Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi Leeroy,

Thanks for the reply!

I am using the latest Tor Browser bundle (4.0.8), and checked the
signature before installing. Updating does not work for me anymore, I
have to upgrade to a new machine and newer OSX, will do asap.

I think what you describe might be correct - so far choosing a new
identity in Tor did not work for me, but restarting the Tor Browser
worked. So maybe some circuits did not close?

Just a general question: is it normal to get connected to the same exit
node almost all the time, when I start my mail program?

Thanks for the support everyone
S.


l.m:
> Hi,
> 
> I would like to ask if you're using the Tor Browser bundle with or
> without modification. When the new identity is used in Tor Browser
> (it's my understanding--please correct if wrong) that the circuits
> related to open tabs are allowed to close. This is because the NEWNYM
> signal is issued while also closing the connections for the currently
> open tabs. The existing circuits close naturally because they are
> already dirty. Then later tabs use new circuits and all is well in
> anonland.
> 
> A complication can arise when using other applications (like TorBirdy)
> with the Tor Browser bundle. The problem is some mail server
> connections fail to close and persist across new identities (NEWNYM)
> issued by Tor Browser. This makes later mail server connections appear
> to split with an existing connection through one exit and new
> connections through some other exit. Closing tabs in Tor Browser won't
> fix it. Closing circuits related to tabs won't fix it. What needs to
> happen is to have the existing mail server connection (having not
> closed on it's own) forcefully closed by closing the related circuit.
> 
> I'm unclear if this is (partially) a fault of the mail server. I've
> seen the same behavior in other applications so it may also be a
> failure at the exit. If you see this problem increasingly occurring
> you might try setting up a Vidalia instance in parallel with the Tor
> Browser bundle. (I wouldn't normally suggest it except for
> troubleshooting). You would then be able to see the offending circuit
> held open.
> 
> --leeroy
> 
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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hello Malte,

I already did, before sending an email to the list ;)

Basically they only blocked that one exit - for some security reason. I
have been using TorBirdy for quite a while, worked with my mail provider
until Thursday.

So as long as I restart Tor, I can be a "new identity" and send my
email. It works for the time being, if this stops working, I will spam
you again with my questions!

Thanks everybody for the support
S


ma...@wk3.org:
> On Fri, 10 Apr 2015 14:06:06 +0200
> Justaguy  wrote:
> 
>> That error message means that your mailserver rejects you, because the
>> IP address you are connected from, blocks you.
> 
>> Try to use another exit is my suggested fix.
> 
> I also like to email my providers and ask them to stop blocking Tor. Don't 
> expect a positive answer (or any answer at all), but sometimes a little nudge 
> can work wonders.
> 
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Malte
> 
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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi Leeroy,

> It would be highly unusual to be connected to the same exit if your
> mail servers use standard ports. If I'm not mistaken the port you're
> using for outgoing mail (25) is currently only allowed in the exit
> policy of 3 exits.
Thanks for looking into my troubleshooting info and all the in depth
info. Actually using the default port 587 works, and I can't figure out
why and when I ever changed this setting to port 25. *rolleyes*

> This hurts your anonymity, and makes the problem
> more apparent.
This was my gut feeling, thanks for pointing it out.

How do I look up which ports work on which exit nodes? I tried searching
Atlas, but I didn't find out how to do a reverse search.

I will keep track of the exit nodes TorBirdy connects to, to find out
whether the problem persists. Thanks to goofyzrnssm for reminding me how
to do so and for forwarding the detailed instructions from security in a
box!

As for OS: I am currently on an older version of OSX, but with no
intention to
stick with it (for many reasons, mainly the phone home problem in
yosemity). So my whole setup will change soonish.

As for
> Other things, included for completeness, to try include checking for
> torrc modifications:
The torrc files are ok.

> 1b. close Thunderbird completely
> 2b. use new identity in Tor Browser
> 3b. reopen mail.
Yes, this has always reset the exit node.

Thanks to everyone involved for your help. It is much appreciated!

S.
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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hello Leeroy,

Cool! Thank you! Works like a charm :)

Terminal commands are becoming my favorite. They sort of remind me of
writing games with my brother from some books he had. Boy was he cool.

Thanks again to everyone involved, looking into my little torbirdy world
and replying and suggesting fixes!!!

