Re: [tor-talk] StrictExitNodes deprecated?
On Sat, Nov 23, 2013 at 07:42:23AM +0200, Sherief Alaa wrote:
I just see the options StrictExitNodes and StrictEntryNodes is deprecated?
The correct syntax is:
EntryNodes {node, node, ...}
StrictNodes 0 or 1 #0 for disabled
No, you should not use StrictNodes with EntryNodes or ExitNodes. It
won't do anything (except confuse you I guess).
Note: it's recommend to leave Tor handle your path selection
automatically rather than specifying one yourself as it can greatly harm
your anonymity.
This is likely still true.
--Roger
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Re: [tor-talk] How secure is check.torproject.org?
Roger: On Sat, Nov 23, 2013 at 07:35:54AM +1000, Katya Titov wrote: The advantage that I see is that is there is no way to directly access a .onion site without using Tor, so it is a clear indicator that Tor is in use, visible to the user. Not necessarily. Imagine a local network attacker who sees your request for a .onion address go out on the local network, and then supplies you with a DNS answer and then a webpage when you ask for one. Now you're not using Tor, but you think you are. But if we're talking about TBB then a local network attacker should never see the request, just the resultant Tor traffic. Unless my understanding is very off. Now, it's harder for them to do that with https://check.torproject.org/ because of the https part, but the attacker could just recognize requests for check and route them through Tor, so the check page will congratulate you on using Tor when you're mostly not. The correct answer is for TBB to do some self-tests of its proxy settings, and not ask the big bad scary internet. I certainly agree here, but I'm also a visual person. I use the Network Map a lot to see that the traffic is passing through Tor. (This is one of my issues with the 3.0 series - no Network Map. I've had a look at writing FF plugins but they seem beyond my ability, or at least require more time than I have available at the moment.) I guess that some way to internally ensure that it is indeed using Tor as well as a visual cue would be nice. -- kat -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Regarding #8244; Including a string not under authority control?
11.10.2013 15:44, Sebastian G. bastik.tor: Hello, beside having each authority call in for their vote about the random string, how about including a string in the consensus not under control by any authority? [...] This has not received any comment whatsoever. I had not wasted any thought on this since I posted it. The reason for me bringing this thread back up is to avoid it being overlooked, where I initially wanted to avoid to make the trac ticket more messy with possible useless suggestions. Regards, Sebastian G. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] How secure is check.torproject.org?
On Sat, Nov 23, 2013 at 06:04:54PM +1000, Katya Titov wrote: On Sat, Nov 23, 2013 at 07:35:54AM +1000, Katya Titov wrote: The advantage that I see is that is there is no way to directly access a .onion site without using Tor, so it is a clear indicator that Tor is in use, visible to the user. Not necessarily. Imagine a local network attacker who sees your request for a .onion address go out on the local network, and then supplies you with a DNS answer and then a webpage when you ask for one. Now you're not using Tor, but you think you are. But if we're talking about TBB then a local network attacker should never see the request, just the resultant Tor traffic. Unless my understanding is very off. If we're talking about TBB and it's working correctly, then there's no need to check if it's working correctly, right? :) Check.tp.o is from a time before TBB was standard, when users were trying to muck with their proxy settings, install an extension, or otherwise make their Tor work. The correct answer is for TBB to do some self-tests of its proxy settings, and not ask the big bad scary internet. I certainly agree here, but I'm also a visual person. I use the Network Map a lot to see that the traffic is passing through Tor. (This is one of my issues with the 3.0 series - no Network Map. I've had a look at writing FF plugins but they seem beyond my ability, or at least require more time than I have available at the moment.) I guess that some way to internally ensure that it is indeed using Tor as well as a visual cue would be nice. If you trusted the old check, you should trust the new about:tor page in TBB 3 at least as much. It's more accurate, and it loads quicker too. As for having a network map for TBB 3, I agree in theory. But somebody needs to actually do it. Promising routes include writing it into Tor Launcher (harder to do, but easier to maintain and probably safer) or writing instructions for how best to attach your (old, eventually obsolete) Vidalia to your shiny new TBB 3. --Roger -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] How secure is check.torproject.org?
