Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/13/2013 12:14 PM, grarpamp wrote: I mean, most overlays out there are NOT for anonymity Not for strong anonymity at least. Many are closes source windows blobs and generally weighted towards filesharing and vague vpn privacy claims. Those are definitely the ones to avoid. If you can't see and change the code it's not worth one bit of your time beyond cataloging it's 'features' for possible reimplementation. To be honest, I do that all of the time. I have reverse engineered skype to a certain extent and run massive clusters of virtual machines and virtual networks to reverse engineer the behavior of the skype network, and have very VERY heavily studied the skype api, all versions of it. i did this with the sole purpose of taking the good ideas, concepts and features from it for purposes of planning on a new network, reimplementing the features i like, and cherry picking from HUNDREDS of other protocols and network models for my own overlay project. In case you were wondering, the project is named Fennec, and I have not yet published a git repository for it, yet. I'm not ready. Sure, i2P exists, but who wants to spin up a huge honking java virtual machine just to participate in that relay pool? It's actually pretty easy and can run on modest hardware as a node. Maybe so, but I personally prefer keeping java off my machines in any form. Not only that, but i2P (last I checked) does not support IPv6 Eepsites, while Tor is (slowly) getting to that point. Neither do, and neither are. You can shim both with onioncat to some caveated win. I must have been misinformed. I know you can do it (in theory) with netcat or some other tunneling mechanism, such as tinc or quicktun vpns, but that's not a real solution. I had not heard of onioncat. IPv6 eepsites/hidden services is an important feature to me. Absolutely. GNUnet or even more obscure overlays do not have stable featuresets regarding generic unmodified TCP or UDP services, be it over IPv4 or IPv6. Phantom does this completely already, but is even more obscure. I have heard of phantom, but I thought it was no longer actively developed, and had not been actively developed for years. Has it be quietly forked and developed somewhere I don't know about? Sure GNUnet has IPv6 private VPNs on the eventual roadmap, and sure you could extend that to virtual interfaces, and sure you could enable linux or whatever to act as a router between those interfaces, you could even enable Quagga or whatever to swap an (alternative) BGP peering table, but GNUnet has a lot of other priorities, and isn't likely to get around to that On the IPv6 interop front, the only thing these projects need to code is unique address in specific /48 bound to an IPv6 interface and mapped to internal 80bit address [sub]space for transport. User will setup all those interconnects. There are projects in the works... That would be cool. Too bad I can't code C. Though, some coder and engie friends of mine are talking about kidnapping me from home and tying me up and forcing me to learn C or suffer the consequences. These consequences are not safe for work, so I will spare your sanity. This time. :) ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Alex M (Coyo) c...@darkdna.net wrote: I must have somehow missed it. I would really appreciate a link. I cannot seem to find it on my own. Thank you in advance. Here are the common ways: roll a bunch of bridges using Amazon's cloud [1], have friends/allies/interesting frenemies run bridges using Vidalia [2], or just use a garden-variety VPN/proxy before entering the Tor network. ~Griffin [1] https://cloud.torproject.org/ [2] https://www.torproject.org/download/download.html.en -- Please note that I do not have PGP access at this time. OTR: sa...@jabber.ccc.de / fonta...@jabber.ccc.de ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Thus spake Seth David Schoen (sch...@eff.org): Alex M (Coyo) writes: It concerns me that you [Mike Perry] refer to we as though you contribute anything to the tor project. https://gitweb.torproject.org/ https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/en/design/index.html.en https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/ https://gitweb.torproject.org/https-everywhere.git/blob/HEAD:/src/chrome/content/about.xul No no dude don't do that! Now they know why they should kill me! Aww fuck it. Well, if anyone asks why I died, the official answer is now that it was totally the fault of doubleclick.net (or their current majority shareholder ;). P.S. Thanks, Seth. ;) -- Mike Perry signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/13/2013 01:29 AM, Mike Perry wrote: Thus spake Alex M (Coyo) (c...@darkdna.net): On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote: If you have a specific list of design flaws that aren't couched in long rants, we can perhaps help instruct you on how you might solve them in your redesign with Mr Disney, or at least point you toward some tickets you two should read and follow during that process. Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling. Though, with that attitude of yours, I'm afraid I'm uninterested in any assistance you may deign to bestow upon Gregory Disney and I. I'm confident we can do just fine without your arrogance. Ooh. A flame war. I love these. *Boop* I just took your nose over TCP/IP. You wish. It concerns me that you refer to we as though you contribute anything to the tor project. It's called solidarity. I won't stand idly by while you suggest that Tor developers and relay volunteers could be murdered or threatened to sabotage our project. As if such tactics would even work without someone instantly running to EFF/ACLU or proposing a design change... I wonder why you insist on claiming that I intend to murder coders and activists? It's not like you're going to spark an investigation. Dream on. Perhaps I'm just annoyed you didn't include my name among the death threats in your first rant. Now you know better, I hope. Protip: It's because you don't matter. At all. I'm sure the tor coders are going to be more than happy to support the foss ideals in this case in regards to codebase forking rights. Dude, the source code is BSD/MIT licensed. Sell binaries with your own secret sauce to others if you wish. We don't care. Just don't tell people you're giving them Tor. P.S. Cite your specific design concerns or this is my last reply to you on this list. (I totally promise.. Flame wars are bd... Mmmkay?) FYI: This is my I totally care about what you have to say face. :P ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/13/2013 01:54 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote: Alex M (Coyo)c...