Re: [tor-talk] Mac?
On 2011-09-09 05:09 , cmeclax-sazri wrote: > On Thursday 08 September 2011 22:02:56 Andre Risling wrote: >> - Who stores the MAC address of the computer you're using? The ISP? An >> Webmail service? > > On IPv4, a MAC address goes only as far as the local network (the MAC address > my router has on the WAN side goes to my ISP). On IPv6, if you run radvd, the > MAC address is incorporated into the IP address of all computers that get > their address from radvd. (s/radvd/RA/ as radvd is just an implementation of an IPv6 Router Advertisement Daemon, there are many many others ;) Unless the host has IPv6 Privacy Extensions (RFC4941) enabled or the network uses DHCPv6 (and the host uses that ;) where one is given an effectively static address, or of course if the user itself configures the address manually to something ;) Note that RFC4941 is default on Mac OS X starting with Lion, it is default on all Windows stacks and it can be enabled on Linux. Mostly though it is just an annoyance and anybody wanting to do any kind of tracking can just track the /64 or in most cases even the /48 as that is the address space you will be staying in at that site. And don't forget about having or not having cookies and of course that little thing about your unique signature when you are connecting to certain sites that the rest of the 16 year old don't connect too... (Having a Tor bridge on port 443 of the Google/Facebook/ server farm would be quite awesome for that matter ;) Greets, Jeroen ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] TB-1.4.2
I have install the TB-1.4.2 on my Iceweasel 3.5.16 working under Debian Squeeze AMD64. I can see new option "New Identity" in that version of TB, but it is disables. What is that option and why it disabled? Furtherinmore, there are no option "reffer spoof" in the TB-1.4.2; why? ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Dutch police break into webservers over hidden services
On 09/09/11 09:36, t...@lists.grepular.com wrote: > Set up a firewall on the VM to prevent all other network traffic > going in or out of it. I meant to say set up a firewall on the *host* OS to prevent all other traffic going in or out of the VM. I'd probably set up a firewall on the VM it's self too though as an extra layer of protection. If they hack the VM but don't get root, they wont be able to bypass the VMs firewall. -- Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/ https://twitter.com/mickeyc Professional http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell PGP.mit.edu 0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Dutch police break into webservers over hidden services
On 09/09/11 06:43, Orionjur Tor-admin wrote: > Very intresting what is the vulnerabilities they used for breaking systems? > In the lite of that facts I don't know what I need to advice my clients > - setting up hidden services on their home computers or on overseas > vdses? (My clients are not providers of child pornography but they are > fighters with tyrannical regim). > The first method is the best from the point of view of information > defense but the second method is the best for defense of persons of > operators of that services... Probably the safest way to run a hidden service is to do it from inside a VM. Install Tor on the host OS. Configure up the Hidden Service on the host OS, but point it at the IP of the VM. Set up a firewall on the VM to prevent all other network traffic going in or out of it. Or alternatively use the TransPort functionality of Tor so all traffic leaving the VM goes through Tor. If the webserver on the VM is compromised, they get access to the VM, but the VM shouldn't know its real IP address (just the NAT'd one), or anything else about where it is or who it belongs to. You're still relying on there being no vulnerabilities in the VM software or the Tor software which allow an attacker to access the host system, but that sort of attack is much more difficult to pull off than compromising a web server, or any of the software being served by the web server. For all we know, this was a simple PHP exploit that allowed the attacker to make a HTTP request from the target server to a host on the wider Internet, to discover its IP. -- Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/ https://twitter.com/mickeyc Professional http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell PGP.mit.edu 0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Dutch police break into webservers over hidden services
