Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/5] x86/msr: Carry on after a non-"safe" MSR access fails without !panic_on_oops

2016-03-12 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Sat, Mar 12, 2016 at 7:36 AM, Ingo Molnar  wrote:
>
> * Andy Lutomirski  wrote:
>
>> This demotes an OOPS and likely panic due to a failed non-"safe" MSR
>> access to a WARN and, for RDMSR, a return value of zero.  If
>> panic_on_oops is set, then failed unsafe MSR accesses will still
>> oops and panic.
>>
>> To be clear, this type of failure should *not* happen.  This patch
>> exists to minimize the chance of nasty undebuggable failures due on
>> systems that used to work due to a now-fixed CONFIG_PARAVIRT=y bug.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 10 --
>>  arch/x86/mm/extable.c  | 33 +
>>  2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
>> index 93fb7c1cffda..1487054a1a70 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
>> @@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ static inline unsigned long long native_read_msr(unsigned 
>> int msr)
>>  {
>>   DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
>>
>> - asm volatile("rdmsr" : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
>> + asm volatile("1: rdmsr\n"
>> +  "2:\n"
>> +  _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe)
>> +  : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
>>   if (msr_tracepoint_active(__tracepoint_read_msr))
>>   do_trace_read_msr(msr, EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high), 0);
>>   return EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high);
>> @@ -119,7 +122,10 @@ static inline unsigned long long 
>> native_read_msr_safe(unsigned int msr,
>>  static inline void native_write_msr(unsigned int msr,
>>   unsigned low, unsigned high)
>>  {
>> - asm volatile("wrmsr" : : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
>> + asm volatile("1: wrmsr\n"
>> +  "2:\n"
>> +  _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe)
>> +  : : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
>>   if (msr_tracepoint_active(__tracepoint_read_msr))
>>   do_trace_write_msr(msr, ((u64)high << 32 | low), 0);
>>  }
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
>> index 9dd7e4b7fcde..f310714e6e6d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
>> @@ -49,6 +49,39 @@ bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry 
>> *fixup,
>>  }
>>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_ext);
>>
>> +bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
>> +  struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
>> +{
>> + WARN(1, "unsafe MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x",
>> +  (unsigned int)regs->cx);
>
> Btw., instead of the safe/unsafe naming (which has an emotional and security
> secondary attribute), shouldn't we move this over to a _check() (or 
> _checking())
> naming instead that we do in other places in the kernel?
>
> I.e.:
>
> rdmsr(msr, l, h);
>
> and:
>
> if (rdmsr_check(msr, l, h)) {
> ...
> }
>
> and then we could name the helpers as _check() and _nocheck() - which is 
> neutral
> naming.

Will do as a separate followup series.

At least with this series applied, the functions named _safe all point
to each other correctly.

--Andy

___
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel


Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/5] x86/msr: Carry on after a non-"safe" MSR access fails without !panic_on_oops

2016-03-12 Thread Ingo Molnar

* Andy Lutomirski  wrote:

> This demotes an OOPS and likely panic due to a failed non-"safe" MSR
> access to a WARN and, for RDMSR, a return value of zero.  If
> panic_on_oops is set, then failed unsafe MSR accesses will still
> oops and panic.
> 
> To be clear, this type of failure should *not* happen.  This patch
> exists to minimize the chance of nasty undebuggable failures due on
> systems that used to work due to a now-fixed CONFIG_PARAVIRT=y bug.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 10 --
>  arch/x86/mm/extable.c  | 33 +
>  2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> index 93fb7c1cffda..1487054a1a70 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> @@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ static inline unsigned long long native_read_msr(unsigned 
> int msr)
>  {
>   DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
>  
> - asm volatile("rdmsr" : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
> + asm volatile("1: rdmsr\n"
> +  "2:\n"
> +  _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe)
> +  : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
>   if (msr_tracepoint_active(__tracepoint_read_msr))
>   do_trace_read_msr(msr, EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high), 0);
>   return EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high);
> @@ -119,7 +122,10 @@ static inline unsigned long long 
> native_read_msr_safe(unsigned int msr,
>  static inline void native_write_msr(unsigned int msr,
>   unsigned low, unsigned high)
>  {
> - asm volatile("wrmsr" : : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
> + asm volatile("1: wrmsr\n"
> +  "2:\n"
> +  _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe)
> +  : : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
>   if (msr_tracepoint_active(__tracepoint_read_msr))
>   do_trace_write_msr(msr, ((u64)high << 32 | low), 0);
>  }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
> index 9dd7e4b7fcde..f310714e6e6d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
> @@ -49,6 +49,39 @@ bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry 
> *fixup,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_ext);
>  
> +bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
> +  struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
> +{
> + WARN(1, "unsafe MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x",
> +  (unsigned int)regs->cx);

