Re: [tor-talk] geoip6
On 4/12/2013 2:09 AM, el...@riseup.net wrote: Can someone tell me if I have to do something about geoip6 warnings? I've got a bridge relay running from a vista x64 machine. As with the past few TBB versions I'm still getting occasional message-log warnings: Failed to open GEOIP file C:\Users\,acctname\AppData\Roaming \tor\geoip6. Geoip6 is simply a text list of the approximate physical address of IPv6 addresses. Having this makes it easy to do things like display the locations of exits on a map (as Vidalia can do). It's not at all necessary for Tor to work properly, and won't affect either client or server function, but it's a nifty feature. \AppData\Roaming\tor doesn't exist, nor does the subfolder \geoip6, as I'm running the bridge from from TBB installed on a USB stick. The installation seems correct, my geoip is in the data directory as usual. As far as I can tell the bridge is connecting to circuits as it should (though it's not carrying as much traffic as previously). If you like, you can grab geoip6 from [1] and save it in your data directory alongside geoip. If that doesn't fix the message, you can add the following line to your torrc: GeoIPv6File \path\to\your\datadir\geoip6 I did find some discussion in bug tracker, but it's months old and doesn't suggest anything that I can do. So, do these warnings even apply to my relay installation? Can I just ignore them? Feel free to ignore them; the only thing that will happen is that IPv6 exits won't show up on Vidalia's map. Traffic won't be affected in any way. [1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/config/geoip6 ~Justin Aplin ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] secure and simple network time (hack)
adrelanos: Why was tlsdate written in C? There are a few reasons: The first prototype was in Python (patching tlslite) however, I wanted it to be portable without patching libraries Jailing and/or sandboxing is easier without a system wide interpreter eg: Python Droppings privileges is straight forward in C Setting capabilities is easier on a binary by binary basis This is easily solved for say, Golang programs. I wanted to directly interface with many relevant libraries Currently it supports polarSSL and OpenSSL - patches welcome C is a perfectly fine programming language - I've considered writing it again in Golang. I may make a feature for feature compatible version at some point in the future. All the best, Jacob ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] Hi, does Nintendo block Tor. I can't reach Nintendo
I run a relay on the same computer that I use to surf the web. I run into websites all the time that don't work because I think they block Tor (so I don't do business with them). So I'm asking can anyone else access Nintendo from Tor. My relay is MontanaBlueSky at 184.166.103.9. Try accessing Nintendo through my relay. I need to get to Nintendo because my coins are going to expire in June. Can I use another non Tor proxy to access Nintendo? Any ideas. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] NSA supercomputer
infrastructure for supercomputing is immense, and very visible in the sense of taking up a lot of space as well as power requirements. Those facilities would stick out a country mile, and should be fairly easy to spot, leading to more focused speculation if nothing else. I read in a couple of articles that No Such Agency has their own chip foundry someplace. It seems reasonable to wonder out loud if they do not have ASIC attacks against some cryptosystems (does anyone else remember Deep Crack?) implemented. Perhaps all of the NSA's vaunted supercomputing power takes the form of racks and racks of servers with custom ASICs implementing those attacks instead of massively parallel architectures of general purpose computers running software attacks. The US does now disclose the aggregate budgets for DoD, DHS, and intel services under which NSA falls as a non line item. A search will yield analyst estimates of the actual black amounts, etc. There's even big wall posters for it all. No budget can exceed taxes plus international revenues, various debt facilities and minus known expenses. It's not Moonshot or war scale, nobody can afford that anymore without a complete overhaul. Yet a chip fab and unspottable underground facilities are entirely within current means. To wit, The Mountain, Raven Rock, Utah DC, defuncts such as Yucca, SSC, and so on. And implementing known attacks via ASIC's where useful is common best practice these days. It comes down to cost/benefit, business and rational guess. Figure out where the state of the art lies (both commercial and estimates of advanced black tech) for the budget, megawatts, floor space, die size, storage, bandwidth, algorithms, attacks, hiring and education programs, history, bit and clock efficiences, problems to solve, goals, etc. Within that answer is where you will find the truth. At least as to capability, if not execution. History shows there are always a few lucky gaping advances out there in the world when compared to commercial tech. Whether the current ones apply to anything people here care about is unknown. And unless you're somehow an actor in that same high intrigue, you don't have anything to worry about on an individual personal level [1] beyond the global and national ramifications of it all. [1] Any common criminal elements, what the dog ate for dinner, facebook, etc. If you're trying to be the next WikiLeaks or political head, maybe there's cause for worry? Maybe not? Tor tech is nice, being public has it's advantages too. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] [Tails-dev] secure and simple network time (hack)
