vuze (Azureus) don't help the situation by offering Tor as an option.
 
 Would it be worth putting together selection of template Exit Policies which 
 exit node operators can cut  paste into their torrc?  Or (and this is more a 
 dev question) have an include directive where separate policy files can be 
 specified (and therefore substituted), something like this:
 
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/mail.exit
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/rdp.exit
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/web.exit
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/chat.exit
 
 Combine this with a default reject *:* policy and it *may* lead to a change 
 of 
 culture and squeeze BitTorrent out.  It may even help reduce the number of 
 DMCA notices that exit operators get.
 
 Thoughts?
 

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Gordon Morehouse
On Fri, 01 Nov 2013 17:48:44 +, Paritesh Boyeyoko parity@gmail.com 
wrote:

 On Friday 01 Nov 2013 05:37:14 I wrote:
 The advice on how to manage exit problems seems to
  be very sound and Tor is defensible because it is being abused by
  torrenting also.
  
 
 ...and this is something else I don't quite understand.  People who know 
 about 
 Tor (which obviously includes exit operators) are well aware of the stress 
 that BitTorrent puts on the Tor network.
 
 The paper http://planete.inrialpes.fr/papers/TorTraffic-NSS10.pdf shows 
 54.48% 
 of the traffic passing through the sample exit nodes was BiTorrent traffic.
 
 Myself and others (I'm sure) look forward to the day when the Tor network 
 comprises 100,000+ 100Mb/s nodes.  However, until that time comes I would 
 think that exit node operators would (wrong choice of words incoming) make 
 more effort to use a whitelisted exit policy, thereby starving BitTorrent of 
 bandwidth, and forcing those users away from this free VPN.  The likes of 
 Vuze (Azureus) don't help the situation by offering Tor as an option.
 
 Would it be worth putting together selection of template Exit Policies which 
 exit node operators can cut  paste into their torrc?  Or (and this is more a 
 dev question) have an include directive where separate policy files can be 
 specified (and therefore substituted), something like this:
 
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/mail.exit
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/rdp.exit
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/web.exit
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/chat.exit

I *love* the idea of an conf.d/ style exit config.

 Combine this with a default reject *:* policy and it *may* lead to a change 
 of 
 culture and squeeze BitTorrent out.  It may even help reduce the number of 
 DMCA notices that exit operators get.

I would very much like to see the default policy to be no-exit, because as I 
mentioned before I suspect we're losing some nodes started up by noobs who then 
get screamed at and just shut them down, without ever really becoming part of 
the community.  It needs to be as easy as possible to run a relay, and given 
that one *can* face legal consequences in some jurisdictions over what goes 
into and out of a computer one rents, no-exit should be the default.

Best,
-Gordon M.

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Gordon Morehouse
On Fri, 01 Nov 2013 11:22:19 -0700, Nelson nel...@net2wireless.net wrote:

 Please excuse my ignorance operating Tor relays, but if I run an exit
 node on Windows 7 and use something like Peerblock and correspoding
 block lists of P2P sites, wouldn't this be somewhat effective in
 stopping this sort of undesired traffic on Tor?

Completely aside from the ethical and censorship-related buzzsaw you're about 
to run into for posting this (perennial) question, I believe some actual 
developers on Tor have written a paper about the problems with Bittorrent et al 
(and I think there's a more specific one than the Why Tor Is Slow[1] paper) but 
I can't currently find it.  Anybody know?

1.  https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/roadmaps/2009-03-11-performance.pdf

NB: the above paper is from 2009.

Best,
-Gordon M.


 
 
 On 11/1/2013 10:48 AM, Paritesh Boyeyoko wrote:
  On Friday 01 Nov 2013 05:37:14 I wrote:
  The advice on how to manage exit problems seems to
  be very sound and Tor is defensible because it is being abused by
  torrenting also.
 
  
  ...and this is something else I don't quite understand.  People who know 
  about 
  Tor (which obviously includes exit operators) are well aware of the stress 
  that BitTorrent puts on the Tor network.
  
  The paper http://planete.inrialpes.fr/papers/TorTraffic-NSS10.pdf shows 
  54.48% 
  of the traffic passing through the sample exit nodes was BiTorrent traffic.
  
  Myself and others (I'm sure) look forward to the day when the Tor network 
  comprises 100,000+ 100Mb/s nodes.  However, until that time comes I would 
  think that exit node operators would (wrong choice of words incoming) make 
  more effort to use a whitelisted exit policy, thereby starving BitTorrent 
  of 
  bandwidth, and forcing those users away from this free VPN.  The likes of 
  Vuze (Azureus) don't help the situation by offering Tor as an option.
  
