Taken from the Kernel, put into the same place as in the kernel,
although the hexdump.c does not actually contain hexdum functions.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer
---
include/linux/kernel.h | 4 +++
lib/Makefile | 1 +
lib/hexdump.c | 74
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 03:22:26PM +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
wrote:
> That can be used for digest calculation and verify
>
> Signed-off-by: Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
> ---
> commands/Kconfig| 12 +++-
> commands/Makefile | 1 +
> commands/digest.c | 195
> ++
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 03:22:24PM +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
wrote:
> such as RSA as we load a DER key we will detect the key size
> at runtime and so the algo length.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
> ---
> include/digest.h | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 inserti
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 03:22:20PM +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
> ---
> crypto/hmac.c | 6 ++
> crypto/internal.h | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Squashed this one and 2/7 into the initial hmac
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 03:39:56PM +0100, Jan Luebbe wrote:
> From: Sascha Hauer
>
> Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer
> ---
> common/digest.c | 8
> include/digest.h | 8
> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Already rebased onto Jean-Christophes latest changes and a
> > +
> > +static int do_digest(int argc, char *argv[])
> > +{
> > + struct digest *d;
> > + unsigned char *tmp_key = NULL;
> > + unsigned char *tmp_sig = NULL;
> > + char *sig = NULL;
> > + char *sigfile = NULL;
> > + size_t siglen = 0;
> > + char *key = NULL;
> > + char *keyfile =
this will allow as example to list the current supported digest
Signed-off-by: Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
---
common/command.c | 2 ++
include/command.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/common/command.c b/common/command.c
index 61191c2..dc2cb88 100644
--- a/common/c
On Do, 2015-03-12 at 19:19 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> please do not send a new version except for fix
>
> I'm going to re-integrate it with the keystore & co
Could you describe your keystore design?
> and sha1,rsa2048 is considered weak in term of security
> and worse md4/m
On Do, 2015-03-12 at 18:47 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> as state in my previous e-mail I will a keystore support
>
> but this dt format to handle no please
>
> we need to use the standard format as in the kernel or openssl
>
> DER and x509
>
> specially x509 as if we want to
On Do, 2015-03-12 at 18:50 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> do as in the kernel use the string as we may want to add hw IP
You mean we should add a priority instead? The kernel also has separate
names for the algorithm and for the driver.
Regards,
Jan
--
Pengutronix e.K.
On 10:35 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> On Do, 2015-03-12 at 18:47 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > as state in my previous e-mail I will a keystore support
> >
> > but this dt format to handle no please
> >
> > we need to use the standard format as in the kernel or openssl
On 10:28 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> On Do, 2015-03-12 at 19:19 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > please do not send a new version except for fix
> >
> > I'm going to re-integrate it with the keystore & co
>
> Could you describe your keystore design?
I'll send the patch
On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 10:56:54AM +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
wrote:
> On 10:35 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> > On Do, 2015-03-12 at 18:47 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > > as state in my previous e-mail I will a keystore support
> > >
> > > but this dt forma
On 10:54 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> On Do, 2015-03-12 at 18:50 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > do as in the kernel use the string as we may want to add hw IP
>
> You mean we should add a priority instead? The kernel also has separate
> names for the algorithm and for th
On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 10:56 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > Having an ASN1 parser for DER/x509 is a huge amount of complexity I
> > would not want in a bootloader. Just take a look at the problems the
> > SSL-CAs and browsers had with different interpretations of the same
> > cert
On 11:06 Fri 13 Mar , Sascha Hauer wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 10:56:54AM +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
> wrote:
> > On 10:35 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> > > On Do, 2015-03-12 at 18:47 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > > > as state in my previous e-mail
On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 11:05 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> On 10:28 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> > On Do, 2015-03-12 at 19:19 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > > please do not send a new version except for fix
> > >
> > > I'm going to re-integrate it with t
On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 11:12 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
>
> sorry mutt via ssh lost some character when typing
>
> der is few 100s line of code that's all
>
> and x509 just a few more
>
> as I do not plan to support all the options of x509 specially the non
> standard one
Do
On 11:10 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 10:56 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > > Having an ASN1 parser for DER/x509 is a huge amount of complexity I
> > > would not want in a bootloader. Just take a look at the problems the
> > > SSL-CAs and browsers had
On 11:22 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 11:12 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> >
> > sorry mutt via ssh lost some character when typing
> >
> > der is few 100s line of code that's all
> >
> > and x509 just a few more
> >
> > as I do not plan to support
Add the required brackets, so that we don't write unused registers
with potentially bogus values.