I don't really understand your reservation about this project. It's reasonable to want authenticated time to a non-webserver of ones choice. Depending on your environment, tlsdate is complementary to the various other programs. You can (and will) use whatever you decide fits your needs, but please don't disparage a valid project because it segfaults after a while. It's a work-in-progress, better to contribute useful information than complain. On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 02:43:13PM +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote: On Fri, Jul 20, 2012 at 3:07 AM, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.net wrote: Allow me to be very explicit: it is harder to parse an HTTP Date header than properly than casting a 32bit integer and flipping their order. The attack surface is very small and easy to audit. Just discovered that tlsdated in tlsdate-0.0.6 is dying with a segmentation fault after a while. Not surprised after seeing the code — my experimentation with this gimmick is finally over. Turns out that “throw something together and wait for patches” is not a sound development approach. -- Maxim Kammerer Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Hi, does Nintendo block Tor. I can't reach Nintendo
On 04/12/2013 11:33 AM, Nate Homier wrote: I run a relay on the same computer that I use to surf the web. I run into websites all the time that don't work because I think they block Tor (so I don't do business with them). So I'm asking can anyone else access Nintendo from Tor. My relay is MontanaBlueSky at 184.166.103.9. Try accessing Nintendo through my relay. I need to get to Nintendo because my coins are going to expire in June. Can I use another non Tor proxy to access Nintendo? Any ideas. Never mind, the Nintendo website was just offline is all. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Cool story bro. We're worried about these things too, I guess. I mean, if killing us all is really the best way to stop Tor, then I would submit to you that Tor is unstoppable. After all, network engineers are basically throwaway commodities to the mexican mafia: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/zeta-radio/ I mean, if they kill their *own* codeslaves^Wemployees, what exactly do you think murdering us will accomplish? In the meantime, we have nothing to fear except fear itself. Oh, and 0day. Don't forget to ph34r the 0day. Turns out that shit costs way less than high-profile assassination contracts (fortunately or unfortunately, depending on your perspective :/). P.S. If you're annoyed by this flippant response, it was given because your rant is basically a long series of FAQs. There are ways to fix your concerns but they require development effort, and in fact many of them (including custom pluggable transports and private bridge distribution) are already supported. For the others: Patches welcome. P.P.S. I'll leave the point-by-point discussion to the other NSA thread participants ;) Thus spake Alex M (Coyo) (c...@darkdna.net): Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities without relying on the centralized tor directory hosted by Peter Palfrader, Jacob Appelbaum and associates? From lurking here on the mailing lists and other places, Jacob and other core Tor staff and advocates generally seem to have a worryingly optimistic attitude toward the possibility of coordinated Tor censorship, crackdowns, network manipulation and attack, coordinated government raids upon Tor directory servers, or even assassinations against Jacob Appelbaum and other core staff and volunteers involved in the Tor project. Is it really so difficult to conceive of situations that involve violent raids against the datacenters hosting Tor directory servers and their mirrors, attacks, possibly physically violent, involving full military force against Jacob Appelbaum and other critical developers, staff, volunteers and advocates? You really think the governments of the industralized first world countries won't stoop that low? One day, they will accuse Jacob and the other core developers of being domestic terrorists or whatever as an excuse to fire upon native citizens on domestic soil. They will do it, one day. This is why providing relatively trivial means to deploy one's own bridge communities with many pluggable transports in order to prepare for that inevitability. The Bitcoin core developers and advocates will also be assassinated or eliminated militarily as well. It is inevitable. You really think our governments