[tor-talk] Tor 0.4.0.2-alpha is released

2019-02-21 Thread Nick Mathewson
Hello!

There's a new alpha Tor release! Because it's an alpha, you should
only run it if you're ready to find more bugs than usual, and report
them on trac.torproject.org.

The source code is available from the usual place on
www.torproject.org; if you build Tor from source, why not give it a
try? And if you don't build Tor from source, packages should be ready
over the coming days, with a Tor Browser alpha release likely in the
next few weeks.

This release fixes TROVE-2019-001, a possible security bug involving
the KIST cell scheduler code in versions 0.3.2.1-alpha and later.  We
are not certain that it is possible to exploit this bug in the wild,
but to be careful, we recommend that all affected users upgrade.  The
potential impact is a remote denial-of-service attack against clients
or relays.

Here's what's new:

Changes in version 0.4.0.2-alpha - 2019-02-21
  Tor 0.4.0.2-alpha is the second alpha in its series; it fixes several
  bugs from earlier versions, including several that had broken
  backward compatibility.

  It also includes a fix for a medium-severity security bug affecting Tor
  0.3.2.1-alpha and later. All Tor instances running an affected release
  should upgrade to 0.3.3.12, 0.3.4.11, 0.3.5.8, or 0.4.0.2-alpha.

  o Major bugfixes (cell scheduler, KIST, security):
- Make KIST consider the outbuf length when computing what it can
  put in the outbuf. Previously, KIST acted as though the outbuf
  were empty, which could lead to the outbuf becoming too full. It
  is possible that an attacker could exploit this bug to cause a Tor
  client or relay to run out of memory and crash. Fixes bug 29168;
  bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha. This issue is also being tracked as
  TROVE-2019-001 and CVE-2019-8955.

  o Major bugfixes (networking):
- Gracefully handle empty username/password fields in SOCKS5
  username/password auth messsage and allow SOCKS5 handshake to
  continue. Previously, we had rejected these handshakes, breaking
  certain applications. Fixes bug 29175; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.

  o Major bugfixes (windows, startup):
- When reading a consensus file from disk, detect whether it was
  written in text mode, and re-read it in text mode if so. Always
  write consensus files in binary mode so that we can map them into
  memory later. Previously, we had written in text mode, which
  confused us when we tried to map the file on windows. Fixes bug
  28614; bugfix on 0.4.0.1-alpha.

  o Minor features (compilation):
- Compile correctly when OpenSSL is built with engine support
  disabled, or with deprecated APIs disabled. Closes ticket 29026.
  Patches from "Mangix".

  o Minor features (developer tooling):
- Check that bugfix versions in changes files look like Tor versions
  from the versions spec. Warn when bugfixes claim to be on a future
  release. Closes ticket 27761.
- Provide a git pre-commit hook that disallows commiting if we have
  any failures in our code and changelog formatting checks. It is
  now available in scripts/maint/pre-commit.git-hook. Implements
  feature 28976.

  o Minor features (directory authority):
- When a directory authority is using a bandwidth file to obtain
  bandwidth values, include the digest of that file in the vote.
  Closes ticket 26698.

  o Minor features (geoip):
- Update geoip and geoip6 to the February 5 2019 Maxmind GeoLite2
  Country database. Closes ticket 29478.

  o Minor features (testing):
- Treat all unexpected ERR and BUG messages as test failures. Closes
  ticket 28668.

  o Minor bugfixes (build, compatibility, rust):
- Update Cargo.lock file to match the version made by the latest
  version of Rust, so that "make distcheck" will pass again. Fixes
  bug 29244; bugfix on 0.3.3.4-alpha.

  o Minor bugfixes (compilation):
- Fix compilation warnings in test_circuitpadding.c. Fixes bug
  29169; bugfix on 0.4.0.1-alpha.
- Silence a compiler warning in test-memwipe.c on OpenBSD. Fixes bug
  29145; bugfix on 0.2.9.3-alpha. Patch from Kris Katterjohn.

  o Minor bugfixes (documentation):
- Describe the contents of the v3 onion service client authorization
  files correctly: They hold public keys, not private keys. Fixes
  bug 28979; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. Spotted by "Felixix".

  o Minor bugfixes (linux seccomp sandbox):
- Fix startup crash when experimental sandbox support is enabled.
  Fixes bug 29150; bugfix on 0.4.0.1-alpha. Patch by Peter Gerber.

  o Minor bugfixes (logging):
- Avoid logging that we are relaxing a circuit timeout when that
  timeout is fixed. Fixes bug 28698; bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha.
- Log more information at "warning" level when unable to read a
  private key; log more information at "info" level when unable to
  read a public key. We had warnings here before, but they were lost
  during our NSS work. Fixes bug 29042; 

[tor-talk] Flatpak, Re: Tor Browser Bundle as a "Snap" package

2019-02-21 Thread Mykola Nikishov
Nathaniel Suchy  writes:

> The confinement capabilities of "Snap" packages are quite interesting. As
> Tor Browser continues to grow in usage, I'm interested in seeing what new
> techniques are adopted to improve security. What do you all think about the
> usage of a container (Snap or otherwise) to improve security?

Check latest news on CentOS and Ubuntu removing Bubblewrap (a sandboxing
tech used by Flatpak) support.

Warning: Unlike when using a separate user and a separate log-in
session, bubblewrap not only exposes security vulnerabilities in the
kernel but also in the window compositor. Users should be aware that
running untrustworthy code in bubblewrap is still not safe.

[0] https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap
[1] https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bubblewrap
[2] https://blog.torproject.org/q-and-yawning-angel

-- 
Mykola

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[tor-talk] Test

2019-02-21 Thread Arkadiusz Bogucki
Test
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