Date: Thursday, February 15, 2018 @ 01:15:30 Author: bisson Revision: 317075
remove patches merged upstream Deleted: x11vnc/trunk/cursor.patch x11vnc/trunk/fix-buffer-overflows.patch x11vnc/trunk/openssl-detect.patch x11vnc/trunk/openssl-support.patch ----------------------------+ cursor.patch | 281 ------------------------- fix-buffer-overflows.patch | 26 -- openssl-detect.patch | 34 --- openssl-support.patch | 481 ------------------------------------------- 4 files changed, 822 deletions(-) Deleted: cursor.patch =================================================================== --- cursor.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074) +++ cursor.patch 2018-02-15 01:15:30 UTC (rev 317075) @@ -1,281 +0,0 @@ -From 37c946191a0f36490531624a2d03ec1ce7c714ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Stephan Fuhrmann <stfu...@freenet.de> -Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 11:28:25 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Broken cursor bugfix for 64 bit systems (#49) - -* Proper 32 bit types assigned - -* The size dependent conversions are not necessary if input type is 32 bit in every case - -* Unused variable - -* Another type problem 32/64 fixed - -* Prototype fixed - -* Pointer cast missing - -* * Multiple conversions from (unsigned long*) to proper (uint32_t*). -* Bugfix for XFixesCursorImage type problem. Structure contains (unsigned long*), but protocol says the pixels are just 32 bit. - This is a problem for 64 bit systems where (unsigned long) is 64 bits wide. ---- - src/cursor.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------ - src/cursor.h | 3 +-- - src/screen.c | 28 ++++++++++----------- - 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/cursor.c b/src/cursor.c -index 8c14b6c..6e135be 100644 ---- a/src/cursor.c -+++ b/src/cursor.c -@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void set_no_cursor(void); - void set_warrow_cursor(void); - int set_cursor(int x, int y, int which); - int check_x11_pointer(void); --int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot); -+int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot); - unsigned long get_cursor_serial(int mode); - rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp); - void save_under_cursor_buffer(rfbClientPtr cl); -@@ -1008,14 +1008,13 @@ void initialize_xfixes(void) { - rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, - int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp) { - rfbCursorPtr c; -- static unsigned long black = 0, white = 1; -+ static uint32_t black = 0, white = 1; - static int first = 1; - char *bitmap, *rich, *alpha; - char *pixels_new = NULL; - int n_opaque, n_trans, n_alpha, len, histo[256]; - int send_alpha = 0, alpha_shift = 0, thresh; - int i, x, y; -- - if (first && dpy) { /* raw_fb hack */ - X_LOCK; - black = BlackPixel(dpy, scr); -@@ -1033,7 +1032,6 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, - if (scaling_cursor && (scale_cursor_fac_x != 1.0 || scale_cursor_fac_y != 1.0)) { - int W, H; - char *pixels_use = (char *) pixels; -- unsigned int *pixels32 = NULL; - - W = w; - H = h; -@@ -1043,48 +1041,10 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, - - pixels_new = (char *) malloc(4*w*h); - -- if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) { -- int i, j, k = 0; -- /* -- * to avoid 64bpp code in scale_rect() we knock -- * down to unsigned int on 64bit machines: -- */ -- pixels32 = (unsigned int*) malloc(4*W*H); -- for (j=0; j<H; j++) { -- for (i=0; i<W; i++) { -- *(pixels32+k) = 0xffffffff & (*(pixels+k)); -- k++; -- } -- } -- pixels_use = (char *) pixels32; -- } -- - scale_rect(scale_cursor_fac_x, scale_cursor_fac_y, scaling_cursor_blend, - scaling_cursor_interpolate, - 4, pixels_use, 4*W, pixels_new, 4*w, - W, H, w, h, 0, 0, W, H, 0); -- -- if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) { -- int i, j, k = 0; -- unsigned long *pixels64; -- unsigned int* source = (unsigned int*) pixels_new; -- /* -- * now knock it back up to unsigned long: -- */ -- pixels64 = (unsigned long*) malloc(8*w*h); -- for (j=0; j<h; j++) { -- for (i=0; i<w; i++) { -- *(pixels64+k) = (unsigned long) (*(source+k)); -- k++; -- } -- } -- free(pixels_new); -- pixels_new = (char *) pixels64; -- if (pixels32) { -- free(pixels32); -- pixels32 = NULL; -- } -- } - - pixels = (uint32_t *) pixels_new; - -@@ -1111,7 +1071,7 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, - i = 0; - for (y = 0; y < h; y++) { - for (x = 0; x < w; x++) { -- unsigned long a; -+ uint32_t a; - - a = 0xff000000 & (*(pixels+i)); - a = a >> 24; /* alpha channel */ -@@ -1154,8 +1114,8 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, - i = 0; - for (y = 0; y < h; y++) { - for (x = 0; x < w; x++) { -- unsigned long r, g, b, a; -- unsigned int ui; -+ uint32_t r, g, b, a; -+ uint32_t ui; - char *p; - - a = 0xff000000 & (*(pixels+i)); -@@ -1322,6 +1282,7 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) { - } - if (xfixes_present && dpy) { - #if HAVE_LIBXFIXES -+ uint32_t *pixel32 = NULL; - int last_idx = (int) get_cursor_serial(1); - XFixesCursorImage *xfc; - -@@ -1350,15 +1311,37 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) { - - /* retrieve the cursor info + pixels from