Re: [tor-talk] Tor in Mexico

2011-11-15 Thread andrew 
On Sat, Nov 12, 2011 at 08:30:45PM +0100, matej.kova...@owca.info wrote 1.0K 
bytes in 28 lines about:
: The site mentioned (http://www.nuevolaredoenvivo.es.tl/) is promoting
: Tor use. It seems the victim used Tor, but the gangsters were able to
: identify and kill him anyway...

There's nothing in the chron.com report, nor that site, that ties Tor
usage to the targeted/killed people. 

Using a hidden service may help protect both the site and users.

I talked to a journalist from a newspaper in Mexico City concerned about
journalist safety in light of the ongoing drug wars. Most of the
discussion was about how internet surveillance can happen and things
people can do to stay safe, even if they aren't reporting on the drug
wars.

There was another journalist from an activist organization with the same
sorts of questions.

In both cases, the bulk of the discussion wasn't around the technology,
but about the social aspects of anonymity. If you use tor to successfully
hide from an adversary who runs the ISP, but login to facebook and join
an anti-zeta group under your real name and profile, well, you've lost
your anonymity.

I mentioned http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/, specifically
http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/projects/guide/, as examples of
places to learn more about blogging/reporting in dangerous areas. CPJ
also has a guide to reporting in dangerous places,
https://www.cpj.org/reports/2003/02/journalist-safety-guide.php. 

This violence against journalists (both citizen and traditional) is
nothing new for lots of places in the world. It seems American's aren't
used to seeing it this close to our borders,
https://www.cpj.org/americas/mexico/.

Tor alone cannot save you in completely hostile situations. Understanding
the environment and making decisions on your own is key. Many people are
struggling with the understanding part due to being overwhelmed with
the technical knowledge required to stay completely safe online, yet
still live in a hostile area. The lack of understanding leads to poor or
uninformed decisions. No software is going to solve some of these issues.

>From talking to DEA agents and former drug/gang members, the drug cartels
are just as advanced as the police forces, if not more so.  We're seeing
the results of this in the targeted killings based on online activities.

-- 
Andrew
pgp key: 0x74ED336B
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[tor-talk] Amazon Cloud server

2011-11-15 Thread Rhona Mahony 
Why are we encouraged to use the Amazon Cloud VPS's for bridges only?  Why not 
set up some as relays?
~~Rhon

--
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rmah...@stanford.edu
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a search engine that keeps no 
record of your searches.
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Today's Topics:

   1. Re: Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud (Jan Weiher)
   2. Re: Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud (Runa A. Sandvik)
   3. Re: Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud (Roger Dingledine)
   4. Re: Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud (Jan Weiher)
   5. Re: Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud (Runa A. Sandvik)
   6. tor net questions (audd)
   7. Re: tor net questions (Roger Dingledine)
   8. Re: tor net questions (audd)


--

Message: 1
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 17:40:31 +0100
From: Jan Weiher 
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud
Message-ID: <4ec295ff.3070...@buksy.de>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252

Am 15.11.2011 07:52, schrieb Runa A. Sandvik:
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 1:28 AM, Mike Damm  wrote:
>> On Monday, November 14, 2011 9:30 PM, "Runa A. Sandvik"
>>  wrote:
>>> Hi everyone,
>>>
>>> The Tor Cloud project gives you a user-friendly way of deploying bridges
>>> to help users access an uncensored Internet. By setting up a bridge, you
>>> donate bandwidth to the Tor network and help improve the safety and
>>> speed at which users can access the Internet.
>>>
>>> Setting up a Tor bridge on Amazon EC2 is simple and will only take you a
>>> couple of minutes. The images have been configured with automatic
>>> package updates and port forwarding, so you do not have to worry about
>>> Tor not working or the server not getting security updates.
>>
>> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays says:
>> "Great. If you want to run several relays to donate more to the network,
>> we're happy with that. But please don't run more than a few dozen on the
>> same network, since part of the goal of the Tor network is dispersal and
>> diversity."
>>
>> I'm curious to know if 'MyFamily' is properly set on these instances, or
>> if Tor plans to bucket all instances within EC2 as part of the same
>> family?
>>
>> Assuming this is a non-issue... looks very awesome!
> 
> A bridge should not specify the ?MyFamily? option. You won't run a
> middle relay or an exit relay in the cloud, so this shouldn't be an
> issue.
> 

As far as I understand, this is correct if you only run bridges (because
a circuit never uses two bridges), but what if someone (like me) runs a
bridge and a normal relay as well? IMHO you don't want to use a relay
which is operated by the same operator as your bridge? Please correct
me, if I'm wrong.