Roger: On Sat, Nov 23, 2013 at 06:04:54PM +1000, Katya Titov wrote: But if we're talking about TBB then a local network attacker should never see the request, just the resultant Tor traffic. Unless my understanding is very off. If we're talking about TBB and it's working correctly, then there's no need to check if it's working correctly, right? :) Well, yes, I guess so. Check.tp.o is from a time before TBB was standard, when users were trying to muck with their proxy settings, install an extension, or otherwise make their Tor work. Yes, I remember the good old days ... If you trusted the old check, you should trust the new about:tor page in TBB 3 at least as much. It's more accurate, and it loads quicker too. It certainly loads quicker. I'll need to trust that it's more accurate. As for having a network map for TBB 3, I agree in theory. But somebody needs to actually do it. Promising routes include writing it into Tor Launcher (harder to do, but easier to maintain and probably safer) or writing instructions for how best to attach your (old, eventually obsolete) Vidalia to your shiny new TBB 3. Great idea, and so very easy. Just run TBB 3, and then run TBB 2.4. TBB 2.4 just simply connects and works. Network Map and New Identity both work nicely. I can't stop FF from starting (well, I can, but not cleanly) so any hints on that would be appreciated. Thanks! -- kat -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Safeplug
On Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 09:48:57PM -0500, grif...@cryptolab.net wrote 1.4K bytes in 0 lines about: : Perhaps your most pressing concern should be about whether or not it : protects its users, given that it's using Tor as the vehicle to attempt : that. And any failure to do so would have the side-effect of making Tor I have lots of concerns, but I'm trying to discuss them with Cloud Engines first, before responding to the handful of reporters looking for quotes. The world press seems to want us at Tor to come out swinging and just simply bash the Safeplug. Rather than simply hand over pageviews to press properties, I'd like a real discussion with the Safeplug people first. Working off facts and understanding their side is more important to me than simply reacting with only half the story. The community here seems to be doing a fine job of raising questions. When I have a response from them, I'll either encourage them to respond or share what I've learned. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x6B4D6475 -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] (maybe OT:) Dispute between RMS and WK on License Change for the GPH
Hi, This is a bit OT, but it might be of interest here, too. I don't know whether you follow the GnuPG mailing lists, but in case you missed it: there has been a dispute between Richard Stallman and Werner Koch on a license change for the GNU Privacy Handbook (GPH). http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/gnupg/doc/63276?page=last I don't know them personally, but usually their wording in the mailing lists is much more balanced; however in this case, there's been things said that make me very concerned about the future of GnuPG, like Werner: I have always spoken out in favor of the GNU project - maybe now is the time to reconsider. Currently it seems that the discussion has stopped without solution (or maybe the solution to rewrite the documentation from scratch. IMHO not a real solution). To me, GnuPG is a key infrastructure component (same as Tor and the GNU Project) and it makes me concerned, that RMS and WK seem to have a personal conflict (as the arguments very quickly rose to a personal level). What do you think on that situation? Is there a possibility to bring them back to the round table, or otherwise solve the problem? I don't want to post this on the GnuPG list, as it could look like voting for one side. Maybe, what I want to achieve is that people who are in closer contact with RMS/WK know about the issue and talk to them. Of course I didn't ask RMS nor WK whether they would accept (or need) a third party to mediate. Both sides have reasonable arguments for their positions and personally, I don't feel authorized enough to vote for one side. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Safeplug
How about a certification program? A company can donate some funds to have their product evaluated and if successful gain TOR Certified status. It would stop all this nonsense and provide everyone the opportunity to request specific features or amendments to designs. I understand that no one wants to become a gatekeeper, but ensuring the integrity of the underlying platform is critical. Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2013 13:46:40 + From: and...@torproject.is To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Safeplug On Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 09:48:57PM -0500, grif...@cryptolab.net wrote 1.4K bytes in 0 lines about: : Perhaps your most pressing concern should be about whether or not it : protects its users, given that it's using Tor as the vehicle to attempt : that. And any failure to do so would have the side-effect of making Tor I have lots of concerns, but I'm trying to discuss them with Cloud Engines first, before responding to the handful of reporters looking for quotes. The world press seems to want us at Tor to come out swinging and just simply bash the Safeplug. Rather than simply hand over pageviews to press properties, I'd like a real discussion with the Safeplug people first. Working off facts and understanding their side is more important to me than simply reacting with only half the story. The community here seems to be doing a fine job of raising questions. When I have a response from them, I'll either encourage them to respond or share what I've learned. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x6B4D6475 -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] European commission seems to have unblocked Tor network