@darkdna.net wrote: I must have somehow missed it. I would really appreciate a link. I cannot seem to find it on my own. Thank you in advance. Here are the common ways: roll a bunch of bridges using Amazon's cloud [1], have friends/allies/interesting frenemies run bridges using Vidalia [2], or just use a garden-variety VPN/proxy before entering the Tor network. ~Griffin [1]https://cloud.torproject.org/ [2]https://www.torproject.org/download/download.html.en That is extremely unhelpful. Merely running bridges on a huge ridiculously insecure public cloud does not equal running bridge authorities independent of the bridge authority run by the tor project. I have still not gotten a straight answer about whether or not the bridge community featureset has been released in the stable tor client. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 13.04.2013 04:30, Alex M (Coyo) wrote: Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities I'm working on setting up (yet) another non-profit organization with limited liability in Germany (gGmbH). Over time, the goal is for it to become a European Tor. One of its projects will be torservers.net, and torservers.net is an independent network of organizations that run Tor exits and Tor bridges in larger scale. For that entity, it would be easy to run a bridge authority, and I will look into how to do this properly as soon as (a) the paperwork is done and (b) time permits and (c) funding is on the horizon. If anyone wants to help, just do it! :) We're happy about every hand we can get. -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/ ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Alex M (Coyo): I have still not gotten a straight answer about whether or not the bridge community featureset has been released in the stable tor client. It's all in there. https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en AlternateBridgeAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Alex M (Coyo): On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote: Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling. Because obviously criticism and actual concern for the well-being of a foss project is always trolling and threats. I hope you aren't a contributor. See https://www.torproject.org/about/corepeople.html.en ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Alex M (Coyo) c...@darkdna.net wrote: On 04/13/2013 01:54 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote: Here are the common ways: roll a bunch of bridges using Amazon's cloud [1], have friends/allies/interesting frenemies run bridges using Vidalia [2], or just use a garden-variety VPN/proxy before entering the Tor network. ~Griffin [1]https://cloud.torproject.**org/ https://cloud.torproject.org/ [2]https://www.torproject.org/**download/download.html.enhttps://www.torproject.org/download/download.html.en That is extremely unhelpful. Merely running bridges on a huge ridiculously insecure public cloud does not equal running bridge authorities independent of the bridge authority run by the tor project. I have still not gotten a straight answer about whether or not the bridge community featureset has been released in the stable tor client. The answer to your second question is no, because private bridges are used in a setting where heavy censorship exists (eg, China), very few people want to expose their private bridge networks to outsiders like yourself. People frequently roll a set of bridges *for their own use*. Of course, if you truly have a problem with the Tor network, you're not obligated to use it. =P Other options still exist for a reason. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Alex M (Coyo): On 04/12/2013 10:37 PM, adrelanos wrote: Hi Alex, these are interesting thoughts. I wrote something related a while ago. Tor: lobbies vs lobbies - Who will prevail?: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025109.html Alex M (Coyo): Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities without relying on the centralized tor directory hosted by Peter Palfrader, Jacob Appelbaum and associates? Good idea in general. (Although I don't share your reasons for it.) What reasons would you have, then? Competition and more people involved always pushes projects forward faster. From lurking here on the mailing lists and other places, Jacob and other core Tor staff and advocates generally seem to have a worryingly optimistic attitude toward the possibility of coordinated Tor censorship, crackdowns, network manipulation and attack, coordinated government raids upon Tor directory servers, I am interested, where did they say so? I am too tired and physically ill with an upper-respiratory infection to dig through mailing list archives at the moment. If it is important that I shoulder the burden of proof, remind me later when I'm not coughing up blood. Keep your time. or even assassinations against Jacob Appelbaum and other core staff and volunteers involved in the Tor project. Why assassinations? I've heard the some mafia style groups have a better method than violence. They catch a child after school, make up some Your parents told me to catch