Re: [tor-talk] How to protect a hidden service from DoS attacks?
On Fri, Mar 4, 2011 at 6:34 PM, morphium wrote: > 2011/3/4 : >> Is it even possible? Since everyone is your entry node's IP, if you block it, >> no one will be able to connect to your service. > > What attack exactly? To eat up your bandwidth? "Protection" would look > the same as in the "regular" internet: get more bandwidth. And this would be a great way to unmask a hidden service. Call in a DOS and watch the traffic, or a supposedly related site go down. Hidden services should run on dedicated links as a result. > > Best regards, > morphium > ___ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > Sincerely, Watson Ladd -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Iran cracks down on web dissident technology
On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Joe Btfsplk wrote: > Why would any govt create something their enemies can easily use against > them, then continue funding it once they know it helps the enemy, if a govt > has absolutely no control over it? It's that simple. It would seem a very > bad idea. Stop looking at it from a conspiracy standpoint & consider it as > a common sense question. Because it helps the government as well. An anonymity network that only the US government uses is fairly useless. One that everyone uses is much more useful, and if your enemies use it as well that's very good, because then they can't cut off access without undoing their own work. Sincerely, Watson Ladd ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor compromised?
My gisting of the article: The researches note that 1/3 of the nodes they could find can be compromised. Then using some tricks the remaining nodes can be taken out of commission, diverting more traffic onto the compromised nodes. (I believe this is a DoS of some kind, but my french is not good enough to say). At that point they use some traffic analysis for the remaining hops. No word about Windows in this article. Sincerely, Watson Ladd On Wed, Oct 19, 2011 at 6:58 PM, wrote: > A better article on the same presentation: > http://pro.01net.com/editorial/544024/des-chercheurs-francais-cassent-le-reseau-danonymisation-tor/ > > -- > http://www.fastmail.fm - Faster than the air-speed velocity of an > unladen european swallow > > ___ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] [announce] MAT 0.1 is out
I took a look at the README and it seems like the big dependency is a pure python library for binary parsing. It might be worth including that in the source, rather then trying to get it onto every package manager out there. On Sun, Oct 30, 2011 at 09:07:40PM -0400, Advrk Aplmrkt wrote: > Can you give some pointers on dependencies and other per-requisites > for the software? I would be very interested in trying to get it to > work on Windows, Mac OS X, and other Linux distributions... > Again thanks for making this! > > On 30 October 2011 19:23, jvoisin wrote: > > On 30 October 2011 21:36, Advrk Aplmrkt wrote: > >> > >> This looks great, will there be Windoze and Mac OS X binaries > >> available? Or is there documentation on how to build them? > > > > nop : it don't use OSX nor Windows, > > so I really don't know how to make MAT running on those platforms, > > sorry :/ > >> > >> Thanks for making this! Is there a road map for future features? > > > > Only a small TODO file. > > But I want to implement "un-watermarking" measures. > >> > >> On 30 October 2011 14:04, jvoisin wrote: > >> > Hello everyone ! > >> > > >> > The first release of MAT is here ! > >> > MAT stands for Metadata Anonymisation Toolkit, it was my 2011 GSoC > >> > project > >> > for Tor. > >> > > >> > It's a toolbox composed of a GUI application, a CLI application, and a > >> > library. > >> > > >> > - What is a metadata ? > >> > Metadata consist of information that characterizes data. > >> > Metadata are used to provide documentation for data products. > >> > In essence, metadata answer who, what, when, where, why, and how about > >> > every > >> > facet of the data that are being documented. > >> > > >> > - Why metadata can be a risk for your privacy ? > >> > Metadata within a file can tell a lot about you. > >> > Cameras record data about when a picture was taken and what camera was > >> > used. > >> > Office documents like pdf or Office automatically adds author and > >> > company > >> > information to documents and spreadsheets. > >> > Maybe you don't want to disclose those information on the web. > >> > > >> > For now, Mat only removes metadata from your files, it does not > >> > anonymise > >> > their content, > >> > nor can it handle watermarking, steganography, or any too custom > >> > metadata > >> > field/system. > >> > > >> > - Supported formats so far: > >> > Portable Network Graphics (.png) > >> > JPEG (.jpg, .jpeg, ...) > >> > Open Documents (.odt, .odx, .ods, ...) > >> > Office OpenXml (.docx, .pptx, .xlsx, ...) > >> > Portable Document Fileformat (.pdf) > >> > Tape ARchives (.tar, .tar.bz2, .tar.gz, ...) > >> > Zip (.zip) > >> > MPEG