Re: [tor-talk] large increase in .onion domains
Last time there was such a large rate of growth in the Tor network, wasn't it the result of a botnet? On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Nathaniel Suchywrote: > Could new people be using Onionchat/Torchat I can't remember the name. But > new addresses are generated for each client. > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 11:49 AM Alexandre Guillioud < > guillioud.alexan...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Not correlated (i'm too small in that pool), but i have workd on software > > to maintain a HS pool. During dev, and at one point, i was emitting > > thousands of registration a day. > > > > 2016-02-18 16:51 GMT+01:00 Roger Dingledine : > > > > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:45:26AM -0500, Scfith Rise up wrote: > > > > Here is the exact link: > > > https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html > > > > > > > > it jumped from 4 to 6 in the past day or two. > > > > > > > > Since the metrics are based on the number of relays acting as hidden > > > >services with the assumption that at least 1% are reporting in, the > > > >numbers are correlated directly with the number of relays running as > > well. > > > > > > Yep. Also, because each reporting relay adds noise, sometimes, due to > > > the math involved, more than half of the relays end up inflating their > > > number, so we end up with a higher number on that graph than is > actually > > > true in reality. > > > > > > Still, that is a large jump. > > > > > > Let's wait a few days and see if it settles down. > > > > > > If it doesn't, I'll guess that it's a real effect. But even then, > > > we don't know why this (daily!) number is so much larger than the > > > (total!) number of onion addresses that e.g. Ahmia knows about. Maybe > > > it's Onionshare users, who generate one onion address per document they > > > transfer? Maybe it's Ricochet users? Maybe it's measurement error? We > > need > > > to see more improvements in the field of privacy-preserving statistics > > > and measurements before we'll feel comfortable trying to get answers to > > > this question. > > > > > > --Roger > > > > > > -- > > > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > > > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > > > > > -- > > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > > > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Question about something said about Tor in the Der Spiegel data dump
I think it means private bridges. On Mon, Dec 29, 2014 at 7:57 AM, Cypher cyp...@cpunk.us wrote: On 12/29/2014 09:52 AM, Lars Luthman wrote: On Mon, 2014-12-29 at 09:11 -0600, Cypher wrote: So I'm looking through the Der Spiegel data dump and noticed the following statement on document 35543: The client must not be running a Tor router of their own... That made me thing of a few questions but I'm specifically wondering what they mean here. 1. Do they mean that it is confusing to them if I am connecting to the Tor network from a computer that also runs a relay but I do not have my client configured to use my relay or 2. Do they mean that it is confusing to them if I am connecting to the Tor network through a relay running on my own machine? That depends on whether they can distinguish between connections made by different Tor processes coming from the same network. Hopefully they can't, in which case it's both 1 and 2, but if the two Tor processes are different versions of Tor or use different versions of libraries such as OpenSSL it might be possible to tell the connections apart, in which case it's only 2. Interesting. Could that mean then that it might be advisable to always enter the Tor network from the node running on my PC instead of allowing Tor to select it? I know that is against best practices but, in light of this new info, might that be the case? -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor and solidarity against online harassment
On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 5:33 PM, Soul Plane soulplan...@gmail.com wrote: I think if you have any ideals you're going to end up harassed at some point. If a community is going to be subject to harassment for its positions, then there is a reciprocal need for colleagues to support other members and assert what the community's norms are. Consider it outreach for those who might not always have had positive influences in their lives, as well as a moment of reflection for even those who aren't necessarily intolerant people to examine their own behavior. -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Non-free country law preventing Tor from getting donations
On Sat, Jun 14, 2014 at 10:07 AM, Joe Btfsplk joebtfs...@gmx.com wrote: I'm not a legal or embargo rules expert, but I wonder if an embargoed country or individuals in it, giving money to a non-profit for which they receive nothing valuable, or that benefits the country financially, militarily or politically, actually violates the spirit of embargo laws. Not only the spirit but the actual law. I would not touch the money no matter how substantial. -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor companies
On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 4:27 PM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote: I don't think there's any such thing as the Tor Solutions Group. The origin of EPIC's FOIA on Tor seems to be largely based on BBG promotional material. I suspect the origin of 'Tor Solutions Group' in the request was this year's factsheet, a well-designed, annual loveletter to Congressional funders. [1] http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/sites/1/2013/03/AntiCensorshipFactSheet_Revised_3_2013.pdf --Roger -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Many more Tor users in the past week?