you today, I am your Uncle Sam. story, aren't violent or threatening at all and go into some Disney land copy, bring back the child afterwards. Not sure if that happens in reality, but I am sure that works better than violence. May I ask for a clarification here? Yes. I do not understand how taking a child to a theme park relates in any way to Jacob Appelbaum being tagged and bagged. I don't know if Jacob has children and it's none of my business. Instead of mentally breaking a mastermind like Jacob, they rather threaten it's loved ones to make him stop working what he is working on it or to make him even working for them. Other than that, it seems obvious to me that killing people isn't effective as turning them around. Why wouldn't they rather use violence to force them to put a backdoor into next Tor version? That isn't quite as trivial as you make it sound, and really, it's unnecessary. Why it's not simple? It's well inside their budget. It is a general consensus that the united states federal government has full access to the directory authorities and majority of guard nodes and exit nodes within the united states. It is a general consensus that the Tor network provides only illusory anonymity to any user hostile to united states military supremacy. The Tor network is a historical toy created by the united states military, and is just as possessed and controlled by the united states military as it has been from day one. Let's assume that's true - no danger for Tor core people from the US. What about other countries? Tor gives network access to many people in countries who censor Tor. Couldn't they get totally mad if their technical fight fails and switch over to a secret service violent operating? As far I know no Tor developer has been harassed for Tor yet. (Please tell me if I am wrong.) Jacob has been harassed like in a totalitarian state because of his connections to wikileaks. I also wonder how Jacob could stay so calm after all what happened to him, not being already a broken man. I admire the Tor developers for doing their work in such a dangerous country (US), knowing about waterbording and that stuff. Is it really so difficult to conceive of situations that involve violent raids against the datacenters hosting Tor directory servers and their mirrors, attacks, possibly physically violent, involving full military force against Jacob Appelbaum and other critical developers, staff, volunteers and advocates? If that happens, that would be the worst case. I think without Tor servers in the US and without the Tor developers, there is more Tor network, since most Tor servers are in the US. Most other Tor servers are in countries which the US can pressure as well. When the US decides to take down Tor, it's pretty much over anyway. My point exactly. You really think the governments of the industralized first world countries won't stoop that low? Maybe they don't have to. When I understood Jacob in his speeches right, he doesn't believe that Tor does defeat the NSA. Why should they break Tor if it's an open book already to them already anyway? Tor is not designed (in its current form) to even attempt to contest NSA control and manipulation. One day, they will accuse Jacob and the other core developers of being domestic terrorists or whatever as
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
I think you're right. On 04/13/2013 04:32 AM, Gregory Disney wrote: OnionCat? Anything more extreme than that is going to have be built from the ground up. On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 5:20 AM, Alex M (Coyo) c...@darkdna.net wrote: On 04/13/2013 01:54 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote: Alex M (Coyo)c...@darkdna.net wrote: I must have somehow missed it. I would really appreciate a link. I cannot seem to find it on my own. Thank you in advance. Here are the common ways: roll a bunch of bridges using Amazon's cloud [1], have friends/allies/interesting frenemies run bridges using Vidalia [2], or just use a garden-variety VPN/proxy before entering the Tor network. ~Griffin [1]https://cloud.torproject.**org/ https://cloud.torproject.org/ [2]https://www.torproject.org/**download/download.html.enhttps://www.torproject.org/download/download.html.en That is extremely unhelpful. Merely running bridges on a huge ridiculously insecure public cloud does not equal running bridge authorities independent of the bridge authority run by the tor project. I have still not gotten a straight answer about whether or not the bridge community featureset has been released in the stable tor client. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/13/2013 10:27 AM, adrelanos wrote: Alex M (Coyo): I have still not gotten a straight answer about whether or not the bridge community featureset has been released in the stable tor client. It's all in there. https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en AlternateBridgeAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint Oh, wow! That's new! Good job, guys! How the heck did I miss that? I must have read that manual a hundred times, but I've never noted that particular command! Durp! ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/13/2013 10:29 AM, adrelanos wrote: Alex M (Coyo): On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote: Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling. Because obviously criticism and actual concern for the well-being of a foss project is always trolling and threats. I hope you aren't a contributor. See https://www.torproject.org/about/corepeople.html.en I just got done rea-- OMFG, that dick is in there. lol TorButton and performance metrics. No wonder I missed his name. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/13/2013 10:35 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote: Alex M (Coyo) c...