Re: [bitcoin-dev] Preventing/detecting pinning of jointly funded txs

2022-11-07 Thread Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
On Sun, Nov 06, 2022 at 06:22:08PM -0500, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Adding a few more thoughts here on what coinjoins/splicing/dual-funded > folks can do to solve this DoS issue in an opt-in RBF world only. > > I'm converging that deploying a distributed monitoring of the network > me

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Preventing/detecting pinning of jointly funded txs

2022-11-06 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi AJ, Adding a few more thoughts here on what coinjoins/splicing/dual-funded folks can do to solve this DoS isse in an opt-in RBF world only. I'm converging that deploying a distributed monitoring of the network mempools in the same fashion as zeroconf people is one solution, as you can detect a

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Preventing/detecting pinning of jointly funded txs

2022-11-02 Thread Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev
Assigning blame here seems to be the paramount concern here. If we can assign blame, most coinjoin-like protocols can terminate in bounded block time, assuming fees are properly set. It's also worth noting that in coinjoin cases, they're obviously coinjoins, so pinging explorers over Tor HS seems

[bitcoin-dev] Preventing/detecting pinning of jointly funded txs

2022-11-01 Thread Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 03:21:53AM +1000, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev wrote: > What should folks wanting to do coinjoins/dualfunding/dlcs/etc do to > solve that problem if they have only opt-in RBF available? ref: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-October/021124.html