Btw., instead of the safe/unsafe naming (which has an emotional and security 
secondary attribute), shouldn't we move this over to a _check() (or 
_checking()) 
naming instead that we do in other places in the kernel?

I.e.:

rdmsr(msr, l, h);

and:

if (rdmsr_check(msr, l, h)) {
...
}

and then we could name the helpers as _check() and _nocheck() - which is 
neutral 
naming.

Thanks,

Ingo

___
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel


Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/5] x86/msr: Carry on after a non-"safe" MSR access fails without !panic_on_oops

2016-03-12 Thread Ingo Molnar

* Andy Lutomirski  wrote:

> +bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
> +  struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
> +{
> + WARN(1, "unsafe MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x",
> +  (unsigned int)regs->cx);

Please make this WARN_ONCE(). There's no point in locking up the system with 
WARN() spam, should this trigger frequently.

> + WARN(1, "unsafe MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 
> 0x%08x%08x)\n",
> +  (unsigned int)regs->cx,
> +  (unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->ax);

Ditto.

Thanks,

Ingo

___
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel


[Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/5] x86/msr: Carry on after a non-"safe" MSR access fails without !panic_on_oops

2016-03-11 Thread Andy Lutomirski
This demotes an OOPS and likely panic due to a failed non-"safe" MSR
access to a WARN and, for RDMSR, a return value of zero.  If
panic_on_oops is set, then failed unsafe MSR accesses will still
oops and panic.

To be clear, this type of failure should *not* happen.  This patch
exists to minimize the chance of nasty undebuggable failures due on
systems that used to work due to a now-fixed CONFIG_PARAVIRT=y bug.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 10 --
 arch/x86/mm/extable.c  | 33 +
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
index 93fb7c1cffda..1487054a1a70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ static inline unsigned long long native_read_msr(unsigned 
int msr)
 {
DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
 
-   asm volatile("rdmsr" : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
+   asm volatile("1: rdmsr\n"
+"2:\n"
+_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe)
+: EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
if (msr_tracepoint_active(__tracepoint_read_msr))
do_trace_read_msr(msr, EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high), 0);
return EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high);
@@ -119,7 +122,10 @@ static inline unsigned long long 
native_read_msr_safe(unsigned int msr,
 static inline void native_write_msr(unsigned int msr,
unsigned low, unsigned high)
 {
-   asm volatile("wrmsr" : : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
+   asm volatile("1: wrmsr\n"
+"2:\n"
+_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe)
+: : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
if (msr_tracepoint_active(__tracepoint_read_msr))
do_trace_write_msr(msr, ((u64)high << 32 | low), 0);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
index 9dd7e4b7fcde..f310714e6e6d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -49,6 +49,39 @@ bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry 
*fixup,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_ext);
 
+bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+{
+   WARN(1, "unsafe MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x",
+(unsigned int)regs->cx);
+
+   /* If panic_on_oops is set, don't try to recover. */
+   if (panic_on_oops)
+   return false;
+
+   regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
+   regs->ax = 0;
+   regs->dx = 0;
+   return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe);
+
+bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+{
+   WARN(1, "unsafe MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 
0x%08x%08x)\n",
+(unsigned int)regs->cx,
+(unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->ax);
+
+   /* If panic_on_oops is set, don't try to recover. */
+   if (panic_on_oops)
+   return false;
+
+   regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
+   return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe);
+
 bool ex_has_fault_handler(unsigned long ip)
 {
const struct exception_table_entry *e;
-- 
2.5.0


___
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel