Question about a spam assassin rule

2010-11-19 Thread jmargi

Does anyone have a detailed definition as to what this rule might mean?

FR_3TAG_3TAG RAW

I'm using spam assassin to check an HTML creative I'm making for a client of
mine and that rule is popping up, I've searched all over the internet and
can't find a definition.
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facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread Michael Scheidell
Thought you would be interested, a facebook phishing email (yes, it is, 
) with SPF_PASS

(reminding EVERYONE, SPF IS NOT A SPAM VS HAM INDICATOR AT ALL)
yes, I publish SPF, I used it in meta rules.

this one passed because sender used a envelope from in the ip range of 
the spf rules.


http://secnap.pastebin.com/zTmkSc6J
ps, scored a 3.5 here.  by now, hopefully, it scores higher with 
razor/dcc/spamcop, urlbl, etc.



--
Michael Scheidell, CTO
o: 561-999-5000
d: 561-948-2259
ISN: 1259*1300
*| *SECNAP Network Security Corporation

   * Certified SNORT Integrator
   * 2008-9 Hot Company Award Winner, World Executive Alliance
   * Five-Star Partner Program 2009, VARBusiness
   * Best in Email Security,2010: Network Products Guide
   * King of Spam Filters, SC Magazine 2008

__
This email has been scanned and certified safe by SpammerTrap(r). 
For Information please see http://www.secnap.com/products/spammertrap/
__  


Re: Question about a spam assassin rule

2010-11-19 Thread Bowie Bailey
rawbody  FR_3TAG_3TAG  
m'[abcefghijklmnoqstuvwxz]{3}/[abcefghijklmnoqstuvwxz]{3}'i

It looks for an html tag containing exactly three characters followed by
a closing tag which also contains exactly three characters.

-- 
Bowie

On 11/19/2010 2:51 PM, jmargi wrote:
 Does anyone have a detailed definition as to what this rule might mean?

 FR_3TAG_3TAG RAW

 I'm using spam assassin to check an HTML creative I'm making for a client of
 mine and that rule is popping up, I've searched all over the internet and
 can't find a definition.


Re: strange issue with cron.daily

2010-11-19 Thread Benny Pedersen

On tir 16 nov 2010 14:08:21 CET, Francesco Acchiappati wrote


/var/lib/spamassassin/compiled ]; then


this dir does imho not exists, its /var/lib/spamassassin/version/compiled

unless debian have fixed it

--
xpoint http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html




Re: facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread Matt Garretson
On 11/19/2010 3:13 PM, Michael Scheidell wrote:
 Thought you would be interested, a facebook phishing email (yes, it is, 
 ) with SPF_PASS
 (reminding EVERYONE, SPF IS NOT A SPAM VS HAM INDICATOR AT ALL)


Hi, SPF CAN BE YOUR FRIEND HERE:

 header LOCAL_FROM_FBM  from =~ /\...@facebookmail\.com/i
 score LOCAL_FROM_FBM 50.0
 whitelist_from_spf   *...@facebookmail.com

Of course, Facebook also uses DKIM so the third line above could just as
well be:

 whitelist_from_dkim   *...@facebookmail.com

or even:

 whitelist_auth   *...@facebookmail.com

So in this case, SPF isn't a necessity, but it certainly works. I do
similar things in various combinations for many commonly-forged domains.

YMMV...


Re: facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread Michael Scheidell

On 11/19/10 4:17 PM, Matt Garretson wrote:

whitelist_from_spf   *...@facebookmail.com

ah, not if you have dns issues.  if you have dns issues, spf and/or dkim 
will fail and legit email will not pass!

tried this years ago and, yes, it blocked legit facebook email.

reason I mention it the first time, was one of my facebook_forgery rules 
looked for spf_pass (didn' t whitelist it!) but didn't add the 5 points 
I assigned for forged facebook, twitter,etc.)