AUdio (.mp3, .mp2, .mp1, ...) > >> > Ogg Vorbis (.ogg, ...) > >> > Free Lossless Audio Codec (.flac) > >> > Torrent (.torrent) > >> > > >> > - Where does MAT lives ? > >> > MAT is already packaged in Haven (https://www.haven-project.org/), > >> > soon Tails (https://tails.boum.org/), > >> > and in debian (http://bugs.debian.org/638504). > >> > Stables versions are here : https://mat.boum.org/files/ > >> > > >> > * git repo : https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/jvoisin/mat.git > >> > * official website : https://mat.boum.org/ > >> > * old blog : mat-tor.blogspot.com > >> > > >> > If you have question, patches, bug reports, or simply want to talk about > >> > this project, fell free ton contact jvoisin on irc.oftc.net > >> > > >> > -- Julien (jvoisin) Voisin > ___ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk pgpVrxplXEE0O.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor and AES-NI acceleration , and Tor profiling
I'm a bit confused: I see a lot of time in assign_onionskin_to_cpuworker and I don't see looking in the code why this should take long. I'm also not seeing lots of time in onion_skin_server handshake, which is apparently a big slow point that had to be put in its own thread for responsiveness. The same with circuit_unlink_all_from_orconn. Apparently crawling a linked list is the new bottleneck. Sincerely, Watson Ladd On Sat, Nov 19, 2011 at 10:16 AM, Moritz Bartl wrote: > On 11/18/2011 10:44 PM, coderman wrote: >> >> hi Moritz, were you able to gather updated stats now that additional >> flags are present? >> i am very curious about the performance profiles you've observed; they >> are unusual :) > > The stats (opdump/opreport/vnstat/dstat) are still being generated and > public. I have reset oprofile now so the files better reflect the new > situation (bandwidth at ~500Mbps now, with peaks up to 700). > > -- > Moritz Bartl > https://www.torservers.net/ > ___ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Tor and AES-NI acceleration , and Tor profiling
So why doesn't aes.c use the same thing as is initialized in crypto.c? It would seem that this is always the right thing to do, and that because we don't do it acceleration only works for some uses of AES. The fix seems to be to change aes.c's use of defines to match that in crypto.c. Sincerely, Watson Ladd On Sat, Nov 19, 2011 at 11:35 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote: > On Tue, Nov 8, 2011 at 10:29 AM, Nick Mathewson wrote: >> Hmm. On examination it looks like there might be some uses of >> OpenSSL's AES_encrypt function left around in your profile. Try >> changing the beginning of Tor's aes.c so that the line that now says: >> >> #undef USE_OPENSSL_EVP >> >> now says >> >> #define USE_OPENSSL_EVP >> >> Does that improve matters at all? > > Curious whether you had a chance to try this. From the latest > profile, your biggest timesink is _x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact. But > that's not the AESNI version. I think that using EVP there would get > the right result, if I understand how engines work correctly. > > -- > Nick > ___ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] [liberationtech] Not another Haystack right?
On Sat, Dec 3, 2011 at 2:53 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote: > On Sat, Dec 03, 2011 at 06:10:14PM +0100, Moritz Bartl wrote: > >> > In summary, I think we should try to expand the way people use Tor, as >> > opposed to pushing them towards less safe solutions. >> >> Interesting. And I tend to agree. I feel there is more and more room for >> a higher-latency suite of applications. > > Anything SMTP (especially if artificially slowed down) seems a good > candidate. Taking a chapter from rms, send your requests to fetch > HTTP resources via an email gateway. NNTP would be another. If you are letting latency rise that high, a Type III remailer suddenly becomes a plausible alternative to Tor. Could it be that the demand for low-latency anonymity of the type Tor provides just isn't that high, as it makes interactive use difficult? > ___ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] tor-blocking sites
On Thu, Feb 9, 2012 at 8:22 AM, Praedor wrote:
> I must say that I believe tor should be working to try to defeat/get around
> tor blocking. You DO realise that as more and more sites block tor as a
> matter of course it makes tor less and less useful right? It then becomes
> very simple for governments to defeat anonymity services like tor entirely by
> simply requiring by law that tor exits be blocked by any number of important
> internet "infrastructure" sites.
That's where jurisdictional diversity comes in. In the US there are
strong protections for anonymous speech. Requiring Gmail to block Tor
users would not be legally possible.
>
> What use is tor if every site you want to connect to via tor blocks you? May
> as well simply terminate the tor project for all the use it is.
>
> On Monday, February 06, 2012 02:24:31 PM Mr Dash Four wrote:
>> I am sick of them all!
