Yes you practically can. No proxy can defeat the protocol investing less
money than buying storage space to store the blockchain.
Even with challenge-response delays of minutes. That's why it will be
fully controlled by a RSK smart-contract, with no user intervention.
I'm will post about this
Den 8 maj 2017 23:01 skrev "Sergio Demian Lerner via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
I'll soon present a solution to encourage full nodes to store the
blockchain based on Proof-of-Unique-Blockchain-Storage (PoUBS)
Proving that you're holding your own copy of the
A full node provides several services to the network:
1•Broadcasts blocks (public service)
2•Broadcasts transactions (public/private service)
3•Increases privacy by hiding other node’s IPs
4•Increases network security by protecting it from global DoS.
5•Provides information filtering services to
>
> This is actually LN’s killer use case - not buying coffees ;)
>
Yes, micro-payments for online network services is precisely what LN is
best at.
Establishing a channel with each peer is too expensive. But using LN to
micro-pay for high-quality peer services seems like it would aggregate
I agree with you here, Erik. Greg's standard answer doesn’t apply to your
suggestion.
I think he was a bit too trigger happy because we have seen a lot of similar
suggestions that have the Sybill issue he mentioned.
On Thursday, 4 May 2017 15:15:02 CEST Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >
- Full nodes already perform many valuable services, and simply allowing
people to pay for better service is something operators can do now - even
without it being baked into bitcoind. Paying for access to a higher-speed
relay network, for example, is something that many operators would do.
-
Yes, as a whole, but I am sorry, your "tip" proposal is very very very
bad as it is, think a little bit more about your latest answer and you
will understand why
I am a bit perplexed sometimes about what is proposed on this list
Adding services paid by the miners is not a bad idea, like some
Strange idea, incentiving people to run full nodes should certainly not
depend on miners, should certainly not involve another wasteful pow and
should certainly not encourage any collusion between participants like
miners are doing (ie full nodes pools for example or miners creating
full nodes
> Greg
> The primary result would be paying people to sybil attack the network.
I cannot imagine the benefit to replicating an ip address in this case,
except maybe you think that you would be more likely to be selected as a
peer? But there would be no actual advantage since download peers are
The ones that *could* pay non-mining full nodes are miners/pools, by
outsourcing transaction selection using a different PoW. By doing so
they could buy proof-of-uncensored-selection and proof-of-goodwill for a
small fee.
We would allow full nodes to generate and broadcast a template
block which:
I think paying for services is in general a great idea, but one that Bitcoin
can much better serve once Lightning is in production. Not only does it enable
cost-effective micro-transactions, it also should allow nodes to initiate
payments before they have a synced node (which is something
If we ever have a problem getting blocks, we could consider adding something to
pay to receive historical blocks but luckily that isn't a problem we have today
- the available connection slots and bandwidth on the network today appears to
be more than sufficient to saturate nearly any
I feel like this would be pointless as the vast majority of users would
likely download the blockchain from a node that was not enforcing a tip
requirement as it would seem like unnecessary cost as in protocols such as
BitTorrent there is no such tips in sharing files and the blockchain
IDEA:
- Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address. Users that need to download the
block chain from that node can be encouraged to send a tip to the peers
that served them (by % served). Recommended tip of 10mbit should be fine.
- A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the blockchain. If
14 matches
Mail list logo