Jan


--

Message: 2
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 17:29:12 +
From: "Runa A. Sandvik" 
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud
Message-ID:

Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252

On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 4:40 PM, Jan Weiher  wrote:
> Am 15.11.2011 07:52, schrieb Runa A. Sandvik:
>> On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 1:28 AM, Mike Damm  wrote:
>>> On Monday, November 14, 2011 9:30 PM, "Runa A. Sandvik"
>>>  wrote:
 Hi everyone,

 The Tor Cloud project gives you a user-friendly way of deploying bridges
 to help users access an uncensored Internet. By setting up a bridge, you
 donate bandwidth to the Tor network and help improve the safety and
 speed at which users can access the Internet.

 Setting up a Tor bridge on Amazon EC2 is simple and will only take you a
 couple of minutes. The images have been configured with automatic
 package updates and port forwarding, so you do not have to worry about
 Tor not working or the server not getting security updates.
>>>
>>> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays says:
>>> "Great. If you want to run several relays to donate more to the network,
>>> we're happy with that. But please don't run more than a few dozen on the
>>> same network, since part of the goal of the Tor network is dispersal and
>>> diversity."
>>>
>>> I'm curious to know if 'MyFamily' is properly set on these insta

Re: [tor-talk] Aurora tab loading status

2011-11-15 Thread Joe Btfsplk 

On 11/15/2011 5:06 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:

On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 05:01:48PM -0600, Joe Btfsplk wrote:

On one hand, I don't want to load up Aurora w/ all kinds of addons that
may interfere w/ Aurora's primary function.  On the other, unless just
going to one or 2 sites&  staying there, using stock Aurora is
irritating at best, when comes to knowing how page loading is
progressing.

I use Vidalia's bandwidth graph, and leave my Firefox alone.

It's not perfect either, but I've found that Firefox is not very good
at guessing how close it is to being ready, and as you say, I don't want
to load up my browser with all kinds of addons.

--Roger
I'm not sure I understand you - or vice versa.  I was speaking of a 
"monitor" for a * single page (tab) * being loaded, not total thru put.  
AFAICT, the Vidalia bandwidth monitor would only be useful for my 
purpose, if the one page loading was the ONLY thing using bandwidth 
(will never be the case).  AFAIK, it also can't show a monitor in addon 
bar, menu bar, etc., to see individual page loading progress at a glance.


 I'm just looking for an indicator (green bar, numbers - what ever) 
that shows at least a relative speed, i.e., or the bar's even moving or 
not (if not actual values), and a rough % of how much is left to load.  
So I know if the page is stalled, taking way longer than I'm willing to 
wait or almost thru loading.


Tab Mix Plus can show horiz. progress bars on each tab.  I've found 
they're pretty accurate & give a good idea if page is going to load or 
not.  I've not used the other progress bar addons from MAO, but some 
have several choices of type indicator you'd like to see.  If I 
remember, older Firefox versions had optional page loading status 
indicator - in lower L corner.  Opera had (has?) very similar, that 
showed speed & % transferred.

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Re: [tor-talk] Tor in Mexico

2011-11-15 Thread Mondior Folimun 
On Wednesday, November 16, 2011 12:08 AM, "Gozu-san" 
wrote:
> On 15/11/11 23:39, Mondior Folimun wrote:
>
> > On Monday, November 14, 2011 12:37 AM, "Gozu-san"
> >  wrote:
> >> On 12/11/11 20:50, Mondior Folimun wrote:
> >>
> >>> To be on the safe side, someone who speaks Spanish should create a
> >>> fake email account and make sure these people know about Tor
> >>> Bridges. If the Zetas are as reckless as they seem, it might not
> >>> be too long before any Tor user who directly accesses the Tor
> >>> network from the area is in danger, regardless of what they use
> >>> Tor for. https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges
> >>
> >> Assume that the Zetas have full admin access for all local and
> >> regional ISPs in the areas that they control.  Also assume that
> >> they know Tor very well, run relays, and routinely communicate
> >> through it.
> >>
> >> How safe would it be, in those areas, to access Tor through
> >> bridges?
> >
> > Isn't this exactly the situation for which bridges were designed?
> > For when your opponent has full control of your upstream and really
> > wants to stop you from using Tor?
>
> Arguably, the prudent threat model is that the Zetas will kill you if
> they learn that you're using Tor.  They can access available resources
> for finding bridge addresses .
> And they may have connection logs, so provisional obscurity isn't
> sufficient.

Prudent, yes.. But the product of probabilities of all of these events
seems low once you tack on bridge enumeration. Enumerating bridges is a
statistics game. You can only get a subset of them, which represents
your probability of finding a particular bridge user. Additionally, it
is possible to create unpublished bridges that are not available to the
public for discovery or use and share them directly with those in need.