--
Michael Scheidell, CTO
o: 561-999-5000
d: 561-948-2259
ISN: 1259*1300
*| *SECNAP Network Security Corporation

   * Certified SNORT Integrator
   * 2008-9 Hot Company Award Winner, World Executive Alliance
   * Five-Star Partner Program 2009, VARBusiness
   * Best in Email Security,2010: Network Products Guide
   * King of Spam Filters, SC Magazine 2008

__
This email has been scanned and certified safe by SpammerTrap(r). 
For Information please see http://www.secnap.com/products/spammertrap/
__  


Re: facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread Lawrence @ Rogers

On 19/11/2010 4:43 PM, Michael Scheidell wrote:
Thought you would be interested, a facebook phishing email (yes, it 
is, ) with SPF_PASS

(reminding EVERYONE, SPF IS NOT A SPAM VS HAM INDICATOR AT ALL)
yes, I publish SPF, I used it in meta rules.

this one passed because sender used a envelope from in the ip range of 
the spf rules.


http://secnap.pastebin.com/zTmkSc6J
ps, scored a 3.5 here.  by now, hopefully, it scores higher with 
razor/dcc/spamcop, urlbl, etc.



I'm not sure how SPF could pass on this one. The sending server doesn't 
have the same domain name, nor is using an IP authorized in Facebook's 
SPF records. SPF is supposed to confirm that the sending server is 
authorized to do so for the domain, but that clearly fails here.


Re: facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread Matt Garretson
On 11/19/2010 4:22 PM, Michael Scheidell wrote:
 On 11/19/10 4:17 PM, Matt Garretson wrote:
 whitelist_from_spf   *...@facebookmail.com
 ah, not if you have dns issues.  if you have dns issues, spf and/or dkim 
 will fail and legit email will not pass!

True, perhaps, but a *lot* of things will stop working if you have DNS
issues.  :)

 reason I mention it the first time, was one of my facebook_forgery rules 
 looked for spf_pass (didn' t whitelist it!) but didn't add the 5 points 

Yes, you're right; SPF_PASS on its own isn't much of a help.


Re: facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread RW
On Fri, 19 Nov 2010 18:00:09 -0330
Lawrence @ Rogers lawrencewilli...@nl.rogers.com wrote:

 n name, nor is using an IP authorized in Facebook's 
 SPF records. SPF is supposed to confirm that the sending server is 
 authorized to do so for the domain, but that clearly fails here.

The domain used for the SPF check is probably primer.hu based on
envelope-from prime...@primer.hu.


Re: strange issue with cron.daily

2010-11-19 Thread Francesco Acchiappati

Il 16/11/2010 15:11, John Hardin ha scritto:

On Tue, 16 Nov 2010, Francesco Acchiappati wrote:


  run-parts: /etc/cron.daily/spamassassin exited with return code 25


here it is


The only things that appear to be exposed and able to return a nonzero 
return code (apart from the simple stuff like sleep and chmod) are:



test -f /etc/default/spamassassin  . /etc/default/spamassassin


and


   sa-compile  /dev/null 21


I'd suggest the most likely problem is sa-compile is failing for some 
reason. Try running it interactively.


You could run this:

  bash -x /etc/cron.daily/spamassassin 21 | tee /tmp/log.txt

to watch the commands as they execute and see which fails.


As you suggested here is the output

# bash -x /etc/cron.daily/spamassassin 21 | tee /tmp/log.txt
+ set -e
+ CRON=0
+ test -f /etc/default/spamassassin
+ . /etc/default/spamassassin
++ ENABLED=1
++ OPTIONS='-q -x -u tomcat4'
++ PIDFILE=/var/run/spamd.pid
++ NICE='--nicelevel 15'
++ CRON=1
+ test -x /usr/bin/sa-update
+ test -x /etc/init.d/spamassassin
+ '[' 1 = 0 ']'
+ RANGE=3600
++ od -vAn -N2 -tu4
+ number='  62039'
++ expr 62039 % 3600
+ number=839
+ sleep 839
+ umask 022
+ sa-update
+ exit 0



Re: facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread Michael Scheidell

On 11/19/10 4:30 PM, Lawrence @ Rogers wrote:

\
I'm not sure how SPF could pass on this one. The sending server 
doesn't have the same domain name, nor is using an IP authorized in 
Facebook's SPF records. SPF is supposed to confirm that the sending 
server is authorized to do so for the domain, but that clearly fails 
here.

