[tor-talk] Announce: Tails 0.7 is out
Hi, Tails, aka. The Amnesic Incognito Live System, version 0.7, is out. , | What is it? ` Tails is a Live system aimed at preserving your privacy and anonymity: - all outgoing connections to the Internet are forced to go through the Tor network; - no trace is left on local storage devices unless explicitly asked. More? -> https://tails.boum.org/ , | Get it, try it, share it! ` Try it! [1] Any comments are most welcome. Please note you'll need to install the CACert root certificate [2] into your web browser before connecting to our web site... unless you use Debian or one of its derivatives. [1] https://tails.boum.org/download/ [2] http://www.cacert.org/ , | What's new? ` Notable changes include: * Built on top of Debian Squeeze. * Tor 0.2.1.30 * Protecting against memory recovery: new, safer way to wipe memory on shutdown which is now also used when the boot media is physically removed. * Hardware support - printers: install more printer drivers, allow the default user to manage more kinds of printers - 3G: support mobile broadband devices such as 3G USB dongles - wireless: install Atheros and Broadcom firmwares - scanner and multi-function peripherals: better support * Iceweasel - install the HTTPS Everywhere extension - many Anonymity Set preservation enhancements, mostly inspired by the Tor Browser Bundle configuration - support FTP, thanks to FoxyProxy * Other software - user-friendly encryption support: install gnome-disk-utility (Palimpsest) and Seahorse plugins - add opt-in i2p support with Iceweasel integration through FoxyProxy - optionally install TrueCrypt at boot time to allow users of the (old and now unsupported) *Incognito* live system to access the data on previously created media; this is *not* meant to be used to create new TrueCrypt media - make better use of battery-powered hardware - replace xsane with simple-scan which is part of GNOME and way easier to use - install scribus-ng instead of scribus: more features, less bugs * Firewall - drop incoming packets by default - forbid queries to DNS resolvers on the LAN - set output policy to drop (defense-in-depth) * Miscellaneous - fromiso= bugfixes - configure keyboard layout accordingly to the chosen language for Italian and Portuguese - more robust HTP time synchronization wrt. network failures; display the logs when the clock synchronization fails - disable automatic media mounting and opening to protect against a class of attacks that was recently put under the spotlights - GnuPG: default to stronger digest algorithms Plus the usual bunch of minor bug reports and improvements. See the online Changelog [3] for technical details. [3] http://git.immerda.ch/?p=amnesia.git;a=blob_plain;f=debian/changelog;hb=refs/tags/0.7 , | Can I use it on a pre-Intel Mac computer? ` Tails images with *i386* in their name work on the Intel x86 architecture only. However, we've been working towards releasing a Tails image suitable for the pre-Intel Macs hardware (PowerPC architecture). Stay tuned, it will be prepared and made available soonish. , | A glimpse towards the future ` Were do we go from here? Have a look to our roadmap [4] to see where we are heading to. Would you want to help? As explained in our brand new "how to contribute" documentation [5], here are many ways **you** can contribute to Tails: no need to be a hardcore developer. [4] https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap/ [5] https://tails.boum.org/contribute/ Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc | Do not be trapped by the need to achieve anything. | This way, you achieve everything. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] TB for Win
On Fri, 8 Apr 2011 17:29:17 -0700 Mike Perry wrote: > Thus spake Greg Kalitnikoff (kalitnik...@privatdemail.net): > > > Hi! When will TorBrowser with Firefox 4 for Windows be released? Tired > > of waiting :) > > So are we. FF4 offers a ton of awesomeness that we want to leverage. > For example, HTML5 allows youtube to work over Tor! (If you opt-in and > set your useragent right): > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2832 > > But it is a lot of work. Every new Firefox release requires a ton of > addon API updates and auditing, and FF4 was a beast of a release in > this respect. We've done the API updates (Torbutton 1.3.2-alpha) but > we still need to do more auditing. > > We're also planning on changing our release structure for Firefox 4. > We will very likely be maintaining our own (hopefully small) set of > patches against Firefox 4 and shipping Tor Browser Bundle as our only > supported platform, and discouraging the advanced tor packages and > Torbutton+OS Firefox setups (and removing or unrecommending Torbutton > on addons.mozilla.org). This also means that we need to sink a bunch > of effort into making sure Tor Browser Bundle is a working solution > for people on every platform. > > So we're not sure exactly when all of this will be ready, but we're > working as hard as we can to make it ASAP. Hi Mike! Thanks for reply! I suspected the answer will be just like what you told. One more off-topic question. Why not QtWeb? It`s not like "replace Firefox with QtWeb immediately", but "why not to pay attention to something else, maybe less problematic and secure and simple". I suppose that you in-development-depth guys already have some thoughts about it. Thanks. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Torbutton 1.3.2-alpha released
On 03/21/2011 12:03 PM, Mike Perry wrote: > Torbutton 1.3.2-alpha has been released at: > https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/releases/torbutton-1.3.2-alpha.xpi > > This release features several fixes for some annoying Firefox 4 > exceptions and popup issues, as well as a score of other bugfixes. > > I am hoping that this will be the last release before 1.4.0, so please > report any issues you notice on our bugtracker: > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/14 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2881 Mike, thanks for your continued work on Torbutton! regards, tagnaq ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] list archive files gziped twice?