I think that is why we're seeing random killings. If the Zetas have
these sorts of Internet surveillance capabilities, they don't seem to
always be inclined to pay the cost for their use if it is possible to
create fear without them.

I do think they may decide to change this policy, but most likely they
will find someone who is connecting to their target blogs directly and
torture or make an example out of them rather than going after Tor
bridge users. Tor bridge users will be much more expensive endeavor, and
killing a repeat blog commenter/user will have just as much if not more
effect to demonstrate their power. :/

-- 
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Re: [tor-talk] Tor in Mexico

2011-11-15 Thread Mondior Folimun 
On Monday, November 14, 2011 12:37 AM, "Gozu-san" 
wrote:
> On 12/11/11 20:50, Mondior Folimun wrote:
>
> > To be on the safe side, someone who speaks Spanish should create a
> > fake email account and make sure these people know about Tor
> > Bridges. If the Zetas are as reckless as they seem, it might not be
> > too long before any Tor user who directly accesses the Tor network
> > from the area is in danger, regardless of what they use Tor for.
> > https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges
>
> Assume that the Zetas have full admin access for all local and
> regional ISPs in the areas that they control.  Also assume that they
> know Tor very well, run relays, and routinely communicate through it.
>
> How safe would it be, in those areas, to access Tor through bridges?

Isn't this exactly the situation for which bridges were designed? For
when your opponent has full control of your upstream and really wants 
to stop you from using Tor?

China has had success enumerating and blocking bridges, so bridges are
obviously not bulletproof. So far, I think they are the only ones able
to block bridges reliably. A few countries have blocked the public Tor
network, though.

Therefore, it would seem that bridges are much safer than using normal
Tor, and normal Tor is in turn much safer than accessing the websites 
directly.

-- 
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Re: [tor-talk] Tor in Mexico

2011-11-15 Thread Gozu-san 
On 15/11/11 23:39, Mondior Folimun wrote:

> On Monday, November 14, 2011 12:37 AM, "Gozu-san" 
> wrote:
>> On 12/11/11 20:50, Mondior Folimun wrote:
>>
>>> To be on the safe side, someone who speaks Spanish should create a
>>> fake email account and make sure these people know about Tor
>>> Bridges. If the Zetas are as reckless as they seem, it might not be
>>> too long before any Tor user who directly accesses the Tor network
>>> from the area is in danger, regardless of what they use Tor for.
>>> https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges
>>
>> Assume that the Zetas have full admin access for all local and
>> regional ISPs in the areas that they control.  Also assume that they
>> know Tor very well, run relays, and routinely communicate through it.
>>
>> How safe would it be, in those areas, to access Tor through bridges?
> 
> Isn't this exactly the situation for which bridges were designed?
> For when your opponent has full control of your upstream and really
> wants to stop you from using Tor?

Arguably, the prudent threat model is that the Zetas will kill you if
they learn that you're using Tor.  They can access available resources
for finding bridge addresses .
And they may have connection logs, so provisional obscurity isn't
sufficient.
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Re: [tor-talk] tor net questions

2011-11-15 Thread Roger Dingledine 
On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 08:15:25PM +0100, audd wrote:
> but if it's so why GFW chinese censorship can track and deny access to
> tor bridge?

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problems-ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges

China is known to be doing #1, and recently suspected to be doing
something similar to #6.

> "p2p network means so many things..." where I can find something to
> study about it?
> yes... I'm a newbie...

You might like http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer

--Roger

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Re: [tor-talk] Aurora tab loading status

2011-11-15 Thread Roger Dingledine 
On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 05:01:48PM -0600, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
> On one hand, I don't want to load up Aurora w/ all kinds of addons that  
> may interfere w/ Aurora's primary function.  On the other, unless just  
> going to one or 2 sites & staying there, using stock Aurora is  
> irritating at best, when comes to knowing how page loading is 
> progressing.

I use Vidalia's bandwidth graph, and leave my Firefox alone.

It's not perfect either, but I've found that Firefox is not very good
at guessing how close it is to being ready, and as you say, I don't want
to load up my browser with all kinds of addons.

--Roger

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[tor-talk] Aurora tab loading status

2011-11-15 Thread Joe Btfsplk 
Since Firefox took any meaningful tab / page loading progress bar or 
indicator of any kind out, several versions ago, I rely on addons in 
Firefox to give some indication of how fast & how much is left to load.  
If a page is slow / hung, I just cancel.  Can't tell that in stock Aurora.