@darkdna.net wrote: On 04/13/2013 01:54 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote: Here are the common ways: roll a bunch of bridges using Amazon's cloud [1], have friends/allies/interesting frenemies run bridges using Vidalia [2], or just use a garden-variety VPN/proxy before entering the Tor network. ~Griffin [1]https://cloud.torproject.**org/ https://cloud.torproject.org/ [2]https://www.torproject.org/**download/download.html.enhttps://www.torproject.org/download/download.html.en That is extremely unhelpful. Merely running bridges on a huge ridiculously insecure public cloud does not equal running bridge authorities independent of the bridge authority run by the tor project. I have still not gotten a straight answer about whether or not the bridge community featureset has been released in the stable tor client. The answer to your second question is no, because private bridges are used in a setting where heavy censorship exists (eg, China), very few people want to expose their private bridge networks to outsiders like yourself. People frequently roll a set of bridges *for their own use*. Someone quoted the Tor manual, and noted that one of the options is: AlternateBridgeAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint That sounds a lot more like I'm looking for. All I need is patch an AlternativeDirectoryAuthority option, and there you go. :D Of course, if you truly have a problem with the Tor network, you're not obligated to use it. =P Other options still exist for a reason. Not very many! I mean, most overlays out there are NOT for anonymity, and they do NOT offer an equivalent featureset to Tor hidden services. Sure, i2P exists, but who wants to spin up a huge honking java virtual machine just to participate in that relay pool? Not only that, but i2P (last I checked) does not support IPv6 Eepsites, while Tor is (slowly) getting to that point. IPv6 eepsites/hidden services is an important feature to me. GNUnet or even more obscure overlays do not have stable featuresets regarding generic unmodified TCP or UDP services, be it over IPv4 or IPv6. Sure GNUnet has IPv6 private VPNs on the eventual roadmap, and sure you could extend that to virtual interfaces, and sure you could enable linux or whatever to act as a router between those interfaces, you could even enable Quagga or whatever to swap an (alternative) BGP peering table, but GNUnet has a lot of other priorities, and isn't likely to get around to that anytime within the next two decades. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 01:14:16PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: Sure, i2P exists, but who wants to spin up a huge honking java virtual machine just to participate in that relay pool? It's actually pretty easy and can run on modest hardware as a node. I disagree about modest hardware. Anything Java (Freenet, ip2, etc.) reliably craps out after a few weeks of operation on lean but usable hardware (~2 GBytes RAM effectively, dual-core Atom). It's okay for fat desktops which run for maybe a few weeks. Anything Java in general makes me a sad panda. Not only that, but i2P (last I checked) does not support IPv6 Eepsites, while Tor is (slowly) getting to that point. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Thus spake grarpamp (grarp...@gmail.com): It concerns me that you [Mike Perry] refer to we as though you contribute anything to the tor project. Mike does a good deal of fine work for the Tor project. And I'm happy to see the torbrowser project come in place with as part goal of working with Mozilla to finally upstream fix FF for benefit of native FF users worldwide. Much better long term approach than torbutton. While I appreciate people standing up for me, there's not really much need to defend me to a drama queen who can't be bothered to RTFM before suggesting features, and moreover who thinks that suggesting specific people will be murdered is the right way to contribute to a FOSS project or ensure the prioritization of their desired features. I mean, I had more than a few lullz patiently toying with this idiocy waiting for the doxx to drop (so to speak), that's for sure ;). -- Mike Perry signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Let's not dread on things out of our control; IMO we should use these concerns to develop solutions then turn them into soultions that we can implement. Obviously we can't develop around assassinations nor state funded terrorism, but we can develop a solution for backdoors and information leaks. On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 10:15 PM, adrelanos adrela...@riseup.net wrote: Sebastian G. bastik.tor: (Fun part?) Not a fun part for me. It's sad that these concern have been raised by a troll (or someone who doesn't know how to behave). However, these concerns are valid, and from my perspective, I can't understand why they are easily dismissed. About assassinating (double ass) the (core?) Tor people I have read that you can hire assassins on hidden-services. Wouldn't it be ironic if one hires an assassin (or many of them) via hidden-services to take the lives or Tor people? They tend to pile up on something they call developers meeting (aka DevMeeting). It's kind of public when and where such a meetings will take place and who will attend to them. The US owns drones (and they love to use them), European states buy also drones so if someone gets accused for treason, which is probably Mr. Jacob Appelbaum because of his relation to wikileaks, while Tor is also a threat such a meeting would be a juicy target. With someone killed for treason or terrorism (or supporting it) the other dead bodies are just collateral damage. That doesn't scare me. It scares me. I'd never want that to happen. Me neither. If it doesn't look like an accident (in this case or any other) people will notice about them missing or being killed. I hope that people will fight murders. Tor might be dead, but people will be upset about the death of innocent people. Yes, people will be upset, too few to see things change. People tortured in Guantanamo, Bradley Manning, list goes on... go through things which are worse than death. What's more concerning is that they could back-door Tor, all it takes is to turn one developer around, let anyone know about the back-door and people will loose trust. Yes. That could kill Tor as well. Or people who could help will finally help pushing the deterministic build feature. Often a fail finally helps to make a change. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Cool story bro. We're worried about these things too, I guess. I mean, if killing us all is really the best way to stop Tor, then I would submit to you that Tor is unstoppable. After all, network engineers are basically throwaway commodities to the mexican mafia: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/zeta-radio/ I mean, if they kill their *own* codeslaves^Wemployees, what exactly do you think murdering us will accomplish? In the meantime, we have nothing to fear except fear itself. Oh, and 0day. Don't forget to ph34r the 0day. Turns out that shit costs way less than high-profile assassination contracts (fortunately or unfortunately, depending on your perspective :/). P.S. If you're annoyed by this flippant response, it was given because your rant is basically a long series of FAQs. There are ways to fix your concerns but they require development effort, and in fact many of them (including custom pluggable transports and private bridge distribution) are already supported. For the others: Patches welcome. P.P.S. I'll leave the point-by-point discussion to the other NSA thread participants ;) Thus spake Alex M (Coyo) (c...@darkdna.net): Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities without relying on the centralized tor directory hosted by Peter Palfrader, Jacob Appelbaum and associates? From lurking here on the mailing lists and other places, Jacob and other core Tor staff and advocates generally seem to have a worryingly optimistic attitude toward the possibility of coordinated Tor censorship, crackdowns, network manipulation and attack, coordinated government raids upon Tor directory servers, or even assassinations against Jacob Appelbaum and other core staff and volunteers involved in the Tor project. Is it really so difficult to conceive of situations that involve violent raids against the datacenters hosting Tor directory servers and their mirrors, attacks, possibly physically violent, involving full military force against Jacob Appelbaum and other critical developers, staff, volunteers and advocates? You really think the governments of the industralized first world countries won't stoop that low? One day, they will accuse Jacob and the other core developers of being domestic terrorists or whatever as an excuse to fire upon native citizens on domestic soil. They will do it, one day. This is why providing relatively trivial means to deploy one's own bridge communities with many pluggable transports in order to prepare for that inevitability. The Bitcoin core developers and advocates will also be assassinated or eliminated militarily as well. It is inevitable. You really think our governments won't stoop that low? They are little more than pan-handling bums attempting to justify their jobs at the taxpayer's expense, and feel entitled to our money. Not only that, but they have the sheer unabashed chutzpa to presume they are legitimate in their entitlement, and have full authority to use our own taxpayer money against us, to enforce unjust laws, to inflict injustice against their own citizenry. If they have absolutely no compunction about shoving CISPA or SOPA down our throats, feel no remorse for warrantless wiretapping and unlawful deep packet inspection, or forcing internet service providers into spying on their own paying customers, what makes you think they won't slay Jacob Appelbaum where he stands? They will. They will, mark my words. And when that happens, we must be ready. Jacob's legacy needs to live on. Christian Fromme, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, Andrea Shepard, Dr. Paul Syverson..., their legacy must live on, regardless of whether the government shoves them against a cinderblock wall and shoots them dead where they stand. We must prepare for this inevitability. We need more pluggable transports, we need to break up the Tor relay network into distinct domains, we must make the tor relay network far more resilient to coordinated attacks, we need to decentralize the directory authorities and mitigate the horrifying damage in the event of directory authority compromise, and the subjugation and subversion of directory authorities, hidden services, user privacy and the physical safety of relay operators. We need far more stringent entry and exit guard node policies, more flexible and informative relay server statistics and circuit routing control. We need bridge relay communities with independent bridge directory authorities that can be run by semi-isolated communities, including bridge communities within other overlay networks such as private OpenVPN, CJDNS or AnoNet networks. As it is, if the Tor client cannot connect to the centralized high-value targets controlled by the Tor project team, Tor is absolutely worthless and useless. This must change. Tor should be usable by independent relay