SPF is on ENVELOPE address, not header address.
Microsoft's patented 'sender id' (which they don't use) can use either.


--
Michael Scheidell, CTO
o: 561-999-5000
d: 561-948-2259
ISN: 1259*1300
*| *SECNAP Network Security Corporation

   * Certified SNORT Integrator
   * 2008-9 Hot Company Award Winner, World Executive Alliance
   * Five-Star Partner Program 2009, VARBusiness
   * Best in Email Security,2010: Network Products Guide
   * King of Spam Filters, SC Magazine 2008

__
This email has been scanned and certified safe by SpammerTrap(r). 
For Information please see http://www.secnap.com/products/spammertrap/
__  


Re: facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread Michael Scheidell

On 11/19/10 4:30 PM, Matt Garretson wrote:

ah, not if you have dns issues.  if you have dns issues, spf and/or dkim
  will fail and legit email will not pass!

True, perhaps, but a*lot*  of things will stop working if you have DNS
issues.:)

with SPF, it could be the senders dns servers, or if they use includes, 
the dns servers for that side, so, its dangerous to add +50 points, say, 
and then use spf/dkim or auth to whitelist.


lots of complicated rules, mostly that I find I have to manually add, 
then run against local corpus to make sure it doesn't break something.
clients complain of course, if you miss one spam, and complain, of 
course if you block one legit email.



--
Michael Scheidell, CTO
o: 561-999-5000
d: 561-948-2259
ISN: 1259*1300
*| *SECNAP Network Security Corporation

   * Certified SNORT Integrator
   * 2008-9 Hot Company Award Winner, World Executive Alliance
   * Five-Star Partner Program 2009, VARBusiness
   * Best in Email Security,2010: Network Products Guide
   * King of Spam Filters, SC Magazine 2008

__
This email has been scanned and certified safe by SpammerTrap(r). 
For Information please see http://www.secnap.com/products/spammertrap/
__  


Re: facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread Matt Garretson
On 11/19/2010 5:03 PM, Michael Scheidell wrote:
 with SPF, it could be the senders dns servers, or if they use includes, 
 the dns servers for that side, so, its dangerous to add +50 points, say, 
 and then use spf/dkim or auth to whitelist.


You do have a valid point, but I'm not too worried about it 
myself, since I use this method only for big domains which 
are unlikely (IMO) to frequently have the type of DNS failures 
you speak of.

Hmm, I wonder if you could protect against DNS failures with 
something like:

 meta __LOCAL_GOT_SPF 
(SPF_PASS||SPF_NEUTRAL||SPF_FAIL||SPF_SOFTFAIL||SPF_HELO_PASS||SPF_HELO_NEUTRAL||SPF_HELO_FAIL||SPF_HELO_SOFTFAIL)
 header __LOCAL_FROM_FBM1  from =~ /\...@facebookmail\.com/i
 meta LOCAL_FROM_FBM  ( __LOCAL_FROM_FBM1  __LOCAL_GOT_SPF )
 score LOCAL_FROM_FBM 50.0
 whitelist_from_spf   *...@facebookmail.com

My idea is that, in the case of DNS failures or timeouts while 
looking up SPF, __LOCAL_GOT_SPF would be false (I think), thus
preventing the 50.0 penalty.  And in the normal case where DNS
is okay, the penalty and whitelisting would function as before.

Would that work, or is it crazy?


 clients complain of course, if you miss one spam, and complain, of 
 course if you block one legit email.

Yes, that's what makes our jobs so interesting.  :)




Re: resolved, but why? Re: SA 3.3.1 performance issues?

2010-11-19 Thread Michael Scheidell
happened again.  1 out of 100, EXACTLY THE SAME SYSTEMS, DOWN TO MD5 
CHECKSUMS ON BINARIES, need to remove INET6 perl module.