Cheers
S

l.m:
> Hi Sophie,
> 
> "Sophie Hassfurther"  wrote:
>> How do I look up which ports work on which exit 
>> nodes? I tried searching Atlas, but I didn't find 
>> out how to do a reverse search.
> 
> Glad to see the problem appears sorted. To find exit policies I used
> the cat and grep commands on microdesc data. This data is available on
> the CollectTor website as well as locally in your Tor Browser folder.
> After loading Tor Browser, do a search for cached-microdescs in the
> Tor Browser install folder. If you then open a terminal at the
> location and use (for simplicity):
> 
> cat cached-microdescs | grep accept
> 
> That gives you an idea of accept policies. If you add to that:
> 
> cat cached-microdescs | grep accept | grep portnumber
> 
> That gives you an idea of how many exits (that you know about) which
> accept portnumber. If you add to that:
> 
> cat cached-microdescs | grep accept | grep portnumber | wc -l
> 
> You'll have (very roughly) the number of exits. I'll leave it to you
> to search the man pages for better expressions to use with grep ;) In
> your case the number of exits accepting port 25 was quite small.
> --leeroy
> 
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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi Leeroy

> You mentioned trying to perform a similar look-up for exit policies
> using Atlas.
Yes, I tried "25" or "port 25" in Atlas' search, but did not get any
results... it seemed like the most intuitive place to look for port
info. Searching in the local database did not occur to me, before you
mentioned it.

S.

l.m:
> Hi again,
> 
> To demonstrate further the importance of port choice I think a
> clarification is in order. From tor's spec [0] an exit may specify an
> accept or reject policy. So the number of exits that may allow your
> exiting traffic (in this case mail) is those that "accept" and those
> that don't "reject". Keep that in mind when parsing your data in
> whichever method. The count is roughly 12 exits for port 25 versus 657
> for port 587. The choice of exit is influenced by exit bandwidth and
> successful use (in the short-term).
> 
> You mentioned trying to perform a similar look-up for exit policies
> using Atlas. I didn't see an easy way to do so from the protocol [1]
> used by Atlas. It's possible to perform the same inspection of exit
> policy (as parsing/cat+grep local data) using the wget command with a
> parametrization of the details method. There's no built in way to just
> get the count of exits allowing some exit traffic. Or is there? Maybe
> this would be a useful feature? It would allow a more informed choice
> (12 versus 657 out of ~1000).
> 
> --leeroy
> 
> [0] https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n2273
> [1] https://onionoo.torproject.org/protocol.html
> 
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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi Leeroy,

Yes, Atlas was a poor choice. Before you suggested searching the log
through Terminal, I wasn't even thinking of that possibility.

As for improvements: I think a) would be quite important. Using a better
port worked, as far as I can tell, and I was not aware that I put myself
in a very bad position when choosing port 25. But then my life is not
depending on TorBirdy, while other peoples' lives do, so maybe a hint in
the "Before using TorBirdy" advice or a warning message from within
TorBirdy could help those who are not tech-savvy.

Options b) and c) would be very luxurious, but option a) really solved
my problem, and seems quite important for those who come from a
different background.

Other things that come to mind:
"Test proxy settings" could be somewhere more prominent, for users like
me :) I am the kind of person that does not disable the warning message
that pops up when clicking on the TorBirdy preferences.

I am -manually- logging what exit ports TorBirdy uses, out of curiosity.
I will keep you posted in case something weird happens again.

Thanks for the help!
Sophie



l.m:
> Hi Sophie,
> 
> Hmm...Perhaps Atlas isn't the best choice here. At any given time the
> exits you can choose from are those you know of locally. It might be
> better to focus on TorBirdy instead. 
> 
> When using Tor Browser, the tor process is kind enough to take notice
> when using certain ports (WarnPlaintextPorts). So maybe TorBirdy
> should do the same. That is to say, make TorBirdy more verbose about
> choices for mail server port. Had you been warned that port 25 is not
> the port you're looking for you might have chosen differently. Even if
> the port was chosen temporarily, a reminder could've helped. To make
> things worse you have to switch between TorBirdy and Tor Browser to
> change identities. Then you have to run something like
> check.torproject.org to ensure your ip is different from a
> (potentially blocked) previous ip.
> 
> So things TorBirdy could do better to avoid this problem in the future
> include:
> a) Be more verbose about choosing the mail server port. Possibly
> include a reminder which can be disabled. Warn when making a hazardous
> choice such as 25. A known abuse port and one which is blocked in the
> default exit policy and reduced exit policy.
> b) Provide new identity functionality in TorBirdy. It would need to be
> careful not to "step on the toes" of Tor Browser. To this end it could
> emulate the NEWNYM signal by leveraging stream isolation. New
> identities triggered by TorBirdy would create streams isolated from
> previous streams. By tracking streams associated with mail servers
> TorBirdy can ensure old connections are closed before new ones. It can
> do this in a way such that no interference occurs with Tor Browser.
> c) Enable TorBirdy to configure use of TrackHostExits/Expire. Purely a
> preference to deal with Tor Browser triggering a new identity when you
> might prefer to have TorBirdy continue to use the last exit for a
> time. If you've triggered a new identity in TorBirdy to avoid a
> blocked exit this could also mitigate the problem of a blocked exit
> being reused. Is there a better way to achieve the same result here?
> 
> Comments, suggestions, criticisms?
> 
> --leeroy
> 