  Would it be worth putting together selection of template Exit Policies 
  which 
  exit node operators can cut  paste into their torrc?  Or (and this is more 
  a 
  dev question) have an include directive where separate policy files can 
  be 
  specified (and therefore substituted), something like this:
  
  ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/mail.exit
  ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/rdp.exit
  ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/web.exit
  ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/chat.exit
  
  Combine this with a default reject *:* policy and it *may* lead to a change 
  of 
  culture and squeeze BitTorrent out.  It may even help reduce the number of 
  DMCA notices that exit operators get.
  
  Thoughts?
  
 
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread krishna e bera
On 13-11-01 01:48 PM, Paritesh Boyeyoko wrote:
 On Friday 01 Nov 2013 05:37:14 I wrote:
 The paper http://planete.inrialpes.fr/papers/TorTraffic-NSS10.pdf shows 
 54.48% 
 of the traffic passing through the sample exit nodes was BiTorrent traffic.

Isnt that about the same percentage on the non-Tor internet?

 Would it be worth putting together selection of template Exit Policies which 
 exit node operators can cut  paste into their torrc?  Or (and this is more a 
 dev question) have an include directive where separate policy files can be 
 specified (and therefore substituted), something like this:
 
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/mail.exit
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/rdp.exit
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/web.exit
 ExitPolicy include /etc/tor/chat.exit

Examples are great if they are kept up to date.
Could they be put in the wiki with suitable comments?

 Combine this with a default reject *:* policy and it *may* lead to a change 
 of 
 culture and squeeze BitTorrent out.  It may even help reduce the number of 
 DMCA notices that exit operators get.

It would help if most bittorrent trackers enforced sharing ratios of
around 1:1 (since Tor clients cannot accept incoming connections, unless
on a .onion HS).  Also helpful if they switched to UDP-only for data
which would exclude Tor (until Tor suppports UDP).

On the other hand, i had a reduced exit policy and still got DMCA
complaints just for the .torrent file being downloaded via HTTP through
my exit.

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Paritesh Boyeyoko
On Friday 01 Nov 2013 11:22:19 Nelson wrote:
 Please excuse my ignorance operating Tor relays, but if I run an exit
 node on Windows 7 and use something like Peerblock and correspoding
 block lists of P2P sites, wouldn't this be somewhat effective in
 stopping this sort of undesired traffic on Tor?
 

In return, please excuse my ignorance regarding Windows software. :) I've 
heard of Peerblock, but have never used it.  However, if it does what it says 
on the tin, then yes it will help by blocking the IPs of well-known trackers, 
thereby denying the peer list from BitTorrent clients.

However, I'm not sure this will be particularly effective against DHT (the 
mainstay of TPB content these days); unless you have all the addresses of the 
DHT jump-off points (a client has to start *somewhere* to get DHT addresses).
-- 
Parity
parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Lunar
Nelson:
 Please excuse my ignorance operating Tor relays, but if I run an exit
 node on Windows 7 and use something like Peerblock and correspoding
 block lists of P2P sites, wouldn't this be somewhat effective in
 stopping this sort of undesired traffic on Tor?

No. If the relay says it will deliver a connection in its exit policy,
it has to carry it. Otherwise, it will give erratic behaviour on the
client side and this is bad. The relay should be flagged BadExit by the
authority operators.

-- 
Lunar lu...@torproject.org


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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Paritesh Boyeyoko
On Friday 01 Nov 2013 19:36:11 krishna e bera wrote:

 Isnt that about the same percentage on the non-Tor internet?

Probably. :)

 It would help if most bittorrent trackers enforced sharing ratios of
 around 1:1 (since Tor clients cannot accept incoming connections, unless
 on a .onion HS).

Private trackers do this, while open ones like TBP don't care about ratio 
enforcement.  You also raise a good point about incoming connections, however 
BitTorrent clients can still seed as long as *someone* in the swarm can accept 
incoming connections, and not necessarily the original seeder.  Not every 
torrent user will be using Tor, obviously.

 Also helpful if they switched to UDP-only for data
 which would exclude Tor (until Tor suppports UDP).

Agreed, but most of the trackers use HTTP.

 On the other hand, i had a reduced exit policy and still got DMCA
 complaints just for the .torrent file being downloaded via HTTP through
 my exit.

Let me run a couple ideas past you:

1.  Configure Squid as a forward proxy with Squidguard and configure Squidguard 
to reject any URL with announce in it.  Use IPTables to transparently 
redirect anything destined for ports 80, 2710 and other well known tracker 
ports to Squid.