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 9:39 PM, mirimir miri...@riseup.net wrote: I wonder what it might mean. I don't believe much, Syria's increase was relatively marginal and potentially related to normal trends of weekly or holiday use. For the most party, suspect countries have increased orders of magnitude in users -- Syria is only a few percent and it's decreased since. Seems like the start of a dangerous rumor. -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Iranian users cannot download Orbot from Google play store
It seems I was wrong about the initial request for the apk being HTTPS, however, this is a general issue with the Play Store and not Orbot specific I believe. Here is the transaction in question. GET /market/download/Download?packageName=org.thoughtcrime.securesmsversionCode=56token=AOTCm0QNlhXjrw5kiahs1Onr7JlVKsem-_ZcCnF9J5dy3DOKlIZ9_aVCTOMJgrFcqEMYF4Q0p9sHOHy2w7yvTF826bOBds9reMaPjU2ln94downloadId=4767185409281152338 HTTP/1.1 Cookie: MarketDA=09494618516075014141 Host: android.clients.google.com Connection: Keep-Alive User-Agent: AndroidDownloadManager/4.2.2 (Linux; U; Android 4.2.2; skz_tenderloin Build/JDQ39E) HTTP/1.1 403 Access is forbidden. Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2013 06:19:05 GMT Expires: Sat, 31 Aug 2013 06:19:05 GMT Cache-Control: private, max-age=0 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block Server: GSE Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic Transfer-Encoding: chunked a3 HTML HEAD TITLEAccess is forbidden./TITLE /HEAD BODY BGCOLOR=#FF TEXT=#00 H1Access is forbidden./H1 H2Error 403/H2 /BODY /HTML 0 By the way, this is what government blocking looks like (different from above): htmlheadmeta http-equiv=Content-Type content=text/html; charset=windows-1256titleM6-8 /title/headbodyiframe src=http://10.10.34.34?type=Invalidhttp://10.10.34.34/?type=Invalid Sitepolicy=MainPolicy style=width: 100%; height: 100% scrolling=no marginwidth=0 marginheight=0 frameborder=0 vspace=0 hspace=0/iframe/body/html I offered the people I knew at Google a shell, if there is any other Google engineer that would be the proper person to connect with, feel free to put them in touch. On Fri, Aug 30, 2013 at 7:59 AM, Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net wrote: Sherief Alaa sheriefala...@gmail.com wrote: Hello, Over the past couple of days Iranian users have been complaining about not being able to download Orbot from Google's play store (error 403). To solve the problem we at help desk send the official direct download link that GP provides[0] but it's only a matter of time before that get blocked too. I think GP will need to provide more download options in the future to avoid this problem. [0]: https://guardianproject.info/releases/orbot-latest.apk Just to point out something, it was only recently that Google Play was made available at all directly in Iran. The fact that users can find the app without filtering is a big step forward. We are working with Google and others to understand why the 403 error is happening, because the download should be using HTTPS. Otherwise, you can also find Orbot in the Amazon App Store and via f-droid.org. Thanks for the note. +n -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Iranian users cannot download Orbot from Google play store
Are all APK downloads blocked with the 403, or just some? Curious to figure out what the app black/whitelist looks like, and how it is bring done. All application that I tried and others are reporting the same on the Developer notice. Recall though that error is being triggered by Google's side, so it's unclear. I have a few theories about network interference causing this, but it's out of my domain. Is the shell you have on an actual Android device in Iran? No, I set up an SSH SOCKS connection to a host inside from an external Android device. On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 8:29 PM, Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net wrote: Collin Anderson col...@averysmallbird.com wrote: It seems I was wrong about the initial request for the apk being HTTPS, however, this is a general issue with the Play Store and not Orbot specific I believe. Here is the transaction in question. GET /market/download/Download?packageName=org.thoughtcrime.securesmsversionCode=56token=AOTCm0QNlhXjrw5kiahs1Onr7JlVKsem-_ZcCnF9J5dy3DOKlIZ9_aVCTOMJgrFcqEMYF4Q0p9sHOHy2w7yvTF826bOBds9reMaPjU2ln94downloadId=4767185409281152338 HTTP/1.1 Cookie: MarketDA=09494618516075014141 Host: android.clients.google.com Connection: Keep-Alive User-Agent: AndroidDownloadManager/4.2.2 (Linux; U; Android 4.2.2; skz_tenderloin Build/JDQ39E) HTTP/1.1 403 Access is forbidden. Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2013 06:19:05 GMT Expires: Sat, 31 Aug 2013 06:19:05 GMT Cache-Control: private, max-age=0 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block Server: GSE Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic Transfer-Encoding: chunked a3 HTML HEAD TITLEAccess is forbidden./TITLE /HEAD BODY BGCOLOR=#FF TEXT=#00 H1Access is forbidden./H1 H2Error 403/H2 /BODY /HTML 0 By the way, this is what government blocking looks like (different from above): htmlheadmeta http-equiv=Content-Type content=text/html; charset=windows-1256titleM6-8 /title/headbodyiframe src=http://10.10.34.34?type=Invalidhttp://10.10.34.34/?type=Invalid Sitepolicy=MainPolicy style=width: 100%; height: 100% scrolling=no marginwidth=0 marginheight=0 frameborder=0 vspace=0 hspace=0/iframe/body/html I offered the people I knew at Google a shell, if there is any other Google engineer that would be the proper person to connect with, feel free to put them in touch. Are all APK downloads blocked with the 403, or just some? Curious to figure out what the app black/whitelist looks like, and how it is bring done. Is the shell you have on an actual Android device in Iran? -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Many more Tor users in the past week?