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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi guys,

What you explained is a little over my head. Also my capacities are very
limited at the moment. I will look into it, soon!

Thanks
S


l.m:
> Hi teor,
> 
> You could run TorBirdy through its own instance of the tor client
> software, with a separate socks port.
> 
> This  would avoid many of the issues you're trying to work around in
> b) and  c), as TorBirdy could happily send NEWNYM to its own client
> instance all  it liked. There is a slightly increased network load
> involved in  running two instances, and there could be security
> implications of  running separate tor clients - but mainly if their
> connections are  distinguishable.
> 
> teor
> 
> Good point. Then again you can do that with any application and tor.
> The main motivator is the use case for shared tor process. Tor itself
> encourages this use case by supporting multiple socks ports and
> isolation flags. Is it reasonable to expect everyone to run multiple
> tor processes to isolate the NEWNYM signal? It also raises the
> question of *how* they would issue the NEWNYM signal. A patch would
> involve adding a simple controller to TorBirdy. In some use cases it
> probably isn't even a concern to share NEWNYM. That is sometimes just
> a NEWNYM is fine, ignoring the problem of changing exit. So if a patch
> were created it should support both use cases: issue a NEWNYM or
> emulate it for shared use-cases?
> 
> I think it might be too much to ask a tor process to issue NEWNYM to a
> specific isolation context. But given the shared-process use case is
> encouraged--is this a preferable solution?
> 
> --leeroy
> 
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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi Leeroy,

> There's a strong correlation between the perceived usefulness to
> end-users and their support for a FOSS project :) A simple warning is
> easy enough.
:)
If I would like to suggest to add a warning to the "Before using
TorBirdy", where would be the right place to do so?

I am not sure I understand you correctly:
> The ip check hidden behind a warning dialog hinders obtaining
> useful data.
Are you referring to the warning message I got?

> Logging information on success and failure to use an exit
> would be a useful for debugging (and finding problematic exits).
> Thanks for the input.
Would you define failure to use an exit as a) not being able to send
emails over this exit and therefor establishing a connection to a new
exit or as b) when I get a warning saying "blocked using mail.badip.de"?
Because from how I understand this, and please correct if I am wrong,
TorBirdy might connect to a different exit, when the current exit
doesn't support the port I am using.

Sophie
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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Oh, now I get it... TorBirdy preferences > Test proxy settings sorry
> I am not sure I understand you correctly:
>> The ip check hidden behind a warning dialog hinders obtaining
>> useful data.
> Are you referring to the warning message I got?
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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi Leeroy,

Wow, that is one detailed explanation!

You have been a great help in the course of my Tor adventures, thanks
for all the support!

Cheers
Sophie



l.m:
> Hi Sophie,
> 
>> If I would like to suggest to add a warning to the "Before 
>> using TorBirdy", where would be the right place to do so?
> 
> If you would like to submit the feature request what you would first
> do is connect to Tor's bug tracker [0]. From there you can either
> register for your own account or use the credentials listed in the
> 'Welcome' text on the first page. Select 'New Ticket' and fill in the
> ticket. Choose 'enhancement' for type and 'TorBirdy' for the
> component. If you wish to reference the discussion here on tor-talk
> you can use the links available in the archives [1].
> 
> [0]https://trac.torproject.org
> [1]https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-April/037455.html
> 
>> Would you define failure to use an exit as a) not being
>> able to send emails over this exit and therefore 
>> establishing a connection to a new exit or as b) when I 
>> get a warning saying "blocked using mail.badip.de"?
>> Because from how I understand this, and please correct 
>> if I am wrong,TorBirdy might connect to a different exit, 
>> when the current exit doesn't support the port I am using.
> 
> Tricky. A failure could be both. Tor tries to guess if an exit will
> allow your exiting traffic but it's not a guarantee. In which case,
> you're correct, a new exit is chosen. Perhaps from existing circuits
> or by building a new circuit if needed. This would also occur if the
> connection to the mail server is refused. A response 'blocked' is not
> be a failure in the usual sense. The connection succeeds in a manner
> of speaking but is closed before sending data. Thanks for pointing
> that out.
> 
> --leeroy
> 

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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi Yuri,

Thanks for all your input/suggestions. It is really helpful to see
things from various perspectives!