Hi, in October I tried to access the blog of Neelie Kroes with Tor browser. Neelie Kroes is Vice-President of the European Commission and responsible for the Digital Agenda for Europe. At that time she asked the public in her blog about their views: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kroes/en/content/internet-governance- i-want-your-views Using the Tor browser the access to the site was blocked with this message: - Access Denied Your request has been denied for security reason. If you believe that this request should not be blocked, please contact EC DIGIT SNet s...@ec.europa.eu. If your request is urgent, please contact also the service helpdesk (+32)2 29 58181. -- An email to s...@ec.europa.eu and the office of Neelies Kroes seems to have helped. In the mean time it is possible again to access the European Commission web site http://ec.europa.eu/ from the Tor network. Regards, torland -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Safeplug
On Sat, Nov 23, 2013 at 02:22:48PM +, Mark McCarron wrote: How about a certification program? A company can donate some funds to have their product evaluated and if successful gain TOR Certified status. It would stop all this nonsense and provide everyone the opportunity to request specific features or amendments to designs. I would imagine such a certificate to be quite misleading. Even professional code audits never catch all bugs. So it would only be a matter of time until one of these Tor certified products would fail horribly which would then provoke reactions along the lines of but... it was certified?. Also, audits are one time snapshots. The very first commit after the certification process might already introduce new bugs. Cheers, Philipp -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Safeplug
* on the Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 06:17:24PM +, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: You shouldn't just route people through Tor without their knowledge. They need to understand the risks and adapt their use accordingly. And what is the risk of barebacking with a network? When your traffic comes out of a Tor exit node, there is a significantly increased risk of passive and active MITM attacks against you, and also increased risk of being locked out of your accounts. Why should I let traffic trace back to my network? Does that user gather my consent for every action that will be tied to me? No. I did not say, don't route people through Tor. I said, don't route people through Tor without their knowledge. -- Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/ http://cardwellit.com/ OpenPGP Key35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F XMPP OTR Key 8924 B06A 7917 AAF3 DBB1 BF1B 295C 3C78 3EF1 46B4 signature.asc Description: Digital signature -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Safeplug
Some more information from [1] - users can whitelist certain sites so that their use is not run through Tor. - Users can also set up Safeplug to work on a per-browser basis, so for example Firefox may always run through Tor while Chrome won’t. - users can also set themselves up as Tor nodes to help others surf anonymously (the default setting for this is “off” as it has bandwidth implications). - People who are sceptical can look at the Linux level(sic) and see exactly what processes are running. Technical users can look inside the box and feel safe that it’s only running Tor.” - Pogoplug has even made firmware updates for the device pull-only, not push – “If we pushed, we’d have to track all the boxes. It’s pull-based for security reasons.” [1] http://gigaom.com/2013/11/21/say-hello-to-safeplug-pogoplugs-49-tor-in-a-box-for-anonymous-surfing/ -- With respect, Roman signature.asc Description: PGP signature -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] StrictExitNodes deprecated?
On 11/23/2013 2:16 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Sat, Nov 23, 2013 at 07:42:23AM +0200, Sherief Alaa wrote:
I just see the options StrictExitNodes and StrictEntryNodes is deprecated?
The correct syntax is:
EntryNodes {node, node, ...}
StrictNodes 0 or 1 #0 for disabled
No, you should not use StrictNodes with EntryNodes or ExitNodes. It
won't do anything (except confuse you I guess).
Note: it's recommend to leave Tor handle your path selection
automatically rather than specifying one yourself as it can greatly harm
your anonymity.
This is likely still true.