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Hi Alex, these are interesting thoughts. I wrote something related a while ago. Tor: lobbies vs lobbies - Who will prevail?: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025109.html Alex M (Coyo): Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities without relying on the centralized tor directory hosted by Peter Palfrader, Jacob Appelbaum and associates? Good idea in general. (Although I don't share your reasons for it.) From lurking here on the mailing lists and other places, Jacob and other core Tor staff and advocates generally seem to have a worryingly optimistic attitude toward the possibility of coordinated Tor censorship, crackdowns, network manipulation and attack, coordinated government raids upon Tor directory servers, I am interested, where did they say so? or even assassinations against Jacob Appelbaum and other core staff and volunteers involved in the Tor project. Why assassinations? I've heard the some mafia style groups have a better method than violence. They catch a child after school, make up some Your parents told me to catch you today, I am your Uncle Sam. story, aren't violent or threatening at all and go into some Disney land copy, bring back the child afterwards. Not sure if that happens in reality, but I am sure that works better than violence. Other than that, it seems obvious to me that killing people isn't effective as turning them around. Why wouldn't they rather use violence to force them to put a backdoor into next Tor version? As far I know no Tor developer has been harassed for Tor yet. (Please tell me if I am wrong.) Jacob has been harassed like in a totalitarian state because of his connections to wikileaks. I also wonder how Jacob could stay so calm after all what happened to him, not being already a broken man. I admire the Tor developers for doing their work in such a dangerous country (US), knowing about waterbording and that stuff. Is it really so difficult to conceive of situations that involve violent raids against the datacenters hosting Tor directory servers and their mirrors, attacks, possibly physically violent, involving full military force against Jacob Appelbaum and other critical developers, staff, volunteers and advocates? If that happens, that would be the worst case. I think without Tor servers in the US and without the Tor developers, there is more Tor network, since most Tor servers are in the US. Most other Tor servers are in countries which the US can pressure as well. When the US decides to take down Tor, it's pretty much over anyway. You really think the governments of the industralized first world countries won't stoop that low? Maybe they don't have to. When I understood Jacob in his speeches right, he doesn't believe that Tor does defeat the NSA. Why should they break Tor if it's an open book already to them already anyway? One day, they will accuse Jacob and the other core developers of being domestic terrorists or whatever as an excuse to fire upon native citizens on domestic soil. They will do it, one day. Only in case they can't easily break Tor already anyway. This is why providing relatively trivial means to deploy one's own bridge communities with many pluggable transports in order to prepare for that inevitability. I don't see how that helps after hosting Tor servers has been made illegal in US and most other countries. The Bitcoin core developers and advocates will also be assassinated or eliminated militarily as well. It is inevitable. You really think our governments won't stoop that low? They are little more than pan-handling bums attempting to justify their jobs at the taxpayer's expense, and feel entitled to our money. Not only that, but they have the sheer unabashed chutzpa to presume they are legitimate in their entitlement, and have full authority to use our own taxpayer money against us, to enforce unjust laws, to inflict injustice against their own citizenry. If they have absolutely no compunction about shoving CISPA or SOPA down our throats, feel no remorse for warrantless wiretapping and unlawful deep packet inspection, or forcing internet service providers into spying on their own paying customers, Agreed. what makes you think they won't slay Jacob Appelbaum where he stands? Answered above already. They will. They will, mark my words. And when that happens, we must be ready. Jacob's legacy needs to live on. Christian Fromme, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, Andrea Shepard, Dr. Paul Syverson..., their legacy must live on, regardless of whether the government shoves them against a cinderblock wall and shoots them dead where they stand. As far I understand, Dr. Paul Syverson works for Naval Research Laboratory and can be told to stop working on Tor and work for something else instead. The others, already covered that above. We must prepare for
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Alex M (Coyo) c...@darkdna.net wrote: Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities without relying on the centralized tor directory hosted by Peter Palfrader, Jacob Appelbaum and associates? Don't say I didn't warn you. If anything, I would say that the Tor team tends to emphasize the absolute worst-case scenarios. There's really nothing keeping you from making a private bridge network. The documentation's all there. best, Griffin -- Please note that I do not have PGP access at this time. OTR: sa...@jabber.ccc.de / fonta...@jabber.ccc.de ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/12/2013 10:27 PM, Mike Perry wrote: Cool story bro. I know. We're worried about these things too, I guess. I believe it. I'm in the market for a bridge, if you'll sell one to me. I mean, if killing us all is really the best way to stop Tor, then I would submit to you that Tor is unstoppable. After all, network engineers are basically throwaway commodities to the mexican mafia: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/zeta-radio/ I mean, if they kill their*own* codeslaves^Wemployees, what exactly do you think murdering us will accomplish? Well, killing us all wouldn't be necessary, just the core developers and the highest-profile advocates. Minor contributors and patchers would be incapable of maintaining the project. Still, the possibility is entirely within reason. In the meantime, we have nothing to fear except fear itself. Oh, and 0day. Don't forget to ph34r the 0day. Turns out that shit costs way less than high-profile assassination contracts (fortunately