On 6/22/2022 2:08 PM, ais523 via agora-business wrote: > On Wed, 2022-06-22 at 15:40 -0500, secretsnail9 via agora-discussion wrote: >> On Jun 22, 2022, at 3:15 PM, ais523 via agora-business < >>> agora-busin...@agoranomic.org> wrote: >>> I intend, with support, to appoint ais523 to the office of Speaker. >>> >>> [As far as I can tell, although I can't actually resolve this intent, >>> that doesn't prevent me making the intent. It seems as though it could >>> potentially be resolved by someone else?] >>> >> I don't think you can actually make the intent? It's not a tabled >> action because it's not an action described in the rules. "any player >> CAN appoint *another player* to the office with support." And since >> you didn't do that I don't think it works? Just like you couldn't >> intend to deactivate someone with notice before it's been 30 days of >> inactivity. Unless you can idk > > I call a CFJ on the statement "My attempt to intend to perform a tabled > action in the above-quoted message succeeded". > > Arguments: > > This basically boils down to whether I can intend to perform a tabled > action, despite it being an action that I personally could not perform > even if I had the required support. There are situations in which one > person can act on a different person's intent (either due to an office > changing hands, or due to the "I support and do so" mechanism), so it > can matter whether the intent is valid even if the stated action isn't > possible. > > Historically, I think we've held that intents to perform an impossible > action are valid, and can be made in case, e.g., rule changes make that > action possible in the future, although the action has to be described > precisely enough to make it clear that the intent matches up. This > situation is analogous. (As a side note, rule 2471 has an explicit > exception for intents – this was designed so that a player could table > an intent to perform an action simply so that they'd have the option > available, without planning to actually act on the intent later on, > despite the wording of the announcement.) > > However, the rules for tabled actions have changed since the previous > precedents, and they may no longer be applicable; a judge would need to > check the current wording of the rule and see if anything has changed. > In particular, the key to the case seems to be whether "table an intent > to perform a tabled action" permits intents to perform a hypothetical > tabled action, or only tabled actions that are defined in the rules. > > For what it's worth, I've been assuming that you can intend to > deactivate someone before they've been inactive for 30 days (e.g. > because you're planning to resolve the intent after the 30-day timer > has expired) – the action that you're intending to perform is an action > that can only be performed in the future, but that's fine because the > your intention is to perform the action in the future, rather than > right now. So "you can only intend to perform an action that you could > (if you had an appropriately ripe intent) perform right now" seems like > it's the wrong reading of the rule. Another possibility is "you can > only intend to perform an action that you could (if you had an > appropriately ripe intent) perform in the future", but that's a future > conditional, and those are almost impossible to resolve correctly (and > in this case, the 14-day ripeness limit is enough time to pass a > proposal to make the action possible, so this sort of future > conditional would hardly exclude anything anyway). So the most > reasonable reading seems, to me, to be "you can intend to perform an > action even if you can't envisage circumstances under which you could > actually perform it". > > However, there's a disagreement about this, thus this CFJ. > > (The judge might also want to opine on whether the intent in question > could be acted upon, without rules changes, if it's resolved by a > supporter rather than the sponsor – the action of "appoint ais523 as > Speaker" is impossible for ais523 but would be possible for a > hypothetical supporter of the intent. I didn't file a separate CFJ on > this because it was too difficult to come up with a short and loophole- > free statement.) >
Since the CFJ called, the "stretch" interpretation I mentioned is here: A person CAN act on eir own behalf, by announcement, to table an intent (syn. "intend") to perform a tabled action... the possible interpretation being "it's not an intent to perform a tabled action if it isn't currently a rules-defined action you can do via tabled action" (instead, it's an intent to perform a non-tabled action via a tabled action method, which doesn't qualify). But I think this still supports the old interpretation of "if I say I'm intending to perform an action by a tabled action method, it's an intent to perform the tabled action. Because even if it's not currently possible, I still *intend* to do it that way, who knows maybe by changing the rules which is possible in the 14 day timeframe." -G.