Moral,
Mining the sync flag isn't compatible with the payout structure of non
hot-wallet pools like Eligius or decentralized pools like p2pool.
Those need the ability to split a reward among multiple parties.
Instead of giving an address to send the funds to, you could include
the hash of the
On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 9:58 PM, Martijn Meijering via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Is there a reason miners would be more likely to engage in selfish
> mining of sync flags than they are now with ordinary blocks?
>
This proposal has the same effect as adding
- Flags will be mined selfishly, and not published until the advantage
gained from withholding is less than the mining reward. This effect may
kill the decentralization features, since big miners will be the only ones
that can selfish-mine flags. Indeed, collusion would be encouraged...
Hi
> ==Generating the master mnemonic==
>
> The master mnemonic is first derived as a standard mnemonic as described
> in BIP39.
> ==From master mnemonic to derived mnemonics==
>
> From the master mnemonic a new string is created:
>
> string = MasterMnemonic + " " + Count + " " + Strength;
- Flags will be mined selfishly, and not published until the advantage
gained from withholding is less than the mining reward. This effect may
kill the decentralization features, since big miners will be the only ones
that can selfish-mine flags. Indeed, collusion would be
> #Basic idea:
>
> Ideally, all miners would begin hashing the next block at exactly the same
> time. Miners with a head start are more profitable, and the techniques that
> help miners receive and validate blocks quickly create centralization
> pressure.
>
> What if there was something that
I posted this to /r/bitcoin yesterday but it got minimal comments. One uses
suggested I try the mailing list so here it is:
The idea presented here could have the following benefits:
1. Improve mining decentralization
2. Reduce variance in mining profitability
3. Reduce or eliminate SPV mined