Alternatively, one could run Tor on VMs that can only access the internet via OpenVPN-based "anonymity services". OpenVPN clients can be run on physical routers, with tunnels routed to physical LANs that lack management access. Even if attackers manage to compromise VM hosts, getting real external IPs also requires compromising the routers. One can readily extend this approach using nested OpenVPN tunnels. On 09/09/11 08:36, t...@lists.grepular.com wrote: > Probably the safest way to run a hidden service is to do it from inside > a VM. > > Install Tor on the host OS. Configure up the Hidden Service on the host > OS, but point it at the IP of the VM. Set up a firewall on the VM to > prevent all other network traffic going in or out of it. Or > alternatively use the TransPort functionality of Tor so all traffic > leaving the VM goes through Tor. > > If the webserver on the VM is compromised, they get access to the VM, > but the VM shouldn't know its real IP address (just the NAT'd one), or > anything else about where it is or who it belongs to. > > You're still relying on there being no vulnerabilities in the VM > software or the Tor software which allow an attacker to access the host > system, but that sort of attack is much more difficult to pull off than > compromising a web server, or any of the software being served by the > web server. > > For all we know, this was a simple PHP exploit that allowed the attacker > to make a HTTP request from the target server to a host on the wider > Internet, to discover its IP. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] TB-1.4.2
On Fri, Sep 09, 2011 at 07:41:28AM +, Orionjur Tor-admin wrote: > I have install the TB-1.4.2 on my Iceweasel 3.5.16 working under Debian > Squeeze AMD64. You should realize that using Torbutton on your own browser is a dying concept: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/toggle-or-not-toggle-end-torbutton There aren't that many known bugs now in using Torbutton this way, but in a few months there may well be known serious bugs that we have chosen not to fix. > I can see new option "New Identity" in that version of TB, but it is > disables. > What is that option and why it disabled? http://archives.seul.org/tor/talk/Aug-2011/msg00241.html "However, the New Identity button and the Hotmail fix are only available to Tor Browser Bundle users." > Furtherinmore, there are no option "reffer spoof" in the TB-1.4.2; why? The changelog of Torbutton 1.4.1 includes * bug 3809: Disable referer spoofing (fixes navigation issues) https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3809 --Roger ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Dutch police break into webservers over hidden services
On Fri, Sep 9, 2011 at 6:14 AM, Gozu-san wrote: > Alternatively, one could run Tor on VMs that can only access the > internet via OpenVPN-based "anonymity services". OpenVPN clients can be OpenVPN-based "anonymity services" ~= snake oil. If you're running a hidden service you've already got a perfectly good network anonymity service running. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Mac?
On 09/09/11 03:02, Andre Risling wrote:
> - Why would someone want to change ("spoof") their MAC address?
If you're an activist who travels the country and uses free WiFi to
access the internet, you might not want to make it any easier for law
enforcement to track your movements.
Julian
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Re: [tor-talk] Check wether IP has been a Tor node
On Fri, Sep 09, 2011 at 12:52:36PM +0200, morphium wrote: > where is the Page, where I can check wether an IP has been an exit > node at a given time? https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html or https://metrics.torproject.org/relay-search.html Good luck! Let us know if we can be more helpful. --Roger ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Check wether IP has been a Tor node
* morphium schrieb am 2011-09-09 um 12:52 Uhr: > where is the Page, where I can check wether an IP has been an exit > node at a given time? https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html> Besten Gruß -- Jens Kubieziel http://www.kubieziel.de Enten legen ihre Eier in aller Stille, Hühner gackern dabei wie verrückt. Was ist die Folge? Alle Welt ißt Hühnereier. William Claude Fields signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] Check wether IP has been a Tor node
Hi, where is the Page, where I can check wether an IP has been an exit node at a given time? Thanks! -- morphium - morph...@jabber.ccc.de - 113332157 http://identi.ca/morphium - http://twitter.com/morphium86 ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] TB-1.4.2
On 09.09.2011 10:36, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Fri, Sep 09, 2011 at 07:41:28AM +, Orionjur Tor-admin wrote: >> I have install the TB-1.4.2 on my Iceweasel 3.5.16 working under Debian >> Squeeze AMD64. > > You should realize that using Torbutton on your own browser is a dying > concept: > https://blog.torproject.org/blog/toggle-or-not-toggle-end-torbutton As I remember when the discussing that issue was expressed the opinion that in the Debian's Iceweales (as an old version of FF) it was not needing urgently to migrate to the Tor Browser Bundles. > There aren't that many known bugs now in using Torbutton this way, > but in a few months there may well be known serious bugs that we have > chosen not to fix. > So, it was wrong and it needs to migrate. When the Tor team you intend to release a deb-packet for the TBB? >> I can see new option "New Identity" in that version of TB, but it is >> disables. >> What is that option and why it disabled? > > http://archives.seul.org/tor/talk/Aug-2011/msg00241.html > > "However, the New Identity button and the Hotmail fix are only > available to Tor Browser Bundle users." > >> Furtherinmore, there are no option "reffer spoof" in the TB-1.4.2; why? > > The changelog of Torbutton 1.4.1 includes > * bug 3809: Disable referer spoofing (fixes navigation issues) > > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3809 > > --Roger > What means the next: "Referer spoofing breaks browser navigation due to an interaction with our content policy"? And why Mike think that the referrer blocking feature is not very useful? It seems to me that it - if that works without another problem - could increase anonimity, am I wrong? ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Dutch police break into webservers over hidden services