I like the idea of Whonix/Qubes or other VMs, but with my limited skills
I wouldn't consider that a safe option. Simply because I can not
maintain it.

So if I were to be dealing with extremely sensitive info, that could
possibly put me or others at danger, I would probably go for a
physically and locally isolated solution. Or communicate face to face.
Without bringing any devices. Obviously.

Thanks again,
Sophie



>> If this is the concern that request to check.torproject.org might 
>> compromise security, this is the clear indication that TorBirdy/TBB 
>> aren't adequate for the requirements. Clearly, such people should
> switch 
>> to VM isolation, and there is no need to ever go to
> check.torproject.org 
>>from there, and there is no risk even if one does.
>>
>> Yuri

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Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy seems to connect to the same exit node again and again

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Okey, you made me think twice, I will give the VM machine idea a chance.
That is, once I have the resources to do so. I spend way too much time
in front of a screen nowadays.

Cheers
S

Yuri:
> This is just a fascinating topic, and it is interesting how Tor allows
> to separate singular digital life, that most people have, into the more
> or less separate islands, not connected to each other. And once such
> separation is available, the natural question to ask is what is the
> highest degree of such separation that is achievable? And that is how
> virtual machines/Qubes/etc come into play.
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Re: [tor-talk] Meeting Snowden in Princeton

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi,

Mirimir:
> I just saw this posted by coderman on :
>
.

Thanks for sharing.

My favorite quote:
"The deepest problem is that the system architecture that has evolved in
recent years holds masses of information on many people with no
intelligence value, but with vast potential for political abuse."

This is what it all boils down to for me: Security issues are largely a
political problem. Separation of Powers, Freedom of Speech. Although
both concepts are more than 200 years old, we still have to have this
discussion. Technology can only do so much to fix this.

Sophie
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Re: [tor-talk] German University signs up 24 tor relays

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi,

nusenu:
> just in case if someone is wondering who caused this month's little
> spike in relaycount on 2015-05-01:
> https://metrics.torproject.org/versions.html
>
> The IP addresses are associated with a German University
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RWTH_Aachen_University, maybe
> they are doing some research?

Thanks for keeping an eye on the statistics!

I just looked at their official website
http://www.rwth-aachen.de/
and did a search for "tor" on both the German and the English version.
The English site produced a couple of useless hits (factor, doctoral,
etc.). The hits on the German site were not exactly more exciting,
mostly related to soccer :) "Tor" means goal in German.

The department for computer science has a different website [1] Their
annuals reports [2] show some interesting research on onion routing and
threat modeling.

in 2007 [3]
Olaf Landsiedel, Lexi Pimenidis, Klaus Wehrle, Heiko Niedermayer, Georg
Carle: Dynamic Multipath Onion Routing in Anonymous Peer-To-Peer Overlay
Networks, Proceedings of IEEE Globecom 2007, Washington D.C., November 2007.

and in 2011 [4]
Lukas Nießen: Website 
Fingerprinting
 in 
Anonymization

Networks:
Improved Methods
 and 
Evaluation 
of 
Countermeasures

The Chair for Computer Science 4 that conducted the research in 2011 is
called Communication and Distributed Systems (ComSys)
p 163 in of the annual report [4] "Research at ComSys focuses on the
development of flexible, scalable & resilient communication systems and
the required models, methods, and tools to design, analyse, realise, and
evaluate these systems."

Has anyone contacted them yet to ask what they are doing with those
relays? Or have they contacted anyone in the Tor project?

Sophie

[1] http://www.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/index_eng.php
[2] http://www.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Forschung/jabe.php
[3] http://www.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/FGI/Forschung/Jabe/jb2007_08.pdf
[4] http://www.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/FGI/Forschung/Jabe/jb2011.pdf

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Re: [tor-talk] New Astoria Tor client is said to be better than plain Tor

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi Rishab,

Rishab Nithyanand:
> I would like to stress that most of the news articles I've come across have
> some incorrect claims. It is sad that none of them got in touch with us
> before publishing their stories. 
I had the same impression. I do not know the author, but I read your
paper and checked it back with the article [1]. It made me think that
the latter is quite inaccurate. Even when journalists are well meaning,
they sometimes tend to over-simplify in an effort to put things in terms
that people will understand.