Swirling dots don't tell anything.  Does anyone else use addon like Tab 
Mix Plus (that has tab loading progress options), or Status-4-Evar, etc?

https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/status-4-evar/

There's so much about Firefox & thus Aurora, that is almost a necessity, 
IMO - esp. if using slower Tor network.  Not just tab progress bars.


On one hand, I don't want to load up Aurora w/ all kinds of addons that 
may interfere w/ Aurora's primary function.  On the other, unless just 
going to one or 2 sites & staying there, using stock Aurora is 
irritating at best, when comes to knowing how page loading is progressing.


Thanks.
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Re: [tor-talk] tor net questions

2011-11-15 Thread audd 
On 15/11/2011 19:22, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 07:16:19PM +0100, audd wrote:
>> if TOr is p2p network, why all connection I see on the network-map comes
>> from in the middle of U.s.A?
>> the nodes I see are really geolocalised in that areas?
> Vidalia has one location for each country. So that's one dot for every
> relay in the US.
>
> (Vidalia used to do geolocation at the city level rather than the country
> level, but we got rid of the feature because it was too much overhead.)
>
> And lastly, the phrase "p2p network" means so many things these days
> that at this point it means nothing at all.
>
> --Roger
>
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but if it's so why GFW chinese censorship can track and deny access to
tor bridge?
"p2p network means so many things..." where I can find something to
study about it?
yes... I'm a newbie...
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[tor-talk] tor net questions

2011-11-15 Thread audd 
if TOr is p2p network, why all connection I see on the network-map comes
from in the middle of U.s.A?
the nodes I see are really geolocalised in that areas?
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Re: [tor-talk] Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud

2011-11-15 Thread Runa A. Sandvik 
On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 5:33 PM, Roger Dingledine  wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 05:29:12PM +, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
>> >> A bridge should not specify the ?MyFamily? option. You won't run a
>> >> middle relay or an exit relay in the cloud, so this shouldn't be an
>> >> issue.
>> >
>> > As far as I understand, this is correct if you only run bridges (because
>> > a circuit never uses two bridges), but what if someone (like me) runs a
>> > bridge and a normal relay as well? IMHO you don't want to use a relay
>> > which is operated by the same operator as your bridge? Please correct
>> > me, if I'm wrong.
>>
>> Yes, you should set the MyFamily option in the Tor configuration file
>> if you run both a bridge and a relay.
>
> No, this is dangerous: if you list your bridge as part of your family in
> the relay descriptor, then everybody can learn your bridge fingerprint,
> and they can look up your bridge's descriptor (and thus location) at
> the bridge directory authority.

Ah, thanks for correcting me. Maybe we should update the Tor manual to
point out that this option is for relays only, and not bridges?

-- 
Runa A. Sandvik
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Re: [tor-talk] Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud

2011-11-15 Thread Jan Weiher 


Am 15.11.2011 18:33, schrieb Roger Dingledine:
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 05:29:12PM +, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
 A bridge should not specify the ?MyFamily? option. You won't run a
 middle relay or an exit relay in the cloud, so this shouldn't be an
 issue.
>>>
>>> As far as I understand, this is correct if you only run bridges (because
>>> a circuit never uses two bridges), but what if someone (like me) runs a
>>> bridge and a normal relay as well? IMHO you don't want to use a relay
>>> which is operated by the same operator as your bridge? Please correct
>>> me, if I'm wrong.
>>
>> Yes, you should set the MyFamily option in the Tor configuration file
>> if you run both a bridge and a relay.
> 
> No, this is dangerous: if you list your bridge as part of your family in
> the relay descriptor, then everybody can learn your bridge fingerprint,
> and they can look up your bridge's descriptor (and thus location) at
> the bridge directory authority.

Okay, I already changed my torrc. Maybe this should be pointed out in
the manpage / tor faq?

regards,
Jan
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Re: [tor-talk] Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud

2011-11-15 Thread Roger Dingledine 
On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 05:29:12PM +, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
> >> A bridge should not specify the ?MyFamily? option. You won't run a
> >> middle relay or an exit relay in the cloud, so this shouldn't be an
> >> issue.
> >
> > As far as I understand, this is correct if you only run bridges (because
> > a circuit never uses two bridges), but what if someone (like me) runs a
> > bridge and a normal relay as well? IMHO you don't want to use a relay
> > which is operated by the same operator as your bridge? Please correct
> > me, if I'm wrong.
> 
> Yes, you should set the MyFamily option in the Tor configuration file
> if you run both a bridge and a relay.

No, this is dangerous: if you list your bridge as part of your family in
the relay descriptor, then everybody can learn your bridge fingerprint,
and they can look up your bridge's descriptor (and thus location) at
the bridge directory authority.

