Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

On Sat, May 13, 2017 at 01:11:27PM -0400, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On Sat, May 13, 2017 at 1:26 AM, Luke Dashjr wrote: > > Versionbits change/lose their meaning after the deployment timeout. For > > this reason, the timeout must be specified so the check is

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

Good morning Luke, Considering the proposal as a whole, I think, it's a little imperfect. The main problem, is that the end goal is activation, but what the opcode rewards is signalling. Consider a miner who signals only if the number of non-signalling blocks in this retargeting time > 5% of

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev writes: > On Sat, May 13, 2017 at 1:26 AM, Luke Dashjr wrote: > >> Versionbits change/lose their meaning after the deployment timeout. For >> this >> reason, the timeout must be specified so the check is

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

On Sat, May 13, 2017 at 1:26 AM, Luke Dashjr wrote: > Versionbits change/lose their meaning after the deployment timeout. For > this > reason, the timeout must be specified so the check is skipped when that > occurs. > To add a timeout a user can optionally bundle a pair of

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

On Saturday 13 May 2017 12:48:48 PM Peter Todd wrote: > > You assume users will pay for signalling of softforks prematurely. So > > long as it waits until deployment of the softfork is widespread, this > > risk is minimal. At worst, it creates risks similar to a UASF. So long > > as UASF is the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

On Sat, May 13, 2017 at 12:49:33AM +, Luke Dashjr wrote: > On Friday 12 May 2017 10:22:14 PM Peter Todd wrote: > > nVersion signaling is already technically unenforceable, in the sense that > > we don't have good ways of ensuring miners actually adopt the rules > > they're claiming to signal.

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 05/12/2017 10:45 PM, Luke Dashjr wrote: > On Saturday 13 May 2017 3:26:08 AM Eric Voskuil wrote: >> If people want to influence the decisions of miners, all they >> need to do is mine. > > Most people cannot mine except at a huge expense (profit

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 05/12/2017 08:54 PM, ZmnSCPxj wrote: > Good morning, > >> I do not see why any person would want to pay, and then trust, >> another to mine accordingly. Each person can mine and attain >> their level of influence. This not only avoids the side

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

Good morning, >I do not see why any person would want to pay, and then trust, another >to mine accordingly. Each person can mine and attain their level of >influence. This not only avoids the side payment, but earns the person >money. The problem, is that, the rate of conversion of Bitcoin->

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

On Saturday 13 May 2017 3:26:08 AM Eric Voskuil wrote: > If people want to influence the decisions of miners, all they need to > do is mine. Most people cannot mine except at a huge expense (profit is limited to few people via monopoly and electric costs). But more importantly, the profits from

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

On Saturday 13 May 2017 4:23:41 AM Russell O'Connor wrote: > I recall chatting about this idea recently and my conclusion was the same > as Peter Todd's conclusion: this will just encourage miners to false signal > readiness with undermines both BIP 9 and BIP 8. I already explained why this isn't

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

I recall chatting about this idea recently and my conclusion was the same as Peter Todd's conclusion: this will just encourage miners to false signal readiness with undermines both BIP 9 and BIP 8. I felt that rather than using script system for this construction, it would be better to use the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 If people want to influence the decisions of miners, all they need to do is mine. I do not see why any person would want to pay, and then trust, another to mine accordingly. Each person can mine and attain their level of influence. This not only

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

On Friday 12 May 2017 10:22:14 PM Peter Todd wrote: > nVersion signaling is already technically unenforceable, in the sense that > we don't have good ways of ensuring miners actually adopt the rules > they're claiming to signal. Equally, it's users who ultimately adopt > rules, not miners, and

[bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees

I've written a new BIP draft for OP_CHECKBLOCKVERSION to allow the community to put economic pressure on miners to deploy softforks without the extreme of a UASF. https://github.com/luke-jr/bips/blob/bip-cbv/bip-cbv.mediawiki Due to the potential for miners to maliciously block this