In every case the growth begins on the 19th/20th and the rate seems is susceptible to the local weekend. On Fri, Aug 30, 2013 at 12:41 AM, Griffin Boyce grif...@cryptolab.netwrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 08/30/2013 12:16 AM, Runa A. Sandvik wrote: Hm, there are high spikes in a lot of different countries (countries you may not expect to see spikes in...), such as Albania, Fiji, Costa Rica, Barbados, Bermuda, the Faroe Islands... the list goes on. There's some pretty serious unrest in Colombia right now. Dairy supplies ran out last week and according to a friend who lives in Bogota, 3/4s of the city is unusable. That's probably why Tor users have gone from ~2000 to ~14000 since the 19th. Stuff is pretty intense right now. ~Griffin -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJSICJoAAoJEOMx/SmueSyXyOIQALsHjgHxQNPzmOkprOZDtazA /Zoy2mVjaTuGYZYKnRGkHm1G12KwUKGYp07v0J1+2RdoX0SJJgQE4a7OihYy39oB MpFkNQKMV8MvO/BHkxmupxpvpFRN41D0GElLbNLSmEua8uN/M18Xwwq5LuBp+BiS CNaf1Y7vHeGQHVyS3cwa3qHtC7HASR5vF9nuZ2MXgGaWI6/whA9R9OLFmMoYlFb/ GriLnS07BaD29iecbXrb/VTylVuHA6vxfmINO2RNlw08JnYB4hBzyvtykCtXfx5I R2gdO++tOjwglpv0Qk231h1kjlnCBagQEmM4q30B9Qp49R+IV49saaNDEEUT9sZ9 kgEa3Bivy46pxwLyzU2a53YTn+R3Qqzl38uaJir8qyaks+pmVYwqucmGO/Ogq+hs 1Y5rEwA2RsQw/d2mIS3wb7sAgbPABa/ACIB/4c0kNSIi5hkjadCd9Vh/5PveL32C YFyLumu/Cx5ImyWK0uWcWCjGSET+oUApH18+mIq/Yuye4+gnUxUx9epDnGkOz6kP hGlwNPF1QAdFlJ8SDi+91mQmXXPavW5j1z1dASfCOdD0dUYL2vm9iVUvn4n5zhS2 NE0syO5mGJ783YIZB2K8sd8Ov9ZhFZBQCKQaOfBdPXkAl44eJNsbO09iT6JbNXTw EibJ7gXuzOflS/jbIDSq =KGx9 -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Many more Tor users in the past week?
