solve the problem, but I think in practice would do a good
job (most of the problematic descendants tends to be low feerate sweeps). It
would also preserve the ability for receivers to use CPFP if they wish.
-Ryan
> Original Message --------
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP p
Your BIP would take away the only way the *receiver* has to raise the
fee: CPFP. And the receiver is arguably the more important party in this
question. After all the sender has no real incentive for his payment to
be confirmed; it's receiver who has.
On 07/02/2017 10:35 PM, Rhavar via bitcoin-de
stable fee market. While creating extremely little to no disadvantages.
Unless someone can think of a legitimate use case that spending unconfirmed
bip125 transactions is useful?
-Ryan
> Original Message ----
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP proposal: No chaining off replaceable
es to what was required (and I
> successfully made transactions with). People (and especially services) being
> able to be able to dynamically increase their fees sanely when dealing with
> withdrawals (and especially batched ones) will go a long way to helping the
> overall ecosystem.
>
&g
ally services) being able to be able to
dynamically increase their fees sanely when dealing with withdrawals (and
especially batched ones) will go a long way to helping the overall ecosystem.
-Ryan
> ---- Original Message
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP proposal: No chaining
On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 9:01 PM, Rhavar wrote:
> That's not really realistic. In practice some receivers do big sweeps and
> include unconfirmed inputs. Replacing the transaction means you need to pay
> the cost of the sweep, which you probably don't want to do (can be in the
> order of $100s of do
This isn't BIP material, as it merely describes a local policy.
(BIP125 itself is also local policy, but one that involves standardisation
since it expresses how wallets interoperate with nodes with that policy.)
If you wish to suggest this policy change, you should just implement it and
open a
be in the order of
$100s of dollars).
> Beyond being paternalistic the issue I see with your proposal is thatits
> contrary to miner income
This applies to pretty much all non-standard transactions.
-Ryan
> Original Message ----
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP proposa
On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 8:35 PM, Rhavar via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> ==Abstract==
>
> BIP125 allows transactions to opt into replaceability with a primary use
> case
> of allowing users to increase the fees of unconfirming transactions, helping
> create
> a more efficient fee market place.
I don't rea
==Abstract==
BIP125 allows transactions to opt into replaceability with a primary use case
of allowing users to increase the fees of unconfirming transactions, helping
create
a more efficient fee market place.
However this goal is hindered when the receiver of a transaction spends from the
unconfi
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