Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2021-10-03 Thread Dustin Dettmer via bitcoin-dev
Jim Posen, A few years ago you mentioned roastbeef’s proposal of a P2P message to retrieve all prev-outputs for a given block: 1) Introduce a new P2P message to retrieve all prev-outputs for a given > block (essentially the undo data in Core), and verify the scripts against > the block by executi

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-08 Thread Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
On Thu, 7 Feb 2019 at 12:19, Tamas Blummer via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I did restart the discussion which I read and participated in at its first > instance because implementing the current proposal taught me how problematic > as is until not committed and because I have not seen a sign to assume

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-07 Thread Tamas Blummer via bitcoin-dev
The attack was in your implication that I would assume ill intent of those contributed to the proposal. That is not my position. I explained why, I think, rolling out a commitment could face opposition. This foreseable opposition, that must not come from you makes me prefer a provable uncommitted

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-07 Thread Tamas Blummer via bitcoin-dev
I do not think this ad hominem attack of you on me was justified. I wrote code, gathered and shared data now and back in 2018. I showed understanding of non technical issues. Is there an actual action that defies my observation that a commitment is not yet in sight? Is there anything technically

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-07 Thread Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, Feb 6, 2019 at 8:10 AM Tamas Blummer wrote: > I am skeptical that commitment of any filter will come into Core soon. [...] > A committed filter makes light clients much more reliable and attractive, for > some taste too much more. You keep repeating this smear. Please stop. If you woul

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-06 Thread Tamas Blummer via bitcoin-dev
Hi Laolu, space savings come with the rather serious current disadvantage, that a light client is not in the position to check the filter. Also the advanced uses you mention are subject to this, for now. Building more on a shaky fundament does not make it look better. Now that we have seen ad

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-06 Thread Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev
Hi Tamas, > The only advantage I see in the current design choice is filter size, but > even that is less impressive in recent history and going forward, as address > re-use is much less frequent nowadays than it was Bitcoin’s early days. Gains aren't only had with address re-use, it's also the c

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-06 Thread Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev
Hi Matt, > In (the realistic) thread model where an attacker is trying to blind you > from some output, they can simply give you "undo data" where scriptPubKeys > are OP_TRUE instead of the real script and you'd be none the wiser. It depends on the input. If I'm trying to verify an input that's P

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-06 Thread Tamas Blummer via bitcoin-dev
Hi Laolu, The only advantage I see in the current design choice is filter size, but even that is less impressive in recent history and going forward, as address re-use is much less frequent nowadays than it was Bitcoin’s early days. I calculated total filter sizes since block 500,000: input sc

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-06 Thread Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
On 2/4/19 8:18 PM, Jim Posen via bitcoin-dev wrote: - snip - > 1) Introduce a new P2P message to retrieve all prev-outputs for a given > block (essentially the undo data in Core), and verify the scripts > against the block by executing them. While this permits some forms of > input script mallea

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-04 Thread Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev
Hi Tamas, This is how the filter worked before the switch over to optimize for a filter containing the minimal items needed for a regular wallet to function. When this was proposed, I had already implemented the entire proposal from wallet to full-node. At that point, we all more or less decided t

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-04 Thread Tamas Blummer via bitcoin-dev
I participated in that discussion in 2018, but have not had the insight gathered by now though writing both client and server implementation of BIP157/158 Pieter Wuille considered the design choice I am now suggesting here as alternative (a) in: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitc

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-04 Thread Jim Posen via bitcoin-dev
Please see the thread "BIP 158 Flexibility and Filter Size" from 2018 regarding the decision to remove outpoints from the filter [1]. Thanks for bringing this up though, because more discussion is needed on the client protocol given that clients cannot reliably determine the integrity of a block f

[bitcoin-dev] Interrogating a BIP157 server, BIP158 change proposal

2019-02-04 Thread Tamas Blummer via bitcoin-dev
TLDR: a change to BIP158 would allow decision on which filter chain is correct at lower bandwith use Assume there is a BIP157 client that learned a filter header chain earlier and is now offered an alternate reality by a newly connected BIP157 server. The client notices the alternate reality by