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                            S T R A T F O R

                    THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

                        http://www.stratfor.com
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                                                  18 September 2001


  -> ON OUR WEBSITE TODAY:

      * Central Asia: Backdoor to Afghanistan
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      * Egypt: A Precarious Ally
      http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109182150.htm

      * The Limits of Solidarity
      http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109181830.htm

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Washington Prepares for Long Campaign

2300 GMT, 010918

Summary

As Washington tries to build an international coalition against 
terrorism, the Bush administration is preparing the nation for a 
long campaign rather than a single retaliatory strike. With 
Afghanistan the primary initial target, Washington must deal with 
a problem it has rarely encountered since World War II: attacking 
a landlocked country. 

Analysis

The Bush administration is searching the globe for coalition 
support for its war on terrorism. At the same time, it is 
preparing Americans for a long campaign that may not include a 
rapid, high-profile, retaliatory strike. 

Washington's initial military response to the Sept. 11 attacks 
will shape U.S. relations not only with Middle Eastern nations 
but also with the rest of the world. 

For this reason the administration must carefully consider its 
reprisal so as not to undermine the confidence of allies or fuel 
wider enmity among Arab and Islamic nations. Although strikes are 
inevitable, they will likely take much more time and preparation 
than the cruise missile strikes that followed the 1998 bombings 
of the embassies in Africa.

By labeling Osama bin Laden the key suspect, Washington has also 
marked Afghanistan, where the Saudi exile has been living, as the 
likely first target. This presents a problem the U.S. military 
has rarely encountered since World War II: attacking a landlocked 
nation. The effectiveness of U.S. carrier battle groups will be 
severely reduced in any operation against Afghanistan.

In terms of logistics, Washington must find either land bases for 
a sustained coalition air strike against Afghanistan or provide 
in-air refueling for carrier-based planes. 

Afghanistan's neighbors, with whom the United States has tenuous 
relations, limit both choices. Afghanistan is bounded by 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the north, Iran to the 
west, China to the east and Pakistan to the south. Any 
partnership with the northern neighbors will require substantial 
negotiations with Russia, which retains a strong influence and 
military presence in Central Asia. Even with permission to fly 
out of Central Asia, the supply chain into these nations would be 
long and difficult to maintain. 

Iran, which has no love for the Taliban, is even more unlikely to 
offer basing for U.S. aircraft. China, too, is unlikely to offer 
basing, and even if it does, significant supply line problems 
would remain. 

Washington's best hope for regional assistance, then, is 
Pakistan. Pakistan was once a close ally, and its port access is 
useful for logistical purposes. Pakistan's long border along the 
southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan also offers the closest 
access to the cities of Kandahar, the Taliban headquarters, and 
Kabul, the frontline in the battle between the Taliban and the 
opposition Northern Alliance. 

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has offered substantial 
cooperation to the United States in the wake of the Sept. 11 
attacks. But pro-Taliban forces inside Pakistan threaten his hold 
on power. 

These threats come from those who feel he is too secular as well 
as from ethnic rivalries within Pakistan. Musharraf is a Muhajir, 
an Urdu-speaking member of an immigrant family from India. 
Although Urdu-speakers have dominated Pakistan's political and 
economic elite, the many of the country's indigenous groups -- 
including the native Pushtun population, which geographically 
straddles the border with Afghanistan -- view them as usurpers. 

Even with Musharraf's promises of cooperation, military planners 
in Washington must be absolutely sure that he has control of his 
entire military. The main questions in Washington now are whether 
Pakistan's offer of assistance is firm and whether the government 
is stable enough to allow the United States to strike Afghanistan 
from Pakistan. 

Whether the U.S. military is based in Pakistan or not, simply 
flying over Pakistan on the way to Afghanistan poses a serious 
security challenge. First, bringing significant firepower to bear 
on Afghanistan requires Washington to bring in more carriers or -
- for a sustained and more effective operation -- to establish 
land bases. The nearest places for such land bases are in India, 
Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. 

If the aircraft are launched from carriers, they will require in- air
refueling somewhere over Pakistan. This presents a 
significant security risk: Tanker aircraft would provide a ready 
target for potential rogue elements inside Pakistan's army or air 
force. With the situation in Pakistan still uncertain, it would 
be hard for a U.S. military commander to confidently fly tankers 
over Pakistan. The loss of a single tanker to surface-to-air 
missiles or fighter aircraft would also lead to the loss of 
mission-bound aircraft that depended on the tanker for fuel.

Similar problems pertain to operations not based on carriers. 
Because land-based aircraft generally have a longer combat 
radius, it is possible that flights from Oman, the UAE or Qatar 
could refuel over the Pakistani coast and still have the range to 
strike at Kandahar or other targets in Afghanistan. Operating 
from land bases in the Gulf or from India, however, would require 
a long buildup. 

It is for this kind of protracted operation rather than a quick 
retaliation that Washington is preparing. During a briefing Sept. 
18, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reiterated the 
dominant theme in Washington now -- that this will be a new style 
of war, one that will be fought for a long time. Rumsfeld 
emphasized that this is "not a matter of a single event" nor a 
campaign against one or two terrorist leaders.

Washington needed six months to gear up for Operation Desert 
Storm, and preparations for strikes on Afghanistan or other 
targets may take as long. Although pressure from within the 
United States for a retaliatory strike will grow, President 
George W. Bush currently enjoys high popularity ratings. His 
administration is much more likely to take the heat now rather 
than risk a disastrous attack that accomplishes little. 

If Washington could fully trust Pakistan's stability, it would 
likely have begun operations already. But the administration is 
making every effort to prepare a long-term strategy -- to avoid 
the appearance abroad and at home of a Clinton-esque strategy of 
launching an ineffective cruise-missile strike against some tents 
in Afghanistan as well as to avoid undermining tenuous relations 
with the Arab and Muslim world. 

This strategy may involve more carrier-based aircraft, land-based 
assets or even long-range strategic bombers from the United 
States and the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Such 
strikes will ultimately take place but only after the 
administration can overcome the logistical concerns posed by 
Pakistan's delicate political balance

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