Re: [tor-talk] The Aqua design

2016-06-08 Thread me

On 08.06.16 00:02, Philipp Winter wrote:

On Sun, Jun 05, 2016 at 02:34:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:

You need fulltime regulated fill traffic, within which, your traffic resides.

However, Aqua cannot protect against long-term intersection attacks and
the authors haven't really thought about incentives for joining the
network; I could see the network only being used for illegal file
sharing, making it an attractive target for blocking with low collateral
damage.
The incentive is improving anonymity, of course. It's better to fill a 
connection with *useful* traffic. Does Aqua allow to mix web browser 
traffic with file-sharing traffic?


BTW, do you know a layman's introduction to long-term intersection attack?
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Re: [tor-talk] The Aqua design (was: A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks)

2016-06-07 Thread Philipp Winter
On Sun, Jun 05, 2016 at 02:34:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> You need fulltime regulated fill traffic, within which, your traffic resides.

The Aqua design goes in that direction.  It is a traffic
analysis-resistant anonymity system for BitTorrent:


It handles traffic at the network edges differently than the core, to
achieve low-latency resistance to traffic analysis.  At the edges, it
dynamically groups clients with similar usage patterns together to
provide k-anonymity.  The network core consists of nodes that exchange
constant-rate traffic that is padded when necessary.

However, Aqua cannot protect against long-term intersection attacks and
the authors haven't really thought about incentives for joining the
network; I could see the network only being used for illegal file
sharing, making it an attractive target for blocking with low collateral
damage.
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