Re: [Ace] Comments on draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile

2019-07-25 Thread Cigdem Sengul
Hello Daniel, Thank you very much for your comments. I have commented on them below and created corresponding GitHub issues to be addressed soon. One thing that affects how we address most of the comments is the order of presentation of MQTT v5 and MQTT v3.1.1. I completely agree that if the

Re: [Ace] Comments on draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile

2019-05-24 Thread Cigdem Sengul
Hello, Thanks, Jim, this was helpful, and it also triggered that I go back and read the introspection section of the core draft again. > > > [JLS] For introspection, but not for a published token, the token could be > “revoked” by the RS. In this case a new introspection check would lead to >

Re: [Ace] Comments on draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile

2019-05-23 Thread Jim Schaad
From: Cigdem Sengul Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2019 4:21 AM To: Jim Schaad Cc: draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-prof...@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Ace] Comments on draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile Thank you, Jim, for the comments. I have created issues corresponding to each one

Re: [Ace] Comments on draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile

2019-05-23 Thread Cigdem Sengul
Thank you, Jim, for the comments. I have created issues corresponding to each one in the GitHub repository. We will start working on them, and specifically clarify the issues 1-3 around the CONNECT message. For 4, MQTT v5 can support a challenge-response; not possible with v3 indeed. Will expand

Re: [Ace] Comments on draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile

2019-05-23 Thread Ludwig Seitz
On 22/05/2019 23:58, Jim Schaad wrote: 5. Is there an intention to provide a "standard" format for the scope field or just to leave it as ad hoc? I would be very much in favor of this, or at least provide guidelines to avoid adding to this: https://www.brandur.org/oauth-scope /Ludwig

[Ace] Comments on draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile

2019-05-22 Thread Jim Schaad
Thanks for the updates from my last message. This has helped quite a bit. 1. A discussion of the use of raw public keys rather than certificates for the server may be in order. This can refer to the same RPK issues from the current DTLS document. It may also be that this just uses normal