Re: [tor-talk] Routing Jitsi through Tor
Jitsi now cann't route RTP through Tor becouse not supported RTP over TCP. Only Skype, Mumble and my forks of PGPFone and SpeekFrealy, and maybe some other rare apps can use TCP as a transport layer for voice. It makes no sense to use Tor to connect to the XMPP server only. All the same, the server has information about your location from XML ICE invites, and also your provider will determine your subscriber via a direct connection. I2P theoretically supported UDP, but only one way streams for now. Now there is no 'out of box' solution to your for I2P. In addition, the I2P network today has significantly high latency and jitter than Tor. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Routing Jitsi through Tor
over 9050. The only thing that didn't happen was issuing a NEWNYM command. But would that have stopped the connection from happening? Maybe, sometimes Tor gets a little stuck, or the exit packetfilter's things after Tor finds a path. Using MAPADDRESS can help with testing exits. Also, a quick question about the encryption service. I'm offering SSL/TLS connections to the service. Is that what you mean or are you Yes, offering encryption is good. As far as anything other than TCP goes, you can do that but only if you're going hidden service to hs with onioncat or have established an openvpn with some destination across tor exit. And any testing of new apps should be accompanied by proof work as to leaks with wireshark, etc. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Identify requests made by the same user
Andrew F: krishna, Tor minimizes the variables that can Identify you via fingerprinting techniques, but a dedicated team can still track you with enough effort. I know form personal experience Andrew, I'm interested in any more light you can shine on this. I don't expect full details, but: I expect that if someone is targeting the physical me then they would be able to see and track much or all of my anonymous traffic if they really wanted to. However if someone is trying to find out who is behind some anonymous traffic or actions of a nym then this would be quite a lot more difficult, assuming adequate precautions were made. So could let us know from your personal experience which one is feasible? Thanks -- kat ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Binary patch downloads (for updating TBB)?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 06/29, Mike Perry wrote: David Balažic: In that light, are there patches available to update between releases? It might reduce load on the servers too. We hope to support the Firefox updater in TBB soon. After some Tor Launcher cleanup, this is Pearl Crescent's next task. The Firefox updater uses Mozilla MAR format, and updates contain only the binary deltas (patches) between two release versions. that would also allow one to retain, across upgrades, any extensions that may have been installed into the tor browser bundle as well, no? - -chl - -- cool hand luke -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJR0FClXxSAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXQ5RUE3NjY3OTY3NTE0RjAyMDgyRTNBQzAy QkE2NTVENTVDODgzNUVCAAoJECumVdVciDXrAB8IAKfu5KnSOHIE6vCzAkJIKrkU iWOQzpLPEMV9oQSPI6wyebCWkReRnklHJBQwRNCKhQQbihUqLNuXxNvy8PllPWvU x461ktIoSszAlydnbl/P9+aJD8Szx5fi96c1iEWWi9ST8bVNF0QXtkaVX34nbbuT I4uLFbyx1ypyyv92HscX4GyXkl9srFDzZJsz2GsQGKObHYj23S62UZpSVrhfemvS EZxHDuL5WJMy1tfbCvn4Z+5SUgcAs2aDnbJAfdQBd01XrAfz/tBk6vpRovsLITKL DIt2Vy+BKtNaP3WNK9JF8nJzPm+vK8Qa8c739NPkzJRtlnN3VfnwuK0S7VXxzxY= =vN87 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] Secure email with limited usable metadata
everyone is tooting about pgp these. pgp encryption doesnt solve the problem of tla surveillance. pgp encryption does not touch metadata (recipent, sender). how to secure mail communication? i was thinking about pointing the mx record of the tld to a mail server that is shared with other individuals. the server is configured to drop incoming non-tls smtp connection from other mail server. On a per account basis, every message that is not encrypted to the public pgp key of the address is dropped, too. users use pop3/smtp over a hidden server to download/send messages. what do you think? the setup is easy to maintain. if inbox size is limited to a few mbs any cheap vps thats like 20$ a year can be used to service hundreds of thousands of accounts. a trusted umbrella organization is needed to maintain the server as anonymity is increased by increasing users count. is the tor project or torservers.net interested in running such a service? i would literally pay money for that, so would others. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Secure email with limited usable metadata
I would think that simply finding a mail server that doesn't log ANYTHING (like what StartMail is about to offer) and encrypting everything should be enough. Of course, you'd need to trust that the service really isn't logging anything but that could be solved by accessing it via Tor. So StartMail (when it opens) via Tor should do the trick. Just a thought, Anthony On 06/30/2013 10:52 AM, alice-...@safe-mail.net wrote: everyone is tooting about pgp these. pgp encryption doesnt solve the problem of tla surveillance. pgp encryption does not touch metadata (recipent, sender). how to secure mail communication? i was thinking about pointing the mx record of the tld to a mail server that is shared with other individuals. the server is configured to drop incoming non-tls smtp connection from other mail server. On a per account basis, every message that is not encrypted to the public pgp key of the address is dropped, too. users use pop3/smtp over a hidden server to download/send messages. what do you think? the setup is easy to maintain. if inbox size is limited to a few mbs any cheap vps thats like 20$ a year can be used to service hundreds of thousands of accounts. a trusted umbrella organization is needed to maintain the server as anonymity is increased by increasing users count. is the tor project or torservers.net interested in running such a service? i would literally pay money for that, so would others. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- Anthony Papillion Phone: 1.918.533.9699 SIP: sip:cajuntec...@iptel.org iNum:+883510008360912 IM: cypherpun...@jit.si www.papillion.me ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Secure email with limited usable metadata