Hi Mike, On Fri, Aug 30, 2013 at 3:14 AM, Mike Perry mikepe...@torproject.orgwrote: Dude I love math and whatnot. Maybe science too, but this isn't exactly a controlled experiment. So whatnot it is, then! (Also plus one to you Collin, for being awesome). Can someone with more free time than me try to investigate one or more of the following ideas.. You know, in the interest of whatnot? Embarrassingly, I went straight to the most romantic hypothesis and then worked my way back elsewhere, IRC and Twitter. A few of these prospects could be reasonably addressed through the trends of the top fifty countries, illustrated here: http://cda.io/r/tor_mystery_2013.png From the outset, this seems to suggest that the catalyst occurred between August 19-20. Few other points of conjecture that came up: - I would infer based on no increase occurring in Iran that the Tor version being run by the agent is pre-2.4; Iran continues to implement countrywide DPI against Tor's SSL handshake, which was fixed for the moment in ticket #8443. Whether it's circumvention or malware, I would trust it would hit Iran. - As Runa notes, attempting to correlate with censorship is not strong, I would propose however that based on relative growth, a better indicator is level of development (ehem, piracy) and geography. I might be passing over someone, but it isn't until you get to Japan (40th) that you run into what is traditionally called a highly-developed state (all apologies for the terrible phrasing of this). - Pirate Browser with Tor was released when, August 11th or 12th? I would expect we would see a more gradual and less synchronous incline if it were natural adoption patterns (short of an autoupdater). A) The change in user counts for each country should be proportional to the installation base of some infectable software population for that country. Can we start with the easy ones with lots of public data on them, such as Windows, Flash, or Java? I would also look for piracy and software update rates. B) Weird that we saw no new countries. Why? Is this just a canary test to see if we'd fall over? Can we check for correlations between our change in userbase per-country and the current number of Internet users per-country too, to see if that matches? I culled the list at 1,000 users on either dates, there were a few countries that cropped up with new users, like Anguilla. Macedonia and Bosnia are also interesting toward this, regionally and going from a hundred to a thousand. C) People on IRC have suggested there is correlation to work hours. Does this actually apply to countries with atypical work weeks and holidays? (Is some popular corporate/work-group software the target here?) Look for Muslim countries in the chart. 2. If this was Pirate Browser: It's not. 3. If this is widespread local censorship/unrest: A) No level of censorship/social unrest happens across 91 countries at once. Justify your existence, meme. Like, Hack the planet, bro. So I think we are left with one unfortunate, not Israeli conclusion. Is there an example of such fine grain statistics of botnet growth tagged with date and country? Seems like a pretty solid research dataset for someone. Cordially, Collin P.S. To the bot-herders who are totally not Israeli: Our network can't scale as well as anything you can infect this fast. It will fall over, and when it does, the whole Internet will be looking for you. Maybe you should chillax a bit and consider running your own mix network. Good luck! ;) I downloaded the direct connecting users csv and created a spreadsheet between the start of the month and the end. It seems that it was the confluence of many states increasing their censorship of the Internet, especially instances like Vietnam and Facebook. Here is the raw data: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Amq69Ncu9Fp_dDlFYWhDZlNCTkdfWGhFWGlCOWFFNWcusp=sharing -- Mike Perry -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor relay activity from Antarctica
MaxMind, the database that powers the location tracker is far from perfect and will accept IP prefix registration information blindly. For example on my throttling work I found Iranian hosts with orders of magnitude faster connections than anything else, only to realize they were actually web servers in the Netherlands but registered to people inside Iran. I'd bet if you found the actual IP address it would be in some place decidedly more banal. On Aug 28, 2013 12:56 PM, lee colleton l...@colleton.net wrote: There is an indication that computers are connecting to the Tor anonymizing proxy network from Antarctica. This information is anonymously self-reported by the connecting client computers and it's entirely possible that the locations are inaccurate. However, there is also a possibility that malicious software has been installed on computers in one of your research stations which is using the Tor network for command-and-control purposes, unbeknownst to the owners. I would encourage you to investigate this matter. I'm an operator of Tor relays and take an interest in the activity on the network, but I'm not directly affiliated with the Tor Projecthttps://torproject.orgnor do I claim to represent them. Please refer to their website for further information and official contact addresses. I've also sent this message to their mailing list should you wish to follow up, there. Kind regards, Lee Colleton [image: Inline image 1] https://metrics.torproject.org/direct-users.png?start=2013-05-29events=offend=2013-08-27country=aq -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor and Financial Transparency
Hi Juan, On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 2:46 PM, Juan Garofalo juan@gmail.com wrote: You seriously think people are going to believe that? I mean the bit parts of the US and Swedish Governments...want to see strong privacy and anonymity exist on the Internet So, this is perhaps a privilege (or corruption) of perspective, but governments are not monolithic. The best description about this is a statement by Gen. Hayden, former Dir. of the NSA and CIA: *“We need to pull the rest of American thinking into this in a relevant way. Secretary Clinton gave two speeches on cyber stuff while she was secretary. And if you’re you know you think of the world as security and liberty she broke left literally both times in both of her speeches she came down on on cyber freedom. Society at the same time cyber communities out there are trying to crack the nut on anonymity on the net because you realize that’s the root of many many dangers out there as cyber communities just chugging away at that. The secretary of state is laundering money through NGOs to populate software throughout the Arab world to prevent the people in the Arab street from being tracked by their government. Alright so on the one hand we’re fighting anonymity on the other hand we’re chucking products out there to protect anonymity on the net.”* http://b.averysmallbird.com/entries/hayden-comments Imagine that, the former director of the NSA accusing the former Secretary of State of working against US interests by promoting anonymity. Even the US Government is a large beast with competing interests, some parts are bent on security and intelligence, some are just science research oriented, and some have a material stake in the Internet privacy. -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Many more Tor users in the past week?
