Re: [Zope3-Users] Security alert: use of Through-the-Web reStructuredText
On Jul 8, 2006, at 11:49 AM, David Pratt wrote: Jim Fulton wrote: Recently, a serious security flaw was found in Zope 2 due to it's improper support for allowing reStructuredText to be edited through-the-web. reStructuredText has directives that allow inclusion of any file a Zope process could read and inclusion of data obtained from fetching arbitrary URLs. In a trusted environment, these directives have legitimate uses. The feature of including files and URL results should not be enabled for text entered from untrusted sources, which applies to most through-the- web interactions. Hi Jim. In the case of a wiki, it is the nature of a wiki that folks are able to edit through the web. But a wiki can be edited in other formats that restructured text. (Personally, I think wikis should use tools like Epoz or Kupu to allow direct HTML editing, but that's a different matter. Wouldn't data validation and any necessary alterations to the directives some sense as opposed to removing it from the zope3 mix? Sure, if someone is willing to do it and take responsibility. Note that I'm not removing these from the release, because they've never been in the release. I didn't even remove them from the repository, I just removed them from the Zope 3 tree. I'm convinced that TTW reST can be safe with suitable attention to detail. So far though, that hasn't happened. No one has come forward yet and said "I'll maintain this and be responsible for making sure we're secure wrt reST". The recent hotfix: http://www.zope.org/Products/Zope/Hotfix-2006-07-05/ Hotfix-2006-07-05 addresses the problem for Zope 2. Perhaps. We don't know for sure. We don't have tests. We don't know if it can be defeated using a reload product. It is also a very crude fix. It prevents people from creating add-ons that make legitimate use of file-inclusion or the raw directive. It was a great fix in an emergency -- and this was a serious emergency, but I don't want to use such a fix in Zope 3. It is safe to allow reStructuredText through the web with care. The inclusion of files or URL results can be disabled, but the programmer must explicitly disable the feature. It is not disabled by default. It is also critical that a developer who exposes through-the-web reStructuredText have tests to verify that the file/url inclusion feature has been disabled. Zope 3 itself, as released, doesn't have this problem because it doesn't allow reST entry through the web. There are third-party applications, however, including 2 packages in the Zope 3 subversion tree that do have this problem. I strongly urge you to avoid using any Zope package that allows through-the-web input of reStructuredText unless you can verify that file/url has been properly disabled. The zwiki and bugtracker packages do not currently disable file/ url inclusion and should not be used in situations in which users who are not highly trusted have access to these applications. Can you be explicit about the process of disabling file/url inclusion for zope3 (if this is the critical point you are making ). The use of restructured text is valuable in zope and obviously it is important to understand security measures that would allow its continued use. The reStructuredText documentation gives instructions for disabling it. But something this risk needs people to be responsible. I'm not seeing that. I expect someone to come forward eventually. Part of being responsible is writing reasonably extensive tests. If this can be done, why remove the products from the repository tree? Would it not be better to apply the necessary fixes? Many thanks. Because their presence in the Zope 3 tree put people at serious risk. If someone wants to work on them, great, and they can release them as add-on packages. Jim -- Jim Fulton mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Python Powered! CTO (540) 361-1714 http://www.python.org Zope Corporationhttp://www.zope.com http://www.zope.org ___ Zope3-users mailing list Zope3-users@zope.org http://mail.zope.org/mailman/listinfo/zope3-users
Re: [Zope3-Users] Security alert: use of Through-the-Web reStructuredText
