Re: [tor-talk] I don't see any cookies in TBB 3.5

[Roger Dingledine]

On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 07:50:44PM -0800, C B wrote:
> I do not see any cookies being stored. I clicked Options, Privacy,
>and changed "Torbrowser will" to "Use custom settings for history"
>(do not save) This exposes the button "Show Cookies", which reveals no
>cookies have been saved. Cancel to exit.

You will like (or maybe not like, but still want to be aware of)
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10353

--Roger

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Re: [tor-talk] I don't see any cookies in TBB 3.5

[scarp]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

TT Security:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> 1. How to see cookies in TBB 3.5?
> 
> 2. And what are the options: -Protect new Cookies -Do not Protect
> new Cookies What are they mean?
> 
> -- Regards


Perhaps this is what you're looking for:

https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/cookie-monster/
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/cookie-exporter/

- -- 
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Re: [tor-talk] I don't see any cookies in TBB 3.5

[C B]

I do not see any cookies being stored. I clicked Options, Privacy, and changed 
"Torbrowser will" to "Use custom settings for history" (do not save) This 
exposes the button "Show Cookies", which reveals no cookies have been saved. 
Cancel to exit.
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[tor-talk] Vidalia has been replaced with Tor Launcher

[TT Security]

Hi,

1. So "Network Map" and "New Identity" are absent now. When these functions 
will be add to the TBB?
 
2. Is it still able to set nodes: #EntryNodes, #ExitNodes, #ExcludeNodes, #ExcludeExitNodes in torrc cfg-file?



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[tor-talk] I don't see any cookies in TBB 3.5

[TT Security]

Hi,

1. How to see cookies in TBB 3.5?

2. And what are the options:
-Protect new Cookies
-Do not Protect new Cookies
What are they mean?

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Re: [tor-talk] Forensics on Tor

[Mirimir]

On 01/23/2014 06:13 PM, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
> On 1/23/2014 5:12 PM, Mirimir wrote:
>> I wouldn't run VMs on Windows with any expectation of privacy. Only a
>> year or so ago, shellbags were not common knowledge. Only the forensic
>> community and hard-core black hat types knew about them. It's arguable
>> that many similar features in Windows remain undocumented.[1]
> 
> [1] I'd like to hear more.  "Arguable" mean there is some evidence?

According to ,
"arguable" means "open to argument, dispute, or question" and "that can
be plausibly or convincingly argued".

It's a word that I picked up working with lawyers. Basically, it means
that the proposition isn't clearly and obviously false, and that arguing
for it isn't obviously disingenuous. It's how plaintiffs typically
assert claims in complaints, when they don't yet have the necessary
evidence, some of which will be obtained in discovery.

The best evidence for undocumented privacy leaks in Windows is all of
the previously undocumented privacy leaks that are now documented. This
about sums it up: "Trick me once, shame on you. Trick me twice, shame on
me. Trick me three times and I get what I deserve!"
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Re: [tor-talk] Forensics on Tor

[Joe Btfsplk]

On 1/23/2014 5:12 PM, Mirimir wrote:
I wouldn't run VMs on Windows with any expectation of privacy. Only a 
year or so ago, shellbags were not common knowledge. Only the forensic 
community and hard-core black hat types knew about them. It's arguable 
that many similar features in Windows remain undocumented.[1]


[1] I'd like to hear more.  "Arguable" mean there is some evidence?
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Re: [tor-talk] Shutting down the relay-search service by the end of the year

[Arlo Breault]

On Thursday, January 23, 2014 at 2:11 PM, Christian wrote:
> On 23.01.2014 10:58, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> > Christian,
> > 
> > did you make any progress on the Globe variant that doesn't
> > require client-side JavaScript anymore?
> > 
> > Thanks! Karsten
> 
> Hi,
> in the last 2 weeks I didn't had much freetime to work on it.
> Today I fixed the svg rendering of relay weight/bandwidth graphs.
> 
> Main features that are missing as of now:
> - bridge graphs
> - advanced search
> - some css changes
> 
> I created issues for these missing features.
> 
> The current repo is on github:
> - repo: https://github.com/makepanic/globe-node
> - issues: https://github.com/makepanic/globe-node/issues
> 
> 
> A couple of open questions:
> 
> How should we manage dependencies to other libraries? The problem ist
> that nodejs in wheezy-backports excludes npm (the official package
> manager for Node.js). There is a open bugreport but I don't know if or
> when it's resolved
> (http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=729488).
> (possible solutions:
> - include the external packages in the repository by using npm locally
> and add them to git
> 
> 

Unfortunately, d3 has a binary dependency in contextify via jsdom.
 