Firstly congratulations Tor; secondly this seems pretty solvable with math and what not. I downloaded the direct connecting users csv and created a spreadsheet between the start of the month and the end. It seems that it was the confluence of many states increasing their censorship of the Internet, especially instances like Vietnam and Facebook. Here is the raw data: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Amq69Ncu9Fp_dDlFYWhDZlNCTkdfWGhFWGlCOWFFNWcusp=sharing On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 10:03 PM, lee colleton l...@colleton.net wrote: I've started the Pirate Browser and it does start Tor through Vidalia. The browser component doesn't make an effort to anonymize the user, as I understand it. On Aug 27, 2013 6:56 PM, mirimir miri...@riseup.net wrote: On 08/28/2013 12:35 AM, Nathan Suchy wrote: The Pirate Browser does not use Tor. Anyone who did any reading would realize this. I feel that the more usage of Tor the better. The Pirate Browser needs to have some warning on extraction... It doesn't use Tor at all? For anything? Their FAQ now says: No, it's not inteneded [sic] to be a TOR Browser, while it uses the Tor network, which is designed for anonymous surfing, this browser is ONLY intended to circumvent censorship. On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 6:53 PM, mirimir miri...@riseup.net wrote: On 08/27/2013 10:40 PM, mirimir wrote: On 08/27/2013 04:26 PM, grarpamp wrote: On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 11:56 AM, Missouri Anglers missouri.angl...@gmail.com wrote: PirateBay is pushing the Pirate browser on their website. People are not searching for it. They are discovering it while downloading torrents. Oh, seems there's a bolded link on the bottom of piratebay.sx ... now that might actually do it. It went up on Aug 9/10 I think. Try asking piratebrowser.com for usage stats. 500k? In Alexa's top sites list, their global rank is currently 73. It was about 90 yesterday. By comparison: wordpress.org - 66 flickr.com - 67 adobe.com - 68 vube.com - 72 thepiratebay.sx - 73 blogspot.in - 75 godaddy.com - 77 huffingtonpost.com - 79 about.com - 82 Is that consistent with 500k? That was stupid of me. In Alexa's top sites list, it's thepiratebay.sx that currently has a global rank of 73. Alexa shows piratebrowser.com at about 35,000. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] News from Iran
Karsten, This was the fifth explanation for the blocking in as many days. Iran has blocked YouTube permanently since the June 2009 election. It is important to note, however, that Iran has begun DNS injection today at the DCI gateway (AS12880) for the requests on at least youtube.com. Pastebin: http://pastebin.com/VNDEJReP http://pastebin.com/VNDEJReP Also, my paper on the weird use of 10.0.0.0/8 addresses within the country, which now has to be updated after only twenty-four hours... arxiv.org/abs/1209.6398 Cordially, Collin On Mon, Oct 1, 2012 at 10:23 AM, Karsten N. k...@awxcnx.de wrote: We wanted to block YouTube, and Gmail was also blocked, which was involuntary. (Iran's telecommunications ministry committee) http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19784409 Karsten N. On 10/01/2012 10:06 AM, Collin Anderson wrote: Just a notice, it appears that the rules blocking SSL to the IPs in Google/Gmail's DNS round robin have been removed for the two international gateways, outages are still occurring because a few of the local ISPs decided to get clever and filter it themselves. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] News from Iran
Just a notice, it appears that the rules blocking SSL to the IPs in Google/Gmail's DNS round robin have been removed for the two international gateways, outages are still occurring because a few of the local ISPs decided to get clever and filter it themselves. On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 6:29 AM, Mansour Moufid mansourmou...@gmail.comwrote: On 2012-09-24, at 2:10 AM, Runa A. Sandvik wrote: On Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 11:36 PM, SiNA Rabbani s...@redteam.io wrote: Next phase is to do the same with the entire population of Iran. It is hard for me to imagine the Internet getting completely shutdown. I suspect they will make SSL traffic very slow to a point that users would give up and look for other alternatives Isn't this something they have been doing for a while? Apparently VPNs were made illegal, but I don't think that was enforced. Personally, I wish I had to go to the other side of the planet to find this kind of thing. Bell, a Canadian ISP, does it too. Not SSL but VPN and other traffic their DPI can't identify, is steadily throttled down to zero. OTOH, Rogers, the only other ISP, has always messed with DNS. Iran must be doing this with Canadian tech -- it sounds so familiar. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] News from Iran
To be historically accurate, Youtube has been blocked in Iran for at least three years. Last week, I had compiled a list of open HTTP proxies within country, and iterating requests for Google, Gmail, and Youtube now, everything appears to be the way they have been for some time. Somewhat relatedly, this week, I will be posting a working paper to arXiv on how Iran has set up a hidden Internet using RFC 10/8 IP addresses. On Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 6:36 PM, SiNA Rabbani s...@redteam.io wrote: Finally after years of waiting we will get to see what a so called Halal Internet looks like. So far they have completed Phase One which is to disconnect all the governmental entities from Gmail and other foreign services. Next phase is to do the same with the entire population of Iran. It is hard for me to imagine the Internet getting completely shutdown. I suspect they will make SSL traffic very slow to a point that users would give up and look for other alternatives Today, Iran started to block Gmail at different ISP and cities all over Iran. The head of the unit that is in charge of blocking said that Because of the release of an anti-islam videos about prophet Muhammad on Youtube, which is owned by Google, *The People* have asked for these sites to be blocked! So we have decided to Block Google and Gmail service until further notice. --SiNA On 09/23/2012 03:19 PM, HardKor wrote: Hello, I just read in an online newspaper that Iran will block Google (and Youtube) very soon. The article also say that the whole network will be disconnected from the internet soon. Does any one have more detailed informations about what's going on over threre ? HardKor 5845 16EB 0589 B89A 5E6E 98DE 74F5 F875 6D34 45F9 ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] News from Iran
