On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:21 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Anyway, it's trivial to DoS the entire Bitcoin network today. It
> hasn't ever happened. Maybe one day it will, but the only rationale
> people can come up with for such an attack beyond random griefing is
Which happens and is a concern. Altco
> Because I can potentially waste bandwidth of all nodes forever (well as long
> as users are still scanning blocks with my transactions in them) with O(1)
> work.
And this gets you what?
Users who have active wallets will have their bandwidth wasted for as
long as you keep up the attack. Once y
On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:01 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> If you just want to waste bandwidth of nodes you can connect to nodes
> and repeatedly download blocks, or fill the network with fake nodes
> that spam random generated transactions to whoever connects. I don't
> see how to avoid that so it se
> Presumably these components will just get implemented a few times in
> some carefully constructed library code, so I don't see an
> implementation complexity argument here— except the fact that it isn't
> what Matt has implemented so far.
Well, yes, that is basically the implementation complexit
4 matches
Mail list logo