Jim Fulton wrote: Recently, a serious security flaw was found in Zope 2 due to it's improper support for allowing reStructuredText to be edited through-the-web. reStructuredText has directives that allow inclusion of any file a Zope process could read and inclusion of data obtained from fetching arbitrary URLs. In a trusted environment, these directives have legitimate uses. The feature of including files and URL results should not be enabled for text entered from untrusted sources, which applies to most through-the-web interactions. Hi Jim. In the case of a wiki, it is the nature of a wiki that folks are able to edit through the web. Wouldn't data validation and any necessary alterations to the directives some sense as opposed to removing it from the zope3 mix? The recent hotfix: http://www.zope.org/Products/Zope/Hotfix-2006-07-05/Hotfix-2006-07-05 addresses the problem for Zope 2. It is safe to allow reStructuredText through the web with care. The inclusion of files or URL results can be disabled, but the programmer must explicitly disable the feature. It is not disabled by default. It is also critical that a developer who exposes through-the-web reStructuredText have tests to verify that the file/url inclusion feature has been disabled. Zope 3 itself, as released, doesn't have this problem because it doesn't allow reST entry through the web. There are third-party applications, however, including 2 packages in the Zope 3 subversion tree that do have this problem. I strongly urge you to avoid using any Zope package that allows through-the-web input of reStructuredText unless you can verify that file/url has been properly disabled. The zwiki and bugtracker packages do not currently disable file/url inclusion and should not be used in situations in which users who are not highly trusted have access to these applications. Can you be explicit about the process of disabling file/url inclusion for zope3 (if this is the critical point you are making ). The use of restructured text is valuable in zope and obviously it is important to understand security measures that would allow its continued use. If this can be done, why remove the products from the repository tree? Would it not be better to apply the necessary fixes? Many thanks. Regards, David ___ Zope3-users mailing list Zope3-users@zope.org http://mail.zope.org/mailman/listinfo/zope3-users
[Zope3-Users] Security alert: use of Through-the-Web reStructuredText
Recently, a serious security flaw was found in Zope 2 due to it's improper support for allowing reStructuredText to be edited through- the-web. reStructuredText has directives that allow inclusion of any file a Zope process could read and inclusion of data obtained from fetching arbitrary URLs. In a trusted environment, these directives have legitimate uses. The feature of including files and URL results should not be enabled for text entered from untrusted sources, which applies to most through-the-web interactions. The recent hotfix: http://www.zope.org/Products/Zope/Hotfix-2006-07-05/Hotfix-2006-07-05 addresses the problem for Zope 2. It is safe to allow reStructuredText through the web with care. The inclusion of files or URL results can be disabled, but the programmer must explicitly disable the feature. It is not disabled by default. It is also critical that a developer who exposes through-the-web reStructuredText have tests to verify that the file/url inclusion feature has been disabled. Zope 3 itself, as released, doesn't have this problem because it doesn't allow reST entry through the web. There are third-party applications, however, including 2 packages in the Zope 3 subversion tree that do have this problem. I strongly urge you to avoid using any Zope package that allows through-the-web input of reStructuredText unless you can verify that file/url has been properly disabled. The zwiki and bugtracker packages do not currently disable file/url inclusion and should not be used in situations in which users who are not highly trusted have access to these applications. If you are using a Zope 3 checkout, these packages are currently included and enabled. I plan to remove these packages from the Zope 3 repository tree within the next few hours. If you are using a checkout-based Zope 3 installation that exposes these packages to untrusted users, you are strongly urged to disable these packages by removing the following files from your package-includes directory: zwiki-configure.zcml bugtracker-configure.zcml Removing these files will also avoid problems when you update your checkout later, as these will refer to non-existent packages. Jim -- Jim Fulton mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Python Powered! CTO (540) 361-1714 http://www.python.org Zope Corporationhttp://www.zope.com http://www.zope.org ___ Zope3-users mailing list Zope3-users@zope.org http://mail.zope.org/mailman/listinfo/zope3-users
[Zope3-Users] Zope 3 as WSGI app using mod_python
Hi, I'm interested in running Zope 3 via mod_python as WSGI app directly in apache. I like the idea to configure different instances simply in my apache config and don't have to setup different running zope instances. The "official" docs do not say much about this option, but there is a WSGI handler and I found for example this sample configuration: http://codespeak.net/svn/z3/modzope/trunk/democonf/apache2.conf Could somebody tell me what the status of this stuff is? Is it just an experiment which might be dropped in the future? Has somebody experiences to share? regards, Achim ___ Zope3-users mailing list Zope3-users@zope.org http://mail.zope.org/mailman/listinfo/zope3-users