I spoke too soon, my host that routes through the DCI (AS12880) is unable to access Google sites through SSL. HTTP seems to still work though. On Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 9:04 PM, Chris Smart csma...@cogeco.ca wrote: They won't be online much after the EMP :) --** CTS MASTERING, affordable and professional mixing and mastering: http://www.ctsmastering.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/#!/**CTSMASTERINGhttps://twitter.com/#!/CTSMASTERING BLOG: www.ctsmastering.com/blog Linked In: http://ca.linkedin.com/pub/**chris-smart/46/824/536http://ca.linkedin.com/pub/chris-smart/46/824/536 __**_ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/**cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-**talkhttps://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] News from Iran
Apologies for flooding, Pastebin: http://pastebin.com/xbeQcVNa On Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 9:39 PM, Collin Anderson col...@averysmallbird.comwrote: I spoke too soon, my host that routes through the DCI (AS12880) is unable to access Google sites through SSL. HTTP seems to still work though. On Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 9:04 PM, Chris Smart csma...@cogeco.ca wrote: They won't be online much after the EMP :) --** CTS MASTERING, affordable and professional mixing and mastering: http://www.ctsmastering.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/#!/**CTSMASTERINGhttps://twitter.com/#!/CTSMASTERING BLOG: www.ctsmastering.com/blog Linked In: http://ca.linkedin.com/pub/**chris-smart/46/824/536http://ca.linkedin.com/pub/chris-smart/46/824/536 __**_ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/**cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-**talkhttps://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy suggestion: block subject header when encrypting email
On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 9:32 PM, Shew shew09...@rambler.ru wrote: However, Enigmail does not block or even warn the user if they are sending an encrypted email with something in the subject header. Yes, I agree that is bad policy, however, TorBirdy is not Enigmail and neither require each other to work properly. I, for one, do not use PGP for every outgoing email, although I would still prefer to use Tor for my Thunderbird traffic. I would suggest the proper remedy for this completely legitimate issue would be to file a bug ticket with Enigmail. -- Shew ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] 'Iran plans to unplug the Internet, launch its own clean alternative'
This latest 'Iran is going to disconnect the Internet' paroxysm originated from a year-old April Fools joke that was resubmitted to a popular social media aggregator last week. The meme exploded across Persian-language blogs within the day. Not only is it not posturing, it is factually incorrect. On Tue, Apr 10, 2012 at 3:46 AM, Zebro kojos zebro.ko...@gmail.com wrote: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2012/04/iran-plans-to-unplug-the-internet-launch-its-own-clean-alternative.ars Perhaps there are more sources with more detailed/sourced info. Thought this was relevant. I wonder whether they plan / the idea would be to completely detach from any foreign communications, save for some 'approved' nodes for banks and such. I suppose if the Dark net plan were more mature at this point, it would be possible to theorize the creation of a mediating cluster of nodes connected to the internet via wifi-darknet / whatnot, that would rebroadcast to the local darknet via wifi etc. But holy damn. (I suppose the Iranian plan is premature etc., but still.) ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Cannot finish handshake with directory server (Kazakhstan)
For Kazakhstan specifically, I don't know which company they use, or maybe they're building their own like Iran. While it is important in being good stewards of the Internet to recognize where Western companies are facilitating the repression of speech, there are other actors in this space that need to be recognized. Vendors such as Huawei face less onerous export restrictions than most American and European counterparts, often provided/subsidized by governments as soft-power initiatives and are certainly equipped[1] to do the level of mass surveillance and filtering that we see in countries such as Iran. Please forgive this comment in being tangental; I am increasingly interested in how Kazakhstan is moving and hope to be involved in bringing more to light on the matter. [1] http://www.huawei.com/products/datacomm/catalog.do?id=1219 Collin On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 10:15 AM, Andrew Lewman and...@torproject.orgwrote: On Tue, 28 Feb 2012 13:51:21 +0200 Maxim Kammerer m...@dee.su wrote: As asked by a commenter, is it known which companies supply the Tor-focused DPI blocking technology to governments, universities, and the like? I see two possible directions where such information might be helpful: Yes, there are many, many companies. Bluecoat, Narus, Cisco, Fortinet, Nokia/Siemens, come to mind. For Kazakhstan specifically, I don't know which company they use, or maybe they're building their own like Iran. See https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/upcoming-supreme-court-case-may-hold-key-holding-spy-tech-companies-responsible and https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/not-a-hoax-pakistan-requests-proposals-national-filtering-and-blocking-system and https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/spy-tech-companies-their-authoritarian-customers-part-ii-trovicor-and-area-spa Or just look at http://spyfiles.org/ for a list of possible companies. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x74ED336B ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Sonic Firewall, Iran related?
