Re: [arch-dev-public] Proposal: enabling full ASLR on x86_64 via hardening-wrapper

2014-12-24 Thread Daniel Micay
> The problem is that it's important for anything doing networking, any > executable with setuid/setcap/setgid and anything run by users on > untrusted input like image viewers, text editors and tools like file and > strings. If `python` or `ruby` isn't PIE, then it's trivial to exploit > heap buff

Re: [arch-dev-public] Proposal: enabling full ASLR on x86_64 via hardening-wrapper

2014-12-24 Thread Bartłomiej Piotrowski
On Thu, 18 Dec 2014 18:31:57 -0500 Daniel Micay wrote: > Arch's single biggest security weakness is that it's not benefiting > from address space layout randomization (ASLR). Fixing this issue > would be a major step towards being a leader in this area. Many > distributions enable ASLR, stack prot

[arch-dev-public] Signoff report for [testing]

2014-12-24 Thread Arch Website Notification
=== Signoff report for [testing] === https://www.archlinux.org/packages/signoffs/ There are currently: * 0 new packages in last 24 hours * 0 known bad packages * 0 packages not accepting signoffs * 3 fully signed off packages * 25 packages missing signoffs * 0 packages older than 14 days (Note: t