won't stoop that low? They are little more than pan-handling bums attempting to justify their jobs at the taxpayer's expense, and feel entitled to our money. Not only that, but they have the sheer unabashed chutzpa to presume they are legitimate in their entitlement, and have full authority to use our own taxpayer money against us, to enforce unjust laws, to inflict injustice against their own citizenry. If they have absolutely no compunction about shoving CISPA or SOPA down our throats, feel no remorse for warrantless wiretapping and unlawful deep packet inspection, or forcing internet service providers into spying on their own paying customers, what makes you think they won't slay Jacob Appelbaum where he stands? They will. They will, mark my words. And when that happens, we must be ready. Jacob's legacy needs to live on. Christian Fromme, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, Andrea Shepard, Dr. Paul Syverson..., their legacy must live on, regardless of whether the government shoves them against a cinderblock wall and shoots them dead where they stand. We must prepare for this inevitability. We need more pluggable transports, we need to break up the Tor relay network into distinct domains, we must make the tor relay network far more resilient to coordinated attacks, we need to decentralize the directory authorities and mitigate the horrifying damage in the event of directory authority compromise, and the subjugation and subversion of directory authorities, hidden services, user privacy and the physical safety of relay operators. We need far more stringent entry and exit guard node policies, more flexible and informative relay server statistics and circuit routing control. We need bridge relay communities with independent bridge directory authorities that can be run by semi-isolated communities, including bridge communities within other overlay networks such as private OpenVPN, CJDNS or AnoNet networks. As it is, if the Tor client cannot connect to the centralized high-value targets controlled by the Tor project team, Tor is absolutely worthless and useless. This must change. Tor should be usable by independent relay
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Hi Alex, these are interesting thoughts. I wrote something related a while ago. Tor: lobbies vs lobbies - Who will prevail?: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025109.html Alex M (Coyo): Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities without relying on the centralized tor directory hosted by Peter Palfrader, Jacob Appelbaum and associates? Good idea in general. (Although I don't share your reasons for it.) From lurking here on the mailing lists and other places, Jacob and other core Tor staff and advocates generally seem to have a worryingly optimistic attitude toward the possibility of coordinated Tor censorship, crackdowns, network manipulation and attack, coordinated government raids upon Tor directory servers, I am interested, where did they say so? or even assassinations against Jacob Appelbaum and other core staff and volunteers involved in the Tor project. Why assassinations? I've heard the some mafia style groups have a better method than violence. They catch a child after school, make up some Your parents told me to catch you today, I am your Uncle Sam. story, aren't violent or threatening at all and go into some Disney land copy, bring back the child afterwards. Not sure if that happens in reality, but I am sure that works better than violence. Other than that, it seems obvious to me that killing people isn't effective as turning them around. Why wouldn't they rather use violence to force them to put a backdoor into next Tor version? As far I know no Tor developer has been harassed for Tor yet. (Please tell me if I am wrong.) Jacob has been harassed like in a totalitarian state because of his connections to wikileaks. I also wonder how Jacob could stay so calm after all what happened to him, not being already a broken man. I admire the Tor developers for doing their work in such a dangerous country (US), knowing about waterbording and that stuff. Is it really so difficult to conceive of situations that involve violent raids against the datacenters hosting Tor directory servers and their mirrors, attacks, possibly physically violent, involving full military force against Jacob Appelbaum and other critical developers, staff, volunteers and advocates? If that happens, that would be the worst case. I think without Tor servers in the US and without the Tor developers, there is more Tor network, since most Tor servers are in the US. Most other Tor servers are in countries which the US can pressure as well. When the US decides to take down Tor, it's pretty much over anyway. You really think the governments of the industralized first world countries won't stoop that low? Maybe they don't have to. When I understood Jacob in his speeches right, he doesn't believe that Tor does defeat the NSA. Why should they break Tor if it's an open book already to them already anyway? One day, they will accuse Jacob and the other core developers