Our Neighbour, Kenya
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Kenya's Police Commissioner Philemon Abong'o said that police did not have intelligence information that the suicide bombers were to strike.
"Most of the intelligence information we get does not identify specific areas targeted by the terrorists," he said.
He went on: "The information only refers to 'Western interests', which is a vague reference because Western governments and individuals have so many interests. We can't have police officers guarding all those interests on 24-hour basis."
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Subject: ugnet_: Revealed: How four bomb warnings went unheeded in Kenya Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2002 13:03:30 -0800 (PST)
Daily Nation-Nairobi-Kenya
News
Tuesday, December 3, 2002
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Revealed: How four bomb
warnings went unheededBy NATION Team
Kenya's security agencies were warned four times of an impending bombing a clear eight months before last week's suicide attack near Mombasa, it can be revealed today.
They were told a terrorist mission was planned at the Coast;
that a bomb had been smuggled into the country;
the names of the terror group linked to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda movement that was responsible;
and they were even given the names and pictures of two Iraqi terrorists who planned to enter Kenya from Somalia to carry out the attack.
The warnings were sent to Police Commissioner Philemon Abong'o and also shared with the Chief of the General Staff, General Joseph Kibwana, CID head Francis Sang', National Security Intelligence Service director Brig W.A.C. Boinett, Immigration head Henry ole Ndiema, Internal Security Permanent Secretary Zakayo Cheruiyot, and Foreign Affairs PS David Andere.
The warnings were given throughout last March, investigations by the Nation show.
But in spite of all key agencies involved having eight months clear notice of the planned attack, a team of three suicide bombers was still able to strike at the Paradise Hotel at Kikambala, near Mombasa last Thursday, killing 12 innocent people as well as themselves.
And to add insult to injury, the attack came just minutes after two shoulder launched missiles were fired with apparent impunity at an Israeli charter jet taking off from Mombasa airport with 271 passengers and crew aboard.
Questions about why such a series of unambiguous warnings failed to prevent the twin terror outrage in a country already devastated by an earlier terrorist attack - on the US embassy in Nairobi, in 1998, when 212 people were killed and 5,000 injured - were being asked last night at the highest Government levels.
It is understood the warnings were given in a series of detailed reports to various Government agencies which named potential targets and recommended steps that must be taken to combat the threat.
Questions being asked last night included:
Why in spite of such clear notice of an impending attack were the bombers still able to slip through Kenya's security net?
Why was the National Security Intelligence Service unable to pinpoint likely terrorist targets?
Why has it not given the Government contingency measures to deal with terrorism after the 1998 embassy bomb attacks?
Why did the police and the military not deploy extra security to prevent an attack – the military patrol Kenya's border with Somalia and the police would have been responsible for the targeted Western and Israeli installations?
How were the terrorists able to enter Kenya when the Immigration Department had been told of the potential threat?
How were the terrorists able to smuggle their bomb or bomb manufacturing parts into Kenya?
Why were the two Iraqi terrorists - whose names, dates and places of birth and passport numbers were known and whose photographs had been provided - allowed to enter Kenya, particularly when even their route into the country was known?
Why was security not stepped up at the Coast when it was well known that the province was a target area for terror?
In short: How, given all the detailed warnings, was Kenya's security so lacking that a terrorist cell could enter the country and create mayhem and death under the nose of the very people responsible for preventing such an outrage?
Four warnings of a terrorist attack were sent to key Kenyan agencies:
The first warning: According to well placed sources interviewed by the Nation, the first warning was sent to police chief Mr Abong'o on March 11this year, and spoke of reports that Al Itihad Al Islamiya - believed to be part of Al Qaeda - had planned terrorist attacks on Western interests in Kenya. These included the US embassy, the Israeli embassy and the USAID compound.
Similar information was also sent to the Department of Defence, the Permanent secretary in charge of internal security, Mr Zakayo Cheruiyot and the CID Director, Mr Francis Sang'.
It said a bomb had already been smuggled into the country and urged that contingency measures should be put in place to prevent an attack.
These included police patrols around the target areas and warning the heads of the suggested terrorist targets.
The second warning: This was said to have been given a fortnight later and announced that six explosives experts had recently left Mogadishu in Somalia and were heading for the Kenya border. Their intention, the warning stated, was to attack American, British and German military targets, especially at the Coast.
It commented that threats against Western interests in Kenya "cannot be ruled out" and again urged that contingency measures should be put in place.
The information was shared with Gen Kibwana, Mr Cheruiyot, Mr Sang' and the Principal Immigration officer, Mr Henry ole Ndiema
The third warning: This was given to Mr Abong'o, sources said, a few days later, and named two terrorists who it said were about to leave Doble in Somalia for Garissa from March 27 and from there head to Nairobi where they planned to carry out an attack whose logistics were already in place.
They would travel to Nairobi separately, the warning said, and again suggested ways to combat the threat; this time by monitoring Somalis and foreign nationals, especially those of Arab extraction, crossing to Kenya from Somalia and those travelling from Garissa to Nairobi.
Also notified were Gen Kibwana, Mr Cheruiyot, Mr Sang' and Mr ole Ndiema.
The final warning: That was sent out the following day and enclosed the names, photographs and passport details of the two suspects, together with their descriptions and dates and places of birth.
The attacks did not materialise at once. Instead the terrorists bided their time. And last Thursday they struck with a vengeance that echoed around the world.
The warnings had not come too late. They simply had not been heeded.
Concern about security lapses was raised immediately after the attacks with Lloyds', the London-based reinsurer reportedly asking whether there had been security within a radius 10 kilometres around the Moi International Airport.
Mr Abong'o said yesterday in an interview in his office that the police act upon all intelligence reports received from the National Security Intelligence Service.
He said: "We have a close and warm relationship with our intelligence counterparts. We receive several intelligence reports from them daily."
This year alone, police acting on intelligence information had arrested dozens of foreigners for being in Kenya without valid travel documents.
At the moment, he said, there were 15 foreigners – nine of them Iraqis – in police cells awaiting deportation.
"The nine Iraqis were arrested in Garissa District after sneaking into the country from Somalia early this year. We believe they are dangerous people because they had no valid travel documents and we don't know what they were up to," he said.
Mr Abong'o, who was accompanied by his deputy, Mr Japheth Mwania, and director of operations Edwin Nyaseda, said they had taken to court and later deported many foreigners illegally in Kenya.
He said: "We don't ignore any intelligence information; either from the NSIS, our officers or members of public. Every bit of information that poses a threat to our country's security is acted upon very fast."
The police chief said information on bomb hoaxes was regarded as true until security officers searched the specified areas and buildings and fouind them to be safe.
On the Coastal terror attacks, Mr Abong'o said police did not have intelligence information that the suicide bombers were to strike.
"Most of the intelligence information we get does not identify specific areas targeted by the terrorists," he said.
He went on: "The information only refers to 'Western interests', which is a vague reference because Western governments and individuals have so many interests. We can't have police officers guarding all those interests on 24-hour basis."
Mr Abong'o said that every time they received intelligence information, it was shared with all the relevant security agents for quick action.
Sources within the CID last night denied the department had received the four warnings of an impending terrorist attack.
None of the other people said to have received the warnings was available for comment.
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"Ivinicus factus sum veritabem diceus." ( I have become an enemy for speaking the truth ) St Paul!
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Mitayo Potosi
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