2.  Do not exit port 80.  While security and anonymity are separate things, 
they are tightly coupled, so why not exit only secure ports: HTTPS, POP3S, 
IMAPS etc.

Obviously some protocols use TLS on the same port as the clear traffic, but how 
detrimental do you think restricting to SSL/TLS enabled protocols (with a few 
exceptions) would be?

-- 
Parity
parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Ted Smith
On Sat, 2013-11-02 at 01:27 +0100, Lunar wrote:
 Nelson:
  Please excuse my ignorance operating Tor relays, but if I run an exit
  node on Windows 7 and use something like Peerblock and correspoding
  block lists of P2P sites, wouldn't this be somewhat effective in
  stopping this sort of undesired traffic on Tor?
 
 No. If the relay says it will deliver a connection in its exit policy,
 it has to carry it. Otherwise, it will give erratic behaviour on the
 client side and this is bad. The relay should be flagged BadExit by the
 authority operators.

Of course, there's nothing stopping you from hooking something like
Peerblock up to Tor's control port interface and automatically updating
your exit policy to block connections to torrent trackers and peers.
-- 
Sent from Ubuntu


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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Paritesh Boyeyoko
On Friday 01 Nov 2013 20:57:54 Ted Smith wrote:
 On Sat, 2013-11-02 at 01:27 +0100, Lunar wrote:
  Nelson:
   Please excuse my ignorance operating Tor relays, but if I run an exit
   node on Windows 7 and use something like Peerblock and correspoding
   block lists of P2P sites, wouldn't this be somewhat effective in
   stopping this sort of undesired traffic on Tor?
  
  No. If the relay says it will deliver a connection in its exit policy,
  it has to carry it. Otherwise, it will give erratic behaviour on the
  client side and this is bad. The relay should be flagged BadExit by the
  authority operators.
 
 Of course, there's nothing stopping you from hooking something like
 Peerblock up to Tor's control port interface and automatically updating
 your exit policy to block connections to torrent trackers and peers.

Good idea. :)  So let me revise my earlier posts: to reject connections to 
trackers do something like

ExitPolicy reject *:2710

This will block connections to the Ocelot and XBTT (I think) tracker software 
on their standard ports.  Blocking trackers on port 80 is more difficult, 
obviously.

To be honest, I wouldn't worry too much about blocking peers; a whitelisted 
exit policy will take of that, since torrent peers tend to use fairly high 
range non-standard ports.  

One (perhaps nasty) rare case is someone using OpenVPN over Tor, and then 
torrenting over the VPN, especially since VPN providers will permit port 
forwarding at their endpoint.

I can see people wanting to VPN over Tor for increased anonymity (especially 
if the VPN provider accepts anonymous payment) but how popular is this use 
case?  Does anyone have any hard numbers?

-- 
Parity
parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-11-01 Thread Gordon Morehouse
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Paritesh Boyeyoko:
 On Friday 01 Nov 2013 19:36:11 krishna e bera wrote:
 On the other hand, i had a reduced exit policy and still got
 DMCA complaints just for the .torrent file being downloaded via
 HTTP through my exit.
 
 Let me run a couple ideas past you:
 
 1.  Configure Squid as a forward proxy with Squidguard and
 configure Squidguard to reject any URL with announce in it.  Use
 IPTables to transparently redirect anything destined for ports 80,
 2710 and other well known tracker ports to Squid.
 
 2.  Do not exit port 80.  While security and anonymity are separate
 things, they are tightly coupled, so why not exit only secure
 ports: HTTPS, POP3S, IMAPS etc.
 
 Obviously some protocols use TLS on the same port as the clear
 traffic, but how detrimental do you think restricting to SSL/TLS
 enabled protocols (with a few exceptions) would be?

What if someone inside a totalitarian state is attempting to upload
evidence of a massacre to a service which runs on port 80?

I'd love to get the bandwidth back from the 16 year olds downloading
movies and terrible porn over Tor, too, but this won't fly, and y'all
are gonna get flamed into cinders in about 5... 4... 3... for the
types of reasons I just mentioned above.

Best,
- -Gordon M.


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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-10-31 Thread Runa A. Sandvik
On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 12:43 PM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg wrote:
 On 29 October 2013 22:53, Sanjeev Gupta gha...@gmail.com wrote:
 Yes, to some extent.  I edited the config, as I was willing to pay for the
 extra bandwidth, and enabled an Exit Relay.

 I was under the impression that this was permitted.

