Senior Network Engineer
> ___
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> ⇒ Australian Office: 1300 054 331/+(61) 7 5522 9726 extn 118
> ⇒ Website: www.DTSanz.com
>
>
> On 9/06/2021 4:54 pm, Binh Lam wrote:
>
> All,
>
>
All,
For junos.. check the output of
"show ddos-protection protocols statistics terse"
will give you some hints what happened..
It appears ttl, ndpv6 hit via ix?
On Wed, 9 Jun 2021, 2:48 pm Luke Iggleden, wrote:
> Hi All,
>
> I too would like to see what the traffic was that hit our Junipers
e.apnic.net/48/assets/files/APIC778/Hardening-Your-Transit-Network.pdf
** tweet from APNIC:
#BGP tips and tricks to stop acquisition of bad #routing outcomes from your
transit and #peers: Binh Lam from @NTTICT explores at #apnic48 Technical
Session 3. Watch live: youtube.com/watch?v=qEb5Vq
.
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/11/major-bgp-mishap-takes-down-google-as-traffic-improperly-travels-to-china/
On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 3:16 PM Binh Lam wrote:
> Dear AusNOG..
>
> The latest News about route hijacked, again raises the concerns about
> pot
On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 3:34 PM Aftab Siddiqui
wrote:
> Hi Binh,
> Thanks for sharing this. The most likely issue is NO prefix filtering at
> China Telecom end. Mainone (AS37282) leaked probably everything they
> learned from IXPN (Lagos IXP) Route Server to its direct peer AS4809 (China
>
Dear AusNOG..
The latest News about route hijacked, again raises the concerns about
potential route hijacked, it can happen anytime to anyone..
https://www.itnews.com.au/news/route-leak-sends-google-cloud-traffic-to-russia-515489
how to prevent it?
looking at the prefix was hijacked...
whois
