Comment on #1. You're dropping the blocksize limit to 300KB and only
reaching the limit that we have in place today 7 years later? We're
already at capacity today, surely you're not serious with this proposal?
When you promised code for a hard forking block size increase in the HK
agreement I
I can’t recommend your first 2 proposals. But I only have the time to talk
about the first one for now.
There are 2 different views on this topic:
1. “The block size is too small and people can’t buy a coffee with an on-chain
transaction. Let’s just remove the limit”
2. “The block size is too
On Friday, January 27, 2017 3:04:50 AM Andrew Johnson wrote:
> Comment on #1. You're dropping the blocksize limit to 300KB and only
> reaching the limit that we have in place today 7 years later?
The limit only drops all the way to 300k if it activates before 2017 April.
Considering that this
I've put together three hardfork-related BIPs. This is parallel to the ongoing
research into the MMHF/SHF WIP BIP, which might still be best long-term.
1) The first is a block size limit protocol change. It also addresses three
criticisms of segwit: 1) segwit increases the block size limit
Excuse me, yes, for previously-signed transactions this is required. We might
consider some limits on UTXO-chain-from-before-the-fork-length and likely
something like move towards only allowing one transaction per block from the
old mode over time.
I highly disagree that compatibility with
Even more to the point, new post- fork coins are fork-specific. The
longer both forks persist, the more transactions become unavoidably
fork-specific through the mixing in of these coins. Any attempt to
maximize replay will become less effective with time.
The rationality of actors in this
> On 20 Jan 2017, at 22:02, Tom Zander via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
>
> The way to do this is that from a certain block-height the current
> transaction format labels bytes 2, 3 & 4 to be unused.
> From that same block height the interpretation of the first
On 26 January 2017 at 18:20, Johnson Lau via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
>You can’t anti-replay if you don’t even know a hardfork might happen. And I
>think your hypothesis (replay reduces the incentive of split) is not supported
>by the ETC/ETH split.
I agree
This is a pre-BIP which allows extra block space through a soft-fork. It is
completely transparent to existing wallets (both send and receive), but new
wallets taking advantage of the extra block space will have a very different
user experience.
I’m sure this is controversial but I think it’s
Hi all,
In the transaction today we have a version field which is always 4 bytes.
The rest of the integer encoding in a transaction is variable-size because
it saves on bytes.
Specifically, in practice this means that almost all of the transaction have
bytes 2, 3 & 4 set to zero[1].
The
> If there is a split, it becomes 2 incompatible ledgers.
Not necessarily. When the BIP50 hard fork happened, it didn't create
two incompatible ledgers. It *could* have, but it didn't. If every
single transaction mined during that time has been "double spent" on
the other chain, then it would
I don't think the solution should be to "fix the replay attack", but
rather to "force the replay effect". The fact that transactions can be
relayed should be seen as a good thing, and not something that should
be fixed, or even called an "attack".
The solution should be to create a "bridge" that
BIP50 was an accident, and my proposal is just for a planned hardfork. You
can’t anti-replay if you don’t even know a hardfork might happen. And I think
your hypothesis (replay reduces the incentive of split) is not supported by the
ETC/ETH split.
Aside the philosophical argument, your
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