Raymond Tallis applies his mind to his mind.
My experience with neurological patients has
underlined what ordinary life tells us: that a
brain in some working order is a necessary
condition for human consciousness. Unlike
mind-brain identity theorists, however, I do not
believe that consciousness is identical with
neural activity in the cerebral cortex, the brain
stem, the thalamus or wherever. This does not
mean that I think I have an immaterial soul; nor
do I subscribe to a 'ghost-in-the-machine'
Cartesian dualism. Rather, I am a non-Cartesian
atheist who just can't help noticing that however
hard you look, you will not find sensations,
affections and reasons in bits of the brain, or
even distributed throughout the brain. So
although a functioning brain is necessary for
every aspect of consciousness, from the simplest
twinge of sensation to the most exquisitely
constructed sense of self, it is not sufficient
for consciousness and ccertainly not for the
kind of consciousness you and I enjoy.
A necessary condition, or set of conditions, of
something happening, is that without which it
will not happen; a sufficient condition, or set
of conditions, is that which is enough to ensure
that it happens. In order for me to be knocked
down by a 97 bus in London, itâs necessary for
me to be in London. However, being in London is
not sufficient otherwise I mightt be even more
inclined to avoid the place. Something else is
required â for example that I should be in a
certain street; that a 97 bus should be in the
same street; that, preoccupied with the mind-body
problem, I should walk in front of the bus; and
that the driver, who may also be pondering the
mind-body problem, should fail to see me in order to stop in time.
<http://www.philosophynow.org/issue75/75tallis.htm>Link
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Posted By johannes to
<http://www.monochrom.at/english/2009/11/reflections-on-epilepsy.htm>monochrom
at 11/20/2009 07:15:00 PM