> - compile nodejs ourself
> - install npm manually
> [https://github.com/joyent/node/wiki/Installing-Node.js-via-package-manager#backports])
> 
> I don't have access to a nodejs server. For gaining feedback and
> testing the application on a remote server I could deploy globe-node
> temporarily to heroku (for free). Do you think it would be OK?
> 
> Without JavaScript I can't really make a tabbed view for relay and
> bridge searches.
> Right now i put them on top of eachother: http://i.imgur.com/pN9tgME.png
> Does anyone knows a better solution?
> 
> Cheers
> Christian
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> 


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Re: [tor-talk] Forensics on Tor

[Mirimir]

On 01/23/2014 09:04 AM, Marcos Eugenio Kehl wrote:

> Hey experts! Reading about Tails and Whonix, I learnd that Whonix 
> is for virtual machines and Tails don't. 
> https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Comparison_with_Others

You can run the Tails ISO as a VM. But then there will be traces left on
the host machine, just as with Whonix.

> The questions are:

Many ;)

> 1. What kind of metadata could remain on Windows 8 when running Tails
> and Whonix on virtual machine (VMWare and VirtualBox)? Should I
> inquire the developers?

All sorts of data (not just metadata) will remain from VirtualBox or
VMware running Tails or Whonix. I don't use Windows, but I've seen much
positive feedback about PrivaZer on
.

Even with the best cleaner, I wouldn't run VMs on Windows with any
expectation of privacy. Only a year or so ago, shellbags were not common
knowledge. Only the forensic community and hard-core black hat types
knew about them. It's arguable that many similar features in Windows
remain undocumented.

> If no metadata remains, the fact virtual machine provides us another
> IP and mac adress, would not be safer?

Getting a new public IP address from Tor helps a lot. You also get a new
MAC address for the VMs, and it's easy to permanently change a VM's MAC
address using the VirtualBox/VMware configuration GUI.

You also get a new browser signature. If you use multiple VMs, each can
have its own signature, which prevents association of activity among
them via fingerprinting.

> 2. Should we disable or block by firewall my antivirus when running
> Tails or Whoinx on virtual machine? 

No.

> 3. No metadata remains on the live dvd-rw when running Tails as main
> boot?

No. If you're using Tails on a USB flash drive, there's an option for
persistent storage.

> 4. No metadata remains when running Tor on Ubuntu? If yes, how can I
> clean it?

Data and metadata remain on Ubuntu by default. Given that Linux distros
are generally open source, it's feasible to identify all such remains,
and to remove them.

Even so, I find it far simpler to just use full disk encryption
(dm-crypt and LUKS) on my VM host machines.

> 5. "The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can
> see or measure both traffic going into the Tor network and also
> traffic coming out of the Tor network. That's because if you can see
> both flows, some simple statistics let you decide whether they match
> up. That could also be the case if your ISP (or your local network 
> administrator) and the ISP of the destination server (or the 
> destination server itself) cooperate to attack you. Tor tries to 
> protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to learn 
> whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic 
> confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an 
> attacker tries to confirm an hypothesis by monitoring the right 
> locations in the network and then doing the math" The sentence above 
> means that downloads through Tor are encrypted?

I'm not sure what you're asking. The text that you quote concerns
traffic analysis. But you're asking about encryption. Unless your
connections to Internet sites are end-to-end encrypted, Tor exit relays
can see what you're downloading. But they don't know your ISP-assigned
IP address, and so can't determine who you are (unless you reveal that
by signing in with a traceable account, or whatever).

If by "encrypted" you mean "hidden", Tor does hide paths taken by
downloads, unless your apps aren't properly configured for Tor, and leak
your ISP-assigned IP address through UDP connections, for example.

> If yes, it means that, even if the entry node and the exit node are
> compromissed, the attacker can't easily decrypt what I have
> downloaded?

They may see that you downloaded stuff, but they can't decrypt anything
that was protected by end-to-end encryption. You should always use
SSL/TLS (HTTPS etc) connections via Tor, for example. Connecting via Tor
with SSH or VPNs also provides end-to-end encryption. For messages,
always use GnuPG. For chat, use Pidgin with OTR.

> Cheers!Marcos Kehl (Brasil)
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Re: [tor-talk] Shutting down the relay-search service by the end of the year

[Christian]

On 23.01.2014 10:58, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> Christian,
> 
> did you make any progress on the Globe variant that doesn't
> require client-side JavaScript anymore?
> 
> Thanks! Karsten

Hi,
in the last 2 weeks I didn't had much freetime to work on it.
Today I fixed the svg rendering of relay weight/bandwidth graphs.

Main features that are missing as of now:
- bridge graphs
- advanced search
- some css changes

I created issues for these missing features.