Malaysia or Singapore? On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 1:32 PM, Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net wrote: I have been in touch with an Orbot user at a university somewhere in a relatively free country in Asia, who just a week or so ago found that it no longer worked for him. He was unable to connect to the Tor network either directly or with bridges, and it seemed like SSL related errors were occuring. He wrote me today saying this: Today I had a talk with the head of computer department, he said that the sonic wall blocking policies are automatically updated and they can't do anything with that. While I do not know who automatically updated their firewall rules, it is interesting that this wasn't a targeted Tor thing by the local admin, but some wider deployment, perhaps directly from Sonic corporate themselves. On a hunch, I sent him the new Orbot+OBFS bundle to test out, and it worked like a charm. He was very excited, and has promised to be a loyal tester. It indeed seems like they were doing a similar SSL/TLS DPI block/filter as what is happening in Iran. Now the timing of all of this, and the similar approach to filtering made me curious if this could perhaps be related... could some ISP or national NOC in Iran be running the same product as this university in Asia? Regardless, it seems like the SSL/TLS DPI might become a standard tactic, and the needs for obfsproxy will be growing rapidly. +n ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Sonic Firewall, Iran related?
Nathan, I see, and so on Android, where the CA was not installed, it was throwing the proper error perhaps? If the SonicWall was proxying SSL with its own CA, wouldn't all HTTPS pages be broken? More narrowly, if it was interfering with suspicious/aberrant traffic, wouldn't Tor die with an error logged about an invalid cert? Haha, well, I decided not to say, so I will not. One should bear in mind then that particular countries have direct connections to Iran. I would also add from observation that for some unknown reason, a number of universities in South East Asia appear to be unexpected sources of traffic to Persian-language websites. I think a lot could be learned from a traceroute, looking at logs and noting what certificates are being seen by the user. Collin On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 10:41 PM, Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net wrote: On 02/13/2012 01:53 PM, Andrew Lewman wrote: The CA was installed by the university on their mandated laptops, so students would never know they were mitm'd the entire time. I see, and so on Android, where the CA was not installed, it was throwing the proper error perhaps? Anyhow, +1 for obfsproxy for working in this context. I am still curious of the possibility that Iran is running the same Sonic solution, or the timing is just a coincidence. +n ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] How to make 100.000 bridge?