of being domestic terrorists or whatever as an excuse to fire upon native citizens on domestic soil. They will do it, one day. Only in case they can't easily break Tor already anyway. This is why providing relatively trivial means to deploy one's own bridge communities with many pluggable transports in order to prepare for that inevitability. I don't see how that helps after hosting Tor servers has been made illegal in US and most other countries. The Bitcoin core developers and advocates will also be assassinated or eliminated militarily as well. It is inevitable. You really think our governments won't stoop that low? They are little more than pan-handling bums attempting to justify their jobs at the taxpayer's expense, and feel entitled to our money. Not only that, but they have the sheer unabashed chutzpa to presume they are legitimate in their entitlement, and have full authority to use our own taxpayer money against us, to enforce unjust laws, to inflict injustice against their own citizenry. If they have absolutely no compunction about shoving CISPA or SOPA down our throats, feel no remorse for warrantless wiretapping and unlawful deep packet inspection, or forcing internet service providers into spying on their own paying customers, Agreed. what makes you think they won't slay Jacob Appelbaum where he stands? Answered above already. They will. They will, mark my words. And when that happens, we must be ready. Jacob's legacy needs to live on. Christian Fromme, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, Andrea Shepard, Dr. Paul Syverson..., their legacy must live on, regardless of whether the government shoves them against a cinderblock wall and shoots them dead where they stand. As far I understand, Dr. Paul Syverson works for Naval Research Laboratory and can be told to stop working on Tor and work for something else instead. The others, already covered that above. We must prepare for
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Alex M (Coyo) c...@darkdna.net wrote: Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities without relying on the centralized tor directory hosted by Peter Palfrader, Jacob Appelbaum and associates? Don't say I didn't warn you. If anything, I would say that the Tor team tends to emphasize the absolute worst-case scenarios. There's really nothing keeping you from making a private bridge network. The documentation's all there. best, Griffin -- Please note that I do not have PGP access at this time. OTR: sa...@jabber.ccc.de / fonta...@jabber.ccc.de ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/12/2013 10:27 PM, Mike Perry wrote: Cool story bro. I know. We're worried about these things too, I guess. I believe it. I'm in the market for a bridge, if you'll sell one to me. I mean, if killing us all is really the best way to stop Tor, then I would submit to you that Tor is unstoppable. After all, network engineers are basically throwaway commodities to the mexican mafia: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/zeta-radio/ I mean, if they kill their*own* codeslaves^Wemployees, what exactly do you think murdering us will accomplish? Well, killing us all wouldn't be necessary, just the core developers and the highest-profile advocates. Minor contributors and patchers would be incapable of maintaining the project. Still, the possibility is entirely within reason. In the meantime, we have nothing to fear except fear itself. Oh, and 0day. Don't forget to ph34r the 0day. Turns out that shit costs way less than high-profile assassination contracts (fortunately or unfortunately, depending on your perspective :/). Have you read about assassination markets? Are you familiar with that concept? If you can use an anonymous assassination market to place bounties upon the heads of government officials, what makes you think they could not use the same systems to place bounties upon high-value activists? P.S. If you're annoyed by this flippant response, it was given because your rant is basically a long series of FAQs. There are ways to fix your concerns but they require development effort, and in fact many of them (including custom pluggable transports and private bridge distribution) are already supported. For the others: Patches welcome. I'm afraid I do not follow what you mean by FAQs since I do not see any overt interest (or developer consideration) concerning any of these features. I have not seen any stable Tor client release notes announcing private bridge authority decentralization. Did I misread something? P.P.S. I'll leave the point-by-point discussion to the other NSA thread participants;) I'm sure there are many NSA employees here. Contributions to cryptography make NSA awesome, but that is dramatically balanced by NSA wiretapping. My opinion of the NSA is thus ambivalent. Though that is off-topic. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/12/2013 10:37 PM, adrelanos wrote: Hi Alex, these are interesting thoughts. I wrote something related a while ago. Tor: lobbies vs lobbies - Who will prevail?: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025109.html Alex M (Coyo): Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities without relying on the centralized tor directory hosted by Peter Palfrader, Jacob Appelbaum and associates? Good idea in general. (Although I don't share your reasons for it.) What reasons would you have, then? From lurking here on the mailing lists and other places, Jacob and other core Tor staff and advocates generally seem to have a worryingly optimistic attitude toward the possibility of coordinated Tor censorship, crackdowns, network manipulation and attack, coordinated government raids upon Tor directory servers, I am interested, where did they say so? I am too tired and physically ill with an upper-respiratory infection to dig through mailing list archives at the moment. If it is important that I shoulder the burden of proof, remind me later when I'm not coughing up blood. or even assassinations against Jacob Appelbaum and other core staff and volunteers involved in the Tor project. Why assassinations? I've heard the some mafia style groups have a better method than violence. They catch a child after school, make up some Your parents told me to catch you today, I am your Uncle Sam. story, aren't violent or threatening at all and go into some Disney land copy, bring back the child afterwards. Not sure if that happens in reality, but I am sure that works better than violence. I do not understand how taking a child to a theme park relates in any way to Jacob Appelbaum being tagged and bagged. May I ask for a clarification here? Other than that, it seems obvious to me that killing people isn't effective as turning them around. Why wouldn't they rather use violence to force them to put a backdoor into next Tor version? That isn't quite as trivial as you make it sound, and really, it's unnecessary. It is a general consensus that the united states federal government has full access to the directory authorities and majority of guard nodes and exit nodes within the united states. It is a general consensus that the Tor network provides only illusory anonymity to any user hostile to united states military supremacy. The Tor network is a historical toy created by the united states military, and is just as possessed and controlled by the united states military as it has been from day one. As far I know no Tor developer has been harassed for Tor yet. (Please tell me if I am wrong.) Jacob has been harassed like in a totalitarian state because of his connections to wikileaks. I also wonder how Jacob could stay so calm after all what happened to him, not being already a broken man. I admire the Tor developers for doing their work in such a dangerous country (US), knowing about waterbording and that stuff. Is it really so difficult to conceive of situations that involve violent raids against the datacenters hosting Tor directory servers and their mirrors, attacks, possibly physically violent, involving full military force against Jacob Appelbaum and other critical developers, staff, volunteers and advocates? If that happens, that would be the worst case. I think without Tor servers in the US and without the Tor developers, there is more Tor network, since most Tor servers are in the US. Most other Tor servers are in countries which the US can pressure as well. When the US decides to take down Tor, it's pretty much over anyway. My point exactly. You really think the governments of the industralized first world countries won't stoop that low? Maybe they don't have to. When I understood Jacob in his speeches right, he doesn't believe that Tor does defeat the NSA. Why should they break Tor if it's an open book already to them already anyway? Tor is not designed (in its current form) to even attempt to contest NSA control and manipulation. One day, they will accuse Jacob and the other core developers of being domestic terrorists or whatever as an excuse to fire upon native citizens on domestic soil. They will do it, one day. Only in case they can't easily break Tor already anyway. Tor is already broken. Services like The Hidden Wiki, Silk Road, and other high-profile hidden services are obviously honeypots and sting operations, since those hidden services would have been raided immediately abd their admins arrested without a court hearing or judicial oversight of any kind. Do no pass Go, do not collect 200 worthless united states dollars, go directly to Guantanamo Bay (or whatever the current replacement is). This is why providing relatively trivial means to deploy one's own bridge communities with many pluggable transports in order to prepare for that
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
