Government is the group of people that does things ...
Governments (note the plural) are a collection of entities made up of
people that do all sorts of things both good and bad. Attaching your
political agenda to Bitcoin with the hopes people will agree with it
after using Bitcoin is not a
phm got most of this, but...
On Sat, Sep 19, 2015 at 2:53 PM, phm via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> >
> > * Most governments can easily spend enough money to do a 51% attack,
> > especially if they can compel chip fabs to
It seems there should be a practical limit to the size of a re-org - I mean
a practical limit that is smaller than the current height. Vincent's
proposal suggests that a year's worth of blocks is such a practical limit.
I agree. There are probably lower limits that are practical too, but I
like a
Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Governments find it hard to ban things that are wildly popular with
> their voters. This is the Uber approach: grow fast, annoy governments,
> but be popular enough that banning you is politically risky.
Governments do not find it hard to ban things that threaten
>
> Your argument is that the state is not a threat to a system designed to
> deprive the state of seigniorage, because the state will see that system
> as too important?
>
And so we get to one of the hearts of the debate.
The axiom upon which you and NxtChg disagree is this: he/she believes
gove
>
> Let me get this straight. You start this whole debate with a "kick the can
> down the road" proposal to increase the block size to 20MB, which obviously
> would require another hard fork in the future, but if someone else proposes
> a similar "kicka the can" proposal you will outright reject it
An honest miner is a miner that supports the network by building on top of the
best valid chain. A malicious miner is one who wants to disrupt the Bitcoin
network, not support it, for example by executing a 51% attack which mines
empty blocks on top of the best chain.
/Rune
> Den 19/09/2015 k
On 19/09/15 10:45, Rune Kjær Svendsen wrote:
> We need to distinguish between two different things here:
>
> 1) A 51% attack, where the majority of mining power is *malicious* (hence
> “attack”)
What does "malicious" mean?
In other words, If miner A is mining honestly, and miner B is mining
mal
Let me get this straight. You start this whole debate with a "kick the can down the road" proposal to increase the block size to 20MB, which obviously would require another hard fork in the future, but if someone else proposes a similar "kicka the can" proposal you will outright reject it?
Now
We need to distinguish between two different things here:
1) A 51% attack, where the majority of mining power is *malicious* (hence
“attack”)
and
2) A fork that exists because of a disagreement in the network, with total
mining power split in two camps, each camp mining peacefully on their own
On 9/17/2015 8:27 PM, jl2012 via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> However, requiring 100 block maturity will unfortunately make the
> system much less appealing since the recipient may not like it.
The maturity requirement can be dropped if the expiration height is more
that 100 blocks after inclusion height.
>Your argument is that the state is not a threat to a system
>designed to deprive the state of seigniorage, because the state will see that
>system as too important?
Well, if you look at governments from the point of youtube illuminati videos,
then, yeah, I guess my position would seem a bit of
On 09/19/2015 12:57 AM, NxtChg wrote:>
>> Your vision of censorship resistance is to become such a strong
>> central authority that you can resist it in direct physical
>> confrontation. If you succeed at this, you are the threat.
>
> My vision is a strong _decentralized_ system, which is:
>
> a)
>Your vision of censorship resistance is to become such a strong
>central authority that you can resist it in direct physical confrontation.
>If you succeed at this, you are the threat.
My vision is a strong _decentralized_ system, which is:
a) too important to close,
b) able to provide a
On 09/19/2015 12:27 AM, NxtChg wrote:
>> This is extremely naive. At a minimum, getting popular/successful (and
>> regulated) is the formula for regulatory capture.
>
> Let me give you an example.
>
> Suppose you are a regular guy, say Peter Todd, and you are faced with 10
> policemen in anti-r
>The state is the threat in the Bitcoin threat model. You comments below
>acknowledge it. The assumption of hostile state actors is the only
>rational starting point. That which is regulated (and regulatable)
>in Bitcoin is the attack surface.
I think, you just proved my point. If your goal is t
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