Hi ZmnSCPxj
Well your deeclipser is already WIP ;)
See my AltNet+Watchdog proposals in Core:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18987/https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18988
It's almost covering what you mention, a driver framework to plug
alternative transports protocols : radio,
Good morning Antoine and Gleb,
One thing I have been idly thinking about would be to have a *separate*
software daemon that performs de-eclipsing for your Bitcoin fullnode.
For example, you could run this deeclipser on the same hardware as your Bitcoin
fullnode, and have the deeclipser bind to
Le 08/06/2020 à 06:56, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
> Running both Bitcoin and Lightning nodes on clearnet automatically links
> them, making them easier to attack, whereas running Lightning on Tor does not.
> Of course, they could still be linked by onchain transaction monitoring, but
>
Good morning Antoine,
> > Since the issue here is that eclipsing of Bitcoin nodes is risky, it
> > strikes me that a mitigation would be to run your Bitcoin fullnode on
> > clearnet while running your Lightning node over Tor
>
> We clearly mention that risk of running a Bitcoin node over Tor,
Hi ZmnSCPxj,
> (Of note as well, is that the onchain contract provided by such services
is the same in spirit as those instantiated in channels of the Lightning
Network, thus the same attack schema works on the onchain side.)
If you onchain contract uses a timelock and has concurrent
Hi,
As far as I understand your answer is "let's try to use what exists",
this is not what I am proposing and not the Tor network, no "standard"
exit nodes, different hidden services, decentralized anonymizer network
unlike the Tor network, nodes are anonymizing themselves
Comments below, please
Good morning Aymeric,
> The issue each time there are discussions/research linking to Tor is that it
> is biased since the beginning because based on a wrong postulate: using the
> Tor network
>
Well, in the interest of using the wrong tool for a highly important job, let
me present this
Le 04/06/2020 à 04:58, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
>> [Tor is tricky](https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.6079) too
> Since the issue here is that eclipsing of Bitcoin nodes is risky, it strikes
> me that a mitigation would be to run your Bitcoin fullnode on clearnet while
> running your
Good morning Gleb and Antoine,
This is good research, thank you for your work.
> **Targeting Per-Hop Packet Delay** is based on routing via the victim, and
> the victim should have at least two channels with the attacker.
The existence of offchain-to-onchain swap services means that the
Hi! I and Antoine Riard explored time-dilation attacks on Lightning.
We have a blogpost, which is probably too long to include in the email in full.
You can read it here: https://discrete-blog.github.io/time-dilation/
There’s also a paper we wrote: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.01418
We believe
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