What about when using TBB is desired, but sites (say web mail) won't
accept addresses from countries other than used to sign up?
At least not w/o headaches - at times. Just one example. How can this
be handled - or can it?
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Re: [tor-talk] How secure is check.torproject.org?
On reflection, I think I should clarify ... Roger: As for having a network map for TBB 3, I agree in theory. But somebody needs to actually do it. Promising routes include writing it into Tor Launcher (harder to do, but easier to maintain and probably safer) or writing instructions for how best to attach your (old, eventually obsolete) Vidalia to your shiny new TBB 3. Great idea, and so very easy. Just run TBB 3, and then run TBB 2.4. Vidalia from TBB 2.4 just simply finds the running Tor instance, connects, and works. Network Map and New Identity both work nicely. I can't stop FF from starting (well, I can, but not cleanly) so any hints on that would be appreciated. Thanks! -- kat -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Safeplug
Gordon Morehouse has been spending a lot of time getting the Pi to run as Tor relay: https://github.com/gordon-morehouse/cipollini I've been running a BeagleBone Black relay on a home network for over 2 months now: http://datko.net/2013/09/13/update_bbb_tor/ Josh On Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 5:43 AM, Chris Burge burgech...@gmail.com wrote: I very rarely (if ever) comment on this list (I like to read and learn). That said, I've been looking into building a TOR router using Pi. This is because I have elements within my home that are technically inept and thus are a danger to themselves and everyone else (ageing parents...what can you say). I've been planning a coup by secretly replacing the current Tomato router with something like the Pi (I've been unsuccessful in getting TOR to work on the Tomato router). The scare, to me, of buying a device is what is in there (things that compromise TOR) but it does tempt me because I'm lazy (probably the cause of my downfall). Granted a router does not guarantee safety from Grandpa downloading something bad that compromises the router but one step at a time...right? On 11/22/13, Sean Alexandre s...@alexan.org wrote: On Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 04:50:44PM +0600, Roman Mamedov wrote: https://pogoplug.com/safeplug Someone should buy this and post a teardown. :) (via http://www.cnx-software.com/2013/11/22/49-safeplug-tor-router-let-you-browse-the-net-anonymously/ ) I think these kind of devices configured for Tor make good relays, but aren't great for anonymity. Tor anonymizes your IP address and DNS requests, but application protocols can still reveal your identity. From Want Tor to really work? [1]: Tor does not protect all of your computer's Internet traffic when you run it. Tor only protects your applications that are properly configured to send their Internet traffic through Tor. To avoid problems with Tor configuration, we strongly recommend you use the Tor Browser Bundle. It is pre-configured to protect your privacy and anonymity on the web as long as you're browsing with the Tor Browser itself. Almost any other web browser configuration is likely to be unsafe to use with Tor. Articles like these [2,3] should talk about being good relays versus being good for anonymity. [1] https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en#warning [2] http://www.cnx-software.com/2013/11/22/49-safeplug-tor-router-let-you-browse-the-net-anonymously/ [3] http://learn.adafruit.com/onion-pi/ -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- Interested in selling your home? Ask me! -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] tordns incapable of MX lookups (was Basics of secure email platform)