This poses a really interesting question. Another solution would be to use already existing remailers, and doubling the encryption together with the TO: email in the inline plaintext. The question is how to properly do a dual encryption. My proposed solution is the following: Plaintext message (encrypted for recipient, with unencrypted portion dictating the recipient through inline text) - Encrypted Message (encrypted again to remailer's PGP, including inline portion) - Remailer (decrypted intended layer. Message is sent to recipient dictated in the inline text) - Recipient's Email Server / Provider (cannot be read by provider) - Recipient Mailbox On Sun, Jun 30, 2013 at 8:52 AM, alice-...@safe-mail.net wrote: everyone is tooting about pgp these. pgp encryption doesnt solve the problem of tla surveillance. pgp encryption does not touch metadata (recipent, sender). how to secure mail communication? i was thinking about pointing the mx record of the tld to a mail server that is shared with other individuals. the server is configured to drop incoming non-tls smtp connection from other mail server. On a per account basis, every message that is not encrypted to the public pgp key of the address is dropped, too. users use pop3/smtp over a hidden server to download/send messages. what do you think? the setup is easy to maintain. if inbox size is limited to a few mbs any cheap vps thats like 20$ a year can be used to service hundreds of thousands of accounts. a trusted umbrella organization is needed to maintain the server as anonymity is increased by increasing users count. is the tor project or torservers.net interested in running such a service? i would literally pay money for that, so would others. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Secure email with limited usable metadata
On 06/30/2013 03:52 PM, alice-...@safe-mail.net wrote: everyone is tooting about pgp these. pgp encryption doesnt solve the problem of tla surveillance. pgp encryption does not touch metadata (recipent, sender). how to secure mail communication? There's an easy solution. Only communicate among arbitrarily anonymous accounts, and always use arbitrary subjects. i was thinking about pointing the mx record of the tld to a mail server that is shared with other individuals. the server is configured to drop incoming non-tls smtp connection from other mail server. On a per account basis, every message that is not encrypted to the public pgp key of the address is dropped, too. users use pop3/smtp over a hidden server to download/send messages. what do you think? the setup is easy to maintain. if inbox size is limited to a few mbs any cheap vps thats like 20$ a year can be used to service hundreds of thousands of accounts. a trusted umbrella organization is needed to maintain the server as anonymity is increased by increasing users count. is the tor project or torservers.net interested in running such a service? i would literally pay money for that, so would others. If you want total overkill, you can use Mixmaster nyms with alt.privacy.anon-server as inbox. Quicksilver is easy to use, and runs on Linux in Wine. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Secure email with limited usable metadata
I would think that simply finding a mail server that doesn't log ANYTHING (like what StartMail is about to offer) and encrypting everything should be enough. Of course, you'd need to trust that the service really isn't logging anything but that could be solved by accessing it via Tor. So StartMail (when it opens) via Tor should do the trick. StartMail/tormail does not solve the problem of metadata either. i do not want to hide my identity. i want to use my real name and communicate with people i know in real life. its about *enforcing* content encryption and secure communication so an outside observer cannot easily correlate my social network by snooping on mail traffic at net gateways. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Secure email with limited usable metadata
That's why I'm setting up my own mail server at home. And also plan to access it via web interface if using someone else's machine (like at home). I would only allow web access via SSL and password, and only show the emails of the last week (not more). Trying postfix, dovecot, and SquirrelMail. Still in progress :) On Sun, Jun 30, 2013 at 5:48 PM, alice-...@safe-mail.net wrote: I would think that simply finding a mail server that doesn't log ANYTHING (like what StartMail is about to offer) and encrypting everything should be enough. Of course, you'd need to trust that the service really isn't logging anything but that could be solved by accessing it via Tor. So StartMail (when it opens) via Tor should do the trick. StartMail/tormail does not solve the problem of metadata either. i do not want to hide my identity. i want to use my real name and communicate with people i know in real life. its about *enforcing* content encryption and secure communication so an outside observer cannot easily correlate my social network by snooping on mail traffic at net gateways. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Secure email with limited usable metadata
edit: someone one's else machine *like at work On Sun, Jun 30, 2013 at 6:18 PM, AK aka...@gmail.com wrote: That's why I'm setting up my own mail server at home. And also plan to access it via web interface if using someone else's machine (like at home). I would only allow web access via SSL and password, and only show the emails of the last week (not more). Trying postfix, dovecot, and SquirrelMail. Still in progress :) On Sun, Jun 30, 2013 at 5:48 PM, alice-...@safe-mail.net wrote: I would think that simply finding a mail server that doesn't log ANYTHING (like what StartMail is about to offer) and encrypting everything should be enough. Of course, you'd need to trust that the service really isn't logging anything but that could be solved by accessing it via Tor. So StartMail (when it opens) via Tor should do the trick. StartMail/tormail does not solve the problem of metadata either. i do not want to hide my identity. i want to use my real name and communicate with people i know in real life. its about *enforcing* content encryption and secure communication so an outside observer cannot easily correlate my social network by snooping on mail traffic at net gateways. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