>>
>> Initially, there was a small number of these in the wild, but now it is
>> widely spread - google is the main offender, but youtube (which is, as
>> we all know, google-owned) and now, wait for it, scroogle.org (a site I
>> use a lot) is also at it!
>>
>> Tor-blocking could be very easily to implement by parsing
>> cached-descriptors{.new} to see all exit nodes and then add them to a
>> blacklist and start blocking. Is there anything which can be done to
>> prevent this?
>>
>> I am thinking of something similar to what is currently in existence
>> with the bridge system - you don't know them all, just a portion of it,
>> enough to connect you to the network. Could something similar be
>> implemented with tor?
>> ___
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>>
>>
> ___
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"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin
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[tor-talk] Ars Technica on Iran's latest strategy
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2012/02/iran-reportedly-blocking-encrypted-internet-traffic.ars I'm not sure what we can do in response to something like this. Obviously this is a pretty extreme move with high costs, so Iran doesn't have the ability to do anything else, and by making the choice shutting down e-commerce or tolerating tor, we do a lot. But what countermeasures can we envision against this? Sincerely, Watson Ladd ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] please suggest a new project name for Anonymous Operating System
GygesOS might be too culture-bound. Sincerely, Watson Ladd -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Fwd: according to leaked XKeyScore source NSA marks all Tor users as extremists, puts them on a surveillance list
On Jul 3, 2014 9:57 AM, "Jacob Appelbaum" wrote: > > On 7/3/14, coderman wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 8:36 AM, coderman wrote: > >> ... > >> i presume you mean as below: > >> (more a translation than additional QUELLCODE info though ;) > > > > Here is some of the source code: > > http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt Quellcode means source code. It's a secret compartment inside GERMAN. > > Happy hacking, > Jacob > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Crypto used by Tor
On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Noel David Torres Taño wrote: > What encryption does the onion routing use? I cannot seem to find the > answer to this anywhere. > Use the Spec Luke! https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=tor-spec.txt > > Thanks in advance > > A: Because it breaks the logical flow of discussion. > Q: Why is top posting bad? > > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > > -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] What the NSA cares about getting and defenses
Prompted by the Ars Technica reporting on QUANTUM, I took a look at the slide and read the text, as well as compared to the MULLINIZE document describing NAT breaking. My conclusion is that the NSA obtains significant amounts of information from user activity in between closing browsers, and that current Tor Browser Bundle remains vulnerable to this attack. QUANTUM appears to rely on inserting fake references to third party assets and manipulating cookies in the requests made by the browser in response. I propose that we block third party cookies unless over HTTPS to mitigate this problem, and try to encourage users to use more frequent new identities. MULLINIZE achieves the reliable tracking of individual users behind a NAT through similar tricks. It is clear that the NSA views this information as valuable, even without real-world addresses to tie to it. Linkability across pages is difficult: breaking sessions is a major cost of the obvious no cookies approach to preventing this sort of attack. Sincerely, Watson -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] [cryptography] The Heartbleed Bug is a serious vulnerability in OpenSSL
On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 5:43 PM, Joe Btfsplk wrote: > On 4/9/2014 1:29 PM, Christopher J. Walters wrote: >> >> It seems no one wants to talk or hear about this issue. It is not being >> reported on media sites or anywhere else, other than the Heartbleed site, >> and the OpenSSL lists > > It's all over the internet, when I look in Ixquick / Startpage. > > Possible that main stream media isn't "allowed" to report on stories that > may upset the public. Both the New York Times and BBC reported it. > > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Multiple CPU cores?
On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 4:18 AM, Kristoffer Rath Hansen wrote: > Hello, > > I've over some time ran some different tor relays - and I really like the > Tor project. It really makes sense to me. > > Here is the problem I've ran into. On my exit node, speedybacon2500, I have > 2.5 Gbit/s interface and 8 CPU cores. Tor uses ~60 mbps and 1 CPU core. I > do also have a few other things running on the server, but I'd really like > to be able to take advantage of more CPU cores and more bandwidth. So would everyone else. Sadly Tor is not fully multithreaded yet: there are longstanding plans but the work goes slowly. There is an apparently abandoned project https://github.com/tvdw/gotor which was capable of solving some of the problems when it did run, but apparently there were issues. > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] CloudFlare captchas disappeared?
Blinded tokens finally shipped. As a result they can remember that you solved the captcha. On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 5:15 AM, wrote: > Recently I've realized that I'm not seeing the CloudFlare capchas anymore in > TBB, or seeing them far less often. > > Is it just me, or they have really changed something about their captchas? > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