or unfortunately, depending on your perspective :/). Have you read about assassination markets? Are you familiar with that concept? If you can use an anonymous assassination market to place bounties upon the heads of government officials, what makes you think they could not use the same systems to place bounties upon high-value activists? P.S. If you're annoyed by this flippant response, it was given because your rant is basically a long series of FAQs. There are ways to fix your concerns but they require development effort, and in fact many of them (including custom pluggable transports and private bridge distribution) are already supported. For the others: Patches welcome. I'm afraid I do not follow what you mean by FAQs since I do not see any overt interest (or developer consideration) concerning any of these features. I have not seen any stable Tor client release notes announcing private bridge authority decentralization. Did I misread something? P.P.S. I'll leave the point-by-point discussion to the other NSA thread participants;) I'm sure there are many NSA employees here. Contributions to cryptography make NSA awesome, but that is dramatically balanced by NSA wiretapping. My opinion of the NSA is thus ambivalent. Though that is off-topic. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/12/2013 10:37 PM, adrelanos wrote: Hi Alex, these are interesting thoughts. I wrote something related a while ago. Tor: lobbies vs lobbies - Who will prevail?: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025109.html Alex M (Coyo): Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities without relying on the centralized tor directory hosted by Peter Palfrader, Jacob Appelbaum and associates? Good idea in general. (Although I don't share your reasons for it.) What reasons would you have, then? From lurking here on the mailing lists and other places, Jacob and other core Tor staff and advocates generally seem to have a worryingly optimistic attitude toward the possibility of coordinated Tor censorship, crackdowns, network manipulation and attack, coordinated government raids upon Tor directory servers, I am interested, where did they say so? I am too tired and physically ill with an upper-respiratory infection to dig through mailing list archives at the moment. If it is important that I shoulder the burden of proof, remind me later when I'm not coughing up blood. or even assassinations against Jacob Appelbaum and other core staff and volunteers involved in the Tor project. Why assassinations? I've heard the some mafia style groups have a better method than violence. They catch a child after school, make up some Your parents told me to catch you today, I am your Uncle Sam. story, aren't violent or threatening at all and go into some Disney land copy, bring back the child afterwards. Not sure if that happens in reality, but I am sure that works better than violence. I do not understand how taking a child to a theme park relates in any way to Jacob Appelbaum being tagged and bagged. May I ask for a clarification here? Other than that, it seems obvious to me that killing people isn't effective as turning them around. Why wouldn't they rather use violence to force them to put a backdoor into next Tor version? That isn't quite as trivial as you make it sound, and really, it's unnecessary. It is a general consensus that the united states federal government has full access to the directory authorities and majority of guard nodes and exit nodes within the united states. It is a general consensus that the Tor network provides only illusory anonymity to any user hostile to united states military supremacy. The Tor network is a historical toy created by the united states military, and is just as possessed and controlled by the united states military as it has been from day one. As far I know no Tor developer has been harassed for Tor yet. (Please tell me if I am wrong.) Jacob has been harassed like in a totalitarian state because of his connections to wikileaks. I also wonder how Jacob could stay so calm after all what happened to him, not being already a broken man. I admire the Tor developers for doing their work in such a dangerous country (US), knowing about waterbording and that stuff. Is it really so difficult to conceive of situations that involve violent raids against the datacenters hosting Tor directory servers and their mirrors, attacks, possibly physically violent, involving full military force against Jacob Appelbaum and other critical developers, staff, volunteers and advocates? If that happens, that would be the worst case. I think without Tor servers in the US and without the Tor developers, there is more Tor network, since most Tor servers are in the US. Most other Tor servers are in countries which the US can pressure as well. When the US decides to take down Tor, it's pretty much over anyway. My point exactly. You really think the governments of the industralized first world countries won't stoop that low? Maybe they don't have to. When I understood Jacob in his speeches right, he doesn't believe that Tor does defeat the NSA. Why should they break Tor if it's an open book already to them already anyway? Tor is not designed (in its current form) to even attempt to contest NSA control and manipulation. One day, they will accuse Jacob and the other core developers of being domestic terrorists or whatever as an excuse to fire upon native citizens on domestic soil. They will do it, one day. Only in case they can't easily break Tor already anyway. Tor is already broken. Services like The Hidden Wiki, Silk Road, and other high-profile hidden services are obviously honeypots and sting operations, since those hidden services would have been raided immediately abd their admins arrested without a court hearing or judicial oversight of any kind. Do no pass Go, do not collect 200 worthless united states dollars, go directly to Guantanamo Bay (or whatever the current replacement is). This is why providing relatively trivial means to deploy one's own bridge communities with many pluggable transports in order to prepare for that