On 09.09.2011 08:36, t...@lists.grepular.com wrote: > On 09/09/11 06:43, Orionjur Tor-admin wrote: > >> Very intresting what is the vulnerabilities they used for breaking systems? >> In the lite of that facts I don't know what I need to advice my clients >> - setting up hidden services on their home computers or on overseas >> vdses? (My clients are not providers of child pornography but they are >> fighters with tyrannical regim). >> The first method is the best from the point of view of information >> defense but the second method is the best for defense of persons of >> operators of that services... > > Probably the safest way to run a hidden service is to do it from inside > a VM. > > Install Tor on the host OS. Configure up the Hidden Service on the host > OS, but point it at the IP of the VM. Set up a firewall on the VM to > prevent all other network traffic going in or out of it. Or > alternatively use the TransPort functionality of Tor so all traffic > leaving the VM goes through Tor. > > If the webserver on the VM is compromised, they get access to the VM, > but the VM shouldn't know its real IP address (just the NAT'd one), or > anything else about where it is or who it belongs to. > > You're still relying on there being no vulnerabilities in the VM > software or the Tor software which allow an attacker to access the host > system, but that sort of attack is much more difficult to pull off than > compromising a web server, or any of the software being served by the > web server. > > For all we know, this was a simple PHP exploit that allowed the attacker > to make a HTTP request from the target server to a host on the wider > Internet, to discover its IP. > > > How I need to set my VM for thas purposes? I use a VirtualBox under transparently torified user on host machine for the most secure browsing in the Internet but I cannot to get access to that machine through ssh from my host machine inspite setting up suitable port forwarding in VBox settings. I think that the settings of my host firewall prevent that access. So, I'll probably have such problem in the connection between my host and guest machines if I set up a web-server on VM, and my hidden service on my host. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] TB-1.4.2
Is there a way to not to close Vidalia and Tor itself with browser exit? Or open TB`s Firefox separately fully functional, with "New identity" option? When I need to restart FF or when it crashes, it is very inconvenient to start all cycle again: Vidalia-Tor connect-Browser. I realize that it is the only reason for me right now wny I run Firefox separately (though that one which TB contains). ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Dutch police break into webservers over hidden services
On 09/09/11 12:19, Orionjur Tor-admin wrote: > How I need to set my VM for thas purposes? > I use a VirtualBox under transparently torified user on host machine for > the most secure browsing in the Internet but I cannot to get access to > that machine through ssh from my host machine inspite setting up > suitable port forwarding in VBox settings. > I think that the settings of my host firewall prevent that access. > So, I'll probably have such problem in the connection between my host > and guest machines if I set up a web-server on VM, and my hidden service > on my host. I don't know what you're asking from me... If your firewall is blocking the connections, reconfigure your firewall to allow them. -- Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/ https://twitter.com/mickeyc Professional http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell PGP.mit.edu 0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Mac?
--
andr...@fastmail.fm
On Friday, September 09, 2011 11:08 AM, "Julian Yon"
wrote:
> On 09/09/11 03:02, Andre Risling wrote:
> > - Why would someone want to change ("spoof") their MAC address?
>
> If you're an activist who travels the country and uses free WiFi to
> access the internet, you might not want to make it any easier for law
> enforcement to track your movements.
>
>
> Julian
I've forgotten already if someone answered thisbut with the
free WiFi connections do they typically get your MAC address?
I've noticed in Ubuntu that when the computer is booted up and before I
connect to the web the computer needs the "keyring" password. No matter
whether I try to change my mac address that stupid keyring thing won't
let me do anything until it gets the "answer it wants". So the password
is entered and the computer connects the web (actually just to the
router to get the wireless signal) and then I change the MAC address.
If I were trying to hide my mac address, no matter where I am, I have to
assume my real mac address would go out over the web or to the router
before I could change my address.
Is that correct?
