"David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev"
writes:
> To avoid the excessive wasting of bandwidth. Bitcoin Core's defaults
> require each replacement pay a feerate of 10 nBTC/vbyte over an existing
> transaction or package, and the defaults also allow transactions or
> packages up to 100,000 vbytes in
On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 03:53:37PM -0700, Matt Corallo wrote:
> if you focus on sending the pinning transaction to miner nodes
> directly (which isn't trivial, but also not nearly as hard as it
> sounds), you could still pull off the attack.
If the problem is that miners might have information
Hi everyone,
Sorry to just be getting to a response here. Hadn't noticed it till now.
*(Plug: If anyone or their organizations would like to assist in funding
the work described below for a group of developers, I've been working to
put resources together for funding the above for a few months
On 4/22/20 7:27 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote:
>
>> Indeed, that is what I’m suggesting
>
> Gotcha, if this is indeed what you're suggesting (all HTLC spends are now
> 2-of-2 multi-sig), then I think the modifications to the state machine I
> sketched out in an earlier email are required. An
> Indeed, that is what I’m suggesting
Gotcha, if this is indeed what you're suggesting (all HTLC spends are now
2-of-2 multi-sig), then I think the modifications to the state machine I
sketched out in an earlier email are required. An exact construction which
achieves the requirements of "you
> This seems like a somewhat unnecessary drive-by insult of a project you
> don't contribute to, but feel free to start with a concrete suggestion
> here :).
This wasn't intended as an insult at all. I'm simply saying if there's
concern about worst case eviction/replacement, optimizations likely
Hmm, that's an interesting suggestion, it definitely raises the bar for attack
execution rather significantly. Because lightning (and other second-layer
systems) already relies heavily on uncensored access to blockchain data, its
reasonable to extend the "if you don't have enough blocks,
On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 03:03:29PM -0400, Antoine Riard wrote:
> > In that case, would it be worth re-implementing something like a BIP61
> reject message but with an extension that returns the txids of any
> conflicts?
>
> That's an interesting idea, but an attacker can create a local conflict
> In that case, would it be worth re-implementing something like a BIP61
reject message but with an extension that returns the txids of any
conflicts?
That's an interesting idea, but an attacker can create a local conflict in
your mempool
and then send the preimage tx to make hit recentRejects
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 10:43:14PM -0400, Matt Corallo via Lightning-dev wrote:
> A lightning counterparty (C, who received the HTLC from B, who
> received it from A) today could, if B broadcasts the commitment
> transaction, spend an HTLC using the preimage with a low-fee,
> RBF-disabled
On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 09:13:34PM -0700, Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 10:43:14PM -0400, Matt Corallo via Lightning-dev
> wrote:
> > While this is somewhat unintuitive, there are any number of good anti-DoS
> > reasons for this, eg:
>
> None of these really strikes me as
Hi Matt,
> While this is somewhat unintuitive, there are any number of good anti-DoS
> reasons for this, eg:
None of these really strikes me as "good" reasons for this limitation, which
is at the root of this issue, and will also plague any more complex Bitcoin
contracts which rely on nested
[Hi bitcoin-dev, in lightning-land we recently discovered some quite
frustrating issues which I thought may merit
broader discussion]
While reviewing the new anchor outputs spec [1] last week, I discovered it
introduced a rather nasty ability for a user
to use RBF Pinning to steal in-flight
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