On 11/5/10 4:44 PM, Michael Scheidell wrote:

On 11/5/10 4:08 PM, Michael Scheidell wrote:

On 11/5/10 4:00 PM, Mark Martinec wrote:


It certainly looks like a DNS resolver problem. What is your 
/etc/resolv.conf?

The Net::DNS only uses the first nameserver from that file.

To turn on debugging in Net::DNS (assuming bourne-like shell):

  $ RES_OPTIONS=debug  spamassassin -D -ttest.msg

deinstalled p5-IO-Socket-INET6 and everything is fine.
(might I note that amavisd-new wanted that file, and also note, that 
it works FINE on amd64?)






--
Michael Scheidell, CTO
o: 561-999-5000
d: 561-948-2259
ISN: 1259*1300
*| *SECNAP Network Security Corporation

   * Certified SNORT Integrator
   * 2008-9 Hot Company Award Winner, World Executive Alliance
   * Five-Star Partner Program 2009, VARBusiness
   * Best in Email Security,2010: Network Products Guide
   * King of Spam Filters, SC Magazine 2008

__
This email has been scanned and certified safe by SpammerTrap(r). 
For Information please see http://www.secnap.com/products/spammertrap/
__  


Re: Question about a spam assassin rule

2010-11-19 Thread Daniel McDonald
On 11/19/10 2:51 PM, Bowie Bailey bowie_bai...@buc.com wrote:

 rawbody  FR_3TAG_3TAG
 m'[abcefghijklmnoqstuvwxz]{3}/[abcefghijklmnoqstuvwxz]{3}'i
 
 It looks for an html tag containing exactly three characters followed by
 a closing tag which also contains exactly three characters.

But no instances of d,p,r or y.  I'm sure that's a really clever trick for
something, I just don't have a clue as to what it might be


-- 
Daniel J McDonald, CCIE # 2495, CISSP # 78281



Re: facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread Benny Pedersen

On fre 19 nov 2010 21:13:26 CET, Michael Scheidell wrote

http://secnap.pastebin.com/zTmkSc6J


url is just a joe job from the spammers facebook login, report to  
facebook and problem is gone


--
xpoint http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html




Re: facebook phishing, SPF_PASS

2010-11-19 Thread Benny Pedersen

On fre 19 nov 2010 23:33:51 CET, Matt Garretson wrote

Would that work, or is it crazy?


the later, facebook is dkim signed

whitelist_auth *...@facebookapp.com
whitelist_auth *...@facebookmail.com
whitelist_auth *...@facebook.com

if From: says facebook then its forged if not dkim signed or spf pass

dont blame facebook for a url in body and facebook in from: header :=)

--
xpoint http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html




Re: Question about a spam assassin rule

2010-11-19 Thread David B Funk
On Fri, 19 Nov 2010, Daniel McDonald wrote:

 On 11/19/10 2:51 PM, Bowie Bailey bowie_bai...@buc.com wrote:

  rawbody  FR_3TAG_3TAG
  m'[abcefghijklmnoqstuvwxz]{3}/[abcefghijklmnoqstuvwxz]{3}'i
 
  It looks for an html tag containing exactly three characters followed by
  a closing tag which also contains exactly three characters.

 But no instances of d,p,r or y.  I'm sure that's a really clever trick for
 something, I just don't have a clue as to what it might be

It was an attempt to find obfsucated HTML junk that spamers were
using to break up spammy words such as male medications

EG: viasqz/sqzgra

The idea was that most all legit 3 character HTML tags such as 'div'
contained at least one of those letters ([dpry]) in them. So a purported
tag that had none of them was not legit and thus probably bogus spammer
spoor.
With the evolution of HTML (xml, etc) that's no longer a safe
asumption, so that rule probably FPs.


-- 
Dave Funk  University of Iowa
dbfunk (at) engineering.uiowa.eduCollege of Engineering
319/335-5751   FAX: 319/384-0549   1256 Seamans Center
Sys_admin/Postmaster/cell_adminIowa City, IA 52242-1527
#include std_disclaimer.h
Better is not better, 'standard' is better. B{