I judge as follows on CFJ 2320 ("Four days and 5 hours from the time
this CFJ was/will be called, it will be possible to object to the above
intent.", called just before a holiday in the same message as the
intent):
{{{{
This case hinges around when the deadline for objection is for objecting
to a dependent action, and whether there is in fact such a deadline. The
interesting complicating point here (apart from the Holiday) is that the
dependent actions rule is written backwards, so to speak. Rule
1728/22(b) says:
{{{
b) A person (the initiator) announced intent to perform the
action, unambiguously and clearly specifying the action and
method(s) (including the value of N for each method), at
most fourteen days earlier, and (if the action depends on
objections) at least four days earlier.
}}}
So the question here is whether (as in ehird's attempted paradox)
intending an action creates a deadline for objection, or whether (as in
Goethe's and my/comex's scam attempt) doing a dependent action creates a
deadline for intending it, or both. I first point out that there is no
contradiction in supposing both are true, because they are deadlines for
different things; but also, that the resolution of Goethe's scam is a
matter for another CFJ, especially as I tried a similar one, and so that
I won't discuss the issue further in this judgement.
The following excerpts from rule 2124/9 are, I think, the most
enlightening on the matter:
{{{
[...] An Objector to a
dependent action is a first-class player (or other person
explicitly allowed to object to that action by the rule allowing
that action to be performed dependently) who has publicly posted
(and not withdrawn) an objection to the announcement of intent
to perform the action.
[...]
Agora is Satisfied with an intent to perform a specific action
if and only if:
(1) if the action is to be performed Without N Objections, then
it has fewer than N objectors;
[...]
}}}
First, note that this means that the verdict on this CFJ is trivially
TRUE, as it is indeed possible to object to a dependent action even
after it's been carried out, by the above definition (although doing so
does nothing). [Note that objecting to a dependent action before it is
carried out - the opposite of this, is more murky, due to the difficulty
of identifying whether the objection is to the announcement of intent in
question before the announcement exists, but again irrelevant to the
case.] So no paradox here. Normally at this point I'd modify the
question to a version which isn't defeated by technicality, but I'm not
sure how to do so in this case [pun noticed but not intended]. So
instead, I simply judge as follows:
CFJ 2320 is TRUE. It is possible to object to a dependent action even
after it is resolved, not that that will do anything.
}}}}
I judge as follows on CFJ 2298: {{{ TRUE. No Ribbon except Violet is
awarded for gaining the Patent Title "Minister without Portfolio". }}}
--
ais523