1) Create a list of tor exit nodes that do not block port 25 2) Command the tor daemon to exit those nodes exclusively. SSL-SMTP configured to works over 465 port in most cases. On Windows Yes. SMTP over ssl/tls is configured on port 25. Starttls, aca submission, is configured for port 587 You guys are getting hung up on the wrong thing. Before talking ports (which is a non-issue), realize that tordns cannot do an MX lookup. This remains the biggest hurdle to sending mail. Postfix must run with a transparent proxy (no SOCKS proxy capability), so it relies wholly on tordns for MX lookups. Torsocks has a (now broken) feature to disable TorDNS. If tordns could be disabled, then postfix could do an MX lookup. It would be a leak, but at least it would work. At the moment, the tordns disabler has been removed, so there is no hope of running a mail server... Unless someone comes up with a SOCKS-capable mail server. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Safeplug
On 11/22/2013 16:53, Red Sonja wrote: How can one be sure that firmware that is running on the router is built from this particular source code and not from some modified version or different revision? Hashes? The ability to build it from sources? If you search you can find a few other solutions. Nope, there is no solution. Hash can only prove it comes from this vendor, it doesn't establish vendor trust. You practically can't prove that firmware is built from the particular source since it is practically impossible to duplicate the build environment for any complex project from the real world. Also how can one be sure that one extra service wasn't added on top of this open source? Go for your own compile and see what's broken. Sorry, this doesn't make any sense. Open source only makes sense when built and installed by the party interested in security, or maybe when it is built by some trustworthy organization, like some trusted linux distro, and not just some random commercial company without any reputation. Not really. How about the tor project? Trust comes precisely from this open source, open review. In fact, Tor is one step above: it's Free Software. Yes, trust comes with the open review, and transparent build process. None of these is possible with firmwares supplied by commercial companies. Therefore, no trust. Product in its original form is pretty much useless for what it is advertised. However, there are many useless products on the market, and commercial success doesn't seem to correlate with usefulness. So I only wish them well in their endeavor. Nice try anyway. Yuri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] tordns incapable of MX lookups (was Basics of secure email platform)