The current repo is on github:
- repo: https://github.com/makepanic/globe-node
- issues: https://github.com/makepanic/globe-node/issues


A couple of open questions:

How should we manage dependencies to other libraries? The problem ist
that nodejs in wheezy-backports excludes npm (the official package
manager for Node.js). There is a open bugreport but I don't know if or
when it's resolved
(http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=729488).
(possible solutions:
- include the external packages in the repository by using npm locally
and add them to git
- compile nodejs ourself
- install npm manually
[https://github.com/joyent/node/wiki/Installing-Node.js-via-package-manager#backports])

I don't have access to a nodejs server. For gaining feedback and
testing the application on a remote server I could deploy globe-node
temporarily to heroku (for free). Do you think it would be OK?

Without JavaScript I can't really make a tabbed view for relay and
bridge searches.
Right now i put them on top of eachother: http://i.imgur.com/pN9tgME.png
Does anyone knows a better solution?

Cheers
Christian
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Re: [tor-talk] Tori

[jake.tar...@gmail.com]

I don't thin this is the right place for that...

Maybe try contacting her through one of her friends?

> On Jan 22, 2014, at 21:24, Julie Chartier  wrote:
> 
> How can I comnect with tori ?
> 
> Hi. Will you give my daughter
> A message as she hasnt see seemed to be able to hear me.I really hope this
> upco coming year will be different you're young lady we missed last year
> together.I will be here for you forever. I really hope to see are you'm c I
> really need to talk free all I wanted was shelter you from harm.
> I miss you so much. I love you so much.
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[tor-talk] Forensics on Tor

[Marcos Eugenio Kehl]

Hey experts! Reading about Tails and Whonix, I learnd that Whonix is for 
virtual machines and Tails don't. 
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Comparison_with_Others The questions are: 1. What 
kind of metadata could remain on Windows 8 when running Tails and Whonix on 
virtual machine (VMWare and VirtualBox)? Should I inquire the developers? If no 
metadata remains, the fact virtual machine provides us another IP and mac 
adress, would not be safer?  2. Should we disable or block by firewall my 
antivirus when running Tails or Whoinx on virtual machine? 3. No metadata 
remains on the live dvd-rw when running Tails as main boot? 4. No metadata 
remains when running Tor on Ubuntu? If yes, how can I clean it? 5. "The Tor 
design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see or measure both 
traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming out of the Tor 
network. That's because if you can see both flows, some simple statistics let 
you decide whether they match up. That could also be t
 he case if your ISP (or your local network administrator) and the ISP of the 
destination server (or the destination server itself) cooperate to attack you. 
Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to learn 
whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic confirmation (also 
known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries to confirm an 
hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and then doing the 
math" The sentence above means that downloads through Tor are encrypted? If 
yes, it means that, even if the entry node and the exit node are compromissed, 
the attacker can't easily decrypt what I have downloaded? Cheers!Marcos Kehl 
(Brasil)  

  
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Re: [tor-talk] Integrity of platforms: Trusted Computing

[Moritz Bartl]

On 01/22/2014 04:05 PM, Jan Reister wrote:
>> I'm wondering if, within anonymity community, the trusted computing
>> technologies hasn't been evaluated properly for the values that it could
>> be provide in terms of operating system and application integrity.
> In terms of security, the developers of Qubes OS make use of TPM for
> their Anti Evil Maid functionality:
> http://qubes-os.org/trac/wiki/SystemRequirements
> http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.it/2011/09/anti-evil-maid.html

Recommendation to watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pKeiKYA03eE
(
https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-21/dc-21-presentations/Selifonov/DEFCON-21-Selifonov-A-Password-is-Not-Enough-Why-Disk-Encryption-is-Broken.pdf
)

"[...] By integrating AES new instructions, x86 debugging registers,
encrypted RAM, IOMMU, and the TPM into a combined encryption system, the
difficulty of executing a successful attack is raised significantly. We
will examine the construction of this system in detail, and, at a higher
level, the role of full disk encryption in assuring meaningful security
in the face of physical access. Source to an experimental version of the
system will be made available. "

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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Re: [tor-talk] Shutting down the relay-search service by the end of the year

[Karsten Loesing]

Christian,

did you make any progress on the Globe variant that doesn't require
client-side JavaScript anymore?

Thanks!
Karsten


On 1/9/14 9:53 AM, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> On 1/8/14 10:10 PM, Arlo Breault wrote:
>> On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 at 1:49 PM, Christian wrote:
> 
> Hi Christian, hi Arlo,
> 
> replying to both mails inline.
> 
>>> On 08.01.2014 08:52, Karsten Loesing wrote:
 It seems that most things in Globe could work just fine without
 client-side JavaScript. The only problem might be bandwidth and weights
 graphs. How does Arlo's version display graphs?
>>>  
>>> As far as i know it doesn't display the graphs right now.
>> Right, they’re currently rendered client-side to a canvas.
>> Switching to svgs, as you mention below, would be necessary.
> 
> Makes sense.
> 
 However, I just looked at Debian's package search page, and there's no
 phantomjs in wheezy nor wheezy-backports. That means we probably can't
 run it on a Tor machine. :(
>>>  
>>> Ok. Theoretically we could download the binary (
>>> http://phantomjs.org/download.html ) or build it ourself (
>>> http://phantomjs.org/build.html ).
> 
> If we want to keep our sysadmins happy, we should only use packages in
> wheezy or wheezy-backports.
> 
 What's the alternative? Use Globe's current codebase and turn it into
 something that runs in nodejs, which is contained in wheezy-backports?
>>>  
>>> That's what I'm currently working on. As of now, only bridge details and
>>> graphs aren't completly ported.
> 
> Cool!
> 
>> Sounds like you’re most of the way there.
>>
>> I only suggested the phantomjs approach as a means to avoid a rewrite,
>> but since you’ve pretty much gone and done it,
>> we’re probably better off focussing on that.
> 
> I agree with Arlo.
> 
>> Let me know if there’s anything I can help with.
> 
> Thanks, Arlo!
> 
>>> If you think if it's better to use Arlos approach I can try to change
>>> the current globe to make it more useable via phantomjs.
>>>  
>>> Btw because we can't provide interactive graphs without JavaScript I'm
>>> building an API that uses d3js (like atlas and earlier versions of
>>> globe), renders the graphs serverside as SVG and returns them.
>>> This way users can link and embed SVGs for specific fingerprints using a
>>> simple url ( like globe.torproject.org/relay/bandwidth/:fingerprint.svg 
>>> (http://globe.torproject.org/relay/bandwidth/:fingerprint.svg)
>>> or something alike).
> 
> Sounds great!  Thank you!
> 
> All the best,
> Karsten
> 
> 

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Re: [tor-talk] MaxMind GeoIP vs. Tor

[Karsten Loesing]

On 1/22/14 5:55 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> http://dev.maxmind.com/faq/what-are-the-a1-anonymous-proxy-entries/
> 
> You'll also want to browse the links up top such
> as minfraud, chargeback, proxy reporting, vpn, etc.
> The v2 may help a bit since anyone converting to it
> may not have actually been blocking on A1/A2 but
> on !ISOlist or !alpha or !US, etc and/or they wont care
> to check the traits.

Related post on tor-dev@:

https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-January/006080.html

All the best,
Karsten

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Re: [tor-talk] [tor-relays] [Question] Onion router's bandwidth

[Karsten Loesing]

Please don't crosspost.  Let's keep this discussion on *rolls dice*
tor-talk@.  Setting Reply-To: to tor-talk@, though mailman might not
respect that.  But please only post replies to tor-talk@.  Thanks.

On 1/23/14 7:51 AM, hyoseok Lee wrote:
> Hi
> 
> I am junior student in Sungkyunkwan University,South Korea
> 
> I am studying Tor for my paper
> 
> In my research, onion router has to report its bandwidth by sending
> descriptor to authority directory.
> 
> and then authority directory verifies onion router's bandwidth
> 
> 
> 
> [Question 1]
> 
> I hope to know the way how authority directory verifies bandwidth which
> came from onion router.
> 
> I was told that authority directory had bandwidth verifying tool called
> bandwidth scanner.
> 
> How can I get source code of bandwidth scanner ?

https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/tree/HEAD:/NetworkScanners/BwAuthority

Or use Git to clone the repository:

  git clone https://git.torproject.org/torflow.git

> [Question 2]
> 
> I made my own onion router, I configured my onion router's bandwidth 100kB/s
> 
> But, In updated cached-microdesc-consensus file, My onion router's
> bandwidth was estimated at 20kB/s and there is "unmeasured=1"
> 
> It means my onion router's bandwidth had not been estimated.
> 
> what is difference between measured router and unmeasured router ?

https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/dir-spec.txt#l1647

All the best,
Karsten


> Thank you for reading my question

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[tor-talk] [Question] Onion router's bandwidth

[hyoseok Lee]

Hi

I am junior student in Sungkyunkwan University,South Korea

I am studying Tor for my paper

In my research, onion router has to report its bandwidth by sending
descriptor to authority directory.

and then authority directory verifies onion router's bandwidth



[Question 1]

I hope to know the way how authority directory verifies bandwidth which
came from onion router.

I was told that authority directory had bandwidth verifying tool called
bandwidth scanner.

How can I get source code of bandwidth scanner ?



[Question 2]

I made my own onion router, I configured my onion router's bandwidth 100kB/s

But, In updated cached-microdesc-consensus file, My onion router's
bandwidth was estimated at 20kB/s and there is "unmeasured=1"

It means my onion router's bandwidth had not been estimated.

what is difference between measured router and unmeasured router ?



Thank you for reading my question
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