server: */ - xfc = XFixesGetCursorImage(dpy); -+ { -+ /* 2017-07-09, Stephan Fuhrmann: This fixes an implementation flaw for 64 bit systems. -+ * The XFixesCursorImage structure says xfc->pixels is (unsigned long*) in the structure, but -+ * the protocol spec says it's 32 bit per pixel -+ * (https://www.x.org/releases/X11R7.6/doc/fixesproto/fixesproto.txt). -+ * I'm converting the data anyway to 32 bit to be sure. Only necessary for 64 bit systems, -+ * but doing it anyway for 32 bit. -+ * */ -+ int x,y; -+ pixel32 = malloc(xfc->width * xfc->height * sizeof(uint32_t)); -+ for (y = 0; y < xfc->height; y++) { -+ for (x = 0; x < xfc->width; x++) { -+ uint32_t ofs = x + y*xfc->width; -+ *(pixel32 + ofs) = *(xfc->pixels + ofs); -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ - X_UNLOCK; - if (! xfc) { - /* failure. */ - return which; - } - -- which = store_cursor(xfc->cursor_serial, xfc->pixels, -+ which = store_cursor(xfc->cursor_serial, pixel32, - xfc->width, xfc->height, 32, xfc->xhot, xfc->yhot); - -+ if (pixel32 != NULL) { -+ free(pixel32); -+ } -+ - X_LOCK; - XFree_wr(xfc); - X_UNLOCK; -@@ -1367,7 +1350,7 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) { - return(which); - } - --int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, -+int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, - int xhot, int yhot) { - int which = CURS_ARROW; - int use, oldest, i; -@@ -1453,7 +1436,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "sc: %d %d/%d %d - %d %d\n", serial, w, h, cbpp, xhot, yhot); - } - - /* place cursor into our collection */ -- cursors[use]->rfb = pixels2curs((uint32_t*)data, w, h, xhot, yhot, bpp/8); -+ cursors[use]->rfb = pixels2curs(data, w, h, xhot, yhot, bpp/8); - - /* update time and serial index: */ - curs_times[use] = now; -diff --git a/src/cursor.h b/src/cursor.h -index 0cd42d1..e8ed248 100644 ---- a/src/cursor.h -+++ b/src/cursor.h -@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ extern int alpha_blend; - extern int alt_arrow; - extern int alt_arrow_max; - -- - extern void first_cursor(void); - extern void setup_cursors_and_push(void); - extern void initialize_xfixes(void); -@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ extern void set_no_cursor(void); - extern void set_warrow_cursor(void); - extern int set_cursor(int x, int y, int which); - extern int check_x11_pointer(void); --extern int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot); -+extern int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot); - extern unsigned long get_cursor_serial(int mode); - extern rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp); - void save_under_cursor_buffer(rfbClientPtr cl); -diff --git a/src/screen.c b/src/screen.c -index bda4690..395b503 100644 ---- a/src/screen.c -+++ b/src/screen.c -@@ -1206,10 +1206,10 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_update(rfbClient *cl, int x, int y, int w, int h) { - void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, int height, int bytesPerPixel) { - static int serial = 1; - int i, j; -- char *pixels = NULL; -- unsigned long r, g, b; -- unsigned int ui = 0; -- unsigned long red_mask, green_mask, blue_mask; -+ uint32_t *pixels = NULL; -+ uint32_t r, g, b; -+ uint32_t ui = 0; -+ uint32_t red_mask, green_mask, blue_mask; - - if (cl) {} - if (unixpw_in_progress) { -@@ -1230,21 +1230,20 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, i - green_mask = (client->format.greenMax << client->format.greenShift); - blue_mask = (client->format.blueMax << client->format.blueShift); - -- pixels = (char *)malloc(4*width*height); -+ pixels = (uint32_t *)malloc(4*width*height); - for (j=0; j<height; j++) { - for (i=0; i<width; i++) { -- unsigned int* uip; - unsigned char* uic; - int m; - if (bytesPerPixel == 1) { -- unsigned char* p = (unsigned char *) client->rcSource; -- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i); -+ uint8_t* p = (uint8_t *) client->rcSource; -+ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i); - } else if (bytesPerPixel == 2) { -- unsigned short* p = (unsigned short *) client->rcSource; -- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i); -+ uint16_t* p = (uint16_t *) client->rcSource; -+ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i); - } else if (bytesPerPixel == 4) { -- unsigned int* p = (unsigned int *) client->rcSource; -- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i); -+ uint32_t* p = (uint32_t *) client->rcSource; -+ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i); - } - r = (red_mask & ui) >> client->format.redShift; - g = (green_mask & ui) >> client->format.greenShift; -@@ -1261,12 +1260,11 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, i - if (m) { - ui |= 0xff000000; - } -- uip = (unsigned int *)pixels; -- *(uip + j * width + i) = ui; -+ *(pixels + j * width + i) = ui; - } - } - -- store_cursor(serial++, (unsigned long*) pixels, width, height, 32, xhot, yhot); -+ store_cursor(serial++, pixels, width, height, 32, xhot, yhot); - free(pixels); - set_cursor(cursor_x, cursor_y, get_which_cursor()); - } Deleted: fix-buffer-overflows.patch =================================================================== --- fix-buffer-overflows.