I'm down to help with the rebuild. On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 12:39 AM, Alex M (Coyo) c...@darkdna.net wrote: On 04/12/2013 11:01 PM, adrelanos wrote: Griffin Boyce: There's really nothing keeping you from making a private bridge network. The documentation's all there. Indeed. One can even make its own (private) Tor network. It will require a considerable amount of learning, though. It would be interesting to see several competing Tor networks. May or may not happen in long term future, if Tor can attract much more users and relays. Alex probable won't be up for creating an alternative Tor network with that threat model. As soon as you host a relay or directory authority, it's difficult (impossible?) to stay anonymous, you move yourself into the target line by doing so. With the current Tor network model, this is apparent. I might fork the Tor codebase and redesign the network from the ground up, and see what I can come up with. Should be interesting. Even if Tor cannot be salvaged, working with the traditional 3rd generation onion routing paradigm should be educational and instructive. __**_ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/**cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-**talkhttps://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/12/2013 11:01 PM, adrelanos wrote: Griffin Boyce: There's really nothing keeping you from making a private bridge network. The documentation's all there. Indeed. One can even make its own (private) Tor network. It will require a considerable amount of learning, though. It would be interesting to see several competing Tor networks. May or may not happen in long term future, if Tor can attract much more users and relays. Alex probable won't be up for creating an alternative Tor network with that threat model. As soon as you host a relay or directory authority, it's difficult (impossible?) to stay anonymous, you move yourself into the target line by doing so. It fills me with indescribable patriotism, nationalist love for my country, the heartland, home of the free. My experiences with tor imply the child porn archives, the silk road and other drug exchange markets, the hackbb and other cracker/carder communities and other high-profile hidden services (eepsites) are all implicitly honeypot sting operations run by the united states military and federal agencies. My country is constantly vigilant, and protects us from all the evil drug-addled hippies, perverted child-lovers, dangerous cyberterrorists and other dissident intellectuals quietly preparing for countless acts of domestic terrorism and treason against my beloved country and her rightful representatives and public servants. I love my country, I love my federal and state governments, and I have complete faith in the competency, legitimacy, authority and moral superiority of my beloved country's representatives and public servants. I love how my country looks after us all like a doting father, performing deep packet inspection, email, sms text, phone call and skype message interception like a responsible and watchful father over his children. I love how my country obviously knows what's best for me, my family, my friends, my community, and fellow citizens and is stern but fair, disciplining us when we misbehave and rewarding us when we behave like model citizens. I love how my country promises that if I have nothing to hide, I have nothing to fear but fear itself. My country is obviously the best, hands down. :P ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Thus spake Alex M (Coyo) (c...@darkdna.net): P.S. If you're annoyed by this flippant response, it was given because your rant is basically a long series of FAQs. There are ways to fix your concerns but they require development effort, and in fact many of them (including custom pluggable transports and private bridge distribution) are already supported. For the others: Patches welcome. I'm afraid I do not follow what you mean by FAQs since I do not see any overt interest (or developer consideration) concerning any of these features. If you have a specific list of design flaws that aren't couched in long rants, we can perhaps help instruct you on how you might solve them in your redesign with Mr Disney, or at least point you toward some tickets you two should read and follow during that process. Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling. -- Mike Perry signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote: Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling. Because obviously criticism and actual concern for the well-being of a foss project is always trolling and threats. I hope you aren't a contributor. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote: If you have a specific list of design flaws that aren't couched in long rants, we can perhaps help instruct you on how you might solve them in your redesign with Mr Disney, or at least point you toward some tickets you two should read and follow during that process. Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling. Though, with that attitude of yours, I'm afraid I'm uninterested in any assistance you may deign to bestow upon Gregory Disney and I. I'm confident we can do just fine without your arrogance. Obviously, your selfless concern for your userbase knows no bounds. It concerns me that you refer to we as though you contribute anything to the tor project. I'm sure the tor coders are going to be more than happy to support the foss ideals in this case in regards to codebase forking rights. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