>
> ___
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[tor-talk] Please help me to resolve the following error
Dear All, Good Day!! I am configuring my own private tor directory server but I have finalized all the steps but when I run tor with my own configured tor configuration file, it gives me the following error: Sep 09 12:44:39.953 [notice] Tor v0.2.1.30. This is experimental software. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity. (Running on Linux i686) Sep 09 12:44:39.955 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Running as authoritative directory, but no ORPort set. Sep 09 12:44:39.955 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. Please can any body help to get rid off this error because I have to finish the configuration of directory server by the coming Sunday, so any help will be highly appreciated. Thanks and Regards, Faisal Rehman___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Check wether IP has been a Tor node
Hi! 2011/9/9 Roger Dingledine : > On Fri, Sep 09, 2011 at 12:52:36PM +0200, morphium wrote: >> where is the Page, where I can check wether an IP has been an exit >> node at a given time? > > https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html > or > https://metrics.torproject.org/relay-search.html > > Good luck! Let us know if we can be more helpful. Thanks for the response. I wonder why I didn't find that via google, I searched for "check IP was tor exit" and such. Also now googling for "check whether some IP address was a Tor relay" - which is pretty similar to the string on exonerator page: "or: a website that tells you whether some IP address was a Tor relay" doesn't lead me to a result on the first 5 pages (google). Could we include that in the FAQ (if it is already, I did not find it easy enough) and make it available for search enignes in a better way? (i.e. robots.txt is missing - that shouldnt stop engines from crawling, but probably it's better if one is there, allowing everything? I don't know). Thanks! -- morphium - morph...@jabber.ccc.de - 113332157 http://identi.ca/morphium - http://twitter.com/morphium86 ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Mac?
On Fri, Sep 09, 2011 at 01:43:13PM +0200, Andre Risling wrote: > I've forgotten already if someone answered thisbut with the > free WiFi connections do they typically get your MAC address? > > I've noticed in Ubuntu that when the computer is booted up and before I > connect to the web the computer needs the "keyring" password. No matter > whether I try to change my mac address that stupid keyring thing won't > let me do anything until it gets the "answer it wants". So the password > is entered and the computer connects the web (actually just to the > router to get the wireless signal) and then I change the MAC address. > If I were trying to hide my mac address, no matter where I am, I have to > assume my real mac address would go out over the web or to the router > before I could change my address. > > Is that correct? Your MAC, being an OSI Layer 2 feature, is not propagated beyond the first router (unless you use IPv6, which can embed MAC information within the /64 local part of the address -- Tor doesn't do IPv6 yet) or malware on your system sends that information). -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Mac?
On 09/09/11 12:43, Andre Risling wrote: > I've forgotten already if someone answered thisbut with the > free WiFi connections do they typically get your MAC address? Any router you connect to knows your MAC address. That's a necessary part of how the network works. It isn't propagated further than that, i.e. webservers won't know it. *But* the router itself can log it, thereby recording that your computer was there, which could be taken to imply that so were you. > If I were trying to hide my mac address, no matter where I am, I have to > assume my real mac address would go out over the web or to the router > before I could change my address. > > Is that correct? Your MAC address will not be broadcast over the Internet. It will be known to a router, but only once you connect to the network. If you want to manually set your address each time then you'll need to ensure that "Connect automatically" isn't checked in the connection settings. Be aware that the default MAC assigned to your network interface isn't random. As with most things in computing there is a predefined format, and an unusual or malformed address may cause you technical problems or draw attention. If you're unsure of what you're doing, consider using a tool such as macchanger (sudo apt-get install macchanger) which will take care of picking a plausible address for you. Julian signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] HTTPS Everywhere
Colin Klett writes: > I'm using the current Browser Bundle and wondering if installing the HTTPS > Everywhere extension would provide any additional security? If you're using the current Browser Bundle, you're already using the HTTPS Everywhere extension. -- Seth Schoen Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 +1 415 436 9333 x107 ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] HTTPS Everywhere
I'm using the current Browser Bundle and wondering if installing the HTTPS Everywhere extension would provide any additional security? ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor banned in Pakistan.