 Amazon does not like Exit Nodes running in EC2.  I'm not sure if there
 was a specific reason bridge vs relay was chosen, but I do know that
 exit nodes weren't an option.

When deciding whether or not to build Tor Cloud relay-by-default
images, we first estimated how much bandwidth an average relay is
pushing per week [1] - 251 GiB/wk. Instead of offering users to run
slow, expensive, and less than average, relays in the cloud, we opted
for bridges only.

[1]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4387

-- 
Runa A. Sandvik
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-10-31 Thread Andreas Krey
On Thu, 31 Oct 2013 10:43:41 +, Paritesh Boyeyoko wrote:
...
 This is something which has always confused/annoyed me.  How can a Tor node 
 (unless it's exposing its SOCKS interface to the whole world) be classed as 
 an 
 open proxy?

The 'open proxy' is simply a tag on the IP address; it does not say that
the openness actually exists at that address.

 Yes, Exit Relays exit to the clear Internet but they're not exactly open to 
 clients for connection (unless specifically configured that way).

Oh, but they are. Anybody with a tor client can use them, and if only a
single tor client is run with its socks port exposed then all of the
exit relays become 'open proxies' more along your definition.

Andreas

-- 
Totally trivial. Famous last words.
From: Linus Torvalds torvalds@*.org
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 07:29:21 -0800
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-10-31 Thread Paritesh Boyeyoko
On Thursday 31 Oct 2013 15:34:20 Andreas Krey wrote:
 On Thu, 31 Oct 2013 10:43:41 +, Paritesh Boyeyoko wrote:
 ...
 
  This is something which has always confused/annoyed me.  How can a Tor
  node
  (unless it's exposing its SOCKS interface to the whole world) be classed
  as an open proxy?
 
 The 'open proxy' is simply a tag on the IP address; it does not say that
 the openness actually exists at that address.
 
  Yes, Exit Relays exit to the clear Internet but they're not exactly open
  to
  clients for connection (unless specifically configured that way).
 
 Oh, but they are. Anybody with a tor client can use them, and if only a
 single tor client is run with its socks port exposed then all of the
 exit relays become 'open proxies' more along your definition.
 
 Andreas

Hi Andreas --

Thanks for the clarification, and yes in that regard Exit Nodes are open; I 
suppose I considered open to refer to the clear Internet.

On a related note, just out of interest why was the decision taken that the 
default exit policy for an out-of-the-box relay allows any exits at all?

Considering that 

a) the majority of people running Tor would be TBB users (and therefore 
clients) and 

b) running exits can lead to unwanted grief

I would have thought that the default exit policy would be reject *:* for 
(can't think of a better word) safety reasons.  If someone wants to run an 
exit, it is then a deliberate action on their part, as opposed to a default 
setting.

Thoughts?
-- 
Parity
parity@gmail.com
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-10-31 Thread Andy Isaacson
On Fri, Nov 01, 2013 at 12:53:48AM +, Paritesh Boyeyoko wrote:
 On a related note, just out of interest why was the decision taken that the 
 default exit policy for an out-of-the-box relay allows any exits at all?

Out of the box, relays don't allow exit at all.

A relay admin has to explicitly choose to run an exit relay, and should
be aware of what that might mean for ISP policy compliance.

 Considering that 
 
 a) the majority of people running Tor would be TBB users (and therefore 
 clients) and 

Clients aren't running relays at all.  TBB and similar client installs
are non-relay.

 b) running exits can lead to unwanted grief
 
 I would have thought that the default exit policy would be reject *:* for 

That's correct, the default is reject *.

 (can't think of a better word) safety reasons.  If someone wants to run an 
 exit, it is then a deliberate action on their part, as opposed to a default 
 setting.

That's correct, it takes a deliberate action on the part of the
administrator to become a relay; and another deliberate action to become
an exit relay.

-andy
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-10-31 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 06:12:47PM -0700, Andy Isaacson wrote:
 That's correct, it takes a deliberate action on the part of the
 administrator to become a relay; and another deliberate action to become
 an exit relay.

Actually, that second part isn't true. Once you decide to become a relay,
the default is to exit to most popular ports.

(If you're using Vidalia to configure your relay, it makes you choose
whether you want to be a non-exit relay or an exit relay. But just Tor
by itself, the default exit policy is in the man page.)

The main reason for this choice is the number of people who've told us
that they are only able to run exit relays because it's what Tor does
when you run a relay, and their institution wouldn't let them do it if
it required a manual config change to become an exit.

Then again, that was a long time ago, and maybe it's gotten harder to
sustain exits these days?