The most striking part of the article for me was this:

"A full 58 percent of Tor circuits are vulnerable to network-level
attackers, such as the NSA or Britain’s Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ), when they access popular websites, according to new
research from American and Israeli academics. Chinese users are the most
vulnerable of all to these kinds of attacks, with researchers finding
85.7 percent of all Tor circuits from the country to be vulnerable.

Even though Tor is designed to provide complete anonymity to its users,
the NSA’s position means they can potentially see and measure both
traffic entering the Tor network and the traffic that comes out. When an
intelligence agency can see both, simple statistics help an autonomous
system at their control match the data up in a timing attack and
discover the identity of the sender.

Anonymity over."

The author makes it sound as if all Tor traffic was vulnerable to
attacks by the infamous agencies in two out of three times. And looking
into my magic crystal ball, I know which media will quote that exact
fallacy as a fact and exploit it.

I read your paper, but I am not sure I comprehended it. From how I
understand it, this section of the Dailydot article should read
something like:

A full 58 percent of the *times* Tor creates a circuit, it creates it in
such a way that, *if* a potential adversary, such as the NSA or
Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), operates the
relays chosen in an autonomous system, they could deanonymize users who
access popular websites, according to new research from American and
Israeli academics. Chinese users are the most vulnerable of all to these
kinds of attacks, with researchers finding 85.7 percent of all Tor
circuits from the country to be vulnerable.

Then he goes on about what intelligence agencies can do, not taking into
account, that they would have to operate a huge part of Tor to achieve
the 58 or 85.7 percent he quotes earlier. This is critical, as it
becomes more and more difficult to own a large part of this network, due
to its decentralized nature and due to the fact that Tor grows.

Am I mistaken?

This is a very complex matter, but *if* I understood the paper
correctly, I think it is quite a hip research, and interesting
conclusions are drawn.

Cheers
Sophie

[1] https://www.dailydot.com/politics/tor-astoria-timing-attack-client/

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Re: [tor-talk] Tor birdy fails downloading public keys.

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Hi Lluis,

I suppose you are using the Enigmail add-on. In the Torbirdy wiki [0]
the developers state that
"Enigmail is supported and is safe to use with TorBirdy (...) but you
will not be able to use Enigmail for communicating with keyservers until
we find a HTTP -> SOCKS5 shim."
The idea is to not leak location information. Disabling TorBirdy to
fetch the keys kind of defeats that purpose.

There are two workarounds that I know of, if you want/have to use
keyservers:

1) Look up the key manually, check fingerprint, copy the long block of
gibberish that starts with -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- to the
clipboard.
Now go to your mail program, choose Enigmail -> manage keys -> edit ->
import key from clipboard.

2) use gpg with curl support (Linux/OSX only). This is explained in the
TorBirdy wiki as well [0]
Scroll down to Additional Add-Ons -> Enigmail.

Cheers
Sophie

[0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/torbirdy



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Lluís:
> Hello everyone,
> 
> I am using Tor Birdy 0.1.4 and it is failing to download public
> keys from servers. It is configured with defaults.
> 
> I have to disable Tor Birdy to download a key and re-enable it
> when done.
> 
> Does anyone know a solution ?
> 
> Thank you,
> Lluís
> 
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Re: [tor-talk] LeMonde: France To Block Tor

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Udo van den Heuvel:
> On 2015-12-08 04:56, grarpamp wrote:
>> http://motherboard.vice.com/read/after-paris-attacks-proposed-french-law-would-block-tor-and-forbid-free-wi-fi
>> French law enforcement wish to “Forbid free and shared wi-fi
>> connections” and “to block or forbid communications of the Tor
>> network.”
> 
> Based on what?
> Any connections with the stories around Charlie or the Bataclan?

Nope. Quite the contrary.
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20151118/08474732854/after-endless-demonization-encryption-police-find-paris-attackers-coordinated-via-unencrypted-sms.shtml
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Re: [tor-talk] CloudFlare blog post - Addendum

[Sophie Hassfurther]

Joe Btfsplk:
> Like I said, don't think CF wants TBB users to get thru.

archive.is works quite nicely for read only access, when CF gets in the
way ;-)
https://archive.is/xtCEm

Seems like this person started a fundraiser for Tor:
https://archive.is/xtCEm#selection-1033.35-1033.118

The highlighted address points to
https://www.gofundme.com/crw6n878


Sophie Hassfurther
https://sophiehassfurther.com
PGP fingerprint:
F13B 77D4 3641 1420 0F41 B62D 162F 2CE2 98FD 61AB

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