[tor-talk] Ars Technica on Iran's latest strategy
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2012/02/iran-reportedly-blocking-encrypted-internet-traffic.ars I'm not sure what we can do in response to something like this. Obviously this is a pretty extreme move with high costs, so Iran doesn't have the ability to do anything else, and by making the choice shutting down e-commerce or tolerating tor, we do a lot. But what countermeasures can we envision against this? Sincerely, Watson Ladd ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Ars Technica on Iran's latest strategy
On Fri, 10 Feb 2012 17:18:41 + Robert Ransom rransom.8...@gmail.com wrote: https://bugs.torproject.org/4927 seems to have been effective. We just need to hunt down and fix some obfsproxy (server-side) crash bugs and get a good list of very-high-bandwidth obfsproxy bridges before we tell everyone where to find a Tor+obfsproxy client bundle. Additionally, the reality in Iran isn't quite so cut and dry, https://blog.torproject.org/blog/iran-partially-blocks-encrypted-network-traffic for some details. The blocking is not nationwide, nor even ISP wide. Still working on more details. It seems only people connected to AS12880 are being routed through a proxy doing more filtering. Granted, this AS12880 seems to cover most of Tehran. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x74ED336B ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Ars Technica on Iran's latest strategy
https://bugs.torproject.org/4927 seems to have been effective. We just need to hunt down and fix some obfsproxy (server-side) crash bugs and get a good list of very-high-bandwidth obfsproxy bridges before we tell everyone where to find a Tor+obfsproxy client bundle. On 2012-02-10, Watson Ladd watsonbl...@gmail.com wrote: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2012/02/iran-reportedly-blocking-encrypted-internet-traffic.ars I'm not sure what we can do in response to something like this. Obviously this is a pretty extreme move with high costs, so Iran doesn't have the ability to do anything else, and by making the choice shutting down e-commerce or tolerating tor, we do a lot. But what countermeasures can we envision against this? Sincerely, Watson Ladd ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Ars Technica on Iran's latest strategy
So not as bad as first portrayed? How is intra country routing being affected? -Andrew Lewis Twitter: ThePunkbob On Feb 10, 2012, at 6:00 PM, Andrew Lewman and...@torproject.org wrote: On Fri, 10 Feb 2012 17:18:41 + Robert Ransom rransom.8...@gmail.com wrote: https://bugs.torproject.org/4927 seems to have been effective. We just need to hunt down and fix some obfsproxy (server-side) crash bugs and get a good list of very-high-bandwidth obfsproxy bridges before we tell everyone where to find a Tor+obfsproxy client bundle. Additionally, the reality in Iran isn't quite so cut and dry, https://blog.torproject.org/blog/iran-partially-blocks-encrypted-network-traffic for some details. The blocking is not nationwide, nor even ISP wide. Still working on more details. It seems only people connected to AS12880 are being routed through a proxy doing more filtering. Granted, this AS12880 seems to cover most of Tehran. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x74ED336B ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
