Re: [tor-talk] tor project website change

2019-04-04 Thread Lee 
On 4/3/19, blacklight...@tutanota.com  wrote:
> Pretty sure this guy is just trolling and baiting at this point

It looks more like frustration to me
>> The last actual use case warning or disclaimer on torproject.org
>> was removed by or on October 10 2010.

Starting at  https://www.torproject.org/
  Browse Privately.
  - with no caveats.
  BLOCK TRACKERS
  - except they aren't actually blocked, just isolated.  right?
  DEFEND AGAINST SURVEILLANCE
  - I suspect tor is a better defense than using a vpn but still...
with no warnings or caveats it seems a bit much.
  RESIST FINGERPRINTING
  - yay!  "Tor Browser aims to ..."  a reasonable claim.

But wait!  There's more!!

Click on the 'Download Tor Browser' link & go to
https://www.torproject.org/download/
Click on the 'Download Tor Browser' link on that page and get sent to
"../download/" but that's where I was, so wtf?  Maybe I need
javascript enabled??

There's also a link for "Verify Tor Browser signature" but no link to
the signature file.

At least the "Download in another language" link gets me to a page
where I can download tbb and the sig.  It doesn't show which version
will be downloaded, but it does have working links, so it's infinitely
better than the download page.

Lee


> Apr 3, 2019, 10:47 AM by grarp...@gmail.com:
>
>>> why adversaries should finance tor project and publicly it if they have
>>> a malicious intent?
>>>
>>
>> Why do adversaries do that to their opponents?
>> Because it's a simple and effective diversion operation.
>> Nor is it dependant upon whether any "malicious intent".
>> Adversaries often fund their opponents to keep them busy and happy
>> even if opponent only a few steps tangent behind the race to actually
>> being able to kill the adversary. It can work actively...
>> "Here's a pile and stream of money to develop some useless
>> or thing we want in an RFP / contract / grant / employee",
>> or passively... "Hey, those guys seem to be going down useless
>> paths, ok here's a bunch of money to keep them happily digging
>> in those holes, LOL." Usually delivered by false fronts.
>> See also "regulatory capture" type of concept. Also how nice
>> salaries and simple weight of self reinforcing mass inertia and
>> groupthink over time can keep any one or group settled into the
>> same thing, less dynamism, up to even not abandoning and starting
>> out elsewhere due to simple risk aversion... "job food friends lifestyle."
>>
>>
>> Is an entity, product, or network subject to whatever
>> to some degree or other? Maybe, maybe not, others decide.
>> Yet without talking about and analysing harder questions
>> once in a while, especially as generations come and go,
>> people might have less sense therein.
>>
>> If a site looks sexy it must be good, right?
>> That's what at least marketers think, and it's perhaps good enough
>> for browsing mundane TV news sites. Yet there's no frontpage
>> splash disclaimer for others with more sensitive, vulnerable,
>> or different use cases.
>>
>> Nor mention of Tor people hypocritically trying to censor ban
>> nodes out of the consensus for, ironically, nothing more than
>> excercising their right to free speech. Instead of say punting that
>> out to meta analysis projects that users can choose to subscribe
>> to as suits their own likes, support, and thinking therein.
>>
>> To be fair, no different than any other business (say ibm.com)
>> or opensource project... finding much suitability disclaimer
>> on anyone's pages, surely not without a good number of clicks,
>> it's of less interest or natural to cover some potentially
>> questionable areas, adversarial weaknesses, etc... it doesn't sell.
>>
>>
>> Anyhow...
>>
>> The last actual use case warning or disclaimer on torproject.org
>> was removed by or on October 10 2010. Some historical bisects..
>>
>> Site v1
>> first, domain 1998-01-29
>> http://web.archive.org/web/19981212031609/http://www.onion-router.net
>> 
>>
>> same content actually to "circa" 2006
>> http://web.archive.org/web/20061023145713/http://www.onion-router.net
>> 
>>
>> http://web.archive.org/web/20130120133213/http://www.onion-router.net
>> 
>> except for the gov diff
>> http://web.archive.org/web/20130420093515/http://www.onion-router.net
>> 
>>
>> curr
>> http://web.archive.org/web/20190228035625/http://www.onion-router.net
>> 
>>
>> Site v2
>> first, domain 2006-10-17
>> http://web.archive.org/web/20071011223019/http://www.torproject.org
>> 
>> last
>> http://web.archive.org/web/20101003133226/http://www.torproject.org
>>

