Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2006 15:39:31 -0400 (EDT)
From: Frances L VanScoy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [vel] Princeton Hacks Diebold (fwd)
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2006 15:38:30 -0400
From: Hedda Haning
Subject: Princeton Hacks Diebold
Another article on how hackable diebold (and probably all others) are. Hedda
Also see below:
Princeton Prof Hacks E-Vote Machine .
Princeton Scientists Create Vote-Stealing Program for Diebold
AccuVote-TS
t r u t h o u t | Press Release
Thursday 14 September 2006
Researchers reveal "extremely serious" vulnerabilities in e-voting
machines.
In a paper published on the Web today, a group of Princeton computer
scientists said they created demonstration vote-stealing software that can be
installed within a minute on a common electronic voting machine. The software
can fraudulently change vote counts without being detected.
"We have created and analyzed the code in the spirit of helping to
guide public officials so that they can make wise decisions about how to secure
elections," said Edward Felten, the director of the Center for Information
Technology Policy, a new center at Princeton University that addresses crucial
issues at the intersection of society and computer technology.
The paper appears on the Web site for the Center for Information
Technology Policy.
The researchers obtained the machine, a Diebold AccuVote-TS, from a
private party in May. They spent the summer analyzing the machine and
developing the vote-stealing demonstration.
"We found that the machine is vulnerable to a number of extremely
serious attacks that undermine the accuracy and credibility of the vote counts
it produces," wrote Felten and his co-authors, graduate students Ariel Feldman
and Alex Halderman.
In a 10-minute video on their Web site, the researchers demonstrate
how the vote-stealing software works. The video shows the software sabotaging a
mock presidential election between George Washington and Benedict Arnold.
Arnold is reported as the winner even though Washington gets more votes. (The
video is edited from a longer continuously shot video; the long single-shot
version will be available for downloading from the center's site as well.)
The researchers also demonstrate how the machines "are susceptible to
computer viruses that can spread themselves automatically and invisibly from
machine to machine during normal pre- and post-election activity."
Felten said that policy-makers should be concerned about malicious
software infecting the Diebold AccuVote-TS and machines like it, from Diebold
and other companies. "We studied these machines because they were available to
us," the researchers wrote in their Web posting. "If we had gotten access to
another kind of machine, we probably would have studied it instead."
Felten said, "There is reason for concern about other machines as
well, even though our paper doesn't directly evaluate them. Jurisdictions using
these machines should think seriously about finding a backup system in time for
the November elections."
Felten, a professor of computer science and public affairs who is
known for his groundbreaking work in computer security, said that some of the
problems discussed in the paper cannot be fixed without completely redesigning
the machine.
Other problems can be fixed by addressing software or electronic
procedures. "But time is short before the next election," he said.
According to the researchers' paper, the Diebold machine they
examined and another newer version are scheduled to be used in 357 U.S.
counties representing nearly 10 percent of all registered voters. About half
those counties, including all Maryland and Georgia, will use the exact machine
examined by Felten's group.
Felten said that, out of security concerns, the Diebold machine
infected with the vote-stealing software has been kept under lock and key in a
secret location.
"Unfortunately election fraud has a rich history from ballot stuffing
to dead people voting," he said. "We want to make sure this doesn't fall into
the wrong hands. We also want to make sure that policy-makers stay a step ahead
of those who might create similar software with ill intent."
Princeton's Center for Information Technology Policy includes members
from diverse departments, including computer science, economics, electrical
engineering, operations research and financial engineering, sociology and the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.
More information can be found on the Princeton Engineering News Web
site.
News from PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Office of Communications
Chambers St.
Princeton, New Jersey 08542
Telephone (609) 258-3601; Fax (609) 258-1301
From the full paper:
Main Findings
The main findings of our study are:
1. Malicious software running on a single voting machine can steal
votes with little if any risk of detection. The malicious software can modify
all of the records, audit logs, and counters kept by the voting machine, so
that even careful forensic examination of these records will find nothing
amiss. We have constructed demonstration software that carries out this
vote-stealing attack.
2. Anyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory
card that will later be inserted into a machine, can install said malicious
software using a simple method that takes as little as one minute. In practice,
poll workers and others often have unsupervised access to the machines.
3. AccuVote-TS machines are susceptible to voting-machine
viruses-computer viruses that can spread malicious software automatically and
invisibly from machine to machine during normal pre- and postelection activity.
We have constructed a demonstration virus that spreads in this way, installing
our demonstration vote-stealing program on every machine it infects.
4. While some of these problems can be eliminated by improving
Diebold's software, others cannot be remedied without replacing the machines'
hardware. Changes to election procedures would also be required to ensure
security.
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Go to Original
Princeton Prof Hacks E-Vote Machine
By Chris Newmarker
The Associated Press
Wednesday 13 September 2006
A Princeton University computer science professor added new fuel
Wednesday to claims that electronic voting machines used across much of the
country are vulnerable to hacking that could alter vote totals or disable
machines.
In a paper posted on the university's Web site, Edward Felten and two
graduate students described how they had tested a Diebold AccuVote-TS machine
they obtained, found ways to quickly upload malicious programs and even
developed a computer virus able to spread such programs between machines.
The marketing director for the machine's maker - Diebold Inc.'s
Diebold Election Systems of Allen, Texas - blasted the report, saying Felten
ignored newer software and security measures that prevent such hacking.
"I'm concerned by the fact we weren't contacted to educate these
people on where our current technology stands," Mark Radke said.
Radke also question why Felten hadn't submitted his paper for peer
review, as is commonly done before publishing scientific research.
Felten said he and his colleagues felt it necessary to publish the
paper as quickly as possible because of the possible implications for the
November midterm elections.
About 80 percent of American voters are expected to use some form of
electronic voting in the upcoming election, in which the makeup of the U.S.
House will be decided, as well as 33 Senate seats and 36 governorships.
The AccuVote-TS is commonly used across the country, along with a
newer model, the AccuVote-TSx. While Felten wasn't able to test the new
machine, he said he thought much of what he found would still apply.
The machine Felten tested, obtained in May from an undisclosed
source, was the same type used across Maryland in its primary election Tuesday,
according to Ross Goldstein, a deputy administrator with the state's Board of
Elections. Goldstein said he couldn't comment on the report until he read it.
Diebold and other machine manufacturers, including California-based
Sequoia Voting Systems Inc. and Nebraska-based Election Systems & Software
Inc., have been the subject of lawsuits, claiming the machines are vulnerable
to hacking and breakdowns that can assign votes to the wrong candidate.
Election officials in some states have also complained.
Previous studies have claimed hacking vulnerabilities with the
machines. But Felten claims his study is the first time that an independent
research group has obtained an actual machine and tested it extensively.
Felten and graduate students Ariel Feldman and Alex Halderman found
that malicious programs could be placed on the Diebold by accessing the memory
card slot and power button, both behind a locked door on the side of the
machine. One member of the group was able to pick the lock in 10 seconds, and
software could be installed in less than a minute, according to the report.
The researchers say they designed software capable of modifying all
records, audit logs and counters kept by the voting machine, ensuring that a
careful forensic examination would find nothing wrong.
The programs were able to modify vote totals or cause machines to
break down, something that could alter the course of an election if machines
were located in crucial polling stations.
It was also possible to design a computer virus to spread malicious
programs to multiple machines by piggybacking on a new software download or an
election information file being transferred from machine to machine, Felten
said.
"I think there are many people out there who have the type of
technical ability to carry out the sort of attacks we describe here," he said.
Felten said hacking dangers could be mitigated with better software,
more restrictions on access to machines and memory cards, and paper receipts
verified by the voter.
Radke said Diebold already has implemented many of those things.