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
I'm down to help with the rebuild. On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 12:39 AM, Alex M (Coyo) c...@darkdna.net wrote: On 04/12/2013 11:01 PM, adrelanos wrote: Griffin Boyce: There's really nothing keeping you from making a private bridge network. The documentation's all there. Indeed. One can even make its own (private) Tor network. It will require a considerable amount of learning, though. It would be interesting to see several competing Tor networks. May or may not happen in long term future, if Tor can attract much more users and relays. Alex probable won't be up for creating an alternative Tor network with that threat model. As soon as you host a relay or directory authority, it's difficult (impossible?) to stay anonymous, you move yourself into the target line by doing so. With the current Tor network model, this is apparent. I might fork the Tor codebase and redesign the network from the ground up, and see what I can come up with. Should be interesting. Even if Tor cannot be salvaged, working with the traditional 3rd generation onion routing paradigm should be educational and instructive. __**_ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/**cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-**talkhttps://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/12/2013 11:01 PM, adrelanos wrote: Griffin Boyce: There's really nothing keeping you from making a private bridge network. The documentation's all there. Indeed. One can even make its own (private) Tor network. It will require a considerable amount of learning, though. It would be interesting to see several competing Tor networks. May or may not happen in long term future, if Tor can attract much more users and relays. Alex probable won't be up for creating an alternative Tor network with that threat model. As soon as you host a relay or directory authority, it's difficult (impossible?) to stay anonymous, you move yourself into the target line by doing so. It fills me with indescribable patriotism, nationalist love for my country, the heartland, home of the free. My experiences with tor imply the child porn archives, the silk road and other drug exchange markets, the hackbb and other cracker/carder communities and other high-profile hidden services (eepsites) are all implicitly honeypot sting operations run by the united states military and federal agencies. My country is constantly vigilant, and protects us from all the evil drug-addled hippies, perverted child-lovers, dangerous cyberterrorists and other dissident intellectuals quietly preparing for countless acts of domestic terrorism and treason against my beloved country and her rightful representatives and public servants. I love my country, I love my federal and state governments, and I have complete faith in the competency, legitimacy, authority and moral superiority of my beloved country's representatives and public servants. I love how my country looks after us all like a doting father, performing deep packet inspection, email, sms text, phone call and skype message interception like a responsible and watchful father over his children. I love how my country obviously knows what's best for me, my family, my friends, my community, and fellow citizens and is stern but fair, disciplining us when we misbehave and rewarding us when we behave like model citizens. I love how my country promises that if I have nothing to hide, I have nothing to fear but fear itself. My country is obviously the best, hands down. :P ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
Thus spake Alex M (Coyo) (c...@darkdna.net): P.S. If you're annoyed by this flippant response, it was given because your rant is basically a long series of FAQs. There are ways to fix your concerns but they require development effort, and in fact many of them (including custom pluggable transports and private bridge distribution) are already supported. For the others: Patches welcome. I'm afraid I do not follow what you mean by FAQs since I do not see any overt interest (or developer consideration) concerning any of these features. If you have a specific list of design flaws that aren't couched in long rants, we can perhaps help instruct you on how you might solve them in your redesign with Mr Disney, or at least point you toward some tickets you two should read and follow during that process. Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling. -- Mike Perry signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote: Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling. Because obviously criticism and actual concern for the well-being of a foss project is always trolling and threats. I hope you aren't a contributor. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Bridge Communities?
On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote: If you have a specific list of design flaws that aren't couched in long rants, we can perhaps help instruct you on how you might solve them in your redesign with Mr Disney, or at least point you toward some tickets you two should read and follow during that process. Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling. Though, with that attitude of yours, I'm afraid I'm uninterested in any assistance you may deign to bestow upon Gregory Disney and I. I'm confident we can do just fine without your arrogance. Obviously, your selfless concern for your userbase knows no bounds. It concerns me that you refer to we as though you contribute anything to the tor project. I'm sure the tor coders are going to be more than happy to support the foss ideals in this case in regards to codebase forking rights. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
