Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fraud proofs for block size/weight

2017-03-24 Thread Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev
On Thursday, March 23, 2017 6:27:39 PM Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I think it would be clearer to put the "Creation of proofs" section > before "Proof verification", maybe even before "Proof format" if a > high level defintion of "full tx size proof" is provided before. Creation of proofs

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Defending against empty or near empty blocks from malicious miner takeover?

2017-03-24 Thread Emin Gün Sirer via bitcoin-dev
Because there's no consensus on the contents of the mempool, this approach is unsafe and will lead to forks. It also opens a new attack vector where people can time the flood of new transactions with the discovery of a block by a competitor, to orphan the block and to fork the chain. The technical

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Inquiry: Transaction Tiering

2017-03-24 Thread praxeology_guy via bitcoin-dev
Potentially miners could create their own private communication channel/listening port for submitting transactions that they would not relay to other miners/the public node relay network. Users could then chose who they want to relay to. Miners would be incentivized to not relay higher fee tran

[bitcoin-dev] Strong Anti-Replay via Coinbase Transactions

2017-03-24 Thread Cameron Garnham via bitcoin-dev
BIP: ??? Layer: Consensus (soft fork) Title: Strong Anti-Replay via Coinbase Transactions Author: Cameron Garnham Comments-Summary: No comments yet. Comments-URI: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/wiki/Comments:BIP-??? Status: Draft Type: Standards Track Created: 2017-03-25 Lice

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Defending against empty or near empty blocks from malicious miner takeover?

2017-03-24 Thread Aymeric Vitte via bitcoin-dev
Since I have been working on crypto currencies/bitcoin, I kept repeating: btc should make a priority to significantly increase the ridiculous number of full nodes we have today, design an incentive for people to run full nodes and design a system for people to setup full nodes in an acceptable time

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Defending against empty or near empty blocks from malicious miner takeover?

2017-03-24 Thread Aymeric Vitte via bitcoin-dev
Since I have been working on crypto currencies/bitcoin, I kept repeating: btc should make a priority to significantly increase the ridiculous number of full nodes we have today, design an incentive for people to run full nodes and design a system for people to setup full nodes in an acceptable time

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Defending against empty or near empty blocks from malicious miner takeover?

2017-03-24 Thread Hampus Sjöberg via bitcoin-dev
> For example would be something like this: > If block = (empty OR <%75 of mempool) THEN discard > This threshold just an example I don't think this is a good idea, mempool is different from node to node and is not a part of the consensus. Hampus 2017-03-24 18:29 GMT+01:00 Nick ODell via bitcoi

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Defending against empty or near empty blocks from malicious miner takeover?

2017-03-24 Thread Nick ODell via bitcoin-dev
Two concerns: 1) This makes block validity depend on things that aren't in the blockchain. If you and I have different minrelaytxfee's, we will have different mempool sizes. Your node will discard a block, but my node will think it is valid, and our nodes will not come to consensus. 2) This is tr

[bitcoin-dev] Defending against empty or near empty blocks from malicious miner takeover?

2017-03-24 Thread CANNON via bitcoin-dev
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 When the original white paper was written the idea was that nodes would be miners at same time. That the distribution of mining power being mostly on par with the distribution of nodes if I understand correctly. The problem we face now I fear, is the