On 04/08/2011 05:07 PM, Andrew Lewman wrote: > I don't see this behavior. Are you sure your browser didn't rename the > file or try to do something to it? Indeed, downloading the file with firefox results in a different output file when compared to the wget output file: md5sum */* 5987e124389cc1cc156663f41d54d3cd ff/2011-March.txt.gz 2598b636064e3884893a93268eb1fbdb wget/2011-March.txt.gz (reproducible not only on my host) ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] endless list of scrubbed circuits
On 4/8/2011 5:35 PM, Mike Perry wrote: Thus spake Joe Btfsplk (joebtfs...@gmx.com): Using vidalia bundle 0.2.10 / 0.2.30 w/ Torbutton 1.3.2a in Vista x64, Firefox 4.0 There's an endless, constantly increasing list of scrubbed circuits - like below. It just keeps going thru them like a ticker tape. "Apr 08 14:36:37.277 [Notice] We tried for 15 seconds to connect to '[scrubbed]' using exit 'politkovskaja'. Retrying on a new circuit." NOTE: I CAN connect to some sites using Tor - so it IS working, it's just so slow, apparently because of all the scrubbed circuits, it's of no use for anything. Any ideas what's causing this behavior? I did uninstall / reinstall tor bundle. Have closed Tor& browser, then restarted - no joy. One of the things that can cause this is a set of bad guards (the first hop in your Tor circuits). If you got unlucky and Tor picked only slow guards, this can cause you poor performance. You can check them out in the vidalia window by noting the first hop in your circuits. There should only be 3 different nodes chosen for that first hop. Note you should not post your guard list in public, as it can be used to identify you. If that is the issue, you can try using bridges to see if that helps, or you could try to stop tor and wipe away your tor state file, which will cause new guards to be chosen. Are you saying a "bad" guards can cause an ENDLESS, rapid stream of log entries: "We tried for 15 seconds to connect to '[scrubbed]' using exit 'x'. Retrying on a new circuit"? When it is doing this (it seems) the listed speed of the 3 nodes in the 1st hop are often listed as high. Listed speed may mean nothing. If it * does * mean anything, then that isn't the only problem in my case, because they often show higher speeds. But I digress. If we're talking about same thing, the entry guard - in Tor Network Map, 1st entry under "connection" column in L pane? When select that 1st connection, shows 3 nodes in R pane, w/ their IP address, bandwidth, etc. Early last evening, after reinstalling Vidalia bundle again, I was able to load pages * almost as fast as w/o Tor. * (yes, I'm sure Tor was working) I tried a # of pages - all worked well. Looked at the Vidalia log - didn't see constant stream scrubbed circuits. It was still quite early & would've been lots of traffic. Regardless of what the 1st 3 nodes look like, it *seems * when I'm able to connect to a site - at all - the behavior of an endless stream of scrubbed circuits in the log is NOT happening. When it IS happening, connecting to any site (not high traffic ones, or very slow servers) either fails or takes well > 1 min (usually more, IF at all). Usually, by then it times out. It's not the site's servers, because can stop Tor & same sites load instantly. I've tried this on numerous sites, days & times, that I know to usually be fast w/o Tor - or w/o it. If this was the typical state / function of Tor network, no one would be using it, so I know it can't be happening to everyone on a regular basis. This is now the norm rather than exception, for me. As it is, Tor is useless for me > 90% of time (I mean it won't load pages - at ALL). Today, checked it again & basically can't load pages at all - even though (at times) the 3 nodes in entry guard all show fairly high speeds, while still unable ot load pages. Again, at times, entry guard changes frequently. I stopped Tor, wiped the Tor state file (the "lock" file - what ever it can contain - is empty now). It did cause pages to load much faster - for now. If "bad" entry guards are the problem AND if happening to most users MOST of the time, like me, I'll need a "clear Tor state file" button addon. :-( By design, how often does the entry guard (and the 3 nodes in it) change / get refreshed - w/ no user intervention? I've noticed at times, mine seems to change quite often - sometimes every 30 - 60 sec or so. When I AM able to load pages normally (by Tor standards), I don't think the entry guard is constantly changing, but the log definitely does not show a constant stream of scrubbed entries. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