DARPA has funded a project to develop a stego type communications system as a "next generation TOR". Its called SAFER Warfighter Communications. http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/I2O/Programs/SAFER_Warfighter_Communications_(SAFER).aspx On Sep 8, 2011, at 7:00 PM, "Michael Holstein" wrote: > >> Very disturbing. I wonder if its possible to hide encrypted traffic as >> seemingly unencrypted http traffic in much the same way as a gpg key is >> rendered as ascii armored, or stenographically inside images. Although >> such methods may be inefficient, they may be good enough for some purposes. >> > > Of course .. any number of mechanisms exist to do exactly this, although > (generally speaking) it's not to provide a "live" VPN service. A > constant HTTP stream of nothing but .jpegs would be pretty suspicious. > Video-type services might be a better bet (because the traffic would be > more believable) but if you can't encrypt it, all that's required to > render the stego useless is to (slightly) re-encode it transparently > (eg: take your 640x480 MPEG stream and run it through ffmpeg to lower > the bitrate by 10k or some such). > > One would detect this in the same way you do encrypted botnets .. you > stop looking for patterns *in* the traffic and start looking at *traffic > patterns* (ie: "that's odd, why is this machine doing a constant stream > of ICMP all of a sudden? .. what are these long DNS queries for?, why > are the HTTPS traffic ratios fairly symmetrical?" .. etc). > >> It would be good to know what technologies these ISPs will implement to >> do the packet inspection for encrypted tunnels. Half the problem is you >> don't really know what they'll be looking for and so you don't know how >> to circumvent. >> > > That's the key distinction here .. rather than try to "ban with > technology" (ie: "great firewall of china"), they went for "ban with > policy" .. meaning you'll likely never know if you're "getting away with > it" until the ISI shows up and drags you off. > > I suppose a clever service would be for Twitter (et.al.) to allow you to > upload a keypair for stego and a https "twitpic" site that allowed each > image to be checked for a valid signature and stego'd text, which would > then be published. > > Regards, > > Michael Holstein > Cleveland State University > > > ___ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Location App
I know I will need to supply the exitnode fingerprints, I was looking for a way to get the list of fingerprints form a tor status server and automate the whole process On Fri, Sep 9, 2011 at 3:12 AM, Runa A. Sandvik wrote: > On Fri, Sep 9, 2011 at 12:11 AM, SpookFX wrote: > > Hi all, > > I am trying to create an app that allows you to choose a location for > your > > end point, to that end I'm trying to get the location and fingerprint of > > endpoints from a torstatus server. I'd like to use something like curl or > > wget to get the data. > > I'm open to suggestion, and ideas on how best to make this app. > > I'm not sure if the data I want can be extracted from a torstatus > server... > > so HELP! > > This might be what you're looking for: > https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#ChooseEntryExit > > -- > Runa A. Sandvik > ___ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor banned in Pakistan.
On 09/08/2011 08:02 PM, David H. Lipman wrote: > From: "Anthony G. Basile" > >> On 09/08/2011 05:23 PM, Matthew wrote: >>> >>> http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/30/pakistan-bans-encryption-software >>> >>> >> >> Very disturbing. I wonder if its possible to hide encrypted traffic as >> seemingly unencrypted http traffic in much the same way as a gpg key is >> rendered as ascii armored, or stenographically inside images. Although >> such methods may be inefficient, they may be good enough for some purposes. >> >> It would be good to know what technologies these ISPs will implement to >> do the packet inspection for encrypted tunnels. Half the problem is you >> don't really know what they'll be looking for and so you don't know how >> to circumvent. >> > > LOL > > Steganography not stenography. ;-) > > They are vastly different concepts. > Yeah! The hand is faster than the brain. -- Anthony G. Basile, Ph. D. Chair of Information Technology D'Youville College Buffalo, NY 14201 (716) 829-8197 ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] TB-1.4.2
On 9/9/2011 7:20 AM, Greg Kalitnikoff wrote: Is there a way to not to close Vidalia and Tor itself with browser exit? Or open TB`s Firefox separately fully functional, with "New identity" option? When I need to restart FF or when it crashes, it is very inconvenient to start all cycle again: Vidalia-Tor connect-Browser. I realize that it is the only reason for me right now wny I run Firefox separately (though that one which TB contains). Hi, I don't believe so. I asked the same thing a few wks ago, because of running other apps thru Tor, when didn't necessarily want / need TBB open. Or, if TBB hangs / crashes, & don't want to lose Tor connection on the other app(s). Answer I was given - Tor/ Vidalia & TBB can be installed on same machine, because TBB runs out of it's own folder (or off a USB drive) & uses separate Firefox profile. Running both at SAME time could be a problem (don't remember that part of answer), but haven't tried it out yet. I've slept since then, & forgot exactly what one of the gurus said - ** if TBB & Tor - Vidalia bundle could be RUN at same time (perhaps w/ some mods)? ** I'd appreciate a refresher on that.:) ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor banned in Pakistan.