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach
---
/me hides under a rock
---
drivers/pci/pci.c | 6 --
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c
index 5b84
On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 11:25 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> On 11:10 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> > On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 10:56 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > > > Having an ASN1 parser for DER/x509 is a huge amount of complexity I
> > > > would not want in
On 03/13/2015 11:05 AM, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> On 10:28 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
>> On Do, 2015-03-12 at 19:19 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
>>> please do not send a new version except for fix
>>>
>>> I'm going to re-integrate it with the keystore & co
>
On 11:21 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 11:05 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > On 10:28 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> > > On Do, 2015-03-12 at 19:19 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > > > please do not send a new version except for f
On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 15:28 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > It's not the job of barebox to define security policies, it must fit
> > well into the larger security design, which may require compromises.
>
> I disagree, disable by default non secure feature is require to pass
> sec
Hello,
I have a cortex-A9 based platform featuring a spi-nor (n25q256a).
I have disabled 4KB sector for this spi-nor in order to use UBI/UBIFS.
So far I can ubiattach, mount and copy small files (~65KB or 2 sectors)
to ramfs. Copying a bigger file (512KB) leads to a read failure
(ubifs_search_zbra
On 11:43 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 11:25 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > On 11:10 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> > > On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 10:56 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > > > > Having an ASN1 parser for DER/x509 is a hug
On 12:33 Fri 13 Mar , Marc Kleine-Budde wrote:
> On 03/13/2015 11:05 AM, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > On 10:28 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> >> On Do, 2015-03-12 at 19:19 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> >>> please do not send a new version except for fix
>
On 03/13/2015 04:54 PM, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
>>> if you can break rsa4096, the chance you can break ECC are high too
>>
>> If you want to open the box, today you would probably not break
>> rsa2048/sha1 (unless you have huge calculation power) but look for
>> implementation weakn
On 16:41 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> On Fr, 2015-03-13 at 15:28 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > > It's not the job of barebox to define security policies, it must fit
> > > well into the larger security design, which may require compromises.
> >
> > I disagree, disable b
On 17:06 Fri 13 Mar , Marc Kleine-Budde wrote:
> On 03/13/2015 04:54 PM, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> >>> if you can break rsa4096, the chance you can break ECC are high too
> >>
> >> If you want to open the box, today you would probably not break
> >> rsa2048/sha1 (unless you have
On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 09:42:22AM +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
wrote:
> this will allow as example to list the current supported digest
^^ ^
Tly.
Maybe you mean
On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 11:10:19AM +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
wrote:
> On 10:54 Fri 13 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote:
> > On Do, 2015-03-12 at 18:50 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote:
> > > do as in the kernel use the string as we may want to add hw IP
> >
> > You mean we sho
Hello Antony,
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 01:32:53PM +0400, Antony Pavlov wrote:
> It looks like my local repo is damaged ("git fsck" exits with a bus error
> message).
> I suppose that the problem is likely due to my laptop yesterday emergency
> power off.
> I have just re-cloned barebox.git from p
Move to the common streaming DMA ops in order to get rid of
the direct usage of the ARM MMU functions for the cache
maintenance.
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach
---
I don't know why I missed this one driver in the big conversion
series, but the randconfig builder just came around and reminded
to get m
35 matches
Mail list logo