On Sat, Nov 23, 2013 at 8:04 PM, t...@lists.grepular.com wrote: 1) Create a list of tor exit nodes that do not block port 25 2) Command the tor daemon to exit those nodes exclusively. SSL-SMTP configured to works over 465 port in most cases. On Windows Yes. SMTP over ssl/tls is configured on port 25. Starttls, aca submission, is configured for port 587 You guys are getting hung up on the wrong thing. Before talking ports (which is a non-issue), realize that tordns cannot do an MX lookup. This remains the biggest hurdle to sending mail. Postfix must run with a transparent proxy (no SOCKS proxy capability), so it relies wholly on tordns for MX lookups. Torsocks has a (now broken) feature to disable TorDNS. If tordns could be disabled, then postfix could do an MX lookup. It would be a leak, but at least it would work. At the moment, the tordns disabler has been removed, so there is no hope of running a mail server... Unless someone comes up with a SOCKS-capable mail server. Well, there's a way to get this done, but it's not a *nix based solution. You can utilize ISA Server, Microsoft Exchange, and the Socksv4 firewall client. Use the ISA Server to centrally connect to Tor, use the Socksv4 client to let Microsoft Exchange connect via socks to the client. It's something I'm willing to try out and see if it works if anyone wants to know the results of such test, but I'm pretty sure this type of solution should work. -Rock -- Conrad Rockenhaus http://www.rockenhaus.com/ http://www.lagparty.org/~conradr/ -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) mQGNBFKLfOwBDADgdC8rA0FY8WFBllGZWogsOGSh7YvwA50OwNnlb//j/U9A8WCi jL+KAHm/eaaHne6R0t2SvIVTkC/tNljb9ylUKSsb8F2+5JDEb1k0Za2bJCM1BqkW M8mpcu+VYdhOqCRKr2mIV34gD8XQhOi9Z95VGH2aUoIShSeTUU9gFC9r9MGiZrue Sdxaq+n1rDaadPwg1fuCmiDyN6kTDGpbxIzSuEuXpat+Yif4styvwXTq5oYHZG5t WikEJUcoY6S2rH/qhfU4K/kuAKK2m5IfawP3+bD3iaD+cQrTtjVdGXCOUVbogVEj uGDugwGAWe8sJoSX/HxbzE6gKFlgbwDRNjDdU21YJJCyYXAdwAIx+uzBcFBtcWtl OEWamE23i0O/koaYQKi5AxBrUTKBfKenmF98L5hCbd8v6dMHhjepJj8OZ1hMOxw+ NnHI38h40TEZmgj8+GuyG2yJIPgl/+baqZciJzsY0tf6k2FAHcebpCuwwXUMyxpF zDlHM+CMwy9LhosAEQEAAbRFQ29ucmFkIFJvY2tlbmhhdXMgKE5ldyBHUEcgS2V5 IC0gUmVwbGFjZW1lbnQpIDxjb25yYWRAcm9ja2VuaGF1cy5jb20+iQG/BBMBAgAp BQJSi3zsAhsDBQkGCTokBwsJCAcDAgEGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQwzp0 fZg53n+ldgv/dOCxNCDlNNExStot90KZvMELGqDQs7A7LN5LJHLJmPR4s93b3xUB GW6TrJEn+bwrvPsc2IERvYDjHd7618pCm83tRB+yD5xqdd2wzeFO0CxrdhSsCLeQ MvQyW6ObEL/OyZN90jWIIab8KffHdWpnn3cGbEmpGBFT34gV7aEgUtCn3w+sCpll gth6z5tI0Gd6wVCzd02hfjtKvFrHcmI9I6V/HlcF2cKSzJwUPozwelTGl6v80lBf CCGWZ9itJ2kL1H0CZuienwgqielhundCwu+NiJZJE9X5R9kAgqF/6HdZd0DxIlmY 7GDLZn84xBfBLQWtV/skysK81f4HAk2CJF80DO9+k2IqRnwfvhNIzNAI2WE7jjr/ yeZa3H0hvjG2PBhNeMByk3rQoI1Vhp37QAuta6lPRSJV6XOC0ZsMAYvS3PXBkXqO uEx/hgATl24M9Ziyryd3aYtLyQpJup/Q1GB7MRjRoNxUTt96LGef16MiY5qqfEF7 swMm4VnWK5JVuQGNBFKLfOwBDACfae2k6ehQ9q6CTteFbNnrVCJWK/dQlkT53cDS xX+hLI+P/8SVQ3PrTvmHo+6ihTEp11TlmjpB7tGuuSH6kZD3e8vuiqdibzOkjot4 l4dU3K8Rs/pCM8sTsMWUoZlK8iSTWJmi1RVO3A5/MshPFN9X/SSv5wZ8Cop+ME// hvrRpcPwGz4tE9ULkeIRVaPicmh8IeQDfTeKDrwgU+Sm5DKVGTWk74dieQ1jcS7I zJCAv0Z6U+GKNVwby/HX1z3wPGQvHrmMtcXbUYBDYkMgr71YOtwqpfvFej1VrUrR y1jbCtztgCKESN1C9VAQEggSTExMUdYCpImKYk9DAsydl2p96Wo7rFgP1Ryru9oY 76tw5h7AhegJJqY9ZmCP0as4LtASRSXjY8DOAtRnM2V5jB7Cn1mFGTpEps6ykCiG 2vDLEnLZ5zn2l1S+Ka/EsSbQCUFgOyJBlTJLBbd9a4/Z/FxMcIKfWY/WbTyJMTsQ XJoejHzTRDcK6VcXcszEjYv8d3kAEQEAAYkBpQQYAQIADwUCUot87AIbDAUJBgk6 JAAKCRDDOnR9mDnef0YCDAC6YZhvuvIuoykfL6XfFHGNg+EKGPPQ0JkcJXambMnc duINru44VIKFfCi8NeHV9KmPmMKPFXVlpnxqNS9AZJVjBiFSztsET2uDLu3BASza 6sHEIshXrhoU7VoiGQEC17NIurByrAztPXOAGLkeOOH/oPhdkKlyOJ8nxiKxFGzG /No6ejcrzKoZ0Zi62aOp9kOxXan8zyrc5o0mTUnDAyKSU9+niiiwifYVhI284n6G wiCdkCFxG22x5MkYafWIR+z58cTLSTtUfqzxBE/nXTFaS+MvBueCpoo+DhSpsTHw sy3qDpHIRdx+T/E+Nh/g3B5EHgUEt2R3Q8mdgtYUyQkc5VE9XuZ+FaU7yA6kSBRx DdO/0zgSjh78LwwD3BHmZI6dzDRX4MHKjCAWU5YZnL5iu63Msr1EGkfsAYQmuLCk 8NN1ZXJPDT8bS3coPawDMXhrbI6LCiQ2S1GJH4aLhmTfFZ/KAs1IUddlkp0Dm/II V/cr6DHoVJlLzdHp9RdA/2U= =d3ja -END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