>> http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/30/pakistan-bans-encryption-software >> >> > It is very bad news because I am affraid that another tyrannical regimes > such as Russian can make do it too. > But it seems to me that Tor-users can use bridges and etc. for avoiding > repressive measures from "law enforcement bodies" of their countries (if > the termin "law is applicable to such bodies :) ). Hi Orionjur, Sorry to burst your bubble, but Russia is one of the last places I can imagine banning VPN's and Tor, especially from what I gather from my contacts in Russia... the FSB already has direct access to all Internet connection hubs (i.e. in an apartment building), completely by-passing ISPs and legal requirements! Have you seen the Russian net? The amount of piracy (as well as Tor traffic!) that goes through there is staggering! Regardless of all of the capabilities, authorities are simply not interested in you unless you *really* step on some toes (and, hint hint, running a Tor relay or exit node hasn't drawn their wrath so far)... And if you do happen to be such a person, it is much easier to break your door down using existing laws (using the crackdown on pirate copies of Windows as an excuse, for example) than amending the laws to include VPNs! But you're definitely right about the danger of the capability to block VPN's - I thought it was restricted to China and other such extreme regimes. If they can break your door down *just* because they're seeing encrypted traffic, there's definitely a problem! Which, of course, doesn't eliminate false positives, like running Facebook with the https always option turned on, or gmail, or any other SSL-encrypted site... -- GPG Key: CF345FAE ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Dutch Police Investigation & Tor Spike: Correlation Or Also Causation?
On Sun, Sep 04, 2011 at 06:03:35PM +0200, k...@uva.nl wrote 7.4K bytes in 147 lines about: : Requests: Why? [1] from the Tor-talk mailinglist. Some believe (credits : to @ly_gs for enlightening me) that the August 2011 spike in Tor users : via bridges may be related to the Dutch police investigation on Tor : hidden services hosting child pornography, which also took place during How do these two things go together? Hidden services are unrelated to bridges. And we're seeing massive bridge queries, and huge spikes of bridge useres in European countries. -- Andrew pgp key: 0x74ED336B ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor banned in Pakistan.
On Thu, Sep 08, 2011 at 10:23:41PM +0100, pump...@cotse.net wrote 1.4K bytes in 42 lines about: : http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/30/pakistan-bans-encryption-software I talked to someone from the pakistani government about this encryption ban early this spring. They were concerned that this law would be far too broad and demolish whatever nascent e-commerce and online banking markets that had started in the country. They were also concerned that too many people in the government didn't understand the difference between a VPN and HTTPS. This person talked to American counter-terrorism people and found that actual terrorists were not using VPNs nor HTTPS at all. They stating right out in the open, from their registered DSL lines, their plans, where they lived, and what they were planning to do on various online chat network and forums. While technically, yes this law does make anything that uses encryption on the Internet in pakistan illegal, it was primarily aimed at the various VPN providers run by known criminal organizations. Tor, HTTPS Everywhere, and other tools are now illegal. Whether someone is actually prosecuted for using such tools in country remains to be seen. -- Andrew pgp key: 0x74ED336B ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Location App
On Fri, Sep 09, 2011 at 08:56:07PM +0100, spoo...@gmail.com wrote 3.5K bytes in 93 lines about: : I know I will need to supply the exitnode fingerprints, I was looking for a : way to get the list of fingerprints form a tor status server and automate : the whole process This app you want to create is already an open item for Vidalia, just waiting for someone to do it. As for getting the fingerprints, they're all in the cached-descriptors file on the tor client. Therefore, they are local to the person running the app. -- Andrew pgp key: 0x74ED336B ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Dutch police break into webservers over hidden services
On Fri, Sep 09, 2011 at 05:43:50AM +, tor-ad...@orionjurinform.com wrote 2.2K bytes in 45 lines about: : Very intresting what is the vulnerabilities they used for breaking systems? This question can likely only be answered by the authorities. The obvious attacks are against the webserver itself (apache, IIS, nginx, etc) or some interpreted language, like PHP, Python, or Java. Hidden services provide the path and addressing to a destination. They don't provide the application or content at the address. You need some sort of daemon/server software to provide the content and application. -- Andrew pgp key: 0x74ED336B ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] Better TBB about:config settings(?); re: browsing and loading speed, etc.
Hello,
I just made a new trac ticket for this topic. In case this e-mail does not
appear properly formatted on TorTalk list, the trac ticket can be found here:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3978
I have been testing the following about:config settings (specific to
Firefox 6) for a couple of weeks. I have used very similar settings for
TBB since Firefox v3.x.x. These settings do seem to (very noticeably)
speed up browsing.
The only setting I think may do well with a bit of tweaking is
nglayout.initialpaint.delay, I doubled the Firefox default of 250 ms.
Doing so seems to (noticeably) decrease total page load time, while
(unnoticeably) increasing time to first load on page.
I tried to test these settings in TBB vs. vanilla TBB but I don't know
how to configure Tor to use the same circuit for all speed tests. I am very
open to corrections and suggestions.
