I've heard about this idea from TierNolan. Here's some quick an dirty
analysis:
Suppose the last known block claimed a large tx fee of L. A miner who owns
1/N of the total hashrate needs to choose between two strategies:
1. Mine on top of that block and win usual reward R with probability 1/N.
2.
On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 1:40 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> Something you might want to try to formalize in your analysis is the
> proportion of the network which is "rational" vs
> "honest"/"altruistic". Intuitively, if there is a significant amount
> of honest hashrate which is refusing to aid the
On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Jorge Timón wrote:
> In any case, it is interesting to think about this things since mining
> subsidies will eventually disappear and then transaction fees will
> ALWAYS be higher than subsidies.
You can imagine that instead of subsidy Bitcoin came with a initial
s
On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 4:40 PM, Gregory Maxwell
> I should point you to some of the tools that have been discussed in
> the past which are potentially helpful here:
Ah, I should also mention a somewhat more far out approach which helps
here as a side effect:
If transactions were using the BLS sh
On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Sergio Lerner wrote:
> I would like to share with you a vulnerability in the Bitcoin protocol I've
> been thinking of which might have impact on the future of Bitcoin. Please
> criticize it!
> The Freeze on Transaction Problem
I should point you to some of the tool
I would like to share with you a vulnerability in the Bitcoin protocol
I've been thinking of which might have impact on the future of Bitcoin.
Please criticize it!
*The Freeze on Transaction Problem
*
The freeze problem occurs if someone publishes a transaction with fees
much higher than the bloc
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