Re: [arch-general] sandboxing

2017-02-04 Thread Leonid Isaev
On Sun, Feb 05, 2017 at 11:08:09AM +0530, Shridhar Daithankar wrote: > ok. It confirms my understanding that X clients can listen to each other's > events and modify them. > > But in xwayland, things are bit different. > >

Re: [arch-general] sandboxing

2017-02-04 Thread sivmu
Am 05.02.2017 um 06:38 schrieb Shridhar Daithankar: >> this point is about the insecurity of the X Windows System architecture, >> which basically assumes that all applications are to be trusted. There >> is no build in security, therefore failing modern threat models completly. >> >> This

Re: [arch-general] sandboxing

2017-02-04 Thread Shridhar Daithankar
On Sunday 5 February 2017 6:10:51 AM IST sivmu wrote: > Am 05.02.2017 um 05:16 schrieb Shridhar Daithankar: > > On Saturday 4 February 2017 7:28:31 AM IST sivmu wrote: > >> As long as the application has access to the xwayland instance, which is > >> by default the case when xwayland is available,

Re: [arch-general] sandboxing

2017-02-04 Thread sivmu
Am 05.02.2017 um 05:16 schrieb Shridhar Daithankar: > On Saturday 4 February 2017 7:28:31 AM IST sivmu wrote: >> As long as the application has access to the xwayland instance, which is >> by default the case when xwayland is available, it can influence all >> other applications that still use

Re: [arch-general] sandboxing

2017-02-04 Thread Shridhar Daithankar
On Saturday 4 February 2017 7:28:31 AM IST sivmu wrote: > As long as the application has access to the xwayland instance, which is > by default the case when xwayland is available, it can influence all > other applications that still use the x-protcol. Just to understand, if there are two

Re: [arch-general] sandboxing

2017-02-04 Thread Daniel Micay via arch-general
On Fri, 2017-02-03 at 17:49 +0100, Bart De Roy via arch-general wrote: > Error verifying signature: parse error > --pyi53mwzyx2s2ll6 > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > Content-Disposition: inline > > hello > > I've been postponing looking into browser isolation > since I