--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-10-31 Thread Andy Isaacson
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 09:52:41PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 06:12:47PM -0700, Andy Isaacson wrote:
  That's correct, it takes a deliberate action on the part of the
  administrator to become a relay; and another deliberate action to become
  an exit relay.
 
 Actually, that second part isn't true. Once you decide to become a relay,
 the default is to exit to most popular ports.

Whoops, thanks for the correction Roger.  I guess I've been configuring
exit relays for so long that I forget what it's like to configure a
non-exit. :)

 (If you're using Vidalia to configure your relay, it makes you choose
 whether you want to be a non-exit relay or an exit relay. But just Tor
 by itself, the default exit policy is in the man page.)

The Vidalia behavior you describe seems like a principle of least
surprise to me.

 The main reason for this choice is the number of people who've told us
 that they are only able to run exit relays because it's what Tor does
 when you run a relay, and their institution wouldn't let them do it if
 it required a manual config change to become an exit.
 
 Then again, that was a long time ago, and maybe it's gotten harder to
 sustain exits these days?

I can easily imagine that folks who get their first warning from their
ISP simply say well, guess I can't run Tor at all then and turn it
off.

-andy
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-10-31 Thread Gordon Morehouse
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Roger Dingledine:
 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 06:12:47PM -0700, Andy Isaacson wrote:
 That's correct, it takes a deliberate action on the part of the 
 administrator to become a relay; and another deliberate action to
 become an exit relay.
 
 Actually, that second part isn't true. Once you decide to become a
 relay, the default is to exit to most popular ports.

I don't think this is a good enough reason these days, when people who
haven't read the fine fine print are putting them up on VPSes.  A
friend of mine did it and had to get his Linode IP changed after
getting on a bunch of blacklists in like two days.

 (If you're using Vidalia to configure your relay, it makes you
 choose whether you want to be a non-exit relay or an exit relay.
 But just Tor by itself, the default exit policy is in the man
 page.)
 
 The main reason for this choice is the number of people who've told
 us that they are only able to run exit relays because it's what
 Tor does when you run a relay, and their institution wouldn't let
 them do it if it required a manual config change to become an
 exit.

Yeah... you guys would know better than me about that, but speaking
from the perspective of a small fish, the exit-as-default torrc is a
serious WTF? and always has been, given potential legal trouble in
privacy-hostile countries.

$.02

Best,
- -Gordon M.

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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-10-30 Thread Tom Ritter
On 29 October 2013 22:53, Sanjeev Gupta gha...@gmail.com wrote:
 Yes, to some extent.  I edited the config, as I was willing to pay for the
 extra bandwidth, and enabled an Exit Relay.

 I was under the impression that this was permitted.

Amazon does not like Exit Nodes running in EC2.  I'm not sure if there
was a specific reason bridge vs relay was chosen, but I do know that
exit nodes weren't an option.

You can fight them on it, but you'll probably lose. Or you can switch
them back to bridges or to relays, and tell them you've removed the
exit node.

-tom
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-10-29 Thread I
Is there confusion between using the special version of Tor designed to be a 
bridge on Amazon's EC² which uses a limited volume of data so to stay within 
the free offer for the free year Amazon offers?


 -Original Message-
 From: mor...@torservers.net
 Sent: Mon, 28 Oct 2013 23:17:15 -0700
 To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
 Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report
 
 On 28.10.2013 22:10, Sanjeev Gupta wrote:
 Since Tor Cloud https://cloud.torproject.org/ suggests running on Amazon
 EC2, I am confused.
 
 Tor Cloud images are configured to act as bridges. You can run non-exit
 relays on Amazon EC2, but the cost are comparatively expensive. As
 you've found out, Amazon does not allow exit relays.
 
 If you want to run low-cost relays, I suggest you browse through the
 offers at lowendbox.com. If you're up for running an exit (read the Exit
 Guidelines first [1]), contact the ISP(s) if they're okay with that.
 
 --Moritz
 
 [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorExitGuidelines
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Re: [tor-relays] Amazon abuse report

2013-10-29 Thread Sanjeev Gupta
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 7:49 PM, I beatthebasta...@inbox.com wrote:

 Is there confusion between using the special version of Tor designed to be
 a bridge on Amazon's EC² which uses a limited volume of data so to stay
 within the free offer for the free year Amazon offers?


Yes, to some extent.  I edited the config, as I was willing to pay for the
extra bandwidth, and enabled an Exit Relay.

I was under the impression that this was permitted.

-- 
Sanjeev Gupta
+65 98551208 http://www.linkedin.com/in/ghane
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