On Wed, Jun 01, 2016 at 02:07:10AM +0200, Christian Boltz wrote:
> Hello,
>
> thanks to reading the wrong directory in read_inactive_profiles()
> (profile_dir instead of extra_profile_dir), aa-genprof never asked about
> using a profile from the extra_profile_dir.
>
> Sounds like an easy fix,
On 05/31/2016 05:07 PM, Christian Boltz wrote:
> Hello,
>
> thanks to reading the wrong directory in read_inactive_profiles()
> (profile_dir instead of extra_profile_dir), aa-genprof never asked about
> using a profile from the extra_profile_dir.
>
> Sounds like an easy fix, right? ;-)
>
>
Hello,
thanks to reading the wrong directory in read_inactive_profiles()
(profile_dir instead of extra_profile_dir), aa-genprof never asked about
using a profile from the extra_profile_dir.
Sounds like an easy fix, right? ;-)
After fixing this (last chunk), several other errors popped up, one
On 05/31/2016 01:17 PM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> https://launchpad.net/bugs/1584069
>
> This patch allows policy authors to specify how exec transitions should
> be handled with respect to setting AT_SECURE in the new process'
> auxiliary vector and, ultimately, having libc scrub (or not scrub) the
>
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1584069
This patch allows policy authors to specify how exec transitions should
be handled with respect to setting AT_SECURE in the new process'
auxiliary vector and, ultimately, having libc scrub (or not scrub) the
environment.
An exec mode of 'safe' means that the
On 05/31/2016 07:52 AM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> https://launchpad.net/bugs/1584069
>
> This patch allows policy authors to specify how exec transitions should
> be handled with respect to setting AT_SECURE in the new process'
> auxiliary vector and, ultimately, having libc scrub (or not scrub) the
>
My mail client decided to sign and encrypt my previous reply. See what I
wrote below.
Tyler
On 05/31/2016 09:46 AM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> On 05/31/2016 05:08 AM, John Johansen wrote:
>> On 05/28/2016 09:42 AM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
>>> https://launchpad.net/bugs/1584069
>>>
>>> This patch allows
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1584069
This patch allows policy authors to specify how exec transitions should
be handled with respect to setting AT_SECURE in the new process'
auxiliary vector and, ultimately, having libc scrub (or not scrub) the
environment.
An exec mode of 'safe' means that the
binvstqIDBHNU.bin
Description: PGP/MIME version identification
encrypted.asc
Description: OpenPGP encrypted message
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