// Spell check works with all fields
user_pref("layout.spellcheckDefault", 2);
// defulat is 250 ms, longer wait time means faster total page load time, but
slower inital page loading.
user_pref("nglayout.initialpaint.delay", 500);
// Stops the display of placeholders while images are loading to speed up the
page. Default is True
user_pref("browser.display.show_image_placeholders", false);
// Sets the maximum number of times the content will do timer-based reflows to
5. After this, the page will only reflow once it is finished downloading. This
is a new value. Default is -1 (no limit)
user_pref("content.notify.backoffcount", 5);
// Sets the minimum amount of time to wait between periodic reflowing of the
page to 0.12 seconds – stops Firefox becoming slow by reflowing too frequently.
This is a new value. Default is 12
user_pref("content.notify.interval", 12);
// Sets the maximum amount of time Firefox will be unresponsive while rendering
pages – set to 3 times the content.notify.interval above. This is a new value.
Default is 36
user_pref("content.max.tokenizing.time", 36);
// Ensures Firefox does not reflow pages at an interval any higher than that
specified by content.notify.interval above. This is a new value. Default is True
user_pref("content.notify.ontimer", true);
// Sets Firefox to interrupt parsing a page to respond to UI (user interface)
events to prevent it becoming unresponsive until parsing is complete. This is a
new value. Default is True
user_pref("content.interrupt.parsing", true);
// Sets the number of microseconds of inactivity that puts Firefox into low
frequency interrupt mode. This is a new value. Default is 75
user_pref("content.switch.threshold", 75);
// Disables IPv6 DNS lookups to prevent a significant delay with poorly
configured IPv6 servers.
user_pref("network.dns.disableIPv6", true);
// This preference takes values between 1 and 255 inclusive, directly
corresponding to the maximum number of HTTP keep-alive connections the
application can have open at once to the proxy server. Default is 8.
user_pref("network.http.max-persistent-connections-per-proxy", 16);
// Increases the maximum number of persistent connections per server which can
help speed up loading of multimedia rich sites. This settings must be equal to,
or greater than, "Network.http.max-persistent-connections-per-proxy". Default
is 15.
user_pref("network.http.max-connections-per-server", 16);
// Amount of time in seconds to keep keep-alive connections alive. Default is
115 seconds.
user_pref("network.http.keep-alive.timeout", 600);
// [! Not needed: TorBrowser already has correct configuration] Use keep-alive
connections whenever possible.
//user_pref("network.http.proxy.keep-alive", true);
// [! Not needed: TorBrowser already has correct configuration] Stops Firefox
automatically prefetching (loading) the contents of pages linked to by the page
you are viewing – in most cases you will never visit those links so this time
is wasted and it is a security risk because you are unwittingly downloading
(possible virus/adult) content only linked to by the current page but which you
have not chosen to load. Default is True.
//user_pref("network.prefetch-next", false);
// [! Not needed: TorBrowser already has correct configuration] Can send
multiple requests to a server together in order to speed up loading of
webpages. This is not supported by ALL servers – some servers may even behave
incorrectly if they receive pipelined requests. Default is False
//user_pref("network.http.pipelining", true);
// [! Not needed: TorBrowser already has correct configuration] Can send
multiple requests to a server together in order to speed up loading of
webpages. This is not supported by ALL servers – some servers may even behave
incorrectly if they receive pipelined requests. Default is False
//user_pref("network.http.pipelining.ssl", true);
// [! Not needed: TorBrowser already has correct configuration] Can send
multiple requests to a server together in order to speed up
[tor-talk] Is the Hidden Wiki dead?!
Hello, For some days (weeks?) the Hidden Wiki (http://kpvz7ki2v5agwt35.onion) has been down. Does anyone know what's going on? Will it come back up soon? Are there other places that list many Hidden Services, besides the Hidden Wiki? ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Is the Hidden Wiki dead?!
