George Kadianakis <desnac...@riseup.net> writes: > Hello, > > here is the October 2015 report for SponsorR: > > - The first bunch of hidden service statistics is now enabled by default. The > feature was enabled in tor-0.2.7.3 and the coverage graphs have already > climbed slightly: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-frac-reporting.html > > The stats enabled are: > * The total number of unique hidden services: > Graph: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html > * The total volume of hidden service traffic on the network: > Graph: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html > > - As part of our larger statistical efforts, we did another security and > privacy > evaluation of the above stats to ensure that the obfuscatory noise we are > adding is indeed completely covering the tracks of individual users. > > We performed the evaluation by extracting all the hidden service statistics > values that were reported by relays over the month of September. Then we > manually inspected them to see that the noise we are adding is significantly > affecting the reports of relays. A more detailed analysis can be found here: > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15254#comment:33 > > We invite people to use or even expand our dataset to evaluate the privacy > of > our statistics. > > - We also improved on the HSDir health tool that tracks the health of the > HSDir > subsystem and the correctness of descriptor uploading by hidden services: > https://gitlab.com/hs-health/hs-health/blob/master/design.md > > You can now see its results updated in real time: > http://ygzf7uqcusp4ayjs.onion/tor-health/tor-health/index.html > > - As part of our efforts to engage the research community, we met with UCL > researchers and students who have interest in anonymity-related topics like > hidden services, private statistics, and mixnets. We discussed ideas > regarding > guard node security, detecting active end-to-end correlation attacks and > hidden service scaling techniques. > > - To further lubricate the research community, we published a document > describing the current status of open hidden service proposals. We also > provided a brief summary for each proposal so that researchers and > developers > can get up to date faster: > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/torz-dev/2015-October/009762.html2 >
Oops. The link here should have been: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-October/009762.html Sorry about that! _______________________________________________ tor-reports mailing list tor-reports@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-reports