> This sounds very dangerous. As Gregory Maxwell pointed out, the key
derivation
> function is weak enough that passphrases could be easily brute forced
So you are essentially imagining that a perpetrator will combine the
crypto-nerd fantasy (brute forcing the passphrase) *with* the 5-dollar
wrenc
Something similar to this has been proposed in this article by Ron Lavi,
Or Sattath, and Aviv Zohar, and discussed in this bitcoin-dev thread
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-September/015093.html
They only discussed changing the fee structure, not removing the block s
I don't get it. At the moment, the number of Bitcoin is fixed (at 21
million) by the geometric decay of the block reward.
Adding any other means of creating coins besides the existing block reward,
or altering the block reward schedule, is extremely likely to be seen as
messing with fixed supply.
Mark, this seems an awful lot like an answer of "no", to my question "Is
there a contingency plan in the case that the incumbent chain following the
Bitcoin Core consensus rules comes under 51% attack?" - is this a correct
interpretation?
In fact, beyond a no, it seems like a "no, and I disagree w
Is there a contingency plan in the case that the incumbent chain following
the Bitcoin Core consensus rules comes under 51% attack?
If the 2x fork really does have the support of >66% of miners (which
remains to be seen), it seems like they'd have spare capacity to perform
such an attack. In which
