Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 2/3] x86/vvmx: correctly emulate VMWRITE

2017-02-13 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: Sergey Dyasli [mailto:sergey.dya...@citrix.com]
> Sent: Monday, February 13, 2017 10:21 PM
> 
> There is an issue with the original __vmwrite() in nested vmx mode:
> emulation of a guest's VMWRITE with invalid arguments leads to BUG().
> 
> Fix this by using vmwrite_safe() and reporting any kind of VMfail back
> to the guest.
> 
> A new safe versions of set_vvmcs() macro and related functions are
> introduced because of new function signatures and lots of existing
> users.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli 


Acked-by: Kevin Tian 

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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 2/3] x86/vvmx: correctly emulate VMWRITE

2017-02-13 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> On 13.02.17 at 15:21,  wrote:
> There is an issue with the original __vmwrite() in nested vmx mode:
> emulation of a guest's VMWRITE with invalid arguments leads to BUG().
> 
> Fix this by using vmwrite_safe() and reporting any kind of VMfail back
> to the guest.
> 
> A new safe versions of set_vvmcs() macro and related functions are
> introduced because of new function signatures and lots of existing
> users.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli 

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich 



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[Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 2/3] x86/vvmx: correctly emulate VMWRITE

2017-02-13 Thread Sergey Dyasli
There is an issue with the original __vmwrite() in nested vmx mode:
emulation of a guest's VMWRITE with invalid arguments leads to BUG().

Fix this by using vmwrite_safe() and reporting any kind of VMfail back
to the guest.

A new safe versions of set_vvmcs() macro and related functions are
introduced because of new function signatures and lots of existing
users.

Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli 
---
v3 --> v4:
* VMX_INSN_SUCCEED is used instead of 0
* added TODO comment into set_vvmcs_virtual_safe() based on Andrew's email

 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c| 12 
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c| 27 ++-
 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h |  2 ++
 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h |  8 
 4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
index 0b77dbc..c4ba45e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -950,6 +950,18 @@ void virtual_vmcs_vmwrite(const struct vcpu *v, u32 
vmcs_encoding, u64 val)
 virtual_vmcs_exit(v);
 }
 
+enum vmx_insn_errno virtual_vmcs_vmwrite_safe(const struct vcpu *v,
+  u32 vmcs_encoding, u64 val)
+{
+enum vmx_insn_errno ret;
+
+virtual_vmcs_enter(v);
+ret = vmwrite_safe(vmcs_encoding, val);
+virtual_vmcs_exit(v);
+
+return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * This function is only called in a vCPU's initialization phase,
  * so we can update the posted-interrupt descriptor in non-atomic way.
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
index 7172621..c5d7262 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
@@ -305,6 +305,25 @@ void set_vvmcs_real(const struct vcpu *v, u32 encoding, 
u64 val)
 virtual_vmcs_vmwrite(v, encoding, val);
 }
 
+enum vmx_insn_errno set_vvmcs_virtual_safe(void *vvmcs, u32 encoding, u64 val)
+{
+set_vvmcs_virtual(vvmcs, encoding, val);
+
+/*
+ * TODO: This should not always succeed. Fields and values need to be
+ * audited against the features offered to the guest in the VT-x MSRs.
+ * This should be fixed when the MSR levelling work is started, at which
+ * point there will be a cpuid_policy-like object.
+ */
+return VMX_INSN_SUCCEED;
+}
+
+enum vmx_insn_errno set_vvmcs_real_safe(const struct vcpu *v, u32 encoding,
+u64 val)
+{
+return virtual_vmcs_vmwrite_safe(v, encoding, val);
+}
+
 static unsigned long reg_read(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
   enum vmx_regs_enc index)
 {
@@ -1740,13 +1759,19 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 unsigned long operand; 
 u64 vmcs_encoding;
 bool_t okay = 1;
+enum vmx_insn_errno err;
 
 if ( decode_vmx_inst(regs, &decode, &operand, 0)
  != X86EMUL_OKAY )
 return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
 
 vmcs_encoding = reg_read(regs, decode.reg2);
-set_vvmcs(v, vmcs_encoding, operand);
+err = set_vvmcs_safe(v, vmcs_encoding, operand);
+if ( err != VMX_INSN_SUCCEED )
+{
+vmfail(regs, err);
+return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+}
 
 switch ( vmcs_encoding & ~VMCS_HIGH(0) )
 {
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h 
b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
index 005e7e1..1212609 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -539,6 +539,8 @@ void virtual_vmcs_enter(const struct vcpu *);
 void virtual_vmcs_exit(const struct vcpu *);
 u64 virtual_vmcs_vmread(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding);
 void virtual_vmcs_vmwrite(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding, u64 val);
+enum vmx_insn_errno virtual_vmcs_vmwrite_safe(const struct vcpu *v,
+  u32 vmcs_encoding, u64 val);
 
 static inline int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr)
 {
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h 
b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
index 242e524..e49a000 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
@@ -183,6 +183,9 @@ u64 get_vvmcs_virtual(void *vvmcs, u32 encoding);
 u64 get_vvmcs_real(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding);
 void set_vvmcs_virtual(void *vvmcs, u32 encoding, u64 val);
 void set_vvmcs_real(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding, u64 val);
+enum vmx_insn_errno set_vvmcs_virtual_safe(void *vvmcs, u32 encoding, u64 val);
+enum vmx_insn_errno set_vvmcs_real_safe(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding,
+u64 val);
 
 #define get_vvmcs(vcpu, encoding) \
   (cpu_has_vmx_vmcs_shadowing ? \
@@ -194,6 +197,11 @@ void set_vvmcs_real(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding, u64 
val);
set_vvmcs_real(vcpu, encoding, val) : \
set_vvmcs_virtual(vcpu_nestedhvm(vcpu).nv_vvmcx, encoding, val))
 
+#define set_vvmcs_safe(vcpu, encoding, val) \
+  (cpu_has_vmx_vmcs_shadowing ? \
+   set_vvmcs_real_safe(vcpu, encoding, val) : \
+   set_vvmcs_virtual_safe(vcpu_nestedhvm(vcpu).nv_vv