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074) +++ fix-buffer-overflows.patch 2018-02-15 01:15:30 UTC (rev 317075) @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -diff -Naur x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/win_utils.c x11vnc-0.9.13/src/win_utils.c ---- x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/win_utils.c 2016-10-07 23:26:03.248600761 +0200 -+++ x11vnc-0.9.13/src/win_utils.c 2016-10-07 23:26:51.919256706 +0200 -@@ -262,8 +262,8 @@ - } - - last_snap = now; -- if (num > stack_list_len + blackouts) { -- int n = 2*num; -+ if (num + blackouts > stack_list_len) { -+ int n = 2 * (num + blackouts); - free(stack_list); - stack_list = (winattr_t *) malloc(n*sizeof(winattr_t)); - stack_list_len = n; -diff -Naur x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/xrecord.c x11vnc-0.9.13/src/xrecord.c ---- x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/xrecord.c 2016-10-07 23:26:03.248600761 +0200 -+++ x11vnc-0.9.13/src/xrecord.c 2016-10-07 23:27:49.566700470 +0200 -@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ - data = (char *)req; - data += sz_xConfigureWindowReq; - -- for (i=0; i<req->length; i++) { -+ for (i = 0; i < req->length - sz_xConfigureWindowReq / 4 && i < 4; i++) { - unsigned int v; - /* - * We use unsigned int for the values. There were Deleted: openssl-detect.patch =================================================================== --- openssl-detect.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074) +++ openssl-detect.patch 2018-02-15 01:15:30 UTC (rev 317075) @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -From 5889645bd3e63cf02c3fcad942d7edef1b4df472 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bert van Hall <bert.vanh...@avionic-design.de> -Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 10:56:24 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix openssl 1.1.x detection - -The SSL_library_init function has been renamed to OPENSSL_init_ssl from -openssl 1.1.0 on. While the old name still exists as a define for -backwards compatibility, this breaks detection in the library itself. -Update configure.ac to just detect the library instead of specific -functions. - -Signed-off-by: Bert van Hall <bert.vanh...@avionic-design.de> ---- - configure.ac | 7 +++---- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -351,12 +351,11 @@ fi - AH_TEMPLATE(HAVE_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, [open ssl X509_print_ex_fp available]) - if test "x$with_ssl" != "xno"; then - if test "x$HAVE_LIBCRYPTO" = "xtrue"; then -- AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, SSL_library_init, -+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(OPENSSL, [openssl >= 1.0.0], - SSL_LIBS="-lssl -lcrypto" -- [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], , -- -lcrypto) -+ [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,) - else -- AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, SSL_library_init, -+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(OPENSSL, [openssl >= 1.0.0], - SSL_LIBS="-lssl" - [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,) - fi Deleted: openssl-support.patch =================================================================== --- openssl-support.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074) +++ openssl-support.patch 2018-02-15 01:15:30 UTC (rev 317075) @@ -1,481 +0,0 @@ -From d37dac6963c2fb65cf577a6413657621cbcb406a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bert van Hall <bert.vanh...@avionic-design.de> -Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 14:43:57 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Support openssl 1.1.0 - -Compatibility patch for openssl 1.1.0 and later. The 1.0.2 API should -still work. Note that openssl 1.1.0 builds now have SSLv3 disabled per -default, so clients will have to support TLS to connect securely. - -Signed-off-by: Bert van Hall <bert.vanh...@avionic-design.de> ---- - README | 16 +++++++ - src/enc.h | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- - src/sslhelper.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ - 3 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) - ---- a/README -+++ b/README -@@ -871,6 +871,14 @@ make - place. As of x11vnc 0.9.4 there is also the --with-ssl=DIR configure - option. - -+ Note that from OpenSSL 1.1.0 on SSLv2 support has been dropped and -+ SSLv3 deactivated at build time per default. This means that unless -+ explicitly enabled, OpenSSL builds only support TLS (any version). -+ Since there is a reason for dropping SSLv3 (heard of POODLE?), most -+ distributions do not enable it for their OpenSSL binary. In summary -+ this means compiling x11vnc against OpenSSL 1.1.0 or newer is no -+ problem, but using encryption will require a viewer with TLS support. -+ - On Solaris using static archives libssl.a and libcrypto.a instead of - .so shared libraries (e.g. from www.sunfreeware.com), we found we - needed to also set LDFLAGS as follows to get the configure to work: -@@ -4228,6 +4236,14 @@ connect = 5900 - protocol handshake. x11vnc 0.9.6 supports both simultaneously when - -ssl is active. - -+ Note: With the advent of OpenSSL 1.1.0, SSLv2 is dropped and SSLv3 -+ deactivated per default. A couple broken ciphers have also gone, most -+ importantly though is that clients trying to connect to x11vnc will -+ now have to support TLS if encryption is to be used. You can of -+ course always cook up your own build and run time OpenSSL 1.1.x if -+ SSLv3 is absolutely required, but it isn't wise from a security point -+ of view. -+ - - SSL VNC Viewers:. Viewer-side will need to use SSL as well. See the - next FAQ and here for SSL enabled VNC Viewers, including SSVNC, to ---- a/src/enc.h -+++ b/src/enc.h -@@ -454,8 +454,10 @@ extern void enc_do(char *ciph, char *key - p++; - if (strstr(p, "md5+") == p) { - Digest = EVP_md5(); p += strlen("md5+"); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L && !defined OPENSSL_NO_SHA0 - } else if (strstr(p, "sha+") == p) { - Digest = EVP_sha(); p += strlen("sha+"); -+#endif - } else if (strstr(p, "sha1+") == p) { - Digest = EVP_sha1(); p += strlen("sha1+"); - } else if (strstr(p, "ripe+") == p) { -@@ -696,7 +698,11 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so - */ - unsigned char E_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char D_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *E_ctx, *D_ctx; -+#else - EVP_CIPHER_CTX E_ctx, D_ctx; -+#endif - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; - - unsigned char buf[BSIZE], out[BSIZE]; -@@ -739,11 +745,16 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so - encsym = encrypt ? "+" : "-"; - - /* use the encryption/decryption context variables below */ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ E_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); -+ D_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); -+ ctx = encrypt ? E_ctx : D_ctx; -+#else -+ ctx = encrypt ? &E_ctx : &D_ctx; -+#endif - if (encrypt) { -- ctx = &E_ctx; - keystr = E_keystr; - } else { -- ctx = &D_ctx; - keystr = D_keystr; - } - -@@ -877,9 +888,9 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so - in_salt = salt; - } - -- if (ivec_size < Cipher->iv_len && !securevnc) { -+ if (ivec_size < EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher) && !securevnc) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - WARNING: short IV %d < %d\n", -- prog, encstr, ivec_size, Cipher->iv_len); -+ prog, encstr, ivec_size, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher)); - } - - /* make the hashed value and place in keystr */ -@@ -1033,6 +1044,11 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so - fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - close sock_fr\n", prog, encstr); - close(sock_fr); - -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(E_ctx); -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(D_ctx); -+#endif -+ - /* kill our partner after 2 secs. */ - sleep(2); - if (child) { -@@ -1101,14 +1117,24 @@ static int securevnc_server_rsa_save_dia - } - - static char *rsa_md5_sum(unsigned char* rsabuf) { -- EVP_MD_CTX md; -+ EVP_MD_CTX *md; - char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmp[16]; - char md5str[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 8]; - unsigned int i, size = 0; - -- EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_md5()); -- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE); -- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); -+#else -+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); -+#endif -+ EVP_DigestInit(md, EVP_md5()); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE); -+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md); -+#else -+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md); -+#endif - - memset(md5str, 0, sizeof(md5str)); - for (i=0; i < size; i++) { -@@ -1225,7 +1251,7 @@ static void sslexit(char *msg) { - - static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, int conn2) { - RSA *rsa = NULL; -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx; -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *init_ctx; - unsigned char keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char *rsabuf, *rsasav; - unsigned char *encrypted_keybuf; -@@ -1364,8 +1390,15 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i - /* - * Back to the work involving the tmp obscuring key: - */ -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&init_ctx); -- rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(&init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ init_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); -+#else -+ -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx_obj; -+ init_ctx = &init_ctx_obj; -+#endif -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(init_ctx); -+ rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1); - if (rc == 0) { - sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx) failed"); - } -@@ -1374,6 +1407,9 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i - n = read(server, (char *) buf, BSIZE); - fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: data read: %d\n", n); - if (n < 0) { -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx); -+#endif - exit(1); - } - fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: initial data[%d]: ", n); -@@ -1381,13 +1417,19 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i - /* decode with the tmp key */ - if (n > 0) { - memset(to_viewer, 0, sizeof(to_viewer)); -- if (EVP_CipherUpdate(&init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) { -+ if (EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) { - sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx) failed"); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx); -+#endif - exit(1); - } - to_viewer_len = len; - } -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&init_ctx); -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(init_ctx); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx); -+#endif - free(initkey); - - /* print what we would send to the viewer (sent below): */ -@@ -1448,7 +1490,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i - - if (client_auth_req && client_auth) { - RSA *client_rsa = load_client_auth(client_auth); -- EVP_MD_CTX dctx; -+ EVP_MD_CTX *dctx; - unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *signature; - unsigned int ndig = 0, nsig = 0; - -@@ -1462,8 +1504,13 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i - exit(1); - } - -- EVP_DigestInit(&dctx, EVP_sha1()); -- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); -+#else -+ dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); -+#endif -+ EVP_DigestInit(dctx, EVP_sha1()); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE); - /* - * Without something like the following MITM is still possible. - * This is because the MITM knows keystr and can use it with -@@ -1474,7 +1521,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i - * he doesn't have Viewer_ClientAuth.pkey. - */ - if (0) { -- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE); - if (!keystore_verified) { - fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n"); - fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: Warning: even *WITH* Client Authentication in SecureVNC,\n"); -@@ -1497,7 +1544,12 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i - fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n"); - } - } -- EVP_DigestFinal(&dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig); -+ EVP_DigestFinal(dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(dctx); -+#else -+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(dctx); -+#endif - - signature = (unsigned char *) calloc(RSA_size(client_rsa), 1); - RSA_sign(NID_sha1, digest, ndig, signature, &nsig, client_rsa); ---- a/src/sslhelper.c -+++ b/src/sslhelper.c -@@ -799,8 +799,13 @@ static int pem_passwd_callback(char *buf - - /* based on mod_ssl */ - static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *callback_ctx) { -- X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx; -+ const ASN1_INTEGER *revoked_serial; -+ X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx; -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L -+ X509_OBJECT *obj; -+#else - X509_OBJECT obj; -+#endif - X509_NAME *subject; - X509_NAME *issuer; - X509 *xs; -@@ -820,11 +825,19 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX * - - /* Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of - * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity. */ -+ store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); -+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L -+ obj = X509_OBJECT_new(); -+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, obj); -+ crl = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj); -+#else - memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj)); -- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL); -- rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj); -- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx); -+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj); - crl=obj.data.crl; -+#endif -+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx); -+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx); - - if(rc>0 && crl) { - /* Log information about CRL -@@ -850,7 +863,11 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX * - rfbLog("Invalid signature on CRL\n"); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, - X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj); -+#else - X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); -+#endif - if(pubkey) - EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); - return 0; /* Reject connection */ -@@ -864,45 +881,78 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX * - rfbLog("Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field\n"); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, - X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj); -+#else - X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); -+#endif - return 0; /* Reject connection */ - } - if(X509_cmp_current_time(t)<0) { - rfbLog("Found CRL is expired - " - "revoking all certificates until you get updated CRL\n"); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj); -+#else - X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); -+#endif - return 0; /* Reject connection */ - } -- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj); -+#else -+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); -+#endif - } - - /* Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of - * the current certificate in order to check for revocation. */ -+ store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); -+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L -+ obj = X509_OBJECT_new(); -+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, obj); -+ crl = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj); -+#else - memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj)); -- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL); -- rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj); -- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx); -+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj); - crl=obj.data.crl; -+#endif -+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx); -+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx); - - if(rc>0 && crl) { - /* Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL */ - n=sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl)); - for(i=0; i<n; i++) { - revoked=sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i); -- if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked->serialNumber, -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ revoked_serial = X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(revoked); -+#else -+ revoked_serial = revoked->serialNumber; -+#endif -+ if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked_serial, - X509_get_serialNumber(xs)) == 0) { -- serial=ASN1_INTEGER_get(revoked->serialNumber); -+ serial=ASN1_INTEGER_get(revoked_serial); - cp=X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, NULL, 0); - rfbLog("Certificate with serial %ld (0x%lX) " - "revoked per CRL from issuer %s\n", serial, serial, cp); - OPENSSL_free(cp); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj); -+#else - X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); -+#endif - return 0; /* Reject connection */ - } - } -- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj); -+#else -+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); -+#endif - } - - return 1; /* Accept connection */ -@@ -951,6 +1001,8 @@ static int switch_to_anon_dh(void); - - void openssl_init(int isclient) { - int db = 0, tmp_pem = 0, do_dh; -+ const SSL_METHOD *method; -+ char *method_name; - FILE *in; - double ds; - long mode; -@@ -992,13 +1044,17 @@ void openssl_init(int isclient) { - ssl_client_mode = 0; - } - -- if (ssl_client_mode) { -- if (db) fprintf(stderr, "SSLv23_client_method()\n"); -- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_client_method() ); -- } else { -- if (db) fprintf(stderr, "SSLv23_server_method()\n"); -- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_server_method() ); -- } -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ method = ssl_client_mode ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method(); -+ if (db) -+ method_name = ssl_client_mode ? "TLS_client_method()" : "TLS_server_method()"; -+#else -+ method = ssl_client_mode ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method(); -+ if (db) -+ method_name = ssl_client_mode ? "SSLv23_client_method()" : "SSLv23_server_method()"; -+#endif -+ if (db) fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", method_name); -+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method); - - if (ctx == NULL) { - rfbLog("openssl_init: SSL_CTX_new failed.\n"); -@@ -1520,16 +1576,18 @@ static int add_anon_dh(void) { - } - - static int switch_to_anon_dh(void) { -+ const SSL_METHOD *method; - long mode; - - rfbLog("Using Anonymous Diffie-Hellman mode.\n"); - rfbLog("WARNING: Anonymous Diffie-Hellman uses encryption but is\n"); - rfbLog("WARNING: susceptible to a Man-In-The-Middle attack.\n"); -- if (ssl_client_mode) { -- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_client_method() ); -- } else { -- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_server_method() ); -- } -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ method = ssl_client_mode ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method(); -+#else -+ method = ssl_client_mode ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method(); -+#endif -+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method); - if (ctx == NULL) { - return 0; - } -@@ -1896,6 +1954,7 @@ static void pr_ssl_info(int verb) { - SSL_CIPHER *c; - SSL_SESSION *s; - char *proto = "unknown"; -+ int ssl_version; - - if (verb) {} - -@@ -1905,13 +1964,21 @@ static void pr_ssl_info(int verb) { - c = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl); - s = SSL_get_session(ssl); - -+ if (s) { -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+ ssl_version = SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(s); -+#else -+ ssl_version = s->ssl_version; -+#endif -+ } -+ - if (s == NULL) { - proto = "nosession"; -- } else if (s->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) { -+ } else if (ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) { - proto = "SSLv2"; -- } else if (s->ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION) { -+ } else if (ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION) { - proto = "SSLv3"; -- } else if (s->ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) { -+ } else if (ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) { - proto = "TLSv1"; - } - if (c != NULL) {