Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Hi Markus - I needed to think about how to reply to this specifically and explain why its still a bad idea to try and scale things. See below. On 7/27/2016 8:34 AM, Grunwald, Markus wrote: Hello, sorry to break the threading by not replying directly to a post, but until now I have only be

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Mike, Apart from the black/white aspect, I think we are actually in agreement, i.e. I agree that using a public key-based signature is easily the most practical and secure mechanism from a crypto perspective. If it is practical for the application, it should be what is recommended, However, Markus

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

On 7/26/2016 7:55 PM, Robert Cragie wrote: Mike, My concern with this thread is that you seem to have a very black/white assumption regarding the use of a symmetric group key. Defining a protocol which allows use of a symmetric group key does not in itself imply that it will be misused. It's

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Markus, Thanks for this. I think you've summed up the problem in a nut shell. Please see below. On 7/27/16 2:34 PM, Grunwald, Markus wrote: > > > For me, this leads to multiple security levels: > > 1) Basic security: fast response, low cost with lower security: > use symmetric keys. Us

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Hello, sorry to break the threading by not replying directly to a post, but until now I have only been reading the list passively. So I have no mail to reply to... I followed your discussion regarding group multicast and how to encrypt them. I see the problem, but I think one single approach to

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

1998 paper}. So, in the Philips >>> high-granularity luminary, the one simply hashes the state (still only a >>> few-bytes entry) and then combines e with r, d, k, to produce signature >>> component s -- a simple linear equation with two modular multiplies as cost.

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

o:mstjo...@comcast.net>; Stephen Farrell > <mailto:stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie> > Subject: Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication > Security Work in ACE > > Hi Kathleen, > > > On 7/26/16 4:52 PM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: >> What is the bigger thre

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

StJohns<mailto:mstjo...@comcast.net>; Stephen Farrell<mailto:stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE Hi Kathleen, On 7/26/16 4:52 PM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: What is the bigger threat model? Lights turning on/

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Hi Kathleen, On 7/26/16 4:52 PM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > What is the bigger threat model? > > Lights turning on/off in large buildings could result in increased > energy costs. > Lights turning on/off could result in safety issues (they could be > extreme). It's also a matter of changing co

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

il.com <mailto:rstruik@gmail.com>] *Sent:* Tuesday, July 26, 2016 3:00 AM *To:* Kumar, Sandeep; Stephen Farrell; Somaraju Abhinav; Michael StJohns; ace@ietf.org <mailto:ace@ietf.org> *Subject:* Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Co

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 11:59 AM, Eliot Lear wrote: > Hi Kathleen, > > > On 7/26/16 4:52 PM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > > What is the bigger threat model? > > Lights turning on/off in large buildings could result in increased energy > costs. > Lights turning on/off could result in safety issues (t

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

gt;> Sandeep >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Rene Struik [mailto:rstruik@gmail.com] >> *Sent:* Tuesday, July 26, 2016 3:00 AM >> *To:* Kumar, Sandeep; Stephen Farrell; Somaraju Abhinav; Michael >> StJohns; ace@ietf.org

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

*To:* Kumar, Sandeep; Stephen Farrell; Somaraju Abhinav; Michael StJohns; > ace@ietf.org > > *Subject:* Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security > Work in ACE > > > > Hi Sandeep: > > Fair enough, but with, e.g., ECDSA, computation of the eph

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

behavior. Regards Sandeep From: Rene Struik [mailto:rstruik@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2016 3:00 AM To: Kumar, Sandeep; Stephen Farrell; Somaraju Abhinav; Michael StJohns; ace@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE Hi Sandeep: Fair

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Let's try one more time here. [AS] Good. Much clearer now. 1) If a group of devices share a key, and 2) If some of that group of devices are controllers, and 3) The majority are actuators (e.g. lightbulbs, locks), and, 4) The shared key is the only cryptographic pr

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

computations. Sandeep -Original Message- From: Ace [mailto:ace-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell Sent: Monday, July 25, 2016 9:26 PM To: Somaraju Abhinav; Michael StJohns; ace@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE On 2

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE On 25/07/16 17:59, Somaraju Abhinav wrote: > we essentially have 50-100 ms for the signing+verification process and > I do not know of a solution that does this Just a clarifying question: why can't the signing possibly be d

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

On 25/07/16 17:59, Somaraju Abhinav wrote: > we essentially have 50-100 ms for the signing+verification process > and I do not know of a solution that does this Just a clarifying question: why can't the signing possibly be done asynchronously? E.g. the private key holder could sign a value that

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

On 7/25/16 8:07 PM, Michael StJohns wrote: > > The receiver has no guaranteed way of knowing whether or not ANY group > member is compromised so the authentication is pretty much meaningless. I would just add that it is also more difficult to determine just which device has been broken into afte

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

On 7/25/2016 12:59 PM, Somaraju Abhinav wrote: Let's try one more time here. [AS] Good. Much clearer now. 1) If a group of devices share a key, and 2) If some of that group of devices are controllers, and 3) The majorit