Re: [tor-talk] Is there a way to use internet in a sandbox environment? (Linux)

2019-04-04 Thread Mirimir 


On 04/03/2019 05:40 PM, Jim wrote:
> Mirimir wrote:
>> On 04/03/2019 08:03 AM, Ben Tasker wrote:
>>> When the system boots from the disk, it loads the OS into memory, so
>>> things
>>> like your browser cache files are written into memory (and so lost
>>> when the
>>> DIMMs lose charge).  If you want persistence then most live CDs will
>>> allow
>>> you to provide a writeable media (normally a USB drive) for that
>>> purpose,
>>> but then you get back into the risks associated with having writeable
>>> media
>>> available.
> 
> As I stated in an earlier email I am out of date on this but in the "old
> days" this was certainly not true.  In the original Knoppix (which is
> the grandfather of all live systems TMK) if you had the memory there was
> a mode where you could load the image into memory, but this was not
> necessary.  If you did load the image into memory things ran a lot
> faster.  But the only files that *had to* reside in memory were those
> that were writable.  Over the years there have been at least two
> different methods allowing writable files that reside in memory to
> dynamically and transparently be used in place of the read-only files on
> the original image.
> 
> I have certainly run live CDs on computers that had much less RAM than
> the size of the CD.

I don't recall ever trying that with "normal" LiveCDs. And even "normal"
LiveDVDs are rarely much over 1GB. But I was talking about a custom
LiveDVD that I built. Which had a Debian system plus VirtualBox and
another ~3GB of virtual machine data. I do recall trying to boot that in
a machine with 4GB RAM, with no joy. Maybe I wasn't patient enough. And
it did take some minutes to come up in the 8GB machine.

Wild guess: maybe you need to design LiveCDs so they'll boot quickly in
low-RAM systems.

>> True. And there are some limitations. As far as I know, all live
>> read-only systems allocate half of the physical RAM to the system, and
>> half to working memory. So if your machine has 4GB RM, you can load at
>> most a 2GB system image.
>>
>> But DVDs can hold ~4.7GB. So if your machine has 8GB RAM, you can load
>> 4GB from the DVD. Years ago, I built a live ISO with Debian, VirtualBox,
>> a pfSense VPN gateway VM, and stripped-down Whonix gateway and
>> workstation VMs. The workstation VM had just a simple openbox GUI. It
>> took several minutes to boot, but was very responsive afterward.
> 
> 
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Re: [tor-talk] IPv6 for relay-to-relay or client-to-relay communication?

2019-04-04 Thread nusenu 
Roman Mamedov:
> Does Tor currently use IPv6 connections for relay-to-relay traffic?

no, here is the project for that:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4565

general Tor IPv6 roadmap
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Tor/IPv6


> I remember some time ago there was a drive for people to run more IPv6 relays
> or to set up ORPort in their configs if they already do. But what is the point
> if the current default settings basically mean IPv6 *won't* be used?

Enabling IPv6 ORPorts makes sense even if relay-to-relay communication is
still limited to IPv4 since it makes guards more accessible for clients and
prepares for the next steps (and shows us better how many support it properly)

So yes, please enable IPv6 ORPorts and IPv6Exit if you can.



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[tor-talk] IPv6 for relay-to-relay or client-to-relay communication?

2019-04-04 Thread Roman Mamedov 
Hello,

Does Tor currently use IPv6 connections for relay-to-relay traffic?

I now got some IPv6 relays which access IPv4 via tunneling to a separate
router, so it would *really* benefit my setup if some of the Tor traffic would
move to going over IPv6 directly. However that doesn't seem to be the case at
the moment (or the share is way too low).

For client connections I see there's ClientUseIPv6 which is 0 by default, any
ETA on making it default to 1?

Also ClientPreferIPv6ORPort which bizarrely means "use IPv4" when set to auto.

I remember some time ago there was a drive for people to run more IPv6 relays
or to set up ORPort in their configs if they already do. But what is the point
if the current default settings basically mean IPv6 *won't* be used?

-- 
With respect,
Roman
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