--- On Fri, 9/9/11, John Crimby wrote: > > Hello, > > For some days (weeks?) the Hidden Wiki (http://kpvz7ki2v5agwt35.onion) > has been down. Does anyone know what's going on? Will it come back up > soon? Are there other places that list many Hidden Services, besides > the Hidden Wiki? Well, it looks like _all_ HS are broken in TBB as of (at least) Tor v0.2.2.31-rc. None of the > 20 HS I tried to visit with TBB (Tor v0.2.2.31-rc) and TBB (Tor v0.2.2.32) will load. However, tested HSs do load via. Tor2Web. I made a bug ticket here: "All tested Hidden Services unreachable via. TBB, but are reacable via. Tor2Web." https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3979 ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] TBB 2.2.32 & Automatic Updates
Thus spake sigi (torn...@cpunk.de): > > We hope to better answer these questions in a Tor Browser Bundle > > design document. Just one of the many other items that were supposed > > to go into a new "stable" release that got pushed aside due to recent > > events: > > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3812 > > I'd really like to have such a document. I realized I neglected to mention that you can view the philosophical underpinnings of our approach here: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-private-browsing-modes-do-not-track-vs-real-privacy-design Much of that thinking will be reflected in the design document. -- Mike Perry Mad Computer Scientist fscked.org evil labs pgpbicxunCs0T.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Is the Hidden Wiki dead?!
Arma was kind enough to bonk me on the head to point out the problem is one of timezone or clock or date. He was correct. My clock was over 180 minutes off (due to timezone issues). Hidden Services are working just fine. ... back to your regularly scheduled broadcasts ... ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Is the Hidden Wiki dead?!
On Friday, September 09, 2011 7:42 PM, "John Crimby" wrote: > --- On Fri, 9/9/11, John Crimby wrote: > > > > Hello, > > > > For some days (weeks?) the Hidden Wiki (http://kpvz7ki2v5agwt35.onion) > > has been down. Does anyone know what's going on? Will it come back up > > soon? Are there other places that list many Hidden Services, besides > > the Hidden Wiki? > > Well, it looks like _all_ HS are broken in TBB as of (at least) Tor > v0.2.2.31-rc. None of the > 20 HS I tried to visit with TBB (Tor > v0.2.2.31-rc) and TBB (Tor v0.2.2.32) will load. However, tested HSs do > load via. Tor2Web. > > I made a bug ticket here: > > "All tested Hidden Services unreachable via. TBB, but are reacable via. > Tor2Web." > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3979 > Still works with 0.2.2.22-alpha GD -- http://www.fastmail.fm - Same, same, but different... ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] Email through Tor and VPN questions
Hello, I recently setup my own Tor relay, and its exciting! But I've had the following questions about Tor for a while: (1) I read in a recent list posting that paid "private" VPN services provides no anonymity. According to some of those providers, they don't keep any log of your connections. Is this just a marketing gimmick, or are there other reasons why a VPN service provides no anonymity? Is there a side by side comparison between using Tor vs VPN? (2) The Tor network discourages some uses of it like BitTorrent (and other file sharing?). I can understand that from a bandwidth/speed perspective, but if I want to share files via BitTorrent (such as a GNU/Linux distro image), is there a way to make it more private? (2) I am using the FoxyProxy addon in Thunderbird 6 to use Tor as a proxy. Is this an effective way to improve my email privacy? The only other possible issue I can think of is that my email headers are "real", but I am not sure if that matters so much? (3) The Tor website is now encouraging the use of the new Tor Browser Bundle, and it seems that the TorButton Firefox addon will no longer be supported for much longer. Does that mean the only way for anonymous browsing via Tor is with the Tor Browser Bundle? Is there a way I can setup usual Firefox for browsing that is just as good as the Bundle? Perhaps by using FoxyProxy and other settings? Answers/explanations for any or all of the above questions would be great. Many thanks to the developers who made Tor the great service it is today. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor banned in Pakistan.
would using bridges prevent the ISP from knowing that a person is using tor? On Sat, Sep 10, 2011 at 1:04 AM, wrote: > On Thu, Sep 08, 2011 at 10:23:41PM +0100, pump...@cotse.net wrote 1.4K > bytes in 42 lines about: > : > http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/30/pakistan-bans-encryption-software > > I talked to someone from the pakistani government about this encryption > ban early this spring. They were concerned that this law would be far > too broad and demolish whatever nascent e-commerce and online banking > markets that had started in the country. They were also concerned that > too many people in the government didn't understand the difference > between a VPN and HTTPS. > > This person talked to American counter-terrorism people and found that > actual terrorists were not using VPNs nor HTTPS at all. They stating > right out in the open, from their registered DSL lines, their plans, > where they lived, and what they were planning to do on various online > chat network and forums. > > While technically, yes this law does make anything that uses encryption > on the Internet in pakistan illegal, it was primarily aimed at the > various VPN providers run by known criminal organizations. Tor, HTTPS > Everywhere, and other tools are now illegal. Whether someone is actually > prosecuted for using such tools in country remains to be seen. > > -- > Andrew > pgp key: 0x74ED336B > ___ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