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

t: ‎25/‎07/‎2016 19:00 To: Michael StJohns<mailto:mstjo...@comcast.net>; ace@ietf.org<mailto:ace@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE Let's try one more time here. [AS] Good. Much clearer

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Let's try one more time here. [AS] Good. Much clearer now. 1) If a group of devices share a key, and 2) If some of that group of devices are controllers, and 3) The majority are actuators (e.g. lightbulbs, locks), and, 4) The shared key is the only cryptographic

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

On 7/25/2016 8:21 AM, Somaraju Abhinav wrote: Hi Mike, The group key is also the authorization key in the model proposed. Any entity that holds that key can forge a message that can cause the action authorized by the issuance of that key. In your example, assuming that the door lock and th

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Hi Mike, The group key is also the authorization key in the model proposed. Any entity that holds that key can forge a message that can cause the action authorized by the issuance of that key. In your example, assuming that the door lock and the lightbulb share the same group key, then comprom

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Michael StJohns writes: > I've said similar things before, but there continues to be this > belief from certain folk that its too expensive to do public key > cryptography for lightbulbs. People can believe the Earth is flat; that doesn't make them right. > So to be clear - yes COSE is useful.

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

> -Original Message- > From: Ace [mailto:ace-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Michael StJohns > Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2016 3:05 PM > To: ace@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security > Work in ACE > > On 7/21/2016 5:26 A

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

On 2016-07-21 14:49, Michael StJohns wrote: On 7/21/2016 5:29 AM, Ludwig Seitz wrote: On 2016-07-21 11:04, Michael Richardson wrote: Why will ACE succeed when DICE failed? Does ACE now have some knowledge or mechanism that DICE couldn't have created because it was out of scope? ACE is (also

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

On 7/21/2016 5:26 AM, Carsten Bormann wrote: Michael Richardson wrote: Why will ACE succeed when DICE failed? Because DICE tried to hack something into TLS. That had no support. Actually, that's not the complete story. It was one of the things that finally killed this off (e.g. DICE was su

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

On 7/21/2016 5:29 AM, Ludwig Seitz wrote: On 2016-07-21 11:04, Michael Richardson wrote: Why will ACE succeed when DICE failed? Does ACE now have some knowledge or mechanism that DICE couldn't have created because it was out of scope? ACE is (also) about authorization, which DICE wasn't. A

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Hi Hannes, On 7/21/16 12:30 AM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote: > Hi Thomas, > > thanks for the response. > > > On 07/21/2016 12:05 AM, Thomas Hardjono wrote: >> Generally I'm in support of any efforts to secure multicast messaging for >> IoT >> applications However, I have some concerns about the ACE

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Carsten Bormann wrote: >> Why will ACE succeed when DICE failed? > Because DICE tried to hack something into TLS. That had no support. >> Does ACE now have some knowledge or mechanism that DICE couldn't have >> created >> because it was out of scope? > ACE has COSE. G

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

On 2016-07-21 11:04, Michael Richardson wrote: Why will ACE succeed when DICE failed? Does ACE now have some knowledge or mechanism that DICE couldn't have created because it was out of scope? ACE is (also) about authorization, which DICE wasn't. A compromised lightbulb might well have the p

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Michael Richardson wrote: > Why will ACE succeed when DICE failed? Because DICE tried to hack something into TLS. That had no support. > Does ACE now have some knowledge or mechanism that DICE couldn't have created > because it was out of scope? ACE has COSE. Grüße, Carsten __

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Why will ACE succeed when DICE failed? Does ACE now have some knowledge or mechanism that DICE couldn't have created because it was out of scope? -- Michael Richardson , Sandelman Software Works -= IPv6 IoT consulting =- signature.asc Description: PGP signature

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

t;>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: Ace [mailto:ace-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig >>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2016 6:07 AM >>>> To: Ace@ietf.org >>>> Subject: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Secur

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Message- >>> From: Ace [mailto:ace-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig >>> Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2016 6:07 AM >>> To: Ace@ietf.org >>> Subject: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work >>> in >>> ACE &

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE Hi all, at the ACE meeting today I asked the participants whether they are in favor of adding low latency group communication security work in the ACE group. 20 persons were in favor of doing the work. 5 people argued against doing this work

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

m: Ace [mailto:ace-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Smith, Ned Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2016 10:48 AM To: Hannes Tschofenig ; Ace@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE Agree with the direction toward group communication. This roughly align

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Agree with the direction toward group communication. This roughly aligns with goals of which is inclusive of group key management for symmetric. Fluffy has broader key management goals, but symmetric group key management is a great plac

Re: [Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

As I mentioned at the microphone I'm opposed to pursuing symmetric key multicast solutions. WRT to the current set of proposal documents, I see no substantive improvement on the rejected proposals from the DICE (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=dtls-iot) working group. The

[Ace] Adoption of Low Latency Group Communication Security Work in ACE

Hi all, at the ACE meeting today I asked the participants whether they are in favor of adding low latency group communication security work in the ACE group. 20 persons were in favor of doing the work. 5 people argued against doing this work. If you haven't been at the meeting please contribute