We currently don't have a good answer for putting bridges and relays
in the same family. Suggestions welcome. (Note that if the bridge and
the relay are in the same /16 network, Tor clients will automatically
know they're in the same family. So the unsolved case is where they're
in different networks but operated by the same human. My inclination is
to not worry about it that much.)

--Roger

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Re: [tor-talk] Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud

2011-11-15 Thread Runa A. Sandvik 
On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 4:40 PM, Jan Weiher  wrote:
> Am 15.11.2011 07:52, schrieb Runa A. Sandvik:
>> On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 1:28 AM, Mike Damm  wrote:
>>> On Monday, November 14, 2011 9:30 PM, "Runa A. Sandvik"
>>>  wrote:
 Hi everyone,

 The Tor Cloud project gives you a user-friendly way of deploying bridges
 to help users access an uncensored Internet. By setting up a bridge, you
 donate bandwidth to the Tor network and help improve the safety and
 speed at which users can access the Internet.

 Setting up a Tor bridge on Amazon EC2 is simple and will only take you a
 couple of minutes. The images have been configured with automatic
 package updates and port forwarding, so you do not have to worry about
 Tor not working or the server not getting security updates.
>>>
>>> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays says:
>>> "Great. If you want to run several relays to donate more to the network,
>>> we're happy with that. But please don't run more than a few dozen on the
>>> same network, since part of the goal of the Tor network is dispersal and
>>> diversity."
>>>
>>> I'm curious to know if 'MyFamily' is properly set on these instances, or
>>> if Tor plans to bucket all instances within EC2 as part of the same
>>> family?
>>>
>>> Assuming this is a non-issue... looks very awesome!
>>
>> A bridge should not specify the ‘MyFamily’ option. You won't run a
>> middle relay or an exit relay in the cloud, so this shouldn't be an
>> issue.
>>
>
> As far as I understand, this is correct if you only run bridges (because
> a circuit never uses two bridges), but what if someone (like me) runs a
> bridge and a normal relay as well? IMHO you don't want to use a relay
> which is operated by the same operator as your bridge? Please correct
> me, if I'm wrong.

Yes, you should set the MyFamily option in the Tor configuration file
if you run both a bridge and a relay.

-- 
Runa A. Sandvik
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Re: [tor-talk] tor net questions

2011-11-15 Thread Roger Dingledine 
On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 07:16:19PM +0100, audd wrote:
> if TOr is p2p network, why all connection I see on the network-map comes
> from in the middle of U.s.A?
> the nodes I see are really geolocalised in that areas?

Vidalia has one location for each country. So that's one dot for every
relay in the US.

(Vidalia used to do geolocation at the city level rather than the country
level, but we got rid of the feature because it was too much overhead.)

And lastly, the phrase "p2p network" means so many things these days
that at this point it means nothing at all.

--Roger

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Re: [tor-talk] Run Tor as a bridge in the Amazon Cloud

2011-11-15 Thread Jan Weiher 
Am 15.11.2011 07:52, schrieb Runa A. Sandvik:
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 1:28 AM, Mike Damm  wrote:
>> On Monday, November 14, 2011 9:30 PM, "Runa A. Sandvik"
>>  wrote:
>>> Hi everyone,
>>>
>>> The Tor Cloud project gives you a user-friendly way of deploying bridges
>>> to help users access an uncensored Internet. By setting up a bridge, you
>>> donate bandwidth to the Tor network and help improve the safety and
>>> speed at which users can access the Internet.
>>>
>>> Setting up a Tor bridge on Amazon EC2 is simple and will only take you a
>>> couple of minutes. The images have been configured with automatic
>>> package updates and port forwarding, so you do not have to worry about
>>> Tor not working or the server not getting security updates.
>>
>> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays says:
>> "Great. If you want to run several relays to donate more to the network,
>> we're happy with that. But please don't run more than a few dozen on the
>> same network, since part of the goal of the Tor network is dispersal and
>> diversity."
>>
>> I'm curious to know if 'MyFamily' is properly set on these instances, or
>> if Tor plans to bucket all instances within EC2 as part of the same
>> family?
>>
>> Assuming this is a non-issue... looks very awesome!
> 
> A bridge should not specify the ‘MyFamily’ option. You won't run a
> middle relay or an exit relay in the cloud, so this shouldn't be an
> issue.
> 

As far as I understand, this is correct if you only run bridges (because
a circuit never uses two bridges), but what if someone (like me) runs a
bridge and a normal relay as well? IMHO you don't want to use a relay
which is operated by the same operator as your bridge? Please correct
me, if I'm wrong.

Jan
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