On Fri, Jan 13, 2012 at 12:26 PM, Runa A. Sandvik runa.sand...@gmail.comwrote: Or just https://cloud.torproject.org/ Runa, could you speak to the expectations of the bridge strategy regarding the stability and lifespan of nodes? More specifically, to ensure a healthy and stable network, how long should a volunteer attempt to maintain a bridge (days, weeks or months)? In the case of Amazon Web Services, there is the additional option of being able to cycle address quickly -- this is helpful against blocking but creates frustration with end-users unaffected by country-specific action. Should a user maintain the bridge as long as there is traffic, for the good of the network, or is changing addresses in response to external events reasonable. While Fabio's suggestion is novel, I suspect any volunteer using an shared host would quickly find themselves facing the wrath of administrators. Given the number of well-meaning, but unprepared people, I would be cautious as it would potentially introduce a large number of unstable bridges. Cordially, Collin -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Implement JSONP interface for check.torproject.org
Tor would not be validating the nature or security of the hosted site, rather the JSON would be confirming attributes of the visitor. I cannot imagine many scenarios where a malicious party stands to benefit from forging these credentials -- or for that matter a manner where they could not fake a confirmation themselves without using the API. On Sun, Nov 6, 2011 at 9:13 PM, Andrew Lewman and...@torproject.org wrote: On Sunday, November 06, 2011 11:00:08 Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote: Let's support that AccessNow https://www.accessnow.org/ would like to implement the privacybadge web widget, they have several options: A word of caution about privacy badges, learning the history of TRUSTe is relevant, https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/TRUSTe#History. Research shows that sites with the TRUSTe seal are the least likely to honor what you think of as privacy, http://www.benedelman.org/news/092506-1.html . -- Andrew pgp 0x74ED336B ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor files
Correct, PPTP VPNs have been blocked for the past four days. People have reported issues with Tor to me, however, I was able to connect from a machine inside the country just fine. Aaron's suggestion of gettor is the best approach, please don't trust any other methods of retrieving files. Best of luck Daniel. - CDA On Sat, Oct 1, 2011 at 3:23 AM, Daniel Samani artailic...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Philip, The attempts my friends have done in the university have been unsuccessful in this regard. Tunneling via a proxy seams not to work, as with VPN. Cheero Daniel Hello Daniel, Can you use a proxy server from the uni? Phillip ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Dutch CA issues fake *.torproject.org cert (among many others)
According to a number of bloggers(1), torproject.org was include among those domains targeted in the certificate breach. In at least the case of Google, these certificates have been offered to Iranian Internet users by a number of ISPs, in a number of city. Risk is a product of situation, and if you are in Iran, Syria, Belarus, et al, I would exercise at least that level of caution. (1) http://www.nu.nl/internet/2603449/mogelijk-nepsoftware-verspreid-naast-aftappen-gmail.html On Fri, Sep 2, 2011 at 1:11 PM, Seth David Schoen sch...@eff.org wrote: Joe Btfsplk writes: Is it really a risk, d/l Tor or TBB directly from Tor Project's site, that verifying signatures is necessary? What is the reasoning here - if getting files from Tor Project server? How do you know it was really the Tor Project server? -- Seth Schoen sch...@eff.org Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 +1 415 436 9333 x107 ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor Usage Statistics for Iran
Joe - I may be of some help, as I am working on an ongoing project tracking the methods and behaviors of Iranian circumvention tool users. Between May and August, I independently noticed something of a similar trajectory of adoption numbers by Iranian users. What I've found in part is there are a number of concurrent threads that likely contribute to the increase in traffic, but don't account directly. These include: *Increase of public awareness of Tor:* There are number of organizations and individuals that have been promoting Tor in the country to political audiences. *Less competition:* A number of services such as freegate and gtunnel have reduced their availability to Iranians. Users have moved from HTTP proxies to Ultrasurf and VPNs chiefly, but Tor has also benefited. This is probably the biggest cause. During the initial results of our research, it appears that there is a meaningful correlation between political activism and specific tool use. However, that's deserves a deeper explanation off list. Cordially, Collin David Anderson averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- On Aug 31, 2011 10:29 AM, Andrew Lewman and...@torproject.org wrote: On Wednesday, August 31, 2011 09:10:03 Joe Galvin wrote: Well I'm not presuming that any of them are from the opposition. I don't know what they're doing, which is the point. As I said there's no political OR social reason, as far as I'm aware, for the number have users to have multiplied x5 since last August. Just interested in why it has happened, if there is any particular reason. Maybe there isn't. It's a pretty astonishing jump though. The Persian News Network has been promoting Tor to their viewership in August. This is likely the cause of the jump in usage from Iran. However, this is just a correlation. -- Andrew pgp 0x74ED336B ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Hijacking Advertising to give a Tor Exit node economic sustainability?
For whatever it's worth, this seems to be a common model for a number of free VPN and Glype-style Web-based providers, who cater to clients attempting to get around content filtering. I've been interested in the mechanics and economics of the approach, but haven't yet had time to do any investigation. *CDA* On Sat, Aug 6, 2011 at 5:14 PM, Jim jimmy...@copper.net wrote: Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote: Ok, modifying user traffic it's a tabu', but let's just consider for a moment how many useful things for the user and for the tor project could be done. Perhaps the user doesn't *want* those useful things done for him. Perhaps he knows what he is doing and is already doing *exactly* what he wants to do. Very slippery slope! (Not that I think there is a remote chance that such an exit node would not be marked as a bad exit just on general principles. I just wanted to point out that I find this nanny state attitude of we know better than you offensive. It's bad enough when ISPs break NXDOMAIN, etc. Although I doubt that you